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A Note 
to the Reader 
Because the three principal national leaders of the day did not hold the 
same title, I have referred to them (and the later Tokugawa shoguns) collec­
tively as hegemons throughout the book. As is customary, Japanese names 
are given in the Japanese order, with family name first and given name last. 
All years in the text have been converted to the modern calendar, but in 
quoted documents the original Japanese era name and year have been re­
tained. In all cases in which dates are more detailed, they are given either 
in the form "Genna 6.6.3," which refers to the third day of the sixth lunar 
month of the sixth year of the Genna era, or in the form " 1620.6.3," where 
the Western year replaces the era name and date. 
For convenience I summarize the relationships among the various Japa­
nese measures discussed below. Since weights and measures were not stan­
dardized during the period under discussion, it is impossible to provide pre­
cise modern equivalents. The figures given below are approximate. Some 
variants are noted in the text. Currency exchanges depended a great deal 
on the quality of the coins involved, and no modern approximations can 
be presented. 
Linear 
1 sun (a Japanese "inch") 
10 sun = 1 shaku 
6 shaku, 3 sun = 1 ken (about 2.2 yards; 
(a Japanese "foot") 1.8 meters) 
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sq. ken 
bu 
se 
tan 
koku 
to 
sho 
go 
shaku 
kyomasu 
Area 
= 1 bu (about 4 sq. yards; 
3.5 sq. meters) 
= 1 se 
= 1 tan 
—	 1 cbo (about 1 hectare 
or 2.5 acres) 
Volume 
= 5 English bushels; 180 liters 
= .1 koku 
= .01 koku 
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= 1.9 quarts; 1.8 liters 
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CENTRAL AUTHORITY AND 
LOCAL AUTONOMY IN THE 
FORMATION OF 
EARLY MODERN JAPAN 
Mine was the classic misadventure: I had wanted to master a source in 
order to confirm my youthful convictions, but it was finally the source 
that mastered me by imposing its own rhythms, its own chronology, 
and its own particular truth. My initial presuppositions had been 
stimulating, but they were now outmoded. 
—Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie 
We must train ourselves to see at once both the minutest of minor 
details and the most grandiose of grand designs. We must search, with 
magnifying lenses, deep in the fabric of the social intertexture for the 
winding paths taken by each and every filament; but also step back 
to appreciate the art and meaning of the overall pattern of the 
social tapestry. 
—Vivienne Shue 
Chapter \

Introduction

The century following the outbreak of the Onin Wars in 1467 saw Japan's political order disintegrate into shambles. Up to that time the Ashi­
kaga shoguns maintained a semblance of stability. The founder of the line, 
Ashikaga Takauji, had had the emperor appoint him Seiitaishogun, "Great 
Barbarian-subduing Generalissimo," in the early fourteenth century, and 
to the extent that he and his successors exercised national authority, it was 
largely through the military organization of their own house, the Bakufu 
(literally, "tent government," an allusion to the shogun's command tent), 
in combination with the leaders of several large private military organi­
zations. Like all shoguns, the Ashikaga derived legitimacy from imperial 
appointment. The emperor was the symbolic head of the political order. 
He exercised little real authority and typically bestowed the title of shogun 
when a military leader could demand it without fear of other generals seri­
ously challenging him. Although military prowess brought the Ashikaga 
to power, their political and administrative influence was limited outside 
the family's private lands. They established the seeds of a small national 
bureaucracy and limited national taxation, but much of the shogun's pre­
eminence was cultural. He depended greatly on the cooperation of the other 
military governors, who—at least collectively—were more powerful.1 
The outbreak of widespread warfare brought even that semblance of 
central control crashing down. The Ashikaga family continued to pass the 
title of shogun from generation to generation until 1573, but it was a largely 
empty honor. In an environment in which civil wars raged for a century, 
no one could ensure the passage of revenues from imperial lands to the 
throne, and consequently, the emperor's prestige and economic foundation 
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declined drastically as well. But though both offices were gutted of sub­
stance, the families that held them hung on; no one sought to usurp those 
positions or to replace them with new ones. The titles lay inert for some 
opportunist to resuscitate at a later date. 
Local as well as national leaders faced a formidable challenge just to 
survive. This was the age of samurai. Warlords great and small fought 
in bloody clashes to expand territorial control. Intrigue and deceit were 
rampant. Neither rank, status, marriage ties, adoption, nor hostages could 
provide guarantees of stability in an age when lese majeste, fratricide, and 
even patricide were well known. Lesser military figures, as well as promi­
nent members of the military aristocracy, plotted against their superiors, 
allies, and relatives. The treachery of the age is reflected in the nicknames 
historians use: the age when "the low toppled the high" (gekokujo) and 
the age of Warring States (Sengoku Jidai). 
The mid-sixteenth-century arrival of Europeans further complicated 
matters. The Europeans were potential allies and a source of revenues. 
Trade with the "redbeards" turned handsome profits, which could finance 
military ventures. Just as important, Europeans brought with them new 
weapons, hand-held firearms, the harquebuses. The Japanese soon made 
their own in quantity. Their widespread use disrupted the old forms of com­
bat and encouraged a new approach to military organization and tactics. 
Though not nearly so accurate as the bow, harquebuses could be used by 
quickly trainable recruits. Their use was not restricted to an elite of profes­
sionally trained soldiers. This encouraged the formation of mass armies, the 
construction of large, more defensible castles on plains, and the negotiation 
of large-scale alliances. Militarily and politically, European contacts were 
beneficial to those lords who chose to capitalize on them. Furthermore, the 
firearms they introduced created and expanded the role for commoners in 
the armies of Japan, permitting increased social mobility. 
If this was an age of considerable disorder, it was also an age of op­
portunity for many. Especially from the mid-sixteenth century, small men 
could carve a place in history for themselves. Takeda Shingen, the subject 
of Akira Kurosawa's epic film Kagemusha, was one of those who rose from 
humble beginnings to national prominence. So did the three men who came 
to lead the nationally hegemonic coalitions after 1570, Oda Nobunaga, 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa Ieyasu. 
Opportunities were not restricted to those who would be king. Turmoil 
marked every level of society and dissolved social ties, liberating new forces 
to transform the basic character of society. In the regions around modern 
Osaka, townsmen reacted to the decline of effective political control by 
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organizing themselves. They did so with such effectiveness that they were 
able to establish self-governing, autonomous city governments such as the 
Council of Elders (Ego Shu) in Sakai. In the regions surrounding major 
commercial centers, packhorse teamsters banded together to protect their 
interests and those of the communities from which they came. As with 
similar groups throughout the world, these bashaku ikki, with their inter­
regional connections to the towns and villages along commercial routes, 
served as catalysts for local and regional political movements. 
These developments in commercially mature areas of central Japan had 
rural counterparts elsewhere, and through them, local gentry wrested con­
trol of district affairs from the authorities in Kyoto.2 The creative energies 
of the day did not necessarily take a violent turn. Largely self-governing 
villages (so) became quite common. They developed their own mecha­
nisms for resolving disputes and distributing the rights to scarce commu­
nal resources (common lands), distinct from the desires of an immediate 
overlord. 
The competitiveness of the age fostered administrative creativity, too. 
To be sure, daimyo continued to rely heavily on marriage and kinship ties 
to supplement fief grants as a means of securing their retainers' loyalty.3 
But they also experimented quite freely, especially those whose territo­
ries had expanded beyond a size that permitted direct personal control. 
Domain laws were codified to legitimate daimyo rule.4 New tax systems 
were developed. Many daimyo made repeated efforts to update the tax rolls 
through land investigations (kenchi). Some daimyo successfully curtailed 
the number and power of landed retainers.5 
A daimyo's domain was a complex administrative unit. In one sense 
it was his personal possession, but he usually did not administer all of it 
directly. Some of the land was granted to retainers as fiefs. In the early 
sixteenth century these retainers had a very high degree of autonomy. For 
ordinary administrative purposes the daimyo was not allowed to enter a 
retainer's fief on his own. He did not administer justice there or have the 
right to inspect the land. He could (and often did) demand an accounting 
of its economic resources, but he could not, through his own agents, verify 
the accuracy of the reports he received. As mid-century passed, the larger 
daimyo began to break down this autonomy, gaining the right to enter fiefs 
for an increasing number of reasons and restricting the retainers' authority 
to administer their holdings. 
As domains grew in size, even the part that the daimyo administered 
directly often became so large that personal, resident oversight (such as 
that associated with local seigneurial lords in early modern France) became 
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impossible. One common alternative was to delegate tax assessment and 
collection to salaried underlings. Another was to make a contract with a 
village (so-called hyakusho uke), binding it as a corporate unit to deliver 
a set amount of produce and/or cash to the lord. Both profited from this 
arrangement. Villages (or at least their leaders) gained increased autonomy, 
and daimyo could extend their revenue base over areas in which they could 
not exercise direct day-to-day oversight. Nascent in the mid-sixteenth cen­
tury, these trends accelerated as Japan moved into the seventeenth. By the 
early modern era the most prominent domains were so large that they often 
encompassed several counties (kdri) or whole provinces and required the 
development of depersonalized, semibureaucratic controls. 
All these developments—larger domains, with larger armies, the grad­
ual consolidation of daimyo authority, and the reduced need for samurai 
resident in villages—created pressures on landed retainers and rural samu­
rai, especially the farmer-warrior who was not a professional soldier. As 
daimyo extended their own financial resources, they could afford to in­
crease the size of their salaried army rather than rely on fiefs to reward 
their followers. More and more these men were housed in the daimyo's 
main headquarters, his castle town. At the same time, the growth of profes­
sional armies reduced the need to rely on farmer-warriors. Rural warriors 
often found themselves faced with the choice of becoming either full-time, 
professional soldiers or full-time farmers. In some instances local residents 
made the decision for them, forcing them out of the village and into the 
daimyo's castles. On other occasions the daimyo made the decision. In 
these circumstances, landed retainers, who now accounted for a smaller 
proportion of the-daimyo's army, found it difficult to resist inroads on their 
traditional administrative prerogatives. 
Among the daimyo who cobbled together effective systems of domain 
control, three dominated the late-sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-century 
political scene: Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa 
leyasu. They are collectively referred to as the Three Unifiers or the Three 
Heroes. Technically, the designation "Three Unifiers" is not correct be­
cause Oda Nobunaga (1534—82) never held a unified military command 
over Japan. But he was clearly moving in that direction at the time of 
his death. 
Long viewed as a totally ruthless but highly effective military leader, 
Nobunaga began his career in Owari province. He succeeded in unifying 
half the province after his father's death in 1551, and in the next two de­
cades he conquered the rest of Owari and the large neighboring province 
of Mino, to become one of the most powerful lords in central Japan. From 
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that base, he assisted the last Ashikaga shogun to secure his position in 
1568. Within three years he destroyed utterly the large temple complex at 
Hieizan in Kyoto, which had served as the headquarters for armed Bud­
dhists who represented a major regional military force.6 With much of 
central Japan secured and confident of his own power, he forced the shogun 
to flee Kyoto in 1573, never to return. At the time of his assassination by a 
disgruntled retainer named Akechi Mitsuhide, Nobunaga controlled all of 
central Japan and was the most powerful daimyo in the land, a status well 
symbolized by the magnificent castle he built at Azuchi, not far from Kyoto. 
Among those who accompanied Oda Nobunaga on his ascent was the 
son of a farmer-warrior born in rural Owari, Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536— 
98)/ His status at birth was so low that he did not bear a surname. Hide­
yoshi only joined Nobunaga's band in 1558, but based on his battlefield 
successes, his lord granted him the large domains of the Asai family after 
its defeat in 1573. When Nobunaga was assassinated, Hideyoshi quickly 
avenged his fallen master and then set out to conquer all Japan. Hideyoshi 
was a superb general, but he also knew how to compromise. After Nobu­
naga's death, a good part of his success in creating a stable nationwide 
military organization can be traced to his willingness to bend and to be 
generous with former enemies. By 1590 he had defeated his last domestic 
opponents, the Gohojo. His military control was sufficiently strong that 
he organized two large invasions of the continent, in 1592 and 1596, the 
first time in a millennia that a Japanese army had sought territory on the 
mainland. 
At the time of Hideyoshi's death in 1598, his heir was a small child. 
Hideyoshi had provided for that eventuality by establishing a council of 
Five Elders to act as a collective regency after his death. But the Five Elders 
soon split into two factions, one led by Ishida Mitsunari, the other by 
Tokugawa Ieyasu. Matters came to a violent head on the battlefield at Seki­
gahara in Mino province in 1600. Ishida and his allies were vanquished, 
and the Tokugawa forces were now well on the way to establishing a new, 
peaceful political order. 
Like Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Tokugawa Ieyasu 
(1542.-1616) was born in central Japan.8 He was the eldest son of the lord 
of Okazaki castle in Mikawa province and claimed distant descent from 
the imperial family. Known as the Old Badger, he could be aggressive, 
wily, and patient. He expanded his own domains, sometimes in league with 
Nobunaga and Hideyoshi, sometimes separately or even in opposition to 
them. By 1590 he had made his peace with Hideyoshi and participated 
in the destruction of the Gohojo. When the conflict was over, Hideyoshi 
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offered Ieyasu the newly conquered lands. Acceptance meant giving up his 
home territories, but Ieyasu ultimately paid that price. In a small swampy 
village in eastern Japan, he built his new headquarters. Called Edo, it be­
came one of the largest cities in early modern Japan. Today it is known 
as Tokyo. 
Tokugawa Ieyasu's position was not entirely secure after his triumph 
over Ishida. Toyotomi Hideyoshi's son remained alive, nurtured on the 
glories of an earlier day at his father's castle in Osaka. For a decade and a 
half after Sekigahara, the Toyotomi enclave offered a potential competitor 
to the Tokugawa's domination of Japan. Matters were ultimately resolved 
on the field of battle. In 1614 and 1615, in two campaigns at Osaka, the 
Toyotomi forces and their allies were defeated. Except for an uprising at 
Shimabara in 1637, this was the last military threat to Tokugawa supremacy 
until the mid-nineteenth century. 
Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa Ieyasu controlled 
Japan more firmly than anyone had for centuries. Each man exploited old 
symbols to create an ideology to support the new order. The military chain 
of command was, of course, the first of these. Through it, daimyo were 
subject to traditional military service (gun'yaku), but that obligation be­
came more rigorously tied to the value of each daimyo's domain under the 
new order. 
Investiture remained one of the greatest tools hegemons had for reward­
ing or punishing daimyo. New, larger fiefs could be offered to those who 
were trusted; a reduction or outright confiscation was a clear possibility 
for unreliable lords. Transfers affected all classes of daimyo, regardless of 
whether they initially achieved daimyo status through their own efforts 
or as reward for their service to the hegemon. By 1600 the vast majority 
of all daimyo had faced the challenges of occupying a new territory. The 
Tokugawa continued this practice during the early seventeenth century! 
Transfers to new domains were so common that the lords of the day are 
sometimes referred to as "potted plant daimyo.'* 
Even when daimyo gained a largerfief, they lost some of their autonomy 
in the transfer. By moving daimyo away from their traditional bases of au­
thority, Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and the Tokugawa gained an 
increased measure of control over subordinate generals. Daimyo received 
their new lands as a gift from their overlord, not as something they earned 
by dint of their own conquests. This increased their sense of indebtedness 
and reinforced the bonds of obligation, if not principles of altruistic loyalty. 
More important, transfers created a new degree of dependence on the 
overlord by weakening the daimyo's basis for independent action. They cut 
 7 Introduction
the traditional ties between a general and his home base. These customary 
links had a dual significance. First, they had given the daimyo a sense that 
he had a right to control that territory based on his own ability to defend 
it. The rights to the territory were autonomously generated. By accepting a 
new appointment, the source of the rights o^possession shifted. They now 
came from the overlord's investiture, and (barring enemy conquest) their 
retention was in some measure dependent on his continued goodwill. 
Second, ties between a daimyo and the local leaders of his home ter­
ritory were strong enough to give him an autonomous base of financial 
and military support. When a daimyo moved into a new territory, he lost 
that base of support. Until pacified, the local population might even pose 
a serious threat to effective rule. (That rebellion was a real possibility is 
evidenced by uprisings in Higo in 1588 and in northern Japan in 1590.) In 
these circumstances, the daimyo was vulnerable in a way and to a degree 
that he had not been in his home province. If a difficult situation arose, he 
could not call on long-standing local allies to help. He was more depen­
dent on the assistance of his overlord to deal with local opposition than he' 
would have been in his home territory. 
As in Europe, marriage was used to strengthen alliances. But in Japan 
adoptions were a significant means of cementing these ties as well. A finely 
woven net of marriages, adoptions, and concubinage linked the hegemons 
to the most important daimyo, and the major daimyo to one another. With 
the passage of time this net expanded to cover more and more daimyo. In 
addition to arranging specific marriages for political purposes, the hege­
mons oversaw and regulated even the marriages and adoptions of nonrela­
tives. The use of family members as hostages, widespread but unstructured 
under Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and the first Tokugawa sho­
guns, was being employed systematically by the mid-seventeenth century. 
Each of the Great Heroes sought to restore the prestige of the imperial 
household and to use its aura to legitimate his own national preeminence. 
They made gifts to the emperor and encouraged their allies to do so as well. 
In this way, they transformed the fallen imperial lineage into a glittering 
symbol of a unified nation. All took court titles and engineered appoint­
ments to imperial offices for themselves. At a formal level they received 
their authority through these appointments. Part of this effort involved en­
hancing or fabricating genealogies to show ties to the imperial line. Yet 
each dealt with the emperor and imperial titles in a somewhat different 
way.9 In all of this, only Tokugawa Ieyasu revived the office of shogun 
(1603), and only the Tokugawa's house government came to be referred to 
as the Bakufu. 
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The hegemons also capitalized on newer tools to create an ideology in 
support of their rule. The practice of codifying house laws, begun by some 
of the larger daimyo in the sixteenth century, expanded, with both daimyo 
and shogun participating. Another concept that originated earlier, "public 
authority/* or kogiy was widely exploited by sixteenth-century daimyo and 
hegemons alike. Each claimed to represent public authority, that which 
was exercised for the good of the land rather than for selfish ends. 
A Bakufu legal code, the Laws of the Military Houses (Buke sho hatto), 
enumerated the major mechanisms of daimyo control. Issued in 1615 by 
Tokugawa Hidetada, Ieyasu's son and successor, the code provided a set of 
general moral guidelines and basic laws for daimyo and samurai. In addi­
tion to encouragements to study "the arts of peace and war," to be frugal, to 
comport themselves in accord with their status, to appoint capable officials 
and to avoid debauchery, daimyo were specifically enjoined from the kinds 
of activities that might challenge the Bakufu. That is, they were forbidden 
to marry, travel, or repair castles except as the shogun permitted. In addi­
tion, they were forbidden to hide fugitives. Each of these activities had the 
potential to provide a basis for anti-Bakufu alliances. If daimyo learned of 
any violations, they were to report them to the shogun.10 A revised version 
of the Laws, issued in 1635, systematized the Bakufu's previously informal 
system of hostages and combined it with a requirement that daimyo spend 
alternate periods (usually a year) in Edo. When they were away from Edo, 
important family members were left behind as security. The entire system, 
called sankin-kdtai, required daimyo to expend a great deal of their in­
come on travel and on maintaining two full households, one in the domain 
and one in Edo.11 
Daimyo, too, pursued strategies to make landed retainers more de­
pendent on them. Samurai were encouraged or ordered to live inside the 
daimyo's castle towns. Their judicial and administrative authority within 
their fiefs was increasingly restricted. Daimyo insisted on entering the fiefs 
to inspect them, limited the holders' access to natural resources and cor­
vee labor, closely regulated the taxes retainers could assess, and sometimes 
simply rendered the fiefs a fiction by taking over all administrative respon­
sibility. Many took the ultimate step of abolishing fiefs altogether. By the 
middle of the seventeenth century samurai generally were confined to castle 
towns and thoroughly dependent on the daimyo for their incomes. 
Legal barriers between social classes grew. Class structures hardened, 
and the opportunities for crossing class lines declined. Townsmen gener­
ally could not own farmland, and the villagers' ability to move to other 
communities was restricted. Efforts were made to disarm the commoner 
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population, most notably in Toyotomi Hideyoshi's 1588 Sword Collection 
Edict, ordering the confiscation of commoners' swords. Not only did this 
so-called sword hunt aim to ensure a compliant population; it also differ­
entiated the samurai from the rest of society. Henceforth, samurai were 
to be professional warriors first and foremost. Only they were allowed to 
wear two swords and hold domain offices. 
The systems of assessing land value (for the dual purpose of assessing 
taxes and allocating domains and fiefs) were transformed widely. Land 
came to be valued commonly in units of putative rice yield (the kokuy 
roughly 4.96 English bushels)—the amount of grain land would suppos­
edly have produced had it been planted to rice. Rice was the most valuable 
of the common grain crops, and in an age when the bulk of villagers' taxes 
was collected in kind—and largely rice—this made considerable sense. 
Side by side with this transformation came a widespread reinvestiga­
tion of the area and value of village lands. Since many historians associate 
several historically important developments with land surveys, it is useful 
to look briefly at the procedures, at least as they are commonly understood. 
Surveyors purportedly measured each individual field and assessed its 
quality. The land was generally divided into three quality grades for paddy 
and four for dry fields; superior, average, and inferior paddy; superior, 
average, inferior, and low-grade inferior dry field. Based on the quality of 
the land, each grade was assigned a yield expressed as an amount of rice per 
tan (about one-tenth hectare) and measured in koku. Superior dry field was 
considered the equivalent of average paddy, and each grade of land was 
rated two-tenths of a koku higher or lower than the next grade of land.12 
Though the assessed value of the grades varied from region to region, the 
principle of a two-tenths difference for each grade was standard. 
As surveyors worked, each field's size and grade were recorded in a 
land register, along with the name of a villager, in most cases presumed 
to be the cultivator. The sum of these values and listings was the assessed 
value for the village and used as one basis for land taxation. 
This period also saw the widespread conversion from the Sengoku era's 
(ca. 1480—1580) complex and often apparently arbitrary land tax system 
to a new system based on sampling yearly harvests. The new system, called 
the kemi or annual inspection system, is usually credited with helping to 
increase domain revenues. 
All of this institutional development took place in the context of a 
national polity that reflected a balance of power among daimyo and hege­
mons. No national bureaucracy arose. No system of regular, nationwide 
taxation developed. Yet none of this stood in the way of stability. Hege­
IO
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mons possessed sufficient influence to manipulate the daimyo and main­
tain peace. 
In addition to the efforts of the ruling class to alter Japan's governing 
institutions and society, peace itself had an important transforming effect. 
The economy grew rapidly once civil war ended. That alone created eco­
nomic incentives for commoner and domain lord to make investments to 
increase their income. Daimyo and village alike extended irrigation sys­
tems and improved maintenance. They built water control projects. Trans­
port routes were more secure, encouraging the flow of goods. Within the 
villages, the removal of warriors created new, more simple landholding 
arrangements. The new conditions of tenure stimulated increased agricul­
tural production and, ultimately, the development of commercial rather 
than predominantly subsistence agriculture.13 It was in this dynamic en­
vironment that domains became the building blocks of the early modern 
Japanese political order. 
The Issues 
The turmoil of the late sixteenth century and the birth of early modern 
Japan have transfixed a large number of scholars for the past half century, 
and particularly since the end of the Second World War. The developments 
of the period have provided the grist for some of the most interesting de­
bates among Japanese historians and have stimulated an enormous volume 
of literature. All of these scholars stress the era's pivotal historical signifi­
cance. Araki Moriaki speaks of a "feudal revolution" that led to the rise of 
serfdom in Japan.14 The members of the Koza ha group of prewar historians 
spoke of the establishment of "pure feudalism" during the period.15 Fujita 
Goro discovered a "feudal reaction" (hoken hando)—a hardening of rents 
in kind (seisanbutsu chidai e no kotei) and the establishment of a feudal 
society based on a dependent peasantry (reinoseiteki hoken shakai).16 The 
concept of a "feudal regeneration" (hoken saihensei), first employed by 
Hayakawa Jiro in the late 1930's, has continued to animate prominent post­
war scholars such as Nakamura Kichiji, Kitajima Masamoto, and Wakita 
Osamu.17 
Other historians view the period as giving birth to absolutism (zettai 
shugi) in Japan. During the 1960's proponents of the so-called Bakufu-
Domain State theory (Bakuhan Kokka Ron) stressed the interconnected-
ness of major developments on the national level—for example, the inter­
action of the system for assessing daimyo military obligations to hegemons 
(gun'yaku), the establishment of land values based on putative rice yields 
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{kokudakasei), and the invasions of Korea in the 1590's—in reinforcing 
and building a nationwide state authority. 
Emphasis on conscious state-building has since led to the investigation 
of the late medieval concept of public authority (kogi) as a foundation for 
the early modern state's legitimacy/ Prominent as a means of reinforcing 
the preeminence of the daimyo in the middle to late sixteenth century, kogi 
was transformed by Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa leyasu into a 
device to reinforce their national hegemonies/ In the West, John Whitney 
Hall writes of a "sixteenth-century revolution"; and Mary Elizabeth Berry 
sees the development of a new form of government for Japan, a federa­
tion.18 Still other historians, in Japan as well as in the West, have seen in this 
era the development of unique feudal arrangements with a remarkably 
strong center, a "centralized" form of feudalism. 
These schools of thought vary in the degree to which they see the tran­
sition to the early modern era as revolutionary, progressive, or reactionary, 
but their adherents all see the creation of a strong central authority as the 
hallmark of the era. They commonly describe the new polity as a "unifi­
cation administration" {toitsu seiken) or "unification power" {toitsu ken­
ryoku) to signify the political reunification of Japan after a century of civil 
wars. This reconstituted central authority is widely viewed as the source of 
the political, social, and economic transformations outlined above. 
Before discussing the specific developments thought to have increased 
state authority, we should note that at one level nearly all historians ac­
knowledge a substantial degree of autonomy for the daimyo: when the 
system is described in the abstract. A common descriptive term for the 
political system, bakuhan taisei, distinctly refers to the political structure 
(taisei) of the Bakufu and the ban (domains) of the daimyo. It suggests 
'Japanese scholars commonly do not define "state." For the purposes of this study, I 
accept a very broad definition: "The state is a geographically delimited segment of human 
society united by common obedience to a single sovereign" (Watkins, "State," p. 150). But 
readers should be aware that, by some social scientists' definitions, early modern Japan may 
not have been a state. Some would rule out forms of political organization like "feudal" 
linkages as real states and contrast them with states as a "modern" form of political organi­
zation. Others rule out democracies as states or characterize them as lacking a high degree of 
stateness. In addition to Watkins, see the related articles in the same source by Crick, Fried, 
Southall, and Sternberger. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," is a standard starting 
point for more recent studies. See also Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In." 
t Somewhat paradoxically, these developments came at the same time that a number of 
medieval scholars challenged the assumptions of Kinsei (early modern) specialists that certain 
institutions and policies were typical or definitive of Kinsei'Japan. The origins of some devel­
opments (e.g., land surveys, the collection of samurai in castle towns, and the separation of 
major social classes) have been pushed back in time. The retort of Kinsei historians is that the 
resemblances between Kinsei and earlier patterns is superficial, and that the Kinsei versions 
are qualitatively different. See Kobayashi, "Sengoku soran," pp. 343-51. 
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that nearly equal prominence be accorded domain administrations and the 
Bakufu, with both formulating policies in complementary if not coopera­
tive fashion. 
A few scholars go even further and suggest greater local autonomy. The 
legal historian Ishii Ryosuke argues that the early modern political sys­
tem might better be referred to as the ban-son or domain-village system.19 
George Sansom notes that the daimyo were obligated, under the 1635 provi­
sions of the Laws of the Military Houses, to enforce the shogunal will: "In 
all matters the laws of Yedo must be observed and applied at all places in 
all provinces."20 Nonetheless, he is cautious in evaluating the law's impact 
and concludes that it was unenforced, leaving daimyo to administer their 
domains autonomously. The political scientist James White, examining the 
state's monopolizing of the legitimate use of force, sees state capability as 
relatively weak until the Bakufu began actively intervening in the domains 
after the mid-Tokugawa period.21 
Comparative history provides a second perspective that also tends to 
devalue the strength of the early modern Japanese state. For many Japanese 
historians, European nations have been the measuring stick by which to 
judge state growth in their country.22 In the West the comparative approach 
has led to a shift in the terms of debate in recent years—from the discus­
sion of early modern Japan as a "feudal" society to an assessment of its 
status as an absolutist state. The comparison was implicit in much earlier 
writing, as indicated by descriptive terms that sought to account for the 
apparently greater strength of the Tokugawa order (e.g., "centralized feu­
dalism"). Berry made the comparison explicit. Employing an institutional 
and policy checklist of attributes of absolutist states, she judges the early 
modern Japanese state to have been weaker than its contemporary Euro­
pean counterparts because it lacked state mercantilism, a national public 
treasury and system of taxation, a national bureaucracy, and the like.23 
Responding to Berry, White notes that these comparisons idealize state 
growth in Europe, assuming that there was only a single model of absolut­
ism—that based on the history of the strongest states.24 Because historians 
applied an inappropriately strict definition of absolutism, they mistakenly 
concluded that the early modern Japanese state fell short of European 
monarchies. In fact, White argues, a state need not be very strong to be 
comparable to many absolutist monarchies, which were often quite decen­
tralized—an argument that again suggests the early modern Japanese state 
was weak. 
Such cautious depictions of state authority fade to the background, 
however, when scholars consider the most dynamic era of state-building in 
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Japan, the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Sansom and White 
view Toyotomi Hideyoshi's nationwide land survey (the late-sixteenth­
century Tailed kenchi) and related measures as nationally effective central 
initiatives.25 Berry, Hall, and Araki all support the Japanese historians' tra­
ditional evaluation of Hideyoshi's land surveys: central government ordi­
nances were enforceable, were implemented in fact, and were the source 
of, or greatly furthered, the generally acknowledged wide-ranging reforms 
in rural administration, land tenure and taxation, and class separation/ 
Although Ishii Ryosuke seems to stress the importance of the villages, he 
devotes only a few paragraphs of his institutional history to them. His 
concern is with the Taiko kenchi, Hideyoshi's sword collection edict (the 
katanagari or "sword hunts"), and the legal separation of social classes— 
in short, with the power of the emergent central government.26 
This argument for effective central reform extends into the age of the 
Tokugawa shoguns (ca. 1600-1868). Scholars describe a central authority 
great enough to meddle in domain administration. Hall and Ishii, for ex­
ample, see the Tokugawa shoguns' use of azukeru, "to hold in trust," as a 
conditional grant of authority to daimyo; continued rule of a domain de­
pended on a daimyo's ability to administer it in line with Bakufu decrees. 
They contrast the term's implications with earlier vocabulary indicating 
the daimyo's unconditional proprietary, administrative, and judicial au­
thority over domain lands.27 Under the Tokugawa (as under Nobunaga and 
Hideyoshi), domains were subject to escheat and transfer. Shoguns com­
manded the means to force their standards on daimyo. While admitting 
that the exact conditions of investiture were vague, scholars who take this 
position argue, as does Hall, that "daimyo were accountable to the over­
lord's laws, to the expectation of.. . good administration."28 Even in Ishii's 
*Asao Naohiro, "Sixteenth-century Unification," p. 78, notes that the power structure 
was formed top down, not based on a consensus of daimyo, developing kogi into an absolute 
legal norm beyond proprietary land rights. Wakita, "Social and Economic Consequences of 
Unification," pp. 103,121,123, stresses the role of central initiative. Hall notes, "Not since the 
eighth century adoption of the Chinese institutions of imperial government had Japan been 
ruled under as comprehensive a system of laws and administrative procedures, and historians 
have been quick to expand on its significance" ("Introduction," pp. 12-13). See also Susser, 
"Toyotomi Regime," pp. 150-51, who contends that "the establishment of kinsei-type daimyo 
domains was predicated on the existence of an effective central authority with the right to 
issue orders to implement policies and the power to compel the daimyo's compliance." The 
presupposition of effective nationwide central authority, by no means tenable in many mod­
ern states, is particularly suspect in the case of societies lacking the mass-mobilizing power 
of modern communications—air and rail transportation, telephones, telegraphs, national 
news media, and the like. See Migdal, Strong Societies; White, "State Growth"; Berry, Hide­
yoshi, p. 118; Araki Moriaki, Taiko kenchi to kokudaka sei, pp. 149-52; Hall, "Hideyoshi's 
Domestic Policies," p. 213; and Hall, "Japan's Sixteenth-Century Revolution," p. 16. 
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relatively circumspect evaluation, the dominant image is of domains strung 
passively together like beads on the Bakufu's string.29 The legal historian 
Mizubayashi Takashi, in a work specifically designed to incorporate the 
most recent scholarship on the era, goes even further. In his view article 
13 of the Laws of the Military Houses defined daimyo as members of a 
bureaucratic hierarchy, not part of a master-retainer relationship.* 
Literature on the formation of the early modern political system is 
heavily laced with the supposition of prodigious state authority. It widely 
presumes that there were no constitutional limits on the overlord's power 
to promulgate and enforce edicts. At the very least, such limitations have 
not been the subject of investigation or active debate. 
The Grounds for the National Argument 
Centrally issued policies are seen as crucial in four domestic areas.* 
They are thought to have legally separated Japanese society into four major 
classes: samurai, peasants, artisans, and merchants.* They created a new, 
uniform system of land taxation based on the annual inspection of crop 
yields and land valuation based on putative rice yields (kokudaka) and 
accurate land surveys. In the process, this new system of taxation gave 
cultivators secure tenure over the land they farmed. Finally, the central ad­
ministration reformed local administration, placing the village unit at its 
heart. Let us look more closely at the grounds for this argument. 
Hideyoshi's land surveys. Perhaps no single policy of the late sixteenth 
and early seventeenth centuries better illustrates the emphasis on the reach 
of the state into the domestic affairs of each domain than the Taiko kenchi, 
the land surveys of Toyotomi Hideyoshi. Many survey edicts and registers 
have survived. Scholars, analyzing them, see broader social, economic, and 
political implications in these surveys than in any other single policy in­
strument of the time—more than the separation of warrior and commoner, 
*Mizubayashi, Hokensei, p. 164. Kasaya, "Nihon Kinsei shakai," appears to be a lonely 
voice arguing that substantial elements of local autonomy were maintained despite the higher 
authorities' best efforts to exert their control. 
t My analysis here is limited to domestic policies of hegemons and their impact on the 
domains; however, a similar assumption of substantial state capabilities underlies much of 
the discussion of Japanese foreign relations during this era. Those who stress the imposition 
of a national seclusion policy (sakoku) on Japan assumed that it was enforced from the cen­
ter. Ronald P. Toby paints a much more nuanced picture in State and Diplomacy. Domain 
influence and initiative are particularly evident in Satsuma's dealings with the Ryuku Islands 
and Tsushima's trade with Korea. Without their independent actions, the ties to the continent 
that the Bakufu exploited might not have been created at all. 
* Three smaller classes also existed: the court nobility, the priesthood, and outcastes. 
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the urbanization of the samurai, the sword collection efforts, the creation 
of villages as formal, local administrative units, or the foundation of a new 
system of land taxation and daimyo/retainer control (the kokudaka sys­
tem), to name only the most significant. Indeed, the land surveys are seen 
as performing an important role in advancing each of these developments. 
Hideyoshi's land surveys are typically thought to have had five basic 
social and administrative consequences, namely, they provided land values 
on which to base fief allocation, extraordinary dues, and privileges for 
daimyo and landed retainers, finely adjusted to the social and political 
importance of the holder within the national or domain hierarchy; they 
installed a nationwide land tax system that greatly improved the ruler's 
knowledge of his land tax base and increased his revenues; they trans­
formed the village into the basic formal unit of local administration, taxed 
as a collective unit by domain lords (there were no national taxes on vil­
lagers and townsmen; villagers divided the burden among themselves), 
with defined boundaries that clarified who shared responsibility for pay­
ing the community's taxes; they defined the status of villager {hyakusho), 
who now had official land ownership rights as well as obligations to cul­
tivate the land and pay taxes; and they helped to separate the samurai and 
townsmen from commoners—those listed in survey rosters were not to be 
treated as warriors, and those not on the survey registers were ineligible to 
purchase rights to cultivate or manage arable land. 
This view rests in large part on four important claims (for some authors, 
assumptions) about the distinctiveness of Hideyoshi's land survey process: 
1. Unlike pre-Taiko kenchi surveys, which were simply estimates 
{sashidashi) presented to the daimyo by villages and retainers and were 
made according to diverse private standards, Hideyoshi's surveys were 
qualitatively different, based on actual measurements employing precise, 
nationally uniform methods and standards. In George Sansom's typical 
description (italics mine): 
[Hideyoshi] decided on a land survey in every province, to be carried out under the 
supervision of his own officials.. .  . This [survey] was to impose a unified system 
of land tenure and land tax throughout the country and Hideyoshi's officials pro­
ceeded to put such a system into operation.... He brought the agriculture of the 
whole country under his control.30 
Or as Hall puts it, "By adopting a new unit of area measurement which 
differed from the one in use from Nara days, [Hideyoshi] literally forced 
the entire nation to reassess its land base."31 Japanese historians like Kanai 
Madoka also stress the comprehensiveness of Hideyoshi's land surveys.32 
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Across widely different schools of historians, the national character of the 
Taiko kenchi and its instigation at the behest of Toyotomi Hideyoshi are 
taken as undisputed historical fact.33 
All basic survey procedures are assumed to have been standardized. 
Scholars disagree on when the process was complete, but the consensus is 
that a national system was in place by the mid-1590's. The length of the 
measuring rod for land surveys was set at six shaku, three sun (a little more 
than two yards). This formed the basic unit of length, the ken, on which 
area calculations were made. One square ken was a bu\ 300 bu equaled 
a tan. The standard for volume measurement became the kyomasu (about 
1.9 U.S. quarts). These units of measurement became standard for offi­
cial purposes, but, according to Kodama Kota, were not necessarily those 
used by the populace. Though deviations from the national standard are 
occasionally noted, they are treated as insignificant exceptions.34 
2. Since surveys were precise, actual measures, they were suitable for 
determining who held rights to property. The cultivator's tie to the land 
was based on his listing in the survey register. Because many survey docu­
ments list a name by each field's dimensions, historians commonly agree 
that the survey conveyed some legal right to the land to that person.* Again, 
Sansom's explanation is representative: 
The main purpose of Hideyoshi's land policy was achieved once he established the 
principle that the actual cultivator and no other was responsible for the tax on the 
yield of a specified area of land registered in his name. By this measure alone he 
. . . created a new peasant class with uniform rights and duties which they could 
not escape, and diminished, if he did not destroy, the independence of the rural 
gentry.35 
The exact nature of these rights is subject to dispute. Some scholars, 
including Araki Moriaki and Sasaki Junnosuke, have argued that these 
rights liberated hereditary servants and others from the confines of large 
patrilineal extended families, which (they say) dominated rural society up 
to that time.36 They view this new autonomy as a direct result of Hide­
yoshi's desire to establish small independent nuclear family households as 
*See, for example, Hall, "Japan's Sixteenth-Century Revolution," pp. 16-18. There are 
probably no more important documents for assessing landholding rights and obligations than 
survey registers. The only other major sources are the laws against the sale of land in the 17th 
century. In Western societies land surveys are associated almost exclusively with determining 
landholding rights, so we readily accept claims fqr the utility of survey registers {kenchicho) in 
analyzing social class structure within a village, patterns of landholding, and so forth. How­
ever, as explained below and in Brown, "Mismeasure of Land," there is substantial reason 
for a more critical assessment of Japan's early modern surveys. 
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the base of both agriculture and the land tax system: the surveys enforced 
a redistribution of land and bound cultivators to the land like serfs. 
Other scholars do not subscribe to the redistribution view but do insist 
that the surveys conveyed the legal status of peasant to those listed in the 
registers. Wakita Osamu argues that land, through registration, became a 
form of private property. Kozo Yamamura, too, sees the surveys as making 
those listed into landowners, although they did not thereby become eco­
nomically independent of extended family lineages.37 In his view this set 
the stage for the long-term diversification and commercialization of rural 
economic activity.* 
Thus, although there is substantial debate over the nature of the rights 
conveyed, there is general agreement that the peasants' legal status was 
established and protected by Hideyoshi. This extension of central authority 
into the day-to-day affairs of villagers stood in marked contrast to the 
practices of the Sengoku daimyo and the Ashikaga shogunate. 
Recording names in the survey registers drew a clear class boundary. 
As it defined peasant status it simultaneously excluded the listed families 
from the samurai class. Conversely, samurai and townsmen were legally 
excluded from peasant status because they were not listed. They could not 
possess rights to the use of land. Previously, ties between lord and peasant 
were personal. The new arrangement broke these personal bonds, yet still 
tied agriculturists to a particular village. In legal principle, they were not 
free to migrate. 
Marius Jansen presents a more modest interpretation, seeing surveys 
as accelerating the hardening of status lines but not completely effecting 
the separation of the classes.38 As already noted, other ordinances are seen 
as contributing to this process, but survey registers constitute some of the 
earliest and most widespread evidence that the lines of class demarcation 
were drawn in practice. 
3. The kokudaka system of taxing and valuing land in rice was com­
prehensive, measuring all the land the authorities set out to evaluate. No 
*The current stress on the development of something akin to private landownership owes 
much to debates sparked by Araki Moriaki. In his 1959 work, Bakuhan taisei shakai (see espe­
cially pp. 57—63), Araki advanced the radical contention that Toyotomi Hideyoshi's extensive 
land surveys took land away from a class of small overlords {sakuai hitei) and established a 
direct link between the domain lord and the individual peasant cultivator and between the 
cultivator and the land he farmed. By virtue of listing a farmer's name next to a specified plot, 
the land became his. 
Though many take exception to Araki's emphasis on the "revolutionary" impact of Hide­
yoshi's land surveys, scholars representing a broad spectrum of historical specialties and 
schools of thought accept the notion that the surveys granted villagers land rights akin to 
modern private ownership. The noted legal historian Ishii Shiro argues that Hideyoshi's sur­
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doubt some hidden fields (onden) escaped the tax net, but that was too 
small a problem to have detracted from the overall success of the enter­
prise. Up to now certain proprietors within a domain had been protected 
from interference in their lands by the daimyo. Hideyoshi's surveys ended 
these rights (called funyuken). Landed retainer, temple, and shrine alike 
were surveyed without exception. Furthermore, where under earlier ar­
rangements the land tax was not always levied on dry fields, only rice 
paddy land—including residential land as well as dry fields—had to be 
registered.39 
4. As real, comprehensive measures, surveys formed a rational means 
of increasing the effectiveness of land taxation. Most scholars contend that 
the kokudaka system substantially increased the peasants' tax burden, con­
suming about two-thirds of their harvest.40 In addition, with the taka, or 
assessed value of land, now based on its putative rice yield, taxes were col­
lected exclusively in rice, rather than cash or other crops.41 In the view of 
most scholars, this switch forced an increase in rice production in order to 
pay taxes. Unlike the previous (kandaka) tax system, which measured land 
value by the ideal amount of taxes the land produced, the new system used 
the putative yield of agricultural land to express its assessed value.* The 
veys were not detailed enough to provide a basis for "title" to the land but believes that with 
the passage of time and the development of greater accuracy in procedures, the surveys did 
provide a basis for defining a peasant's claim to a piece of land. In addition to Ishii, Nihon 
kokusei shiy pp. 150-202, see Yamamura, "Pre-Industrial Landholding Patterns." Both schol­
ars are highly critical of the Marxist-influenced mainstream of Japanese scholarship. There 
were limits to peasants' tenurial security, but in general these were the limits of modern prop­
erty ownership. Sale of the land could be forced if the peasant defaulted on a mortgage or 
failed to pay his taxes. In this interpretation the peasant/farmer could not be told to farm 
different fields each year. 
Provocative as this entire body of work is, it has not taken into consideration the warichi 
system of redistributing arable lands (see Chap. 4 for a fuller discussion). The terms of the 
debate over the Araki thesis by definition precluded consideration of a category of land 
"ownership" that, if discussed at all, is deemed exceptional (see, for example, Furushima, 
Nihon hoken nogyoshi, pp. 130-33). Araki has since published his own thoughts on the 
warichi system in a 1983 article, "Ryukyu ni okeru chiwari seido." 
'Theoretical income should be emphasized. Some deductions were made from the taka 
for irrigation expenses, shrine festival expenses, etc. (see Nagahara, with Yamamura, "Sen­
goku Daimyo," pp. 44-46). What has been described here is the standard model for the 
operation of the kokudaka system. Other models were to be found; msmy were variants of this 
basic system. The most distinctive was the tantori method, which set rates at a flat amount 
per tan of land based on the grade of land. The tax rate might have been changed occasionally 
but generally remained constant. In case of a severe crop failure, the loss was calculated by 
converting the shortfall to an amount of land lost from production. This amount was then 
subtracted from the total area of the village. If-yields were 20% below normal, for example, 
20% of the area of the village would be subtracted from its normally cultivated area. The tax 
rate remained constant. For standard descriptions of various tax mechanisms of the Toku­
gawa era, see Ando Hiroshi, Tokugawa, pp. 128-261; Oishi Tsunetaka, Jikata hanrei rokuy 
1: 3Z-198, 2:1-34; and Murakami and Arakawa, Sanpo jikata taisei, pp. 39-106. 
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nature of tax assessments also changed. Under the earlier system taxes due 
were set without specific reference to the yield of the land, whereas taxes 
were now recorded as a percentage of the assessed value and were peri­
odically reassessed in light of crop yields. The tax rate commonly varied 
annually.42 
In short, from the analytical perspective of most scholars, the quali­
ties of national scope, standardized survey procedures, and precise, actual, 
comprehensive measurement signify a great difference between the land 
surveys of the Sengoku era and the Taiko kenchi. More important, the 
distinctive features of the new system are seen as reflecting a fundamen­
tal change in the nature of daimyo. Sengoku daimyo controlled their own 
domains independent of any national central authority. In contrast, the 
early modern daimyo were in many respects subject to the authority of 
Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and eventually the Tokugawa Bakufu. Hegemonic 
authority extended farthest into the domains through the specification of 
land survey procedures and the timing of most surveys. The hegemon or 
shogun could send his officials directly into the daimyo domains and into 
each village to conduct surveys and through them, determine administra­
tive boundaries and class lines. In effect, not only landed retainers, but 
daimyo, too, lost their funyuken. 
Despite some mild caveats, Berry's arguments nicely illustrate these 
lines of demarcation between the Sengoku and early modern eras. She notes 
imperfections in the implementing of the tax system and concedes that 
a few daimyo may have conducted their own distinctive surveys, but she 
nonetheless concludes that these should not "conceal the extent of [Hide­
yoshi's] reach." It was a considerable one, in her view: "He oversaw the 
registration of much of the country's land; he demanded that Toyotomi 
deputies or daimyo officials, not local landholders, supervise that registra­
tion; he defined universal standards of measurement that were employed 
widely; he required the direct inspection of land and its yield."43 
Class separation. Whether attributed to Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi, or the Tokugawa, central administrative fiat has typically been 
viewed as effecting a rigid, legally prescribed class separation (hei-no 
bunri). Traditionally, Hideyoshi's contributions have been emphasized, 
specifically in his handing down of the sword collection (1588) and class 
separation edicts (1591).44 The urbanization of samurai, whether at the en­
couragement of Hideyoshi or as a result of the Tokugawa's limiting the 
number of castles to one per province (1615), is also credited with ere­
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ating a hard division between peasants and warriors.45 As noted above, 
land surveys, too, purportedly played a significant role. People listed in 
survey registers were not allowed to possess swords (the symbol of war­
rior status), and when a daimyo was transferred, listed families were not 
permitted to transfer with him.46 Furthermore, village residents were not 
allowed to move freely from their home villages.* 
Recent writings suggest a more complicated process, and one that 
began much earlier than previously suggested. George Elison finds the 
origins of class separation in the policies of Oda Nobunaga.47 Late medi­
eval and Sengoku specialists see its beginnings in complex developments 
involving peasants pushing samurai off the land, as well as daimyo trans­
ferring landed retainers into concentrated fortifications and urban areas.48 
Local leagues (ikki) and "peasant contracts" (hyakusho uke) encouraged 
the separation of full-time warriors from rural communities. These histo­
rians also argue for the emergence of villages as increasingly autonomous 
administrative units at an earlier point. 
Even before the dominance of the Three Heroes, changes in military 
technology and attempts to increase the stability of the retainer band en­
couraged the movement of samurai from rural to urban settings. Daimyo 
reduced the proportion of warriors holding fiefs and enlarged the ranks 
of salaried retainers. These measures increasingly marked warriors as full-
time professionals who were not engaged in farm management or owner­
ship. We would have difficulty explaining the growth of the effective mili­
tary and administrative control that supported the Three Great Heroes 
without acknowledging the extent to which their efforts were predicated 
on the weakened links between peasant and landed retainer. Nonetheless, 
this process was not complete by 1580. 
Despite this accumulating evidence—and the attempt of scholars like 
Sasaki Junnosuke and Hara Shogo to show that the establishment of a class 
separation system in principle (under Hideyoshi) and its actual implemen­
tation proceeded on a different timetable49—most historians have yet to 
abandon the traditional emphasis on the orders of Hideyoshi and others 
in this matter. More than a few recent studies still insist on the radical 
transforming role of Hideyoshi's edicts.50 
Land taxes. The reach of daimyo and hegemons is commonly portrayed 
'Marriage to and adoption by residents of other villages were permitted. These changes 
and notice of the temporary relocation of villagers as servants were recorded in the registers of 
religious affiliation (in those regions where they were carefully kept). Although this allowed 
local authorities to keep track of residents and indicated their legal status as residents of their 
natal villages, the registers often became a legal fiction that failed to prevent real migration. 
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as increasing in the realm of land taxation. Scholars debate the degree to 
which increased control over land and people led to confiscatory taxes. 
Most Japanese historians, especially Marxists, argue that up through the 
early eighteenth century, land taxation left little or no "surplus labor" in 
the hands of villagers. To these scholars the early Tokugawa era repre­
sents the "first stage" of Tokugawa feudalism—which is to say, the stage 
characterized by confiscation of the peasantry's total surplus production/ 
Dissenting voices are few. Takeyasu Shigeji and Hay ami Akira argue 
that the early Tokugawa land tax system lacked the capacity to confiscate 
all of the villagers' surplus. Nonetheless, in their counterarguments they do 
not directly analyze land tax mechanisms and rates.51 In addition, Miya­
kawa Mitsuru notes that after Hideyoshi's land surveys and the adoption 
of the inspection system of assessment, land tax rates in many areas fell 
from their late-sixteenth-century peaks.52 Though he does not claim that 
this was the general trend, it allows him to recognize the need to keep an 
open mind on the question. 
At the heart of these concerns lies the system of annual inspections 
(kemi). In principle the inspection process was straightforward. Tax asses­
sors selected several fields in each village and took sample cuttings. Three 
or four samples of each grade of paddy were commonly taken. (Dry fields 
were not usually sampled.) The yields from the cuttings were averaged and 
multiplied by the basic domain tax rate, usually 40 percent or 50 percent of 
the average. The percentage taken as tax depended on official estimates of 
local production costs.53 The average tax rice per tan was then converted to 
a percentage of the village's assessed value to calculate the village tax rate.* 
"According to these scholars, it was only in the "second stage" of Tokugawa feudalism, 
characterized by less confiscatory land taxes, that peasants could begin to accumulate a sur­
plus. Among students of the very early Kinsei era, Araki's work has been the key argument to 
which they have felt compelled to respond. The majority of recent studies of land tax systems 
attempt to expand on this interpretation. (See Araki, Bakuhan taisei sbakai, pp. 117-52.) On 
the transition from the "first stage" to the "second stage," Oishi Shinzaburo's study of the 
Kyoho Reforms is most frequently cited (see his Kyoho kaikaku, pp. 121-67; see also Sasaki, 
"Bakuhansei"; and Asao, "Bakuhan sei dai ichi dankai"). Although these authors disagree 
about how long the "first stage of Japanese feudalism" lasted, they agree that the early tax 
system effectively took virtually all the peasants' surplus. Many scholars have subsequently 
attempted to place a third type of assessment system, the domen system, into this two-stage 
format (see, for example, Tanaka Seiji, "Kinsei zenki"; and Nakaguchi, "Kinsei shoki sohd"). 
The domen system was introduced in some regions to adjust for increases in yields after the 
initial official productivity estimates (todai, kokumori). It was generally used over a short 
period and was often replaced later by thefixed tax rate system. 
t In fact, there were several varieties of kemi. In some cases dryfield crops were inspected. 
Reductions infixed tax rates (jomen) were also based on sample cuttings. The basic steps out­
lined here are consistent with these variations. Sasaki, Daimyo, p. 22, and Sasaki, Bakuhan 
kenryoku, pp. 101-10, present data from 17th-century Kaga domain budgets. 
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Several features of the inspection system encourage scholars to argue 
that it appropriated the villagers' agricultural surplus. First, inspections ap­
parently provided detailed knowledge of rice yields. Based on that knowl­
edge, officials could accurately calculate the proportion of crops to take as 
taxes. Second, annual inspections appear highly rational. In principle they 
permitted authorities to raise taxes to take advantage of increased yields 
or to lower them when yields fell. Inspections forced peasants to share any 
increased output with domain lords and landed retainers while simulta­
neously providing a prudent mechanism to alleviate the villagers' distress in 
bad times. Third, and perhaps most important, the model farm budgets on 
which land taxes were based contained no provision for peasants to retain 
any more of their income than that required for the continued operation 
of their farms. In theory villagers could not accumulate any profits from 
farming. Superimposed on assumptions of the thoroughness and complete­
ness of land surveying, these features together mark the inspection system 
as confiscatory.54 
Scholars frequently treat Hideyoshi and his seventeenth-century suc­
cessors as the agents who established standard tax rates and the general 
principle of annual inspection of crop yields. Hideyoshi's "Wall Writings 
of Osaka Castle" (1595) declared a standard rate of two-thirds of the har­
vest to the lord, one-third to the peasants.55 (This rate is often cited to 
bolster arguments that the tax burden grew much heavier in the late six­
teenth century.) Under the Tokugawa, most scholars agree, the standard 
fell to 60-40 or 50-50/ But whatever the rate, an explicit standard sug­
gests that daimyo were obligated to employ annual inspections to calculate 
each village's taxes. Additionally, to credit Hideyoshi with fully implanting 
rice-based taxation is to credit him also with making rice "near money," a 
major medium of exchange during the early modern era.56 
The national restructuring of local administration. As the three pre­
ceding sections have made clear, the village is critical to understanding the 
transformations of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Although late 
medieval villages increasingly took local administrative matters into their 
own hands, the common view is that villages did not harden into official 
administrative units within domains until the early modern era. Again, the 
Taiko kenchi are held to be pivotal in this development. The survey registers 
created an administrative unit for purposes of taxation. That secretarial 
'Similarly, Bakufu shifts from annual inspections to fixed land tax rates are treated as 
setting a new, 18th-century pattern of assessment procedures. I refer here to the shift from 
the kemi system to the jomen system, which presumably accompanied the Kyoho Reforms. 
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act forced residents to cooperate in a key aspect of local administration. 
Villagers themselves had to determine who owed what amount of tax to 
daimyo or retainer. They also had to ensure the delivery of payments to tax 
collectors at the appropriate time. Surveys supposedly fixed village admin­
istrative boundaries for thefirst time. Japanese scholars generally view this 
development negatively. The new, arbitrary units are typically considered 
inflexible, violating more natural village configurations based on residents' 
cooperative economic and social interactions. For good or ill, these units 
are taken as a new focus of administrative interest and the foundation of a 
new rural order. 
One finds the same stress on the role of central authority in most case 
studies. Local developments are either treated as reflecting national policies 
or, where potentially divergent data are acknowledged, their implications 
are minimized. Typical are three Western-language studies of Tosa, Sat­
suma, and Bizen, in which the focus is primarily on the organization of 
the upper levels of domain administration and the consolidation of con­
trol over the retainer band.57 When discussing Hideyoshi's land surveys, 
these studies stress compliance with national orders. Hall, for example, 
notes that despite an early divergence from Hideyoshi's pattern of survey 
in Bizen province, its leaders fell into line after 1594.58 
This emphasis is not limited to Western scholars. The historian Hara 
Shogo, laying the groundwork for a rare attempt to integrate central and 
local developments, criticizes his predecessors for viewing the develop­
ment of the state from a strictly national perspective. He argues that local 
events are viewed only through the national lens without exploring the 
interaction between national developments and the domain, thus ignoring, 
for example, the local dynamics involved in the formation of legally distinct 
classes.59 
The late-sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-century hegemons clearly 
possessed new capabilities. No one can doubt the military control they ex­
ercised over daimyo: they commanded national armies strong enough to 
invade Korea twice in the 1590's and to put down the Shimabara rebellion 
(1637). Nor can their influence over key aspects of daimyo's personal lives 
be denied—hegemons had a large say in their marriages and adoptions, 
made them reside in the capital, and forced them to submit hostages/ Hege­
mons also exacted (irregularly) money and corvee duties from daimyo, 
*Some may disagree with my making personalistic ties part of the creation of a state 
apparatus, preferring instead to focus on rational bureaucratic characteristics as the thrust 
of nonfeudalistic state development, but as Joel Migdal points out, and as students of Japan 
know well, personalistic ties play a very important role in many highly developed modern 
states. 
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primarily for military projects and the support of the imperial household. 
They could compel a substantial degree of compliance with their orders in 
each of these matters and, in principle, all their orders were enforceable by 
attainder. 
Yet these powers were directed explicitly and overwhelmingly at two 
restricted spheres of activity: controlling the daimyo's personal behavior 
and securing the hegemons' own military position. Hideyoshi (from 1590) 
and the Tokugawa especially succeeded in preventing daimyo from form­
ing alliances with each other or with foreign powers, and kept them under 
close scrutiny. But nowhere do we find any direct evidence of a daimyo's 
being compelled to follow centrally ordered practices in the internal ad­
ministration of his domain or even to live up to a generalized standard of 
good administration. 
An examination of the Bakufu's use of its powers of fief transfer and 
attainder, the most powerful administrative enforcement mechanism at its 
disposal, reinforces the impression that the shoguns were concerned more 
with the person of the daimyo and maintaining public order than with 
enforcing administrative law. Transfers were much more common than at­
tainders. If they were employed as a punitive device, one would expect 
to see a very large number of reductions in fief size. Yet fully 49 percent 
of the 551 cases of peacetime transfer (1601 to 1760) reported by Fujino 
Tamotsu involved an increase in fief size; 45 percent involved no change 
in size, and only 6 percent some loss of land—very ambiguous evidence 
for punitive intent. Furthermore, transfers were directed predominantly at 
smaller daimyo.60 
Fujino does not list the reasons for the transfers, but he does for the 
235 cases where a fief was confiscated in peacetime during the same 160 
years. These clearly show the restricted nature of the Bakufu's concerns. 
The vast majority of attainders (88 percent) involved succession issues, 
personal misconduct, "madness," lese majeste, miscellaneous nonadminis­
trative causes, or sections of the Laws of the Military Houses dealing with 
the daimyo's personal behavior and military security. Maladministration 
accounted for a mere 3 percent of the total (six cases), and even then, all 
the cases were associated with another reason—harsh rule or popular dis­
turbances—which suggests that maintaining public order was the primary 
issue. Malfeasance in office and miscellaneous violations of the law are 
ambiguous categories in Fujino's listing, but even if all represented viola­
tions of Bakufu administrative directives to daimyo, they would account 
for only 9 percent, or 21, of the cases.61 At most, then, 12 percent of the 
attainders can be tied to the administrative actions of daimyo within their 
domains; half that percentage is probably still a generous estimate. 
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The Strong State-Weak State Dichotomy 
Beyond these two restrictedfields of demonstrated hegemonic concern, 
there is much reason to debate the widespread emphasis on state, policy 
as an agent of local change. This stress is unsatisfying from two points of 
view. First of all, it glosses over the evidence of widespread institutional 
variation and the implications of that underacknowledged historical fact. 
If the hegemons were resolved on subjecting daimyo to the laws of a central 
authority, we should find more local institutional uniformity than actually 
exists. Even if full uniformity was not achieved, we should see more con­
sistent efforts on the part of the hegemons to enforce their laws than the 
preceding discussion indicates—for example, regular attempts to punish 
daimyo for maladministration when rural revolts (hyakushd ikki) broke 
out or there was a clear violation of central administrative ordinances. 
Defining the enforcement apparatus remains a significant problem. Berry, 
who argues strongly for Hideyoshi's role in fostering social change, also 
notes that he built no such mechanism. During his life and later, the hege­
mons' authority to confiscate fiefs and transfer daimyo suggests a basis to 
compel the implementation of central ordinances within domains; yet re­
gardless of how useful that authority was for eliminating political rivals 
and managing the balance of power among daimyo, it is difficult to demon­
strate that they employed it systematically to impose central rule.62 Under 
the circumstances, developments within domains must be examined if we 
are to understand the social transformations that appear to accord with 
central edicts. 
Second, the state-centered interpretation leaves little room for villagers 
as significant contributors to domain policy. Their image is overwhelm­
ingly that of respondents to domain initiatives. Even those who stress the 
villages' selectivity in incorporating domain and Bakufu ordinances into 
their regulations and the traditional sources of local leaders' authority see 
the daimyo and shogun as defining the key elements of the governing insti­
tutions and policies that linked villages to higher authority. Others, looking 
for a popular voice, stress violent reactions. But in both cases, the possi­
bility of a creative institutional contribution to the early modern order is 
neglected.63 
In part these shortcomings result from a conceptual problem raised by 
White, that is, current studies frequently confound two different measures 
of the state's strength vis-a-vis society. The first is acceptance by major 
political actors of the idea of an overarching state organization and a will­
ingness, however grudging, to cede powers to the state. I think of this 
characteristic as nominal authority. The second measure is a state's ability 
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to carry out policies that realize the goals it sets for itself. This is a state's 
capability.64 While related, these two attributes do not go hand in hand. A 
nominal authority to act does not, in itself, imply a capacity to do so or to 
do so effectively. A direct correlation cannot be assumed. A state can be 
ceded a broad range of nominal authority by society, or a narrow range. 
Similarly, its capacity to enact its programs over the resistance of society 
may be great or extremely limited. 
Different combinations of nominal authority and capability can illu­
minate various configurations of state-society relationships, each of which 
recognizes the reciprocal influences of the two. These configurations 
supplement the more structural emphases in other typologies such as Max 
Weber's. They ignore the institutional forms of state (federal, feudal, tribal, 
rational-bureaucratic) and deal with state-society interactions regardless of 
state structure. Each configuration poses distinct opportunities and chal­
lenges. 
In states with highly developed nominal authority and capability, 
leaders possess a recognized claim to operate in a broad range of activities. 
Furthermore, they set their own agendas with relative freedom and imple­
ment policies that will achieve their goals, even if subordinates in the state 
apparatus or outside it have their own, contradictory objectives. These are 
strong states. 
At the opposite end are weak states, where the leaders' range of nomi­
nal authority is narrow and their capacity for action is highly restricted by 
political actors inside or outside the state structure. These states, or at least 
their leadership, may be struggling to survive. 
Between these two poles (the most commonly used terms for describ­
ing state-society relations), the interpretations stressing Hideyoshi's land 
surveys, tax system, class separation efforts, and reorganization of rural 
administration tend toward the strong-state model. Yet comparisons with 
absolutist states tend to emphasize what Japan lacked, and therefore leave 
the impression that it conformed more closely to the weak-state model. 
Three considerations suggest that looking for complex interactions of 
nominal authority and capability is a more helpful approach to analyzing 
state-society relations than this bipolar characterization. First, a broader 
view reminds us, in thinking about state growth, of the needjto verify the 
impact of central ordinances on society. The relationship between society 
and state should be taken as problematic. We cannot assume the efficacy of 
central pronouncements. Even unchallenged proclamations do not imply 
an effective implementation of policy. 
Second, sensitivity to a greater array of interactions between nominal 
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authority and capability draws attention to the fact that the alternative to 
strong-state status is not just a weak state. There is a significant middle 
ground to be explored on its own terms. Awareness of this middle range 
helps to highlight not only what a given state configuration lacks, but also 
the attributes it possesses. Common sensibilities stress the importance of 
state capabilities. If a state lacks the ability to put policies into practice; it is 
perceived as weak, and its proclamations are seen as largely inconsequen­
tial. Where a state is unable to meet certain needs demanded by society, the 
disparity between nominal authority and capability may hold the potential 
for the government's overthrow. Yet in other circumstances, for example, in 
the course of early modern state-building, the growth of nominal authority 
may be useful even if it outstrips the government's actual capabilities. The 
potential for a positive evaluation of such states is substantial and should 
be taken seriously. 
Finally, an awareness of the tension between nominal authority and 
capability helps move us away from a Eurocentric conceptualization of 
states. This involves a move away from a simple checklist of comparisons 
of Japan and the ideal of an absolutist state that emphasize the develop­
ment of specific institutions such as a national bureaucracy, an autonomous 
judiciary, and related institutions. It separates the issue of an emerging 
rational-bureaucratic order from the successful creation of a strong and 
stable order that releases society's energies to increase wealth, support a 
larger population, support artistic and cultural development, and the like. 
In fact, Japanese political organization had elements of the Weberian ratio­
nalized state, but these were largely restricted to domain administration, 
not the emerging national state.65 Early modern Japan lacked a national 
bureaucracy funded by nationwide tax revenues. Nonetheless, the national 
order as a whole was stable and capable of meeting the challenges it faced 
for more than two centuries. 
To the extent that past research has confused the late-sixteenth- and 
early-seventeenth-century state's claims to authority with effective imple­
mentation, it has overvalued the ability of men like Oda Nobunaga, Toyo­
tomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa Ieyasu to transform local political, social, 
and economic organizations. Emphasis on central political initiative is 
partly a consequence of early difficulties in researching this field. But the 
challenges inherent in researching and writing'Japanese local history were 
reinforced by conceptual confusion. Both created difficulties for scholars 
who might otherwise have examined more critically the emphasis on the 
early modern state's capabilities. 
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More than Z50 domains dotted seventeenth-century Japan. That fact 
alone has complicated the construction of a "typical" path of social, eco­
nomic, and political development. Even where good documentary collec­
tions held the promise of illuminating new elements in this great transfor­
mation, it has taken much of the postwar era to identify and index the 
most important of them. Resources for those purposes went first to col­
lections that directly addressed the role of prominent political leaders like 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi and institutions such as the Tokugawa Bakufu. The 
elitist emphasis represented an important and logical starting place, since 
the elite's activities and organizations tend to be the best and most con­
veniently documented. Studies based on this emphasis have contributed 
greatly to our understanding of early modern Japan. 
Nonetheless, now that local documentary bases have become more ac­
cessible, the elite focus has become restrictive. The stress on central politi­
cal initiative encouraged the development of models and concepts that fail 
to take account of the richness of early modern Japan's history. Two ten­
dencies have developed. Historians have been reluctant to use the data 
from just one region to challenge the conclusions of the established view. 
Indeed, local history is often explored merely to illustrate those interpreta­
tions; Hall explicitly states that this was his intent in writing Government 
and Local Power.66 Traditionalists, when they refer to the few acknowl­
edged deviations from central ordinances at all, often characterize them 
as representing "backward" regions, undervaluing their potential interpre­
tive import.67 Though this description conceals the shadings of historians' 
work, I think that it properly characterizes a very common orientation. 
To my mind, this use of local history to illustrate national trends has 
severe limitations. One risk is that it employs an a priori standard for 
selecting what is representative. The documents left by the political center 
predominantly shape the study, and with it, the findings. In the Japanese 
case, at least, the influences of local social, political, and economic forces 
in creating the early modern order may in consequence be understated. 
The absence of this local perspective has, I believe, left us with a fairly 
monochromatic explanation of change. 
The perspective on change from below can provide a very different 
impression from the top-down view with which most of us are familiar. 
Questions about the prevailing emphasis on the growth of effective central 
political authority began as I looked for land registers as part of planned 
research on agricultural commercialization. The administrative systems I 
discovered did not conform to patterns that I had been led to expect. As 
I sought alternative evidence, I gradually "climbed the hill" (as a Japanese 
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expression has it) and shifted to an examination of the relationship be­
tween state, domain, and village in the first century of the early modern 
era. What I found confirmed my early doubts. I then sought to assess the 
extent to which the process of institutional development (not necessarily 
the institutions' specific content) I found in one domain, Kaga, was repre­
sentative.68 This work further suggested the limits of central initiatives and 
the robust institutional creativity of both domain and village. 
Throughout this study, I periodically draw attention to the range of 
institutional variation I found. This variation indicates that daimyo and 
village addressed the common tasks of domain formation through experi­
mentation, and that they settled on a range of solutions. These variations, 
inadequately accounted for by an interpretive emphasis on centrally con­
ceived programs, are evident in the most fundamental early modern insti­
tutions. They are especially evident in the case of land tax and tenure poli­
cies—the implementation of Hideyoshi's Taiko kenchi and its correlates, 
the establishment of early modern landholding rights, the kokudaka sys­
tem, the separation of commoner and warrior, and the direct incorporation 
of villages into domain administrative structures. 
Discovering the boundaries between domain and central authority re­
quires the use of local histories to test generalizations about the extent of 
national social, political, and economic changes and the role of the political 
center as agent in promoting them. That same testing helps to assess how 
far the image of a stronger central authority was transformed into fact. I be­
lieve that this kind of research will show that there was more institutional 
color in early modern Japan than is commonly acknowledged.69 
This effort requires immersion in local materials and their local con­
texts, rather than simply viewing them through a national lens. The stan­
dard vocabularies in which early modern specialists write are very often 
simply those of a single locality. It may be that the administrative unit 
from which the terms are drawn is large (e.g., the Tokugawa Bakufu), but 
that does not ipso facto make them a nationwide standard. Local terms, 
even when pronounced and written the same way, can have very different 
meanings. For example, the term men, which is commonly used to refer to 
land tax rates collected by the domain lord, had a very different, indeed 
opposite, meaning in late-sixteenth-century Kaga domain: it referred to 
an "exemption," the part of the crop that villagers were allowed to keep, 
not what they paid in taxes. Likewise, village'and low-level administra­
tive documents must be placed in their local institutional contexts rather 
than be subjected to a tyranny of interpretations derived from the study of 
Bakufu institutions. 
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The use of local history I am suggesting here does not claim many ad­
herents among students of Japanese history. In Western languages, James L. 
McClain's study of Kanazawa, Kaga domain's major castle town and ad­
ministrative headquarters, is a rare example of it. But though he effectively 
questions common assertions of the domain lords' complete control of 
castle town development, his focus is on the relatively few people who 
resided in large urban areas. The economic historian Matsushita Shiro 
and the institutional historian Hara Shogo are among the few Japanese 
scholars to use case studies explicitly to test the implementation of central 
ordinances.70 
Kaga as a Case Study 
The domain of Kaga, in western central Japan, provides our context 
for a closer look at the epochal transformations of this era and for explor­
ing the relationships between central administration, daimyo rule, and the 
village. 
The geography of the region represents a cross section of much of Japan. 
Except for having one of Japan's rare sand-dune beaches, at Chirihama, 
there is little to distinguish the region from other sections of coastal Japan. 
Located between the Japan Sea and the Japan Alps, Kaga domain occupied 
the area that corresponds to modern Ishikawa and Toyama prefectures 
and the ancient provinces of Kaga, Noto, and Etchu (see Map 2). Narrow 
plains line most of the coast that forms the western border of the region, 
from the Kaga Plain north and west around the rocky, cliff-rimmed Noto 
Peninsula, past Noto Island and then north again along Toyama Gulf. In­
land from the coast, travelers quickly ascend to a region of foothills. Soon 
after they find themselves on either the high plateau of the Noto Penin­
sula or moving into the higher, often snow-capped mountains—Tateyama, 
Gokayama, and Hakusan—extensions of the Japan Alps. 
Throughout the region agriculture demands considerable effort. The 
upland soils are generally rocky and not especially fertile. Terracing is ardu­
ous, and even during the early modern era, parts of the Noto Peninsula 
were farmed as swidden rather than permanently cultivated. 
The highlands contribute fertile sediment to lowland regions. Two rela­
tively large plains dominate agricultural production. The largest, located 
in the old province of Etchu, is the Toyama Plain. Formed around four 
river systems, the Oyabe, the Sho, the Jintsu, and the Joganji, the plain is 
composed of steep alluvial and diluvial fans. Cold mountain waters from 
the Japan Alps reduce crop yields in these areas. 
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The elongated Kaga Plain, stretching along the coast from present-day 
Kaga City past Kanazawa and on to the Noto Peninsula beyond Hakui, 
is much narrower. Its most prominent features are a series of lagoons and 
marshlands. Drainage is poor in many places. Thanks to major invest­
ments of money and labor in extensive drain-and-fill reclamation projects, 
domain authorities, villagers, and the nationally prominent nineteenth-
century merchant Zeniya Gohei progressively reduced these wetlands. 
The steep descent from the highlands causes landslides and rapid sedi­
mentation that once regularly clogged irrigation channels and raised river 
bottoms, causingfloods where plain meets mountain. Even over short peri­
ods, soil deposition and flooding substantially shifted the course of rivers 
and made premodern farming along them a precarious pursuit. Today, 
maps reveal this heritage through place-names like Oshimizu, literally 
"Pushy Water." Yet even under these circumstances, there were always vil­
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lagers, official planners, and entrepreneurs willing to convert the old river­
beds to productive fields through both large- and small-scale reclamation 
projects. 
The region's climate, too, is typical of much of Japan. Spring and sum­
mer are hot and humid. Though snows are relatively heavy in the winter, 
they are usually not accompanied by extended periods of freezing weather 
in the lowlands. The growing season is about average length (200-220 
days frost-free) except in the higher mountain inland areas, where it is a bit 
shorter (180 days frost-free). Precipitation is plentiful, among the greatest 
in Japan, and it is well distributed to support agriculture. 
These conditions permit double-cropping, and about 40 percent of the 
arable today is double-cropped. Although statistics are not available for the 
Tokugawa era, agricultural treatises and village documents indicate that 
the practice was quite common, at least in the plains, by the eighteenth 
century. Rice was doubled with winter wheat, millet, or vegetables. 
Population data for the seventeenth century are unavailable, so it is im­
possible to do more than suggest, using early-eighteenth-century data, the 
size of the urban population and the man-land ratio. Though the domain 
was not as fully urbanized as the Kanto (Edo) or the Kinai (Osaka) districts 
in the seventeenth century, probably something approaching 20 percent of 
the people lived in cities or towns. McClain estimates the late-seventeenth­
century population of Kanazawa, the domain capital and chief castle town, 
at about 100,000, which made the city one of the largest in Japan. In 1721 
the official population estimate for the three provinces of Kaga, Noto, and 
Etchu was 673,000. These two estimates alone suggest an urban population 
of 15 percent. But in addition to Kanazawa, there were other consequential 
cities and towns in the domain. Thomas Smith places the commoner popu­
lation of Takaoka at 11,700 in 1714. Daishoji and Toyama, the castle towns 
of the two branch fiefs of Kaga domain, had populations roughly compa­
rable to Takaoka's. And there were other towns, including Kaga, Matto, 
Wajima, and Hakui, scattered throughout the domain. The heaviest con­
centrations of urban population were in the Kaga and Toyama plains. The 
villages that provided Kanazawa with labor or vegetables, oil, and other 
products were most affected by the demands of urban life; Noto had the 
lowest level of urban growth and economic diversification.71 
Based on Bakufu estimates of the region's arable land area in 1721, 
each tan (0.245 acres) supported 6.6 people. This compares with a national 
average of 8.8 people per tan.71 The figure for Kaga is probably artifi­
cially low, for the domain included only people aged fourteen (Japanese 
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count) or older in its population estimates/ whereas many other parts of 
Japan included young children. (As in other parts of Japan, the domain 
excluded samurai from the count.) Nonetheless, this relatively high man-
land ratio suggests that crop yields must have been very good, for domain 
farmers routinely supported a sizable urban population and the domain 
still exported large amounts of tax rice after the mid-seventeenth century. 
Although the region is best known for rice production, its economic 
base was moderately diverse. Even before the formation of the domain, 
Kaga was known for its silk, which it regularly exported to Kyoto. Other 
items commonly produced in villages included paper, rice wine, and vege­
tables. Gold was mined at Hodatsu and several other locations. Salt manu­
facture was a major industry on the Noto shores. Coastal communities had 
well-developed fishing, and fine lacquer was produced at Wajima, on the 
Noto Peninsula, and at Yamanaka, not far from modern Komatsu City. 
A well-known pottery developed at Kutani, in the south of the domain, 
and Takaoka witnessed the rise of the metal-casting trade. Nonetheless, 
agriculture and its related enterprises formed the region's economic base. 
Kaga domain was the largest in seventeenth-century Japan. The putative 
agricultural yield of the domain was 1,200,000 koku, or almost 6,000,000 
(English) bushels.* By that fact alone it garnered a considerable measure 
of prestige. Furthermore, it earned a reputation as a leader in administra­
tion. A contemporary expression ranked Kagafirst in politics, Tosa domain 
second ("Seiji wa ichi Kaga, ni Tosa").73 It was a leader in administra­
tive innovation and recognized as an efficiently run domain. These facts in 
themselves make Kaga worthy of study, but practical considerations add 
to its value as a laboratory in which to examine domain formation. 
Rich collections of late-sixteenth- and seventeenth-century administra­
tive and land tax documents permit a detailed analysis of the techniques 
that buttressed a stable domain administration in the face of both external 
and internal pressures. Domain officials compiled substantial compendia of 
ordinances for their own reference. Among other topics, these deal with tax 
assessment and collection methods, commoner labor and service obliga­
tions, restrictions on migration, village and district organization, appeals 
procedures for villagers, and land tenure practices. 
Domain-wide statistical data remain only in very limited quantity. 
'Japanese traditionally count a child as one year old tit birth. 
tSince die value of cash (gold, copper, silver) was computed relative to volumes of rice, I 
provide rice equivalents of these measures throughout. In any case there is no way at present 
to establish good modern monetary equivalents. 
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Serial population or economic data for this era are nonexistent. Most of 
the available documents are related to taxation. These documents, pre­
served in the homes of village and district headmen, include the.results 
of land investigations and a sampling of yearly tax assessments, tax bills, 
and tax receipts. Since serial tax data are also missing, trends must be 
extrapolated from the limited cases for which individual annual land tax 
and land records remain. Finally, village officials also kept copies of village 
laws and descriptions of local practices. Despite lacunae, this documentary 
base is rich compared with the fragmentary material available on most 
other domains. Furthermore, since Kaga domain survived the entire early 
modern era, its documentary records allow us to track the complete trans­
formation from a rough-and-ready military-political unit in 1581 to a stable 
civil administration in the mid-seventeenth century. 
Kaga's territorial stability clearly accounts in part for the well-preserved 
documentation that made this study possible. It may also, in the eyes of 
some, mark this case as exceptional. This perspective would have some 
merit were Kaga a domain with long, hereditary roots in the region it 
dominated. But Kaga was in fact formed by outsiders, the Maeda family, 
who charged into Echizen, Kaga, and Etchu provinces as part of Oda 
Nobunaga's invading armies. As intruders, they faced the same fundamen­
tal problems as other daimyo who moved more often. In this sense the 
Maeda faced challenges typical of those confronting virtually all daimyo 
who survived into the Tokugawa era.74 
Some Preliminary Observations 
In the chapters that follow, I examinefive key aspects of domain forma­
tion: (1) the process by which the daimyo commandeered fiefs of landed 
retainers (kyiinin) and removed them from the land; (2) the development 
of lower-level domain administration; (3) the growth of domain offices 
staffed by rural commoners; (4) the organization of land tenure; and (5) the 
maturing of the land tax system. Since these are the principal spheres in 
which scholars have seen the effective reach of an emerging central ad­
ministration, any attempt to weigh the relative impact of central and local 
influences rests crucially on a close look at each development. We shall 
also look closely into the area in which rulers and villagers came into 
the most frequent (and sometimes violent) contact—the assessing and col­
lecting of major taxes. Together, these analyses will go far in advancing 
our understanding of the process of class separation and the dynamics of 
domain-village interaction. 
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In general, the sources of domain policy can be separated into two 
basic clusters, external and internal. Kaga authorities undeniably took 
some steps in response to the orders of hegemons. But in some cases as 
they dutifully carried out those orders, their impact was broader than the 
center foresaw or wanted. Sometimes developments were the unintended 
by-products of policies designed to accomplish other goals. For example, 
the removal of early Maeda samurai from direct involvement in village 
affairs and agriculture may be seen as a result of the Maeda's transfer to 
Kaga (1581) rather than as a function of a centrally directed policy legally 
separating social classes. The political environment in which the domain 
grew, especially the need to fend off invaders, represents a second set of ex­
ternal influences. Yet as local security increased, the power of events in the 
broader Hokuriku region to shape domain growth declined. For example, 
decreasing villager participation in military activities is partially explicable 
by reference to the reduced threat of invasion of the domain. Overall, I find 
that outside the sphere of defense, external influences on domain policies 
were relatively unimportant. 
The second cluster of factors, the domain's internal dynamics, condi­
tioned most of the developments examined here. The dialogue between 
domain leaders on the one hand and landed retainers and lower samurai 
officials on the other was one of the two major creative forces. The fric­
tion between villagers and their overlords was the other. The interactions 
between these three sets of actors is especially evident in the processes that 
transformed rural administrative structures: the retainers' authority over 
their fiefs, the changing balance between commoner and samurai officials 
in the administrative structure, and the definition of land tenure. 
In these interactions the rulers were not the only source of initiative; vil­
lagers, acting collectively, significantly influenced domain policies as well. 
In some cases, as when, like their counterparts throughout Japan before and 
after, they wrested concessions from their overlords, forcing reductions 
in land taxes or extended delays in payment, the changes were fleeting. 
But often and more importantly, their actions had an enduring effect on 
administrative policies and structures. Among other developments, they 
influenced the change to a little-known (in the West) but quite widespread 
system of land tenure called warichi, literally, "dividing the land." Under 
this system the village rather than individual households controlled access 
to plots of farmland. In other words, though landed retainers and domain 
authorities often took the lead in policy development, they did not act 
alone, much less in a vacuum. Commoner initiatives as well as reactions 
shaped policy initiatives and outcomes. 
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The relative strength of these initiatives was not simply a matter of 
villagers possessing greater absolute leverage than they are generally cred­
ited with. The inherent weakness of some standard domain techniques 
for extracting taxes and labor enhanced the villagers' bargaining position. 
Contrary to the assertions of many historians, I believe domain authorities 
did not possess sufficient knowledge of village agricultural conditions to 
tax at the levels to which they aspired. For one thing, some of the rational­
ization of rural administration was purchased at a substantial cost—the 
loss of the domain's ability to oversee closely and extract resources effec­
tively from its rural subjects. For another, standard land survey methods, 
which historians have judged to be highly accurate, in fact were not. Con­
sequently, domain tax administration was less effective than is commonly 
portrayed. In these local relations between ruler and commoner subject we 
see a trade-off of lower revenues for the promotion of internal stability and 
improved control of the retainer band. 
In the sense that Kaga illustrates the dynamic interaction between cen­
ter, domain, and village and shares with other domains an extended period 
of institutional experimentation, it is typical of early modern ban. Its rulers' 
responses to common problems varied sufficiently from standard portray­
als to highlight the fact that political leaders chose from a range of options 
in building stable institutional settlements. National hegemons, domain 
lords, and commoners formed mutually tolerable relationships within quite 
broad institutional parameters. Local forces greatly conditioned the spe­
cific institutional developments of any given domain. Identifying these 
pressures and suggesting the range of options available will, I hope, extend 
a part of the Sengoku era's image of tentative institutional experimentation 
into the early modern era. 
PART ONE 
Controlling Land 

Chapter 2. 
The Formation of Kaga Domain 
The daimyo who came through the late-sixteenth-century civil wars to participate in the Pax Tokugawa traveled two different roads to a place 
in the new order. One path originated in the disparate, often small, war­
rior domains of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries and led, for 
those with sufficient political astuteness, organizational ability, and luck, 
to celebrity as strong, independent leaders of large regional coalitions. 
Though some of these men managed to build broad, even nationally promi­
nent alliances (e.g., Oda Nobunaga, Takeda Shingen, Uesugi Kenshin, and 
Tokugawa Ieyasu), more typical were families like the Date of northern 
Japan, the Shimazu of Satsuma, and the Mori of Choshu, who were de­
feated by one or more of these coalitions and were ultimately subsumed 
under the Tokugawa order. 
The second route to daimyo status began in the lower ranks of a gen­
eral who rose to national prominence. With the exception of those who 
rose under Ieyasu, the leaders whose fortunes were tied to one of the great 
generals still had to fend for themselves once their patron died. 
The Maeda family followed this second path to fame and fortune. An 
overview of the process by which the domain was occupied and preserved 
reminds us that throughout the late sixteenth and early seventeenth cen­
turies, the future of any general teetered precariously between glory and 
death, and that continued control of any territory by the same family could 
not be taken for granted. The domain's territorial development (distinct 
from its institutional evolution) can be divided into two stages, occupa­
tion and extension (1581-99) and preservation (1599-1636). Meeting the 
challenges of domain-building was primarily the task of the first daimyo, 
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Maeda Toshiie (r. 1581-99), with assistance from his eldest son, Maeda 
Toshinaga (r. 1599-1605). Preserving the family holdings was largely the 
responsibility of Toshinaga and his younger brother, Maeda Toshitsune 
(r. 1605-39), who remained a powerful force behind the daimyo who suc­
ceeded him. 
The Opportunities of a Country at War 
The basic pattern by which Kaga domain was formed was a common 
one—territorial acquisition by enfeoffment as well as by conquest. Leaders 
of the major military coalitions either made their generals lords of the 
domains they conquered or appointed them to rule in one region as a re­
ward for military service in another. The newly acquired and often richer 
territory typically came at the cost of the general's giving up his traditional 
home territory. The Maeda were no exception. 
What was far less common was the Maeda's enduring hold on so large 
a domain. It is for good reason that daimyo are often compared to potted 
plants, which could be picked up and moved to any part of Japan. Most 
of the other major daimyo, the Shimazu of Satsuma, the Mori of Choshu, 
the Uesugi and Date of northern Japan, even the Tokugawa, all coped with 
fief reductions or transfers, or both. Some, such as the Chosokabe of Shi­
koku and the Gohojo of the Kanto, were eliminated completely. From the 
epochal battle at Sekigahara in 1600 through 1700, there were 801 changes 
of domain leadership because of transfers, fief reductions, or attainders. 
Discounting those resulting from Sekigahara (181) and the Osaka cam­
paigns (10), 610 of these changes took place in peacetime.1 Since the number 
of daimyo at any given time was between 260 and 280, the turnover was 
quite high. It would be higher still if the last two decades of the sixteenth 
century were included. Under these circumstances, the process by which 
the Maeda retained control over Kaga under Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi, and the Tokugawa shoguns is of particular interest. 
Maeda Toshiie (1538-99) was the archetypal warrior and leader of the 
sixteenth century, ascending from obscurity to national prominence while 
still a relatively young man. Born in Arako castle, in what is now the city of 
Nagoya, Toshiie entered an uneasy world, torn by the strife that marked the 
end of Japan's middle ages. His early years were dominated by his relation­
ship to Oda Nobunaga. In Toshiie's youth, Nobunaga was just beginning 
the series of conquests and alliances that brought the greater part of central 
Japan under his control. By the time of his assassination in 1582, Nobu­
naga was arguably the preeminent military and political leader in Japan. 
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As with Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Toshiie's rise to prominence was intimately 
tied to the ascendancy of the Oda forces. 
Toshiie was of modest origins. He was the fourth son of the lord of 
Arako, who held a rather small fief of about 2,000 kan, approximately 
the equivalent of an early-seventeenth-century fief of 5,000 koku/ In 1551 
Toshiie entered the service of the family's more powerful neighbor and 
liege lord, Oda Nobunaga, and received a fief of 50 kan (about 125 koku). 
Five years later, in 1556, he proved himself in battle,fighting valiantly along 
with his lord against Nobunaga's own brother in a fray that cost him an 
eye. As a reward for his sacrifice and valor, he was granted a fief of 100 kan. 
Toshiie's characteristic bravery was matched by a quick temper that at 
one point jeopardized his career. In 1559 he killed one of Nobunaga's com­
panions, a tea master (chabozu) named Juami, for stealing the anchor pin 
on one of his swords. It was no small matter, for had he attempted to use 
the sword, the blade would have fallen off at the first thrust—a potentially 
lethal catastrophe. Juami sought refuge from the irate Toshiie with another 
member of Nobunaga's band,* and Nobunaga refused to grant Toshiie per­
mission to exact revenge. Toshiie, however, could not restrain himself and 
slew Juami outside an armory under Nobunaga's very eyes. For this breach 
of his lord's orders, Toshiie was dismissed from service. 
Toshiie regained Nobunaga's favor only after months of fighting on his 
behalf but not under his command—and completely unrewarded. After 
demonstrating such ardor and loyalty, he was readmitted to Nobunaga's 
service in 1561. He continued to serve Nobunaga well, and by 1568 he was 
endowed with a fief of 450 kan (about 1,125 koku). When his father died 
in 1569, Toshiie's valor and service were further acknowledged by Nobu­
naga: he inherited his father's domain of 5,000 koku and was made lord 
of Arako castle in preference to his older brother Toshihisa. 
As Nobunaga's fortunes rose, so did Toshiie's. In 1575, at the battle of 
Nagashino, he was placed in charge of a front-line regiment of fusileers. 
The harquebus was the latest military technology of the day, and Nobunaga 
routinely kept these regiments under his direct control. Placing Toshiie in 
charge was a temporary battle exigency, but at a time when subordinate 
generals frequently changed sides in mid-battle, it also represented another 
sign of Nobunaga's trust and confidence in his loyalty. 
'Domains were identified as large or small according to their value, not their physical 
size. In the 16th century this was commonly measured by the cash {kandaka) or rice {hyd) 
value of the taxes the land produced. The Arako fief of 2,000 kan in theory would have 
produced taxes valued at 2,000 kan of gold. 
tSassa Narimasa (d. 1588), a later Maeda nemesis. 
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Though the adversary in this case was a major daimyo, Takeda Katsu­
yori, Nobunaga's ambitions were threatened not so much by other daimyo 
as by the armies of the Ikko sect of Buddhism. Headquartered in Kyoto, 
the sect's leaders had sought (with varying degrees of success) to coordi­
nate the attempts of its adherents to keep autonomous control over their 
own districts. By the mid-1570Js the Ikko's main military forces were con­
centrated in the Hokuriku district, especially the provinces of Echizen and 
Kaga.2 It was to the defeat of these forces that Nobunaga now turned his 
attention. 
Toshiie, along with Shibata Katsuie and other Nobunaga retainers, 
played an important role in the conquest of these Ikko-held regions. 
Toshiie's battlefield success against the Ikko forces in Echizen province 
(modern-day Fukui prefecture) was rewarded handsomely. He was given 
a vastly larger fief—of 33,000 koku—at Fuchu (near modern Takefu city), 
carved out of the territory he had helped to conquer.3 
This fief represented Toshiie's first acquisition of territory outside the 
Arako region. But this was no transfer in the "potted plant daimyo" style, 
at least as that phrase is commonly understood. The image conveys a sense 
of a complete break with past holdings. That was not the case here, or later, 
during the initial Maeda entrance into the Noto Peninsula. Only after his 
initial arrival in Noto did Toshiie lose control of his old domains at Arako. 
Nobunaga's strategy of rewarding his generals in this fashion was really 
quite subtle, much more sensitive to the potential reactions of his followers 
than his heavy-handed reputation suggests. Lord and retainer were equally 
well served. First, of course, this approach rewarded military accomplish­
ment. In addition, it placed (relatively) trustworthy allies in charge of con­
quered lands. Nobunaga provided a strong incentive for men like Toshiie 
to take a new assignment—a greatly increased fief. While this incentive 
has often been remarked upon, the decision to grant the new fiefs in addi­
tion to lands already held eliminated any trepidations Toshiie and other 
generals might have had about improving their fortunes at the cost of a 
complete break with their traditional holdings. Finally, by granting new 
lands in this manner, Nobunaga accomplished his aims without allowing 
his subordinates to build large, contiguous domains that might serve as 
bases for potential opposition: the daimyo could not be at two places at the 
same time, and governing fragmented territories was a difficult and more 
tenuous game than controlling contiguous lands. 
At the time Toshiie entered Fuchu and later, when he was transferred 
to Noto, political and military power in the Hokuriku was fragmented 
and unstable. Both local leaders and those representing Oda Nobunaga's 
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emerging coalition actively competed for dominance. The major military 
divisions of the region in the spring of 1581 are shown in Map 3. 
In the early spring of 1581, Nobunaga simultaneously granted fiefs in 
Noto to Toshiie and two other retainers, Sugenoya Naganori and Fuku­
tomi Yukikiyo. He had previously granted half of Kashima county (kori) 
in Noto to the Cho family, powerful local notables since the middle ages. 
At somewhat greater distance, the men beside whom Toshiie fought in the 
battles to crush the Ikko forces remained influential in the area: the prov­
ince of Kaga was under Shibata Katsuie, and Sassa Narimasa was named 
overlord of Etchu in 15 81. 
While Nobunaga was alive, these men were all nominal allies, linked by 
their vertical ties to him. But those ties were tenuous at best, as suggested 
by Nobunaga's supplement to the Regulations for the Province of Echizen, 
which commanded that Toshiie and two other commanders, Sassa Nari­
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masa and Fuwa Mitsuharu, "act as Shibata's overseers. . . . Hence you 
shall report without duplicity on the good and bad points of his conduct, 
and Shibata shall report on the good and bad points of yours."4 Sugenoya, 
Fukutomi, Cho Tsuratatsu, and Toshiie shared a similar spy-on-thy-ally 
relationship in early 1581. Nobunaga's death severed the tie that bound 
them to a common cause and opened the way for full competition among 
the former brothers-in-arms. Consequently, Toshiie's ability to preserve 
his domain, much less expand it, now depended on his holding his forces 
at the ready, keeping a watchful eye on his neighbors and paying careful 
attention to the shifts in military alliances throughout Japan. 
There were potential indigenous threats as well. Local military leaders 
were still not fully reconciled to the new, outside rulers of the region. Some, 
like the Nukui family, had recently allied themselves with Nobunaga's 
powerful archenemy, Uesugi Kagekatsu. The military power of the Ikko 
sect and its local allies was waning; but they were still strong enough to be 
disruptive, especially when links to outside forces could be established. 
Even as Toshiie received his new fief in Noto, his possession of it 
was threatened, and his military mettle tested. In early 1581, Nobunaga 
ordered Toshiie, Shibata, and Sassa and his local allies, the Shinbo, to bring 
their forces to Kyoto. Seizing this opportunity, Uesugi invaded Etchu and 
sparked an uprising in the mountains of Kaga (spring 1582).5 Sassa and 
the Shinbo, soon followed by Shibata and Toshiie, were ordered back to 
defend their lands. Uesugi's army was thrown back, defeated at Uozu (in 
Etchu) in early summer 1582, and forced to retreat.6 When Nobunaga died 
in the midst of this campaign, Toshiie broke off his pursuit and returned 
home, fearing a revolt of former enemies in his domain.7 
Territorial Expansion 
When Toshiie first entered Noto, there was little to foretell that he 
would make his domain the largest in all Japan. The unstable environment 
certainly militated against such an enterprise. Yet the very turbulence and 
fragmentation of power in Kaga-Noto-Etchu contributed to the Maeda's 
eventual success as lords of Kaga han. The various earlier assaults of Uesugi 
and Shibata had largely destroyed the Ikko sect's main military base. Once 
the last Ikko uprising was suppressed in the spring of 1582, only small, 
generally isolated pockets of resistance remained. On the Noto Peninsula, 
Toshiie was clearly primus inter pares—a position he could preserve so long 
as he remained sensitive to the potential for resistance within his domain. 
Despite local and national instability, all but two counties in the con­
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Map 4. The Expansion of Maeda and Cho Domains in Kaga, Noto, and Etchu. 
tiguous provinces of Kaga, Noto, and Etchu were brought under Maeda 
control within 14 years. By 1600 those counties were in Maeda hands as 
well. Through a combination of military prowess, political astuteness, and 
favorable local conditions, the Maeda built and preserved a prominent 
position for themselves in early modern Japan. 
In light of the rapid growth of the domain and the volatile situation 
Toshiie initially encountered in Noto, one would expect that the Maeda 
added land primarily through direct conquest. But this was not the case. 
The most significant territorial acquisitions came through awards from the 
hegemons of Japan. 
On arrival in Noto, Toshiie established his headquarters at Inoyama in 
Hakui county. His camp was an old temple compound, but its water supply 
proved inadequate. Consequently he moved to Sugawara (Map 4), site of 
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a former medieval manor (shoen) and a major shrine, Sugawara Tenjin, 
where Kunida Yukinaga and other local warriors headquartered. Toshiie 
successfully drew these samurai into his band and granted a stipend (fuchi) 
to Yukinaga.8 
He was soon on the move again. In late summer 1581, Nobunaga 
granted Toshiie control of all Noto. Sugenoya and Fukutomi were trans­
ferred out of the province, and their domains given to Toshiie. Cho Tsura­
tatsu, a prominent local samurai and Nobunaga's ally, was ordered to serve 
Toshiie was not a foregone conclusion, and Hideyoshi initially interpreted 
the Maeda stance as hostile. 
In the Kaga-Noto area the most important conflict was that between 
After Nobunaga's assassination in 1582., Toyotomi Hideyoshi set about 
building his own hegemony over Japan. Hideyoshi's penchant for seeking 
compromise with his potential or former enemies, combined with Toshiie's 
careful attention to shifting balances of power, permitted the Maeda to 
maintain undiminished control over their domains and to play a major role 
in national affairs. 
The realignment of forces after Nobunaga's death pitted a number of 
his retainers against each other. Toshiie capitalized on these rivalries. In 
this, he had one great advantage: to help cement ties among Nobunaga's 
forces, Hideyoshi had taken two of Toshiie's daughters, Go and Kiku, as 
concubines.1 Those early personal ties proved useful in the months follow­
ing Nobunaga's death, easing the negotiation of a peaceful settlement be­
tween Toshiie and Hideyoshi.9 The rapproachment between Hideyoshi and 
Toshiie was not a foregone conclusion, and Hideyoshi initially interpreted 
the Maeda stance as hostile. 
In the Kaga-Noto area the most important conflict was that between 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Shibata Katsuie. Their major confrontation came 
at the battle of Shizugatake, in 1583. The Maeda forces, arrayed outside the 
"At this time the title was reserved for those in the service of a high official or warrior. 
A daimyo might himself be a yoriki, as Toshiie once was to Shibata Katsuie. Since half of 
Kashima county was bestowed on the Cho by Oda Nobunaga, independent of any relation­
ship to Maeda Toshiie, the Cho lords, although Maeda retainers and aides, were able to 
maintain a substantial degree of independence. The Cho fief was the last retainer fief to come 
under full direct han administration. This was accomplished only after a major disruption 
in 1667. The fief was actually taken over by the han in 1671. Conditions were unsettled for 
some time after, and the principal han reform, the Kaisaku ho, which had been enacted in 
other parts of the domain between 1651 and 1656, was not fully implemented there until 1679. 
See Shimode, Ishikawa, pp. 129,131-32, for a, general outline of these events. ltd Tasaburo 
takes the Cho as typical of enfeoffed retainers ("Kinsei shoki daimyo ryd"), but they were 
exceptional in the degree and duration of their autonomous administration of their lands. 
Even the fact that they had a fief in one contiguous holding was unusual. 
tKiku was an illegitimate child. 
 47 The Formation ofKaga Domain
actual battlefield, did not join with either side. But they were attacked by 
Hideyoshi's armies anyway, and pushed from their positions. Just as it ap­
peared that the Maeda would counterattack, they suddenly and completely 
withdrew. Although they retreated to Fuchu, Hideyoshi's forces remained 
in hot pursuit, and many of the Maeda fighting men lost their lives, includ­
ing several key retainers. Toshiie sent his fusileers out among Hideyoshi's 
advancing troops to harass them while he prepared his defenses, but ulti­
mately no climactic battle materialized. 
Hideyoshi offered a negotiated settlement, one that was quite gener­
ous. Perhaps Hideyoshi understood Toshiie's refusal to commit himself to 
either side. Toshiie certainly cannot be said to have acted decisively. Indeed, 
his apparent attempt to steer a middle course was typical of many of Nobu­
naga's retainers in the months following his assassination. There were, of 
course, good reasons to hesitate. Like a number of Nobunaga's generals, 
Toshiie had followed the custom of the time and sent family members as 
hostages to both the Toyotomi and the Shibata forces. Those hostages, held 
in warrant against any treachery and duplicity, were no doubt a consider­
ation. Past connections between the two men, symbolized by Hideyoshi's 
ties to two Maeda daughters, may also have influenced his decision. What­
ever the reason for Hideyoshi's unwillingness to fight it out with the Maeda, 
he met with Toshiie in 1584 and confirmed his possession of Noto. Later 
that year, Hideyoshi granted Toshiie northern Kaga (Ishikawa and Kahoku 
counties)/ 
Toshiie once again transferred headquarters. He occupied Oyama 
Gobo, the former center of the Kaga Ikko sect. Henceforth, the town was 
known as Kanazawa. Here Toshiie built his castle between the Sai and 
Asano rivers. Overlooking the Kaga Plain, naturally protected by the two 
rivers, Kanazawa was, from Hideyoshi's standpoint, an ideally located for­
tress for his new ally, protecting Echizen and the central provinces from 
northern invaders like the Uesugi. The new castle became the permanent 
administrative center of the domain.10 
No sooner had these events relieved the pressure on Toshiie to the south 
than he found himself confronting a threat from a different quarter, Etchu. 
Sassa Narimasa had continued to pacify his domains, successfully subdu­
ing the remnants of the local Ikko forces and developing a cooperative 
relationship with them.11 Although Sassa had sent troops to aid Hideyoshi 
'Iwasawa, Maeda Toshiie, pp. 92-103. According to Iwasawa, this "reward" indicated 
that Hideyoshi had made a deal with Toshiie before the battle of Shizugatake. But then why 
would he have attacked the Maeda? Since Toshiie had once had ties to Shibata, Hideyoshi 
may have wanted to ensure his removal from the battlefield. 
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at Shizugatake just a few months earlier, he now allied himself with Toku­
gawa Ieyasu (who was still a threat to Hideyoshi). Sharing a border with 
Toshiie (by this time firmly in Hideyoshi's camp) was bound to lead to a 
confrontation.12 
Early in the fall of 1584, Sassa ordered the Shinbo troops to invade 
Noto.13 Within the month Sassa's main forces invaded, too. By mid-
October he was poised to engage Toshiie's forces at Suenomori castle, in 
Hakui county. The fortification was surrounded and placed under siege. 
Sassa's first sallies took a heavy toll on the defenders, and part of the castle 
fell to his forces and was burned to the ground. 
Toshiie acted quickly on receiving news of the strike against Sueno­
mori, collecting forces at two other local castles, Tsubata and Matto. The 
day after Sassa's assault, these forces launched a counterattack. Although 
Toshiie's troops numbered only 2,500, he successfully moved on Sassa from 
the rear. When the dust settled, more than 2,000 soldiers had perished, but 
Sassa had been repulsed and sent packing back to Toyama.14 
As Toshiie's army took the offensive and pressed Sassa the following 
year, Uesugi forces, now under Uesugi Kagekatsu, once again invaded 
Etchu and forced Sassa to fight on two fronts.15 As a result of these battles, 
Sassa Narimasa's holdings in Etchu were considerably reduced. When he 
finally concluded a peace agreement with Hideyoshi, all he had left were 
Niikawa county and his castle at Toyama. By 1585 Ieyasu's ally had been 
rendered ineffective. For Toshiie and the Maeda, Narimasa's fall meant a 
much greater degree of security. 
Suenomori was the last battle to take place within Maeda territory. 
A serendipitous combination of their own military skill and nationwide 
developments worked to the Maeda's advantage. They had had to hold 
their domain in the midst of full wartime conditions for only four years. 
To be sure, their military activities were isot over: Maeda troops assisted 
in Hideyoshi's national campaigns to subdue the Tohoku, Kanto, Shikoku, 
and Kyushu daimyo over the next decade; they supported Hideyoshi's 
Korean expeditions; and in 1599 Maeda forces attacked southern Kaga 
in preparation for the battle at Sekigahara. But for all practical purposes, 
the Hokuriku region was now pacified. It had witnessed the penultimate 
competition among its local daimyo, freeing the Maeda to devote greater 
energies to the creation of a stable administration. 
By this time Maeda Toshinaga, Toshiie's eldest son, had risen to some 
prominence in his own right. He, too, served Nobunaga, and with Toshiie, 
Shibata, and others, invaded and pacified Echizen. Toshinaga had mar­
ried Hosen'in, Nobunaga's daughter, in 1581. This union cemented ties 
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between the two families and represented an expression of confidence in 
both Toshiie and Toshinaga. 
Shortly after Toshiie transferred to Noto in 1581, Toshinaga took pos­
session of his father's fief at Fuchu as well as the old family holdings around 
Arako. Once again Nobunaga's strategy of transfer subtly met the needs of 
his daimyo as well as his own. The family's retention of control in the old 
domain must have eased Toshiie's mind as he moved into Noto. At least 
the transition to the new domain did not represent an abrupt and complete 
change in fiefs. Toshinaga was en route to Fuchu soon after his wedding 
when Akechi Mitsuhide's treachery destroyed the unity of the Oda forces 
and cast doubt on the future of all Nobunaga's generals. 
The extent of the disruption caused by Nobunaga's assassination, even 
within the ranks of one daimyo's organization, is well illustrated by the 
challenge Toshinaga next faced. When news of the assassination reached 
him, he sent two trusted emissaries to take Hosen'in to the Maeda's home 
base, Arako castle, while he made his way to Fuchu. As he sought to re­
spond to the confusion following Nobunaga's death, many of his soldiers 
deserted him, concerned about a possible attack by Akechi's forces.16 
Toshinaga survived this embarrassment and continued to be treated 
with respect. In 1583, after the confrontation at Shizugatake, his fief in 
Fuchu was exchanged for a larger one, of 40,000 koku, in Kaga province. 
Toshinaga occupied the castle at Matto. Two years later, after the Maeda's 
pacification of Etchu, Hideyoshi awarded Toshinaga three of the coun­
ties formerly held by Sassa Narimasa: Imizu, Tonami, and Neii. Toshinaga 
moved to the fortress at Moriyama, where he remained until moving to 
Toyama castle in 1597. At this time the domain at Matto nominally reverted 
to Hideyoshi, but a Maeda retainer, Teranishi Hidenori, was named to ad­
minister it.* When Sassa Narimasa was ordered to Higo province in 1587, 
Niikawa county, too, was "temporarily" placed under Maeda jurisdiction. 
(In 1613 the Bakufu confirmed in writing that Niikawa was henceforth a 
permanent part of the Maeda domains.)t 
In 1598 Toshiie retired in favor of Toshinaga. The territorial expansion 
of the domain was largely completed: it embraced the bulk of Kaga and 
all of Noto, land that had been acquired by appointment, and most of 
Etchu, land added by direct conquest. Only two counties in southern Kaga 
remained to be incorporated by Toshinaga. 
'Teranishi was formally appointed daikan, or intendant (Held, Katto dokushi nempyoy 
P- *7<>). 
tThis confirmed what was apparently an oral promise by Hideyoshi that the Maeda 
would retain possession of Niikawa (IKS, 2: 200-201). 
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Had substantial territorial acquisition been all Toshiie had accom­
plished, he would have had a good deal of which to be proud. In fact, 
he had achieved much more. The size of his domain and his martiaJ skills 
made him one of the most influential men in Japan. In addition, his val­
iant and reliable support of Hideyoshi made him a trusted ally. He became 
a prominent actor in Hideyoshi's emergent hegemony. He was entrusted 
with guarding the imperial capital, Kyoto, while Hideyoshi took the main 
body of his forces south to subdue Kyushu in 1585. Respect for Toshiie's 
skill and position culminated in his appointment as one of the Five Elders 
charged with protecting thefive-year-old Toyotomi heir immediately after 
Hideyoshi's death. Another, less formal indication of Hideyoshi's feelings 
for Toshiie came in a comment he made about his adopted daughter, one 
of Toshiie's children, that "were she a man, I would make her Kampaku 
[Regent]."17 Toshiie's closeness to Hideyoshi and his preeminence among 
the daimyo are pointedly represented in the loyalty oath Hideyoshi elicited 
from his most prominent generals following the Higo Rebellion of 1588. 
Like most of the 2.9 signatories, Toshiie took the Toyotomi surname and 
signed the document as Toyotomi Toshiie. More important, he was one 
of the first six, the most prominent signatories, and one of the only three 
among the six (along with Tokugawa Ieyasu and Ukita Hideie) who were 
not Oda or Toyotomi relatives.18 
Preserving the Domain 
If the general's tent and sword capture the spirit of the first stage of 
domain formation, the negotiating table might best characterize the sec­
ond. After Toshiie's death in 1599, Toshinaga replaced him as one of the 
Five Elders. Yet Toshinaga's role in national politics was not as signifi­
cant as this appointment suggests. Difficulties at home prevented him from 
fully participating in the events that established Tokugawa Ieyasu's preemi­
nence; his primary accomplishment thereafter was to defend and preserve 
Maeda control of the domain. That mission continued to be important 
during the reign of his successor, Toshitsune. The domain's location and 
military prominence, along with a generally low profile in national poli­
tics and artful negotiation at critical junctures, ensured expansion into 
southern Kaga and the preservation of the domain. 
Challenge to the integrity of the domain surely came sooner than Toshi­
naga would have liked. Some months before his death in 1599, Toshiie 
successfully warded off an attempt by Ieyasu to engineer his transfer to 
Shikoku.19 His passing precipitated another threat to Maeda rule. 
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In late 1599, as Ieyasu prepared for direct confrontation with Hide­
yoshi's heirs at the epochal battle at Sekigahara, rumors cast doubt on 
Toshinaga's loyalty to the Tokugawa house. Ieyasu issued orders to chas­
tise Toshinaga, but intensive negotiations under the direction of the trusted 
Maeda retainer Yokoyama Nagachika culminated in a peaceful solution. 
Hoshun'in, Toshinaga's mother, was pledged as a hostage to Ieyasu, the 
first in what became a universal Tokugawa system of hostage-holding in 
1634/ The agreement further specified that Ieyasu's granddaughter would 
marry Toshinaga's younger brother Toshitsune, who also became heir ap­
parent to the Maeda house.20 This new Tokugawa influence over Toshi­
naga and his successor clearly reduced the potential for Maeda opposition, 
but (as became clear a decade or so later) it did not guarantee Tokugawa 
confidence in Toshinaga or the Maeda. 
The rumors may have tarnished the image of the Maeda and instilled 
a measure of humility in Toshinaga, but the incident could not obviate 
Ieyasu's need for active Maeda support. Toshinaga and another younger 
brother, Toshimasa, commanded a major military force and were poten­
tially useful allies against Toyotomi partisans in the Hokuriku region. After 
Ieyasu's victory at Sekigahara, such considerations, as well as the Maeda's 
meritorious service even before that decisive battle, led to the last of their 
territorial acquisitions. 
Some historians wonder about Toshinaga's being so richly rewarded 
by the Tokugawa when he did not even participate in the decisive battle at 
Sekigahara, but the Maeda were in fact involved in important related cam­
paigns.21 They were active in the aborted Aizu forays against the Uesugi 
in June, but more important, they defeated their southern neighbors. Both 
Yamaguchi Munenaga and Niwa Nagashige, the overlords of Enuma and 
Nomi counties, allied themselves with the anti-Tokugawa Western army. 
The Maeda's destruction of this army in August removed any threat to the 
Tokugawa from that quarter. 
Ieyasu could not have been more pleased. He wrote to Hoshun'in in 
fylo, "Recently I learned of Toshinaga's exploits at [Daishoji] in Kaga. He 
is being very faithful to me. I am much pleased by this news. Moreover, 
once we have broken up the northland, I shall reward him with it."22 
*Shimode, Ishikawa, p. 121. Hoshun'in was in Fushimi castle at the time of Toshiie's 
death and during Yokoyama's negotiation with Ieyasu. She returned to Kaga in the spring 
of 1600 before being dispatched to Edo in mid-year (Iwasawa, Maeda Toshiie, pp. 373—74). 
Though hostage-taking was common at this time, it had not developed into a means of en­
suring a daimyo's family's exclusive loyalty to the Bakufu. Giving a hostage to the Tokugawa 
did not exclude the possibility of sending other family members to another important lord. 
Toshinaga's brother Toshimasa sent a hostage to Osaka, headquarters of the Tokugawa's 
rivals, even while his mother was in Edo. 
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All the same, when Ieyasu sent orders for the Maeda forces to advance 
south to join the Tokugawa Eastern army, there was significant hesitation 
in the Maeda ranks. Toshimasa failed to dispatch his troops to march with 
those of Toshinaga. When Toshinaga at last set out by himself, he arrived 
after the battle's outcome had been decided/ 
Though Toshimasa's refusal to participate and Toshinaga's late arrival 
at Sekigahara must have disturbed Ieyasu, neither proved an obstacle to 
his ultimate success, and he had good reason to be generous. The Maeda, 
especially Toshinaga, had served well in preparatory campaigns, and they 
represented a formidable military force. With his recent victory over the 
Western army and the challenge of consolidating his success, Ieyasu was 
once again in a position to prefer the carrot to the stick. Toshinaga was 
rewarded with Nomi and Enuma counties. Even the unresponsive Toshi­
masa was dealt with in a manner calculated to earn Toshinaga's continued 
support or, at least, not alienate him. Though Toshimasa became a ronin 
(masterless samurai), his fief in Noto, inherited from Toshiie, remained in 
the family, as part of Toshinaga's domain. 
Strictly speaking, before this time it is incorrect to speak of "Kaga 
domain," because the Maeda's lands, like those of other great families 
such as the Shimazu of Satsuma, were divided into separate domains, each 
under the leadership of a prominent member of the family. From both the 
standpoint of relations with the hegemons and local administration, the 
domains were distinct. Military levies on each of the Maeda daimyo were 
calculated separately. As Toshimasa's actions indicate, each responded to 
the events of the day based on his own perceptions of self-interest; and each 
(as we shall see in following chapters) made his own decisions regarding 
local administration. Sekigahara changed all that. With the reallocation of 
fiefs, one overlord alone, Toshinaga, now controlled a single domain that 
spanned three provinces and was valued at 1,200,000 koku. 
Five years later, in 1605, Toshinaga retired because of ill health and 
moved to Toyama castle. He left the domain in the hands of his twelve-
year-old brother, Toshitsune. Toshitsune had been born in Kanazawa castle 
in 1593, but had been sent to Moriyama castle to be raised by Maeda Naga­
tane. When Niikawa county was finally transferred to the Maeda in 1595, 
it had been formally given to the child Toshitsune, not his father.+ At the 
'Scholars offer different reasons for Toshimasa's failure to follow Ieyasu's orders, but 
there is some difficulty with each of the major>explanations. It seems likely that his actions 
were in some way linked to the fact that his wife, daughter of Gamo Ujisato, had recently 
been sent to Osaka to stand hostage to Ishida Mitsunari and his allies of the Western Army 
(XS, 2:167,170; Heki, [Kaitei zoho) Kano, p. 853). 
t Toshinaga continued to be regarded with some suspicion in Edo. His mother was re­
tained as a hostage. Honda Masashige was employed as an intermediary in the dispute with 
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conclusion of hostilities with Niwa Nagashige (before Sekigahara), young 
Toshitsune was sent to Komatsu as Niwa's hostage. The following month, 
when Niwa lost his fief, it was formally transferred to Toshitsune (Niwa 
became his castellan). 
Toshitsune was bold but not foolhardy. He valiantly led his forces in the 
Osaka campaigns against the remnants of the Toyotomi house. But the time 
had passed when he could make his major mark as a military figure. There 
were no battles between Sekigahara and Osaka, and only one other during 
the remainder of the century (Shimabara, in 1637). The Tokugawa hege­
mony brought a long-standing peace to Japan. Consequently, Toshitsune's 
principal accomplishments lay in creating an administrative foundation for 
the domain. 
His first important role—the one that concerns us at the moment—was 
as conservator of the Maeda holdings. A few years after his installation as 
daimyo, a series of events sensitized him to the link between the domain's 
fate and that of the Tokugawa house. In 1611, still a long way from his 
deathbed, Toshinaga issued a testament (ikun) in which he stressed the 
need for Toshitsune and all of the retainer band to be loyal to the Toku­
gawa house. This followed by only a month Ieyasu's extraction of a pledge 
of loyalty from 2.1 of the great daimyo, including Toshitsune. 
If these reminders were not adequate to instill a consciousness in him of 
how intimately the fortunes of his own house were tied to the Tokugawa's, 
demands that Niikawa county be returned to the Bakufu provided con­
crete evidence of the kinds of pressures the Tokugawa could bring to bear 
on the domain. Over a number of months the Bakufu placed the Maeda 
under a combination of overt and covert pressures to return that part of 
their domains. Aided largely by the astute negotiations of Senior Councillor 
Honda Masashige, the Bakufu efforts were thwarted in 1614.23 
The Maeda position was again seriously threatened in 1631. In that year 
Toshitsune ordered various repairs made to Kanazawa castle, purchased 
military equipment, and took other steps to improve the domain's martial 
capabilities. To Bakufu authorities it appeared that he was preparing to take 
advantage of Shogun Tokugawa Hidetada's illness to challenge the Toku­
gawa house openly. After debating whether or not to resist the anticipated 
Bakufu expedition to chastise Kaga, Toshitsune came down on the side of 
the Bakufu. This took place only after some substantial internal debate. Similar tensions arose 
before the Osaka campaigns. (See 6n  o Mitsuhiko, "Maeda Toshitsune.") Like Toshiie, the 
new daimyo's mentor, Maeda Nagatane, was from Owari province. If he was related to 
Toshiie by blood, it was probably not a close relationship, since Nagatane, also called Taima, 
married one of Toshiie's daughters. Nagatane's family was one of the more important of the 
han's retainer houses (Heki, [Kaitei zoho] Kan6, p. 855). 
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peace. Once again, a prominent retainer, Yokoyama Yasuharu, negotiated 
with Bakufu authorities. And once again, mediation proved successful. In­
stead of a Bakufu assault, betrothal to another Tokugawa daughter further 
bound the Maeda to the shogunate. Toshitsune's heir, Mitsutaka, was mar­
ried to Shogun Iemitsu's adopted daughter, commencing a regular pattern 
of intermarriage with the Tokugawa.24 Although the requirement to reside 
in Edo, the shogunal capital, was not formally a part of the settlement, the 
fact that Toshitsune henceforth spent most of his time there was almost 
certainly related to the resolution of this dispute.25 
Toshitsune's policy of preserving what the Maeda already held rather 
than recklessly risking it through a confrontation with the Bakufu was the 
capstone of a policy that had guided both Toshiie and Toshinaga in their 
relations with Hideyoshi and Ieyasu. Through it, the Maeda retained their 
position as the largest daimyo. Only the Bakufu controlled more land. Yet 
the heated (sometimes bloody) debates that took place in the Maeda coun­
cils over the proper response to signs of Bakufu mistrust attest that even 
at this late date, and despite paper pledges to the contrary, daimyo (and 
their retainers) saw themselves as autonomous lords. They did not conceive 
of themselves as mere cogs in the shogunal administrative machinery. The 
sixteenth-century conception of the daimyo as the embodiment of pub­
lic authority (kogi) survived the Oda and Toyotomi efforts to encompass 
a national public authority; and daimyo still contested similar Tokugawa 
attempts to coopt that position three decades after Sekigahara.26 
These debates were not the only sign of the Maeda's desire to prevent 
themselves from becoming completely subservient to the Bakufu. Toshi­
tsune took one additional step designed to protect the domain from reduc­
tion or outright confiscation by the Tokugawa: in 1639 he retired. 
Toshitsune had tried several times before to obtain official permission 
to retire.27 From the time he was suspected of opposition to Hidetada, he 
had tried to remove himself as a potential irritant to the Tokugawa and 
replace himself with his eldest son, Mitsutaka, in whom the Bakufu au­
thorities had more trust. Mitsutaka's ties, by blood and marriage, to the 
Tokugawa house alone might have served to relieve the Bakufu's anxi­
eties—his mother was Hidetada's daughter, and he was married to Shogun 
Tokugawa Iemitsu's adopted daughter—but he had also shown consistent 
loyalty to the Tokugawa.28 In retirement, and with his trusted son as han 
lord, Toshitsune may have also hoped to gain a degree of freedom from the 
close scrutiny to which the Bakufu subjected him. 
But Toshitsune had more in mind than merely maneuvering Mitsutaka 
into position to relieve the personal pressure on him and on the Maeda as 
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a whole. As a condition of his retirement, he wanted to establish two rela­
tively large branchfiefs under separate Maeda lineages. This request, which 
figured prominently among his many petitions for permission to retire, was 
designed to protect the Maeda line.29 With two lines of the family for­
mally recognized by the Bakufu and established in separate domains, each 
large enough to make its male members credible candidates for daimyo of 
the main fief, the domain would gain a measure of protection against the 
lack of an appropriate heir (someone who was clearly incompetent) or any 
heir at all. Toshitsune must have been well aware that of 106 attainders 
between 1601 and 1639, the most common cause—about one-third (35)— 
was interrupted succession.30 
Under the provisions of the Laws of the Military Houses, the ques­
tion of who was a suitable heir to daimyo status was a political decision 
arbitrated by the Bakufu. In principle the shogun could take any action he 
wished, but to have discontinued a daimyo line without apparent reason 
when there was a suitable heir would have alienated many daimyo. To that 
extent, even the Bakufu had to pay some attention to political realities. 
Since there was little likelihood that every line of the Maeda family 
would lack a truly suitable heir, the strategy of establishing large branch 
fiefs gave the Maeda an inexpensive measure of protection against the con­
fiscation of their domain. This tactic was employed by the Bakufu itself, 
through the designation of three branch houses, the gosanke, and by many 
other daimyo throughout Japan to preserve their lineage.31 Such precedents 
encouraged Toshitsune to take the same action, to the same end/ 
Toshitsune was finally granted his wish in the spring of 1639. At the age 
of forty-seven, he resigned, reserving lands of 2.2.5,000 koku centered on 
Komatsu to sustain himself in his retirement. He granted a fief of 70,000 
koku, Daishoji han, mostly in Enuma county in Kaga, to his third son, 
Toshiharu; a 100,000-koku fief, Toyama, largely in Neii and Niikawa 
counties, to his second son, Toshitsugu; and the remainder of the domain 
to his eldest son, Mitsutaka. 
The creation of two large branch fiefs also secured some military ad­
vantage. Although the Bakufu had issued orders in 1615 that each province 
should maintain only one castle, the Maeda kept at least six castles in 
operation through 1638.32 In positioning his new fiefs, Toshitsune sagely 
* Ironically, the Maeda never had to recruit an heir from these branch fiefs. On the other 
hand, the main branch of the family supplied successors for one of the large branch fiefs, 
Daishdji han, on five occasions after its formation, and for the other, Toyama han, on one 
occasion. At four other times Daishdji han provided heirs to Toyama han and Nanokaichi 
han, the small domain (about 10,000 koku) ruled by the line of Maeda Toshitaka, fifth son of 
Toshiic. (Wakabayashi, Kinsei komonjo saiho, p. 97.) 
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blocked the traditional routes of access to northern Kaga and the Noto 
Peninsula.* 
There was only one significant change in Kaga domain's territorial con­
figuration afterward, and this was aimed at facilitating the administration 
of the branch domains. In 1660 Toyama han exchanged 20,000 koku of 
land in Nomi county for villages in Niikawa, making all of its territory 
contiguous. To the same end, Daishoji exchanged its 4,300 koku in Etchu 
for the remainder of Enuma and six villages in Nomi.f 
Conclusion 
The Maeda, under Toshiie, Toshinaga, and Toshitsune, accomplished 
what few other daimyo could. Between 15 81 and 1640, an era of great in­
security, they built the largest domain outside the Tokugawa house lands. 
That they were able to preserve this vast property they owed to their astute 
exercise of military skill and political wits. 
Political and military power in Kaga, Noto, and Etchu was splintered 
at the time of Toshiie's arrival. Fragmented authority substantially reduced 
the potential for concerted local opposition to Maeda rule. Toshiie and 
Toshinaga successfully dealt with hostile neighbors through a combination 
of military strength and adroit political maneuvering. The Maeda and their 
allies defeated Uesugi, Sassa, Yamaguchi, and Niwa. Toshiie maintained a 
studied neutrality while Hideyoshi removed Shibata Katsuie. 
The Maeda negotiated a successful relationship with each of the day's 
leading generals, Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa 
Ieyasu. They preserved their fief during the reigns of Hideyoshi and the 
first Tokugawa shoguns, when most daimyo houses typically forfeited at 
least part of their domains or were transferred to new locations. 
Political astuteness saved the domain from possible confiscation or re­
duction on several occasions. Foremost in this effort was the Maeda's 
policy of seeking to explain their position to the Bakufu and resolve dis­
*The castle at Toyama was maintained throughout the Edo period. In 1639 the signifi­
cance of Daishoji castle was apparently reduced. Whether or not it deserved to be called a 
castle and its surrounding area a castle town, as some contemporaries did, is debatable. There 
is no doubt that a military encampment remained there. (Held, [Kaitei zoho] Kano, p. 523; 
Kaga shi shi, 720-23.) 
t There were changes in the relatively small scattered holdings of the Bakufu and other 
daimyo within Kaga, Noto, and Etchu in later years, but these were not significant. The only 
loss of territory was when 18 villages in the Hakusan region became Bakufu territory (tenryo) 
in 1664 after all attempts to settle a boundary dispute between the Kaga and Fukui domains 
failed. Thereafter the territorial integrity of the domain was successfully maintained well into 
the 19th century, until after the Meiji Restoration. 
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putes in a peaceful fashion rather than challenging Tokugawa military 
power. The creation of branch fiefs ensured that the domain would not be 
lost for lack of a suitable heir and helped the Maeda maintain additional 
fortifications. Within domain councils the Maeda kept open the option 
of outright opposition, suggesting that they and other daimyo still saw 
themselves as autonomous lords. 
While dealing with these problems, the Maeda also responded to other, 
nonmilitary issues. Ultimately, preserving the domain depended as much 
on the successful management of its people and resources as it did on 
the astute management of relations with the major military figures of the 
day. The institutions for ruling a domain in wartime proved ill-suited to 
the demands of local administration in the dawning era of peace. New 
means were required to secure a tranquil domain and to create an adequate 
financial base for its administration. Such institutions developed gradually 
through trial, error, and much experimentation. It is to a consideration of 
this process that we now turn our attention. 
Chapter 3

Kaga Land Surveys

More than any other policy, the Taiko kenchi is treated as though the emerging state actually possessed the authority to intrude into 
the domestic affairs of each domain. Surveys were implemented in Hide­
yoshi's own domains beginning in 1583, and he presumably conducted 
them nationwide thereafter. At the highest level, they represent the dawn 
of a new kind of national authority, one that stemmed from a single figure 
who held powers so great that he could bend even the most entrenched and 
hostile daimyo to his will in the administration of their domains. On this 
interpretation, Hideyoshi was far more than a leader primus inter pares; it 
celebrates a man who possessed truly national administrative authority. 
There is some confirmation of this picture. Survey documents in many 
parts of Japan do show some similarity, evidence for many that they reflect 
nationally standardized procedures. And indeed many of these documents 
are very impressive on their face: they contain much detail, the measure­
ments appear to be precise, and the assessments seem to be based on differ­
ences in soil fertility. These characteristics add to the impression that they 
were compiled in compliance with Hideyoshi's specific orders and resulted 
from actual investigations by his designated surveyors. 
The broad geographic and social impact ascribed to surveys makes 
a discussion of their use in Kaga a logical preface to an examination of 
the domain's institutional growth and its sources. The domain's survey 
methods developed for the most part in, thefirst period of institutional evo­
lution, 1581-1600. Only minor refinements took place during the second 
period, 1600-1626, the years in which the most systematic survey efforts 
were made. 
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Assessing the impact of land surveys is largely a technical question. If 
surveys can be found adequate to the tasks scholars have assigned them, 
and if they were implemented in accord with central directives, the case for 
an effective national authority would be strengthened, as would the case 
for rapid social, political, and economic change at the behest of Japan's 
late-sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-century hegemons. If not, we have 
evidence of more decentralized foci of change and a relatively gradual shift 
in policies that were more in tune with local conditions/ 
Kaga's Earliest Land Surveys 
Considering how important land surveys were in determining the tax 
base, measuring fiefs granted to retainers, and establishing han control over 
villages, it is surprising that scholars have only recently devoted substan­
tial energies to the study of Kaga han's early land surveys.1 This neglect is 
even more surprising given the emphasis scholars place on their social and 
political significance in the development of characteristically early modern 
institutions. 
The common assessment is that Kaga's land surveys were conducted in 
accord with Toyotomi Hideyoshi's Taikd kenchi.2 Less commonly stressed 
is the evidence that land surveys were undertaken by an emissary of Oda 
Nobunaga in 1581 or 1582.3 In either case, the predictable conclusion is that 
the Kaga land surveys fit the "classic" Taiko kenchi pattern: they recorded 
the size of each field in a village, based on actual measurements by the 
domain officials; grade of the field, based on a thorough investigation of 
its yields; the field's official assessed value, based on its size and grade; and 
the name of the landholder.4 
As James McClain puts it in his study of Kanazawa, Kaga han's castle 
town: 
The Maeda daimyo acted to prevent the enfeoffed retainers from putting down 
permanent roots in the countryside. The opening move was a set of cadastral sur­
*The various terms used in the documents describing the amount of land in a Village and 
arriving at its assessed value—kenchicho, mizucho, nawauchicho, kancho—clearly cannot 
be narrowly understood as indicating a detailed measurement by domain officials. Likewise 
the term kenchi had a broad meaning, not a narrow and technical one. It referred to a variety 
of different processes used to determine land area and value. That fact, as we shall see, has 
important implications for our understanding of the role of "surveys" in Kaga domain and 
their relationship to national survey edicts. It is with some misgiving, then, that I continue 
to refer to "land survey" or "survey documents" in the pages that follow. I use these terms 
as synonyms for land investigations. By using "survey," I do not wish to imply the use of the 
kind of procedures commonly associated with the Taiko kenchi or any similar survey. 
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veys. . .  . As elsewhere, the cadastral surveys in Kaga domain represented the 
daimyo's claim to ultimate proprietary authority within the domain and demon­
strated his right to intervene in the affairs of his vassal's fiefs. Beyond this, the 
surveys also created status distinctions between the peasants, who were listed on 
the survey documents, and the bushi, who were carried on the Maeda's roster of fief 
holders and stipendiaries—a distinction that was reinforced by the sword hunts of 
the 1580s and 1590s.5 
Despite the broad acceptance of such propositions, they break down 
when the Maeda land surveys are examined in the context of Kaga han's 
institutional development. It is to that task that we now turn. 
Since Etchu was under the jurisdiction of Maeda Toshinaga, not 
Toshiie, throughout most of the domain's first period of institutional de­
velopment, and since it continued to be treated (at least in the area of our 
concern) in a distinctive fashion, it is best discussed separately from Kaga 
and Noto. Nonetheless, both regions had this in common: the evidence 
for the implementing of nationally standardized land surveys is very weak 
during the first years of their rule and nonexistent thereafter. Even within 
one domain the standardization of procedures was not accomplished. In 
addition, the domain lords did not make use of actual measurements, and 
the methods employed were incapable of serving some of the purposes 
commonly associated with land surveys (e.g., the assignment of tenure to 
individual households and identification of which villagers held legal status 
as full village members). 
Kaga and Noto 
Table 1 lists nine early land survey documents for the provinces of 
Kaga and Noto by date and location.6 These are the documents that are 
mustered as proof that central political authority effectively reached into 
the domain's domestic administrative affairs. But the evidence is severely 
weakened by three considerations. 
First, three of the villages, Haneda, Nagata, and Hayashi, were not part 
of the Maeda domains at the time. These were not Maeda surveys. 
Second, two of the other villages, Mijiro and Notobe Kami, were in the 
domain of the Cho family. Although the Cho were vassals of the Maeda, 
their fief predated Toshiie's entry into Noto, and they maintained an un­
usually high degree of administrative autonomy. That they were the only 
retainers to have surveyed their own lands independently is one indica­
tion of that autonomy.7 Consequently, the Cho land surveys cannot be 
considered representative. 
Third, three of the four remaining surveys were conducted in 1582, 
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TABLE 1 
Early Land Survey Documents of Kaga and Noto, 1581—98 
Date Village and county Province Remarks 
1581.7.25 Haneda, Nomi Kaga Pre-Maeda 
1582.3.25 Kokubu, Kashima Noto 
1582.8.8 Fukuno, Hakui Noto 
1582.11.20 Kumabuchi, Kashima Noto 
1583.9.22 Okinami, Fugeshi Noto 
1591.9.21 Nagata, Nomi Kaga Pre-Maeda 
1592.9.11 Mijiro, Kashima Noto Cho domain 
1592.10.1 Notobe Kami, Kashima Noto Cho domain 
1598.7 Hayashi, Enuma Kaga Pre-Maeda 
SOURCES : Kokufu son shi, pp. 347-48; Oda Kichinojo, Kaga-han, pp. 219-21, 224-25; KHNK, 1: 
387-467; Kigoshi, "Maeda," p. z i n . i . 
which is too early for an inference of a centrally directed operation. In 
fact, Hideyoshi was just beginning to survey his own domains by 1583 and 
had not yet ordered surveys outside his home base. Furthermore, Toshiie 
did not achieve his rapprochement with Hideyoshi until early spring 1583. 
Consequently, the only survey that could possibly be related to orders from 
Hideyoshi is the one conducted in Okinami in 1583. Since the Maeda had 
already made their own surveys by then, the Okinami survey more likely 
followed an existing local survey pattern than a new procedure attributable 
to Hideyoshi's influence. 
From the outset, then, the evidence for central initiative in the Kaga 
surveys is weak. It is still more problematical because the survey documents 
differ in important ways from the usual format of Taiko kenchi records. 
Moreover, the Maeda could not have used these surveys to advance the 
purposes to which Taiko kenchi land registers are said to have been put. 
Let us examine the Maeda's documents more closely. 
The three surveys that can clearly be taken as representative of the 
earliest Maeda efforts—for Kokubu, Fukuno, and Kumabuchi villages— 
are not all of a type, suggesting that the Maeda were experimenting with 
different means of investigating land and determining the tax value of vil­
lages. In the Kokubu case, the officials prepared two different records.8 The 
first lists the size and grade of each field (but not its type); the second lists 
the total holdings of each cultivator by land type, the estimated yield for 
his dry fields, and the estimated yield for the total village area. The yields 
for dry fields vary a bit from holder to holder but are generally about 1.1 to 
1.2 bales (hyd) of rice per tan. (At this time a bale would have held about 
1.5 bushels.) The average official yield for the whole village was about three 
bales per tan. Although field quality was rated (superior, average, inferior, 
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low-grade inferior), there is no indication of a corresponding official yield 
(todai, kokumori) for each grade. 
Unlike the Kokubu survey, the Fukuno and Kumabuchi village docu­
ments contain no indication of land quality, nor do they estimate a total 
village yield. Since one of the survey magistrates (kenchi bugyo) for Kuma­
buchi also participated in the Kokubu village survey, this difference is 
especially interesting. The inconsistency suggests that authorities had not 
yet determined a specific model for conducting surveys or reporting results. 
These surveys were rough and ready, recording rather imprecise mea­
surements. Indeed, they are much like what Japanese scholars call sashi­
dashi, that is, survey results reported to the domain by the village. This 
imprecision is evident in all three documents. 
For a start, there is an obvious and gross rounding of the figures in 
two of the documents. All the entries involving bu in the Kumabuchi and 
Fukuno surveys are expressed in units of five or ten (15 bu, 20 bu, 25 bu, 
etc.). Though five bu is not a large area (just under 0.025 acre), in most 
later documents finer measurements were the rule, not the exception.* 
The Kokubu survey cannot be faulted on this count, for it does give odd 
numbers of bu. In this regard, it is as detailed as the Taiko kenchi registers 
that are generally considered to be actual measurements.9 However, this 
document, like the others, does use rough units of measure for areas that 
were greater than several bu but smaller than a tan. Entries are expressed 
in units called dot, ban, and sho (literally "large," "half," and "small"), 
or, respectively, about two-thirds, one-half, and one-third of a tan. Local 
scholars consider the use of such units an indication of estimation and a 
sign that the documents were not based on actual measurement.10 
At best, then, these kenchi can be considered approximations of how 
much arable and residential land the three villages contained. We do not 
know what steps the surveyors took, if any at all, to gather or verify the 
data. Indeed, it is probable that the survey magistrates merely drew the 
documents up from data submitted by village or district representatives.11 
Though the earliest documents record the names of villagers, they are 
clearly exceptional. Most extant survey records do not contain this level of 
detail. They also do not list measurements and land grades for individual 
'This is true also for later documents in areas of Japan more closely approximating the 
standard form of Taiko kenchi reporting. Even assuming a precise measurement was made, 
and the figures were then rounded off, the distortions would have been great. The practice in 
this era was simply to drop uneven amounts, resulting in a substantial understatement of the 
area measured. See Brown, "Mismeasure of Land," pp. 134-35. 
 63 Kaga Land Surveys
plots of land. In fact, later evidence indicates that the domain was not at all 
interested in dealing directly with individual villagers or parcels of land. 
The typical survey document for Kaga han notifies the village as a 
whole of its official assessed area or productive value. The style is simple 
and straightforward. The 1586 document (uchiwatashijo) for Kumabuchi 
village, for example, reads in total: "Land Survey of Kumabuchi Village in 
Onomi District, Kashima County. Amount: 8 chb, 7 tan, n  o k  ; paddy, 
dry field, residential lands, all inclusive. Within this area, 6 tan, 20 bu, is 
wasteland. Based on a survey of the daimyo's fields as above, this land is 
conveyed to the villagers as stated. Tensho 14.4.10. Hashizume Shoemon, 
Mitamura Sanai, Watanabe Hikozaemon, Tatsukawa Tonai. To the vil­
lagers of Kumabuchi Village in Onomi District."12 As we see, the document 
merely states where the village was; how much land there was and what 
share of that was unproductive; when the document was issued; and who 
the survey magistrates were. (For another example, see Fig. 1.) 
Based on these documents, the argument that the domain was at this 
point following a central directive to make field-by-field measures and 
record the names of cultivators in the registers is untenable. There is no 
concern here to confirm or establish the cultivator of the land as the legally 
responsible taxpayer or to define a legal class position for any families. 
These documents provide no evidence that the domain authorities saw the 
early surveys as a device to list villagers and distinguish them from war­
riors and townsmen. The surveyors' concern was simply to establish a tax 
base for each village. 
The Kumabuchi document is the one instance in which we can compare 
the results of a later survey with an earlier, more detailed register. From 
a look at the survey of the village in 1582, it is clear that the estimates for 
that year formed the basis for calculating the village's new (1586) assessed 
value: the 1586 total of 8 did, 7 tan, n  o bu, is only five bu greater than the 
1582 total. Plainly, despite strong evidence that the 1582 document was a 
rough estimate of the size of the village's taxable lands, domain surveyors 
did not conduct an actual measurement of Kumabuchi village in 1586 but 
relied on the earlier estimate. And they continued to rely on estimates. (The 
fact that typical survey documents make no effort to determine precisely 
who was responsible for each plot of land raises the question of why vil­
lagers' names appear in the earliest reports. Apparently the listing of the 
size of individual landholder or cultivator fields was simply a convenient 
way to label each field. This helped ensure that all fields were included in 
a reasonably comprehensive estimate of the village tax base.) 
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Fig. i, A typical land survey report from Kaga. Note that this constitutes the entire 
report. Unlike thefield-by-field ledger book one associates with surveys, this docu­
ment simply reads: "Survey Report of Noto Province, Fugeshi County, Ono Village 
in Machino (district): Total 29 cho, 1 tan, 23 bu paddy, dry fields, and residential 
land combined (however, dry field area adjusted by ori). The preceding is reported 
exclusive of irrigation streams, roads, rivers, and tumuli. Tensho 17.6.18. However, 
the annual tax on mountain dry fields is assessed separately." It carries the signa­
tures of four surveyors and is directed to the villagers {hyakusho). Source: WSS, 2, 
"Shashin" p. 10, no. 22. 
The documents discussed so far come from the very earliest surveys and 
represent the Maeda's attempt to assert authority in their new domains 
by establishing the tax base of their holdings. Throughout the early years 
of their occupation of Kaga and Noto, they repeatedly conducted inves­
tigations to this end. Their efforts were particularly intensive, though not 
demonstrably comprehensive, in 1582—83,1586, and 1589; a similar effort 
may have been made in 1591. The surveys of 1586 and 1589 were probably 
more complete than those of 1582— 83.° 
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Carrying out land surveys at this point in the domain's history repre­
sented a substantial challenge. The potential for local opposition was, of 
course, a constant threat. But perhaps more important, the military de­
mands on Toshiie were a source of disruption. For example, he probably 
intended to make a complete domain-wide investigation in 1582 but had 
to interrupt the process to concentrate on battles in Etchu and Omi.14 In 
any case, major battles certainly impaired investigations in two ways. First, 
men who might have conducted surveys were shifted to military or other 
administrative duties. Second, domestic administration had to function 
smoothly enough to prevent popular disturbances that might interrupt the 
revenue flow and, in the extreme, force Toshiie to fight simultaneously on 
the domestic front, too. 
With these considerations in mind, Toshiie's absences from the domain 
prompted a conservative use of surveys. Returning from Omi early in 1583, 
he suspended surveying while he was out of the domain. Toshiie ordered 
that only lands lost from cultivation be surveyed, and that they were to be 
investigated promptly. Toshiie indicated that when he returned again, he 
would renew investigations throughout the domain.15 
What is noteworthy about Toshiie's actions is that they occurred de­
spite the fact that surveys were estimates and probably based largely on 
reports from the villages. His caution indicates that any reporting of land 
values generated tensions between the new administration and its subjects. 
The conflict was inherent in the relationship between the administration 
and those taxed, and not a function of new, more precise techniques based 
on actual measurement/ 
Etchu 
The 1586 and 1589 surveys can be considered "domain-wide" only in 
the sense that they covered Toshiie's holdings in Kaga and Noto. Several 
sources report that there was a domain-wide survey in 1591, but documen­
tation is very limited—too sparse to verify that on-site investigations were 
*The argument for the rigor of the Taiko kenchi often offers up the threat of peasant 
opposition as proof of their accuracy and thoroughness. I would argue that any improvement 
in reporting, even if not especially comprehensive or precise, has the potential of generating 
opposition. Opposition may even be more likely if methods are not precise and consistent, 
thereby introducing a strong element of arbitrariness into the procedure. The fact of arbi­
trary and inaccurate official estimates of land area often fed villagers throughout Japan to 
remeasure their villages and use their own calculations to assign land rights and taxpaying 
responsibilities. See, for example, the cases of Echigo and Hiroshima domain in Aono, Nihon 
kirtsei warichisei shi. 
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conducted on a broad scale.16 There is no indication that a survey occurred 
in Etchu at these times, either. 
There are a very few survey documents for villages in MaedaToshi­
naga's domains in Etchu. His early surveys appear even more sporadic than 
those of his father. They also reflect a somewhat different type of inves­
tigative process than Toshiie's.17 Toshinaga initiated independent efforts to 
establish his authority in Etchu and to define his tax base. 
Toshinaga, too, had not yet standardized survey procedures. Extant 
documents show much variation in content and format. None suggest that 
his practices were modeled in any way on Hideyoshi's. Some of the docu­
ments, such as this one, for Yanoho village, in 1585, are very much like the 
Kumabuchi report: "Paddy, dry field, and residential land together total 
9 cho, 9 tan small, 48 bu. The above conveyed fields are correctly mea­
sured as stated, exclusive of irrigation streams, roads, and tumuli. Tensho 
13.9.12.. Morikawa Zen'uemon; Hashizume Shozaemon; Saito Kyuemon. 
To the villagers of Yanoho Village in Himi County."18 The only difference 
between the two documents is the specifying of the parts of the village that 
were excluded from taxation. (This is the first example of a practice that 
became common in later surveys throughout the domain.) As with many 
of the surveys in Kaga and Noto, the use of the relatively coarse measuring 
unit "tan small" suggests that the stated area was not based on an actual 
measurement.19 
Other records depart from the Kaga-Noto style. A 1585 report for 
Kurabone village lists dry fields separately from paddy and residential 
lands,20 implying two rates of assessed value or some other special con­
sideration given to different types of fields. Documents from six years later 
show a further departure from typical Kaga and Noto surveys; they indi­
cate yield estimates as well as area specifications. It is especially interesting 
that yields per tan are not uniform, as they are in the post-1583 Kaga and 
Noto records. A 1591 survey for Higashi Ebisaka includes an estimated 
yield of 2. bales (hyo), 1 to, 3 sho* A document for Horita village for the 
following year not only includes a yield estimate but breaks the land into 
two classifications, superior and inferior.21 The yield for superior fields was 
5 bales, 8 sho, that for inferior fields 3 bales, z sho. Both documents indicate 
that the yield estimate was based on an actual measurement ("shozuke"). 
The documents were issued in the ninth lunar month (October—November 
by the modern calendar), well into the harvest season, so it is possible the 
yields were based on harvest samples. 
'Kamisaka-ke monjo," Etchu Shidan 2.8 (March 1964): 53. One to is a tenth of a koku; 
one sho is a hundredth. 
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Assuming this was the case, the data confront us with a puzzle. The 
disparity between the yield estimates of the two villages is extremely large, 
large enough to suggest that measuring units had not yet been standard­
ized. If a bale comprised five to in both cases, as it did in Kaga and Noto 
at this time, the yield for Higashi Ebisaka would have been 1.13 koku per 
tan; inferior land in Horita would have produced 1.52 koku, and superior 
fields 2.58 koku. The latter figure is far too high to be reasonable if it was 
based on either of the two measuring boxes commonly employed at the 
time, the kyomasu and the tonoko masu; yields of that magnitude were 
not reached until the eighteenth or nineteenth century. Furthermore, it is 
unlikely that one village's inferior land would produce so much more than 
the overall yield in a nearby village in the same plain. If, however, the figure 
for Horita was based on the three-to bale used in the very early surveys of 
Noto, the yields would be reasonable and more comparable to the Higashi 
Ebisaka yield.* In any event, the variation in stated yields suggests a lack 
of standardized measures, even within a single domain. 
The Tenshoki (Records of the Tensho Era) and the Uchiyama kyuki 
(Ancient Records of Mount Uchi), two roughly contemporary compila­
tions, report that a survey of Etchu was made in 1595, and that the province 
had a total assessed value of 380,300 koku.22 This was the year in which 
Niikawa county was transferred from Sassa Narimasa to the Maeda. Since 
the only documents supporting this report come from Niikawa county, 
it appears that the new lords simply investigated the area they had ac­
quired and added the findings to existing records for the other three Etchu 
counties.1 
The 1595 Etchu survey, like the early Maeda surveys in general, was 
probably not based on actual measurements. All four of the extant Niikawa 
documents bear the same date and were signed by the same four magis­
trates.23 It was impossible to survey four villages with a total assessed value 
of 750 koku or more in a single day. That these surveys were based on esti­
mates is further implied by the general failure to specify any area of land 
smaller than one tan. Units of measure as small as one bu were used in only 
one instance.* 
* One additional point concerning these yields: none of them, whether based on a five-
to bale or a three-to bale, is close to the final official yield estimate of 1.5 koku per tan (360 
bu) established in the early-17th-century surveys of Etchu. Only at that time, years after the 
implementing of the Taiko's survey policies, were proceduc.es standardized. 
t A tally sheet of the putative yield and taxes for 14 villages in the Himi area was compiled 
exactly one month before the Niikawa survey documents were issued (see Himi shi shi, pp. 
1176-77). This document may have been part of a recalculation of the putative yield for all 
of Etchu. 
t Akigashima village (TKSS, pp. 392-93). To be sure, these documents could have simply 
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Viewed as a whole, the early Etchu documents show no evidence of the 
use of procedures akin to those employed in the Taiko kenchi. They do not 
record the size of individual fields or villagers' names. Procedures "before 
1596 were unsystematic; the format and content of the documents varied 
considerably. Units of measure were not standardized. Survey practices ap­
pear to have been based on local custom or, before the Keicho survey, 
(1604—6), even the practices of individual survey teams. Through this time, 
evidence of central authority in the surveys is nonexistent. 
The Early-Seventeenth-Century Surveys 
The procedures for investigating land were systematized during the first 
decades of the seventeenth century. In basic outline, the procedures em­
ployed in Etchu during the survey of 1604-6 and in Kaga and Noto in 1616 
and 162.0 set the pattern for all later surveys. However, this pattern in no 
way fits the one that historians take as standard. There was still no sign 
of direct central influence on the domain's methods or the intent of the 
surveys. Despite some refinements in presentation, the documents of the 
period bore a strong resemblance to the earlier ones. They do not, for ex­
ample, list individual villagers andfields. There are also further indications 
that no actual measurements were taken/ 
The Keicho Survey (1604—6) of Etchu 
The Keicho survey marks the first verifiable general survey of the four 
counties of Etchu. (As noted, no documents have been discovered to con­
firm that the whole of Etchu was surveyed in 1595, as reported in the 
Tenshoki and the Uchiyama kyiiki.) It also marks the last one. Conse­
quently, changes introduced in Kaga and Noto during the Genna surveys of 
1616 and 1620 (notably the 300-bu tan) were never implemented in Etchu. 
Etchu maintained its own practices until the abolition of domains after 
the Meiji Restoration. The units of measurement for arable land and yields 
were never fully standardized within the whole of Kaga domain. 
been put infinal form and signed on the same day. In the absence of more information on how 
and when the "survey" was conducted, the most we can make of the fact that the documents 
bear the same date and seals is that it tends to reinforce the other evidence that surveyors did 
not make actual measurements. 
"The "atypicality" of these documents places scholars who still hold that standard styles 
of land surveys were the norm in Kaga in an awkward position. They must argue that these 
simple survey registers were based on standard procedures but the documents for the general 
surveys of the 17th century on which they were based have not survived. See Hara, Kaga-han, 
p. 91. 
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The Keicho survey was well organized. Niikawa county was investi­
gated in 1604 by four teams of four men each. The groups that evaluated the 
other counties in the succeeding years varied in size from three to six mem­
bers, but each county was examined by more than one team.24 Their find­
ings became the basis for later surveys where we find changes in a village's 
assessed value often framed as being "in addition to the assessed value 
[taka] of the tenth year [of Keicho]."25 In other words, subsequent changes 
in village assessments were made explicitly as additions to or subtractions 
from the values recorded in the Keicho surveys. 
At least 20 originals and copies of the survey documents from this gen­
eral survey remain. Most are fromTonami county; the rest are from Himi.26 
Their format is not uniform. Some provide computations of arable land 
area, as well as the assessed value of the villages; others merely provide 
the assessed value. Tax rates are given for some villages but not others. 
The latter all appear to be villages held by landed retainers, where domain 
officials had no role in determining tax rates. 
The Keicho survey marks several important changes in assessment prac­
tices in Etchu. Hereafter, with the possible exception of embryonic recla­
mation projects, documents recorded only the assessed value of a village; 
area measurements were no longer recorded. The use of distinct entries for 
various grades of land, seen rarely in earlier documents, was discontinued 
completely, not to be revived until the Meiji land surveys and land tax 
reform.27 The assessed value of a village, excluding reclamation projects 
in progress, was reported in a single total. Furthermore, this total was no 
longer expressed in bales of rice (hyo), but for the first time in koku.* 
The Keicho survey also confirmed the size of the tan used in survey 
measurements and the official yield estimate (todai, kokumori). The tan 
was set at 360 bu. The assessed value of the villages was computed by mul­
tiplying its taxable area and the flat official yield of 1.5 koku per tan. This 
formula, too, remained constant throughout the Tokugawa period. 
Finally, the imposing of a flat yield rate was new. In some of the earliest 
documents, rates varied with the quality of the land, and in no cases did 
these correspond to the 1.5-koku standard ultimately employed. By 1598 
parts of Etchu had converted to the rate used in Kaga and Noto—three 
Th  e 1613.7.25 survey of Hinata village again uses bales and also provides both area and 
assessed value {Himi shi shi, pp. 1184-85). In both these nyttters it departs from procedures 
established in the Keicho survey. Despite such rare variations, the Keicho survey procedures 
seem to be standard. The concern to collect taxes wholly in rice became evident only as the 
domain sold more and more rice on the national market. Rice exports increased substantially 
after the Osaka campaigns, and it is in this period that officials strengthened tax collections 
in rice. We will return to this point in Chap. 8. 
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bales (of five to each) per tan, the equivalent of 1.5 koku per tan.29 The 
Keicho survey spread the rate to the whole of the province. All later surveys 
of wasteland and reclamation projects also used this rate. 
These surveys, like those of the Tensho era, were almost certainly not 
based on actual measurements by domain officials. For one thing, many 
survey documents were signed on the same day by the same survey crew. 
This is true of the records for Sono, Kurabone, and Man'o villages (dated 
1605.12.1), and for five villages in Tonami (1605.12.4). One set of officials 
also surveyed both Kurakawa and Nakamura villages, and the documents 
appear to bear the same date. Since it took at least a week to measure a vil­
lage, the magistrates in these cases clearly could not have made a complete 
survey themselves.1 
For another thing, the survey teams could not possibly have covered all 
the villages in a county in just one year. Take Niikawa county, for example. 
That county, as we saw, was surveyed in one year by four teams of four 
men each. How many villages this involved is unknown, but we do know 
that Niikawa contained 837 villages in 1731,29 and that some number of 
new villages were created by an administrative redefinition of boundaries 
and major land reclamation projects during the seventeenth century. 
Assuming the number of villages had grown by 25-30 percent since 
1604,30 the surveyors would have had to measure 600 villages, or 150 for 
each team. Making the very optimistic assumption that it took only five 
days to measure a village, each crew would have had to work nonstop for 
750 days, over two years. They could not possibly have taken actual mea­
surements within the one-year period in which the investigation reportedly 
took place. 
Moreover, it is unlikely that such a lengthy and intensive effort, which 
would surely have disrupted planting, weeding, and harvesting, and prob­
ably damaged crops as well, could have been conducted without sparking 
widespread complaints, if not outright opposition. Yet no evidence of com­
plaints exists. Under the circumstances, the only reasonable conclusion is 
*Kaga and Noto had converted to a five-to bale when the authorities began issuing land 
tax receipts in 1588 (Kigoshi, "Maeda," p. 25; Takazawa, "Tensho-ki nengu san'yojo," p. 723). 
The appearance of this rate in Etchu in 1598 is likely linked to Maeda Toshinaga's appoint­
ment as dairayo. The three surveys cited above were made a few months later (Heki, Karto 
dokushi nempyo, p. 289). 
t Himi shi shi, pp. 1181-82. One of the "surveyors" of Sono, Kurabone, and Man'o was 
in Osaka! {Fukuoka cho shiy pp. 1050,1143,1231-22.) A week is a very optimistic estimate 
of the time needed to complete a survey. Wakabayashi, Kaga-han no nochi sokuryo, pp. 44— 
56, transcribes the diary of a survey magistrate assigned to Uchihisumi village in 1799. The 
magistrate was preceded by a village group chief (tomura), who made appropriate prepa­
rations for the official inspection. Even so, the magistrate spent eight days in the village. It 
is reasonable to conclude that the early Maeda surveys, for which we have no evidence of 
advance preparation, took somewhat longer, perhaps 10 days or more. 
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that domain surveys were based on estimates, not actual measurements of 
each village by independent domain surveyors. 
The Genna Surveys (1616,1620) of Kaga and Noto 
The Genna 2 survey (1616) was conducted in Nomi, Ishikawa, and 
Kahoku counties of Kaga, and the Maeda lands in all four of the Noto 
counties; the Genna 6 (1620) survey was conducted in the Noto coun­
ties alone.31 Enuma county in southern Kaga province may not have been 
surveyed on either occasion/ 
Before embarking on the first of these investigations, the han promul­
gated itsfirst formal regulations on land survey policy. Issued in the summer 
of 1616, the edict's major provisions may be summarized as follows:32 
1. Henceforth, one tan was to consist of 300 bu, not 360. 
2. Rivers, irrigation streams, and roads were to be excluded from mea­
surement. 
3. Recently reclaimed land was to be included in the total village assess­
ment and treated the same as long-cultivated fields (honden). Any previous 
full or partial tax exemption on such fields no longer obtained; they were 
to be taxed at the full rate levied by the domain or landed retainer. 
4. Lands not cultivated for a long time were also to be surveyed and 
recorded. 
5. The surveyors' expenses in the field, except for the cost of their 
firewood and horse feed, were the domain's obligation, not the villagers'. 
Villagers offering gifts and surveyors who accepted them were to be pun­
ished. 
6. The surveyors were to make estimates of the crop yields (presum­
ably by test sampling, bugari) and if the yields were not properly reflected 
in the current tax rates, the tax rates were to be revised. 
7. The survey crews were also to investigate and adjust the miscella­
neous taxes of each village. 
This was standardization of sorts—but only of policy, not of methods. 
Indeed, two striking aspects of the Genna regulations are the lack of any 
prescribed techniques for measuring land and recording data, and the fail­
ure to mention any purpose other than assessing the potential of villages 
to pay taxes. The regulations reveal no interest in the landholdings of indi­
viduals, no intent to define who was a villager and who was not, no effort 
*At least there is no indication of such a survey in secondary sources, nor have survey 
documents from this period come to my attention. Although pre-Maeda documents are not 
extant, the fact that die todai for Enuma and Nomi counties was set at 1.7 koku per tan, 
rather than the Maeda's standard 1.5 koku, suggests that earlier surveys were used to assess 
the value of the villages within their borders. 
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to evaluate the relative value of individual fields, no interest in defining 
grades of land based on distinctive yield (kokumori), or any other broad 
purpose of the sort widely attributed to land surveys. 
To learn more about the methods of valuation and the degree to which 
they were standardized, we must turn to the survey documents themselves. 
The Genna documents, like most of those discussed already, are simply 
written. No area measurements appear at all. The only information given 
is the total assessed value of the village, expressed in koku; the assessed 
value of specially exempted lands such as domain warehouses and facili­
ties, temples, and tax-free land for certain commoner officials; the amount 
of permanent wasteland; and, in some cases, the village tax rate. (As was 
apparently true in Etchu, the tax rate was recorded only for lands directly 
taxed by the daimyo.33) 
In format, they resemble the Etchu surveys, and as in those surveys, 
they mark the transition to measuring assessed value in koku. Also as in the 
Etchu surveys, the documents for several villages were signed on the same 
day by the same officials. In Kashima county, for example, one crew signed 
four surveys on 1616.10.26.34 In the same county, on 1620.12.28, one team 
signed five surveys, and another signed six.35 Similar phenomena are evi­
dent in varying degrees in Hakui, Fugeshi, and Suzu counties. Calculating 
the time required to complete an actual measurement of the villages in one 
county, as we did for Niikawa county, yields similar results for most of the 
counties in Kaga and Noto. In the case of the 1616 survey, the likelihood 
that domain officials made actual measurements is further reduced by the 
fact that the surveyors started after the promulgation of the regulations in 
the summer of 1616. 
Two additional considerations reinforce the impression that Kaga's 
land surveys differed substantially from the standard Taikd kenchi models. 
One of these, the system of communal land tenure called warichi, will be 
examined more fully in a later chapter. For present purposes it is sufficient 
to note that under this system, records of who farmed what piece of land 
were managed by the village, and that no one had a right to farm the same 
piece of land in perpetuity. Though a family generally retained its status 
as full-fledged cultivators in the village, the cultivation rights for a given 
piece of land were reallocated periodically by the village acting under its 
own authority. The very existence of this system indicates that the domain 
itself had no interest in determiningwho cultivated a particular plot.* 
'The first explicit sign of domain interest in regulating landholding was the prohibition 
of land sales in 1615, just before the Genna surveys of Kaga and Noto. Even this regulation 
did not set rules for determining ownership or land use rights. 
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The other confirming evidence is found in later, detailed descriptions 
of the domain's survey procedures. There are no seventeenth-century pre­
scriptions for making measurements. The first description of measuring 
techniques appears in a manual called "Kenchikata Hisho," written in the 
late eighteenth century.36 Unlike the standard juji nawa method, in which 
surveyors used crossed ropes (hence the name; the crossed ropes looked 
like the Chinese character for "ten," pronounced "ju" in Japanese) to mea­
sure the length and breadth of individual fields, the procedures detailed 
here ignored individual fields and measured entire villages.37 (This broad 
approach was well known in other parts of Japan, although it was more 
commonly used, at least in Bakufu territories, to measure large sections of 
a community rather than the entire village.) Domain survey maps like the 
one shown in Figure 2. and the documents on which the final survey reports 
were based clearly indicate that the Kaga surveyors took absolutely no 
interest in individual landholdings or the registration of individual village 
families with land use rights. Indeed, only irrigation streams, roads, and the 
like above a minimum size were measured separately and subtracted from 
the total taxable village area, so that small footpaths and water courses, 
though unfarmable, were included in the taxable total. 
There is good reason to suppose that when Kaga surveyors did any 
measuring at all, they followed these procedures. For one thing, although 
"Kenchikata Hisho" mentions some alternative methods (e.g., how to mea­
sure circles), they were dismissed as over-fastidious. There is no evidence in 
that work or in any of the other detailed handbooks of local administration 
I examined of a major shift away from past practices. 
Furthermore several of the procedures employed when "Kenchikata 
Hisho" was written were also used in late-sixteenth- and early-seventeenth­
century Kaga. For example, all land was formally valued at 1.5 koku (in the 
earliest surveys, three bales) or 1.7 koku (in the case of Nomi and Enuma 
counties) per tan?* Adjustments for lower quality land were extremely lim­
ited, restricted to certain categories of dry fields. There was no recognized 
variation in the quality of paddy. 
Even many categories of dry field were treated as paddy, at least by the 
mid-seventeenth century and probably earlier. The 1659 survey regulations 
ordered that "dry fields planted in paper mulberry, mulberry, tea, hemp, 
ramie, greens with edible leaves and stalks, and daikon are to be measured 
as paddy."39 Only dry fields exclusively producing wheat, coarse grains, 
red beans, soybeans, other beans, and rapeseed were to be treated as lower 
quality land. 
For dry fields subject to an adjustment, too, the practice remained un­
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Fig. 2. A Kaga domain survey map. Note the typical division of the village into large 
sections for measurement. Redrawn from "Kenchikata Hisho," a late-eighteenth­
century manuscript in the Ume no Yon section, Kawai monjo Collection, Toyama 
University Library, Toyama. 
changed throughout the Tokugawa era: the formal value (putative yield) 
per tan was not altered; the adjustment was made by manipulating the 
field's measured area. This method was called hatake ori. Earliest writ­
ten indications of the practice appear in 1589, but it was probably used 
earlier.40 Hatake ori proportionately adjusted the area of dry fields to the 
value and yield of rice paddy. For example, if a dry field was thought to be 
half as productive as paddy, its area would be reduced by half. That half 
was then added into the village total, to be multiplied by the official per-tan 
yield. This procedure was clearly better suited to the wide-area surveys de­
scribed in "Kenchikata Hisho" than to field-by-field measurements, which 
would have required more calculations. What is more, its consistent use 
from the domain's formative years through the nineteenth century suggests 
a continuity of other survey procedures. 
The deliberate efforts to simplify the survey process in the early years 
are consonant with the widespread use of the methods described in "Ken­
chikata Hisho"; they permitted the measurement of very large segments of 
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each village. They further reinforce the impression that Kaga surveys were 
not based on the standard model. 
Kaga in National Perspective 
The Maeda's investigations of land value between 1582 and 1620 reveal 
a substantial amount of experimentation before procedures were standard­
ized. Nonetheless, they fulfilled three important functions of conventional 
land surveys: 
1. They served to calculate the value of the domain as a whole. The 
domain authorities dutifully reported their figures to the central political 
authorities (in koku) as a basis for the assessment of extraordinary levies. 
2. They served to allocate fiefs to major landed retainers and to calcu­
late their contributions to the domain's military endeavors. 
3. They served to record the value of the land against which taxes 
would be levied and to clarify village boundaries where they affected tax­
able land. 
By all accounts, these investigations were fairly comprehensive. There 
is no indication that any lands were exempted from study. Though hidden 
fields may have been a problem within villages, no retainer's land, temple 
land, or shrine land was exempted. 
But there are also significant differences between Kaga's land surveys 
and the standard model. Substantial evidence indicates that actual mea­
surements were not made. We can speculate that actual measures were 
employed in spot-checking reports of village value, but there is no evidence 
to confirm this. The domain showed no interest in tying individual families 
to specific plots of land. Domain authorities did all they could to simplify 
the evaluation of land grades, ranking all but a few categories of dry field 
at 1.5 koku per tan. Even then, the koku measure itself was for many years 
a mere convention, employed in formally stating domain value; it did not 
become the standard unit of land value for local administrative purposes 
until the seventeenth century. Furthermore, when the "national" 300-bu 
standard was adopted, only Kaga and Noto ultimately took it up; Etchu 
went its own way through the entire early modern era. 
These variations did not come from ignorance of Hideyoshi's wishes. 
Maeda Toshiie served as one of Hideyoshi's survey magistrates in Dewa, 
in 1590.41 Consequently, they have some important implications for under­
standing early modern Japanese history at both the local and the national 
level. 
First, Kaga clearly made no attempt to follow a nationally standardized 
model. Nor is there any evidence that Hideyoshi or the Bakufu tried to 
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encourage the domain to follow the Tailed kenchi or the Tokugawa house 
procedures. Even if we were to assume that there was such an effort, we 
must conclude that, in Kaga domain at least, it failed miserably. The cen­
tral authorities lacked the will, and probably the means, to enforce such 
a policy. Any attempt to enforce this kind of administrative order nation­
wide through the use of attainder would have represented an attack on all 
daimyo simultaneously. This would have entailed great political risk for 
marginal gains in resources/ 
A second conclusion is that the kinds of surveys conducted in Kaga, 
even when they were actual measures (as a number of them, especially 
in later years, were), could not have served many of the purposes that 
scholars have supposed. The absence of any widespread records linking 
individual households with specific pieces of land indicates that domain 
surveys were not aimed at establishing land tenure, reallocating lands by 
forcing the breakup of extended family estates, or defining the members of 
a peasant class distinct from the samurai and townsmen classes. This fact 
encourages a reconsideration of how such policies were articulated, who 
participated in defining tenure rights, and where the initiative for defining 
them originated. It also suggests a need to reassess the sources of class 
separation. 
Third, Kaga's survey procedures call into question the nature of the land 
tax system they were meant to support. Orthodox images stress the preci­
sion of surveys and their use of actual measurements in arguing for a more 
rigorous assessment of land taxes. At least in Kaga domain, actual mea­
surements generally were not made in either the early or the province-wide 
attempts to evaluate the land tax base. Nonetheless, domain authorities 
recognized that land investigations were potentially disruptive of public 
order. From this perspective, we may ask whether the land tax system was 
systematically more exact and rigorous than under earlier forms of sur­
veys. The answer to this question comes below in a discussion of the rate of 
taxation, but we can already conclude, from the minimal allowance made 
for different grades of land alone, that the system had significant arbitrary 
elements. 
Persistent Procedural Variations and 
Limited Standardization Efforts 
These considerations not only suggest a need to reevaluate the his­
tory of Kaga domain; they open similar possibilities on the national level. 
'The political calculus might have been different if hegemons had derived a large share 
of their income from a regular national tax. 
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Although a comprehensive evaluation is beyond the compass of this study, 
let us consider certain evidence from other parts of Japan bearing on some 
of these issues. 
Though some historians acknowledge that there were variations in sur­
vey methods, no one suggests they were significant enough to argue against 
the effectiveness of Hideyoshi's efforts to impose a uniform national stan­
dard. Berry, for example, notes that the problem of implementing national 
standards of measure and the kokudaka system was not fully overcome 
during Hideyoshi's rule, especially in the domains of independent (tozama) 
lords, but still concludes that "the kenchi also served the purposes of 
Hideyoshi's edicts by providing the daimyo with fairly accurate assess­
ments of domain land, computed according to universal standards [em­
phasis added]."42 
Assuming for the moment that Berry, Araki, and others are right in 
concluding that even in the domains of former enemies, Hideyoshi's efforts 
succeeded, the fact that a number of tozama lords acted autonomously is 
highly significant. In determining the capabilities of a state, its capacity to 
carry out its own agenda, precisely this category of local leaders provides 
the crucial test of state strength. These are the men who might seriously 
challenge the central authority when their own inclinations differ from 
those of their superiors. The state can be seen as effective only to the de­
gree that it can consistently gain or compel the cooperation of such locally 
powerful men. To the extent that any of these local leaders can ignore the 
state's ordinances, adopting only those that suit their own purposes or 
tailoring them to their own ends, the state must be deemed ineffective. 
In this context, Hideyoshi's ability to limit variations in the name or size 
of measuring units is a quick but significant indicator of the capability of 
his state. By definition, without a high degree of uniformity, there can be no 
claim to effective implementation of a universal standard. More important, 
if the central authority could not compel the use of uniform standards— 
value (putative rice yields or cash assessments), length, volume—standards 
that in themselves did not challenge the local balance of power between 
daimyo and domain residents, it could hardly coerce the daimyo into carry­
ing out other, more socially disruptive policies often associated with the 
Taiko kenchi, namely, the restructuring of family holdings, the definition 
of land use rights, and the separation of warrior from agriculturalist. 
Variations in measures of length were common and sustained through­
out the early modern era. Standard length under Hideyoshi was, in prin­
ciple, set at 6 shaku, 3 sun; for the Tokugawa lands, it was 6 shaku, 1 sun. 
Yet throughout the seventeenth century and beyond, well after the "stan­
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dardization" of measures occurred, surveyors in many provinces used mea­
suring rods that were as much as 2 percent to 8 percent off the mark, from 
6 shaku long to 6 shaku, 6 sun. In one case, the measuring rod was a mere 
4 shaku, 8 sun, fully a third less than the "standard" length.43 
Equally revealing of the limits of Hideyoshi's state was the variation in 
the units used to calculate official land values. Conventional interpretations 
stress the Taiko kenchi's introduction of the koku as a new, uniform stan­
dard of assessed value and measure of volume for grain payments of land 
taxes. Yet there is reason to suspect both the significance and the breadth 
of such a change, reason enough indeed to question whether it was even 
the specific intent of Hideyoshi or later rulers to create a uniform system 
of assessment based on the koku and of tax collection based on rice. 
The kandaka system of cash assessments, generally regarded as the pre­
decessor of kokudaka assessments, was not dominant outside the Kanto-
Tokaido region. In Kyushu, Shikoku, Chugoku, and at least parts of Hoku­
riku, taxes had commonly been assessed in rice as well as cash. The Kinai 
had used rice exclusively. The units of measure were often bales (hyo), but 
the koku was used in some instances. The much-stressed transition from a 
cash-based to a crop-based system of assessment was not a radical depar­
ture for much of Japan. Consequently, the shift to the koku as a measure 
of land values would have been a minor change for these regions.44 
The widespread use of rice assessments after the Taiko kenchi, com­
bined with the insistence on Hideyoshi's intent to impose this form of 
payment, leads us to expect virtually complete compliance. But this is not 
the case.45 The kandaka system prevailed in at least part of the Bakufu 
domains through the mid-seventeenth century (again, note the inability 
to standardize even within a single political jurisdiction); and it was used 
in one form or another in the Date family's domains of northern Japan 
throughout the early modern period.46 
All these examples come from the domains of daimyo who had made 
their own reputation independent of Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hide­
yoshi, but Matsumoto domain, which adhered to the kandaka assessments 
until at least 1613, is a different case altogether.47 The daimyo, Ishikawa 
Kazumasa, left Ieyasu in 1585 to join Hideyoshi's rariks. Hideyoshi gave 
him Matsumoto domain (in Shinano) five years later. If the current lists of 
Hideyoshi's surveys in Shinano are correct, his officials had four chances 
to correct this seeming deviation through resurveys (1590,1591,1595, and 
1598).48 No "corrections" were ever made. Similarly, the Sanada (also 
in Shinano) and their successors in Ueda han continued to use cash as­
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sessments (kanrnon) after Hideyoshi's survey, and throughout the Toku­
49 gawa era.
Equally interesting is an inconsistency in Hideyoshi's orders to his sur­
vey magistrates. Hideyoshi ordered that his own survey of Aizu (1590) 
register lands by their cash value, kandaka, not according to the "new" 
standard. These instructions apparently were applied not only to Aizu but 
to all of Mutsu province. It is true that later reports to central authorities, 
as well as fief investitures, from many parts of this region stated domain 
values in koku, but that is not to say the measure was used in local admin­
istration.50 That Hideyoshi ordered the use of kandaka in this very recently 
subjugated territory and did not insist on the conversion to koku indicates 
a lack of commitment to a uniform national standard/ 
This example raises the broader question of how deep the change really 
was. In a number of instances, the reporting of domain value in koku had 
no impact on the measure used in the day-to-day administration of land 
taxes. Kaga, in reports to the central authorities in 1598, used kokudaka 
to state both the assessed value of the domain and the value of taxes col­
lected.51 But the kokudaka system was not employed in Etchu until the 
Keicho investigations and in Kaga and Noto until the Genna surveys, both 
carried out well after Hideyoshi's death. In assessing the value of land or 
the taxes due, bales of rice (hyo) were the principal units of measure, a 
practice that predated the Taiko kenchi. The value of villages near Edo 
under two hatamoto (direct shogunal retainers) was listed in Bakufu docu­
ments of the 1640's in kokudaka; but their taxes, even at this late date, 
were computed on the basis of a variant of the kandaka system.52 More­
over, there were districts in which neither koku nor kandaka were used on 
the local level. Satsuma, for example, used makidaka (the amount of seed 
required to plant a given area of land) as a measure of land value. Karidaka 
(the number of sheaves of grain harvested from a given unit of land) was 
employed in Dewa.53 Just as in Kaga han, the two systems existed side by 
side, each employed for discrete purposes. 
Survey measurement procedures also varied substantially. Despite 
Yamamura's assertion that there were only "minor variations in the meth­
ods," procedures were never nationally standardized, not even under the 
Tokugawa shogunate.54 We have already seen this in Kaga's surveys, but 
the variations extended well beyond Kaga's borders. 
One common image of the transformation wrought in the late sixteenth 
*This example stands in marked contrast to the case of Satsuma, which is commonly used 
to demonstrate Hideyoshi's ability to impose his survey standards even in a recently defeated 
enemy's land. 
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century is well illustrated by Berry's observation that "in Hideyoshi's 
period the sashidashi kenchi undertaken by local proprietors came to an 
end The paperwork kenchi was a thing of the past."55 In fact, there are 
major exceptions to this statement. For example, Matsumoto han surveys 
were based on reports by villagers until at least 1613. Similarly, although the 
Satsuma surveys are often treated as examples of former enemies dutifully 
submitting to Hideyoshi's will, the investigations of Satsuma, Osumi, and 
Hyuga provinces, undertaken in close association with Hideyoshi's agents, 
were also sashidashi. The same applies to those of the Date domains. The 
surveys of much of Tohoku were also apparently sashidashi.56 
Even where there were on-site inspections, they did not always in­
volve measurements or conform to the standard model. We have already 
discussed one common variant, the measurement of very large areas that 
ignored individual fields. The ikenchi represented an even more radical 
variant. In this case no measurement was made at all; the surveyor merely 
made a visual estimate. In addition, villagers often conducted surveys for 
their own purposes, in a number of instances clearly avoiding field-by-field 
measures as the primary basis for the survey.57 The use of each of these sur­
vey types in Bakufu territories, the administrative divisions most likely to 
conform to "standard" practices, suggests that there was no attempt at full 
standardization even without the pressure of conducting massive province-
wide surveys in very short periods of time. Each type of survey could 
provide useful data for village and domain valuations without any need 
for standard survey practices or actual measures by Hideyoshi's represen­
tatives or even by domain authorities. In sum, the word "kenchi" referred 
to a variety of processes and did not have a narrow technical meaning. 
In theory, assessments were pegged to expected yields, but it is un­
clear how those estimates were calculated. Some historians claim that yield 
figures were based on crop samples, and others that nonagricultural eco­
nomic activities were considered, too.58 Still others believe that assessed 
values bore little relationship to realistic yields. Whatever the case, regional 
variations in this realm are widely if not universally recognized. 
Similarly, yields were in theory matched to soil fertility, but here too 
there was much variation (see Table 2). Variation was manifested in two 
ways: (1) the number of different grades of land recognized and (2.) the 
range of values assigned to fields of similar quality. For example, we noted 
that Kaga domain imputed a uniform yield to all grades of paddy in each 
county (1.5 or 1.7 koku per tan) and made only limited adjustments for 
dry fields. Among other domains in the Kaga-Noto-Etchu region, the small 
scattered Noto domain of Hijikata Kazuhiko, a Bakufu retainer, divided 
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TABLE 2 
Range of Official Yields in Six Localities, Late Sixteenth Century 
Paddy Dry 
Domain high low high low 
Kaga 
Hijikata 
Hachioji 
Yonezawa 
Dewa 
Tosa 
1.5 
1.6 
1.05 
1.5 
3.2 
1.0 
1.5 
1.2 
0.41 
1.1 
1.6 
1.0 
1.5 
0.6 
> 
1.0 
> 
1.0 
> 
0.18 
p 
0.5 
p 
1.0 
S O U R C E S : Oda Kichinojo, hhikawa keny p. 310; Yasuzawa, Kinsei sonraku keisei, pp. 2.6-33'•>Hansei 
setrttsu, p. 493; Kashiwakura, "Tokugawa," pp. 1018-19; linuma, Kokudakaset, pp. 107-8,151. 
paddy into three grades valued at 1.2,1.4, and 1.6 koku per tan, and three 
grades of dry field valued at 0.6, 0.4, and 0.18 koku.59 These and other 
disparities occurred in a region with economic conditions similar to those 
of the Maeda domains. 
The inconsistency across the country was even greater. Thirteen villages 
in the vicinity of modern Hachioji, west of Tokyo, classified both paddy 
and dry field in four grades; the average assessed value for paddy ranged 
from a low of 0.41 koku per tan to a high of 1.05.60 The range for Yone­
zawa han's paddy in the early seventeenth century was 1.1 to 1.5 koku; 
its dry fields were valued at 1.0, 0.75, and 0.5 koku.61 Superior paddy in 
many areas was rated at 2.0 koku or more per tan in the late sixteenth 
century. In Echizen, Kai, Yamato, and other areas, Tokugawa-era assessed 
values ran as high as 3.0 koku.62 In the far northern mountain villages of 
Murayama county, in Dewa, where soil fertility should have been low, mid-
seventeenth-century superior paddy was rated between 1.6 and 3.2 koku 
per tan. In fact, superior paddy in most villages was valued at 2.7 koku or 
higher, an extraordinary yield for this period in Japanese history, even in 
the most productive regions of the country.63 
The Chosokabe survey, conducted between 1587 and 1590 (two years 
after the family's defeat by Hideyoshi), ranked all land at 1.0 koku per 
tan.64 No distinction in soil fertility was made at this or any later time. 
The survey continued to form the basis for Tosa assessments even after the 
Yama'uchi took over the domain under the Tokugawa. 
In certain cases authorities may have taken into account the value of 
a village's nonagricultural products in setting the yield figures. But that 
hardly explains why a region like Dewa, which was economically less di­
versified and less commercialized than many other regions, had such an 
extremely high valuation. Regardless of their origin, valuations unques­
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tionably do not reflect "a thorough and rigorous reassessment of the yield 
of all paddies in virtually all provinces."65 
One might argue that uniform survey methods and standards could 
only be achieved with repeated efforts. Certainly, it would be too much 
to expect an overnight transformation in the principles of land surveying. 
Yet there is little evidence that Hideyoshi made any concerted attempt to 
survey recalcitrant or incompletely transformed domains. In one signifi­
cant case—Kaga domain's three provinces—he never attempted to conduct 
surveys himself, and so could not oversee a full conversion to universal 
standards. In addition, many of the provinces he purportedly surveyed were 
not resurveyed at all by his agents. 
Several scholars have attempted to compile a record of the change to 
Taiko kenchi. The Kadokawa Nihonshi jiten, a 1976 historical dictionary, 
incorporates data from all major attempts to identify where and when land 
surveys were carried out. The editors distinguish between surveys seem­
ingly deriving from an autonomous tradition and those thought to have 
been made at Hideyoshi's orders or by his standards. The latter category 
includes such cases as Aizu, whose surveys deviated from standards even 
though conducted under Hideyoshi's orders, as well as cases like Kaga, 
Noto, and Etchu, which reported domain values to Hideyoshi but used 
their own measurement procedures and standards. I have made only a very 
limited attempt to verify the existence of cases similar to Kaga domain. 
Other cases noted above as not involving actual measurements, and there­
fore not qualifying as part of the Taiko kenchi as the term is commonly 
understood, are also counted by the Jiten as complying: Shinano, Satsuma, 
Hyuga, Osumi, Mutsu (including Aizu). The inclusion of these provinces 
cautions us that statistics computed from this source overstate the degree 
to which Hideyoshi's orders were followed.66 
Excluding all eight of these provinces, which clearly did not employ 
actual measurements, Hideyoshi surveyed only 33 of the traditional 65 prov­
inces of Japan, or about half, between 1583 and 1598. (In contrast to Berry's 
estimate that he surveyed 20—30 provinces, this base figure is generous.) 
Furthermore, when we look for evidence of extended efforts to implement 
uniform standards through resurveys, we find that just 21 provinces were 
ever investigated more than once under Hideyoshi's orders; and that only 
14 of the 21 resurveys took place between 1594, the year commonly taken 
as marking the standardization of Hideyoshi's survey principles, and his 
death/ At best, fewer than half the provinces Hideyoshi surveyed were ever 
'Takayanagi and Takeuchi, Nihonshi jiten, pp. 1129-30; Berry, Hideyoshi, p. n z . The 
Jiten editors collapse the provinces oi Iwaki, Iwashiro, Rikuzen, Rikuchu, and Rikuoku 
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resurveyed to effect his fully developed methods—rather modest evidence 
of repeated efforts at standardization. 
These calculations assume that none of the surveys or resurveys was 
undertaken at the initiative of the province's daimyo, and that all surveys 
of a province in consecutive years were distinct efforts (a very unlikely 
prospect), not one continuing process. It is worth noting (1) that these com­
putations represent a "best case" for the direct impact of the Taiko kenchi, 
and (2) that although Hideyoshi purportedly surveyed Shinano four times, 
he was unable (unconcerned?) to replace kandaka with kokudaka measures 
of land value—clear evidence against any consistent effort at standardiza­
tion. In short, this "best case" reading indicates that Hideyoshi made a 
very incomplete effort not only in attempting to survey all Japan but also in 
trying to standardize survey procedures in the parts he ostensibly covered. 
In addition, these data clarify the great extent to which surveys were 
privately instituted by daimyo—in 36 provinces, about 55 percent of the 
country, between 1583 and 1598. If we extend the period of our analysis 
somewhat, three more provinces were privately surveyed in 1582, another 
three in 1581, and two more in 1580. Most of these provinces were surveyed 
more than once, even without Hideyoshi's direct involvement and often 
before their daimyo allied with him. During the same time period, gener­
als independently initiated surveys in 30 provinces (45 percent of all) that 
Hideyoshi had not yet surveyed; in contrast, Hideyoshi inaugurated inves­
tigations in only 25 provinces not yet surveyed independently by daimyo 
(a figure that shrinks by seven if we consider evidence back to 1580). The 
degree of autonomous initiative is also indicated by comparing how many 
provinces the daimyo and Hideyoshi surveyed each year. As Table 3 shows, 
private surveys equal or outnumber Hideyoshi's in every year but two. 
Before Hideyoshi's final campaign against the Gohojo, the time when sur­
vival and pacification were his main preoccupations, private surveys were 
conducted in 63 instances as opposed to his 49. Many of these took place 
wholly outside of his sphere of influence. 
There are some who hold that autonomous daimyo "tended to conform 
to Hideyoshi's own guidelines," and imply that his techniques represented 
a significant improvement over theirs.67 In my view, this record of indepen­
dent surveying, combined with the fact that many of the practices involved 
predated Hideyoshi's use of them, indicates that daimyo were as motivated 
as he to explore new, more effective survey techniques entirely on their 
own initiative, without any prodding by Hideyoshi.68 
(Mutsu) into Mutsu province, and Uzen and Ugo into Dewa province. Sado, Oki, Totomi, 
and Iki have been treated as separate provinces in the province total. 
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TABLE 3 
Private and Taiko Kenchi, 1585-98 
Hideyoshi's Private Hideyoshi's Private 
Year surveys surveys Year surveys surveys 
1583 3 6 1591 10 12 
1584 6 5 1592 4 5 
1585 6 5 1593 2 4 
1586 4 5 1594 5 10 
1587 6 7 1595 9 9 
1588 5 6 1596 3 7 
1589 7 14 1597 2 4 
1590 12 15 1598 4 5 
S O U R C E : Kadokawa Nihon shi jiten, p. 1130. 
N O T E  : Surveys in Etchu, Hyuga, Kaga, Mutsu, Noto, Osumi, Satsuma, Shinano, and Tosa have all 
been treated as private surveys. Surveys of Kaga, Noto, and Etchu listed in the Jiten that I have not been 
able to verify have been eliminated from the count. 
The widespread practice of differentiating land grades in the late six­
teenth century further supports this picture. It cannot be said to have had 
its origins in a centrally dictated survey policy, since land was graded in 
the surveys conducted by Oda Nobunaga and in some of those conducted 
under the kandaka system of cash assessments.69 
The question of who initiated changes in survey practices and under 
what stimulus remains open. Not only was the adoption of the kokudaka 
system incomplete; even where the change was made, it required more time 
than is customarily acknowledged. A whole array of different standards 
and methods continued to be used for estimates of domain value in the late 
sixteenth century. Old data were sometimes converted to putative yields. 
In other instances the adoption of putative yields to value domains came 
first, and their use in local surveys and tax assessment occurred only some 
time later. Certainly this record is too meager to permit any claim that 
Hideyoshi established universal standards of measure or land value, too 
incomplete to support a claim that he standardized survey procedures, and 
too inadequate as a basis for the claim that somewhat earlier or contem­
porary independent surveys were markedly less precise than his.770 
Motives for Diverse Practices 
Though in theory domains based assessed values on soil fertility, the 
variation across regions was so great that other considerations must have 
guided the rate-setting process. It is not hard to single out political objec­
tives as a major influence. 
In a sense, a domain's judgment of its worth was a negotiated contract 
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between Hideyoshi (later, the Tokugawa Bakufu) and its daimyo. The value 
put on a tan of land and the size of the tan itself reflected, among other 
things, the place the daimyo sought in the national hierarchy of lords and in 
his relationship with the hegemon or Shogun. It is sometimes claimed, for 
example, that tozama daimyo such as the Yama'uchi set their land values 
low to avoid having to contribute money to meet the emergency expenses 
of the hegemon or Shogun.71 But this was not universally true for tozama 
lords. Kaga domain's assessed value was exceptionally high. By deliberate 
decision, the domain increased its apparent wealth. 
The high assessed value of Dewa reflected a different political concern. 
That overvaluation was the result of a Bakufu tax agent's (daikan) attempt 
to maintain the fiction of an earlier assessed value in a district that had 
experienced a steep drop in cultivated land. In this case the image of conti­
nuity was preserved at the cost of a proportionate cut in tax rates to offset 
the artificially high valuation.72 
The Dewa example well illustrates the aspect of the land tax system 
that permitted land values to be so dramatically manipulated. Ultimately, 
neither the assessed value nor the tax rate, by itself, was meaningful. The 
effect of one on villagers' tax burden cannot be known in the absence of the 
other. Consequently, villagers might accept high estimates of land value if 
the accompanying tax rate kept total taxes within a tolerable range. 
These facts suggest that the transition to kokudaka, even at the rela­
tively superficial level of domain value, was less related to the nationwide 
implementation of uniform land survey procedures than to the negotia­
tion of the relations between a given domain and the hegemon or Shogun. 
Shoken Hyozaemon, a hatamoto and would-be daimyo, shortened his mea­
suring rod to 4 shaku, 8 sun, thereby increasing the value of his domain 
enough to qualify. Similar manipulations occurred throughout the Toku­
gawa era, at the least in Nambu, Tsugaru, Mito, and Daishoji domains.73 
Conversely, domain lords like the Chosokabe could conceal some of their 
actual resources by undervaluing their lands. 
Clearly, much more than simple economics was involved in all this. 
For in principle, anyway, extraordinary exactions were based on domain 
value. Had economic motives been paramount, every daimyo would have 
sought to lower the value of his domain to reduce that burden. This is de­
monstrably not the case, and in the absence of regular national taxation, 
some daimyo unquestionably viewed the added cost as an acceptable price 
to pay for some social benefit. 
What did they buy for this increase in their own obligations to their 
overlord? The Dewa daikan's actions reflect samurai society's enormous 
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concern for the public appearance of wealth, prosperity, and effective ad­
ministration. Increased status was certainly another benefit. Promotion to 
daimyo rank carried with it not only increased social standing but closer 
proximity to powerful people. For some daimyo, loyalty to a hegemon 
could be demonstrated through a willingness to bear increased economic 
and military burdens. A large daimyo like Maeda Toshiie not only bene­
fited from that perception, but also bolstered his own image as a powerful 
lord, someone whose needs and opinions coalition leaders and hegemons 
had to consider in formulating policy and political strategy, someone who 
might be sought out as a pivotal ally. Regardless of the motivations that 
underlay a particular domain lord's actions, the kokudaka system allowed 
daimyo room to maneuver for the status they wanted relative to others and 
in the eyes of the hegemon/ On the other side, local and varied though the 
contractual arrangements were, the system created an explicit standard by 
which hegemons could compute extraordinary levies on daimyo for major 
construction projects, the support of the imperial household, and military 
purposes. 
In stressing the bilateral nature of the kokudaka system, I do not mean 
to imply that both parties negotiated from relatively equal positions or that 
each daimyo was completely free to set his own standard of value.74 In a 
number of instances Hideyoshi may have enforced his policies quite effec­
tively. His ability to do so depended on several considerations. The relative 
power of the parties at any given time conditioned the ultimate measure 
of domain value; other demands on their energies influenced both their 
position and their absolute military strength. Much as Hideyoshi may have 
desired high valuations, especially from recently defeated or newly allied 
daimyo, the cost of pressing for them could compromise more important 
objectives.1 Hideyoshi accepted a low valuation of Chosokabe domains in 
1587 when he was still trying to subjugate Kyushu. Conversely, he forced 
Satsuma domain to accept a (nominally) high valuation seven years later, 
after he had subdued the last of his opponents, the Gohojo, and had no 
other major domestic distractions.75 
Differences in the timing of the transition to the kokudaka system, in 
*The manipulating of the system for social-climbing purposes suggests that this expres­
sion of value carried a momentum of its own. The more that kokudaka became the standard 
for classifying daimyo wealth and determining obligations to the hegemon or Bakufu, the 
more likely a lord was to adopt, at least in his relations with other lords, the same standard. 
Its adoption clarified his position relative to other daimyo. 
t Besides the direct incentive of exacting as much as he could from a domain lord, by set­
ting a high valuation Hideyoshi could place additional financial burdens on former enemies 
and make it more difficult for them to build up a military force great enough to threaten him. 
 87 Kaga Land Surveys
the formulas for assessing value, and in the measuring units used all sug­
gest that assessed values were first and foremost the product of a political 
dialogue between the daimyo and Hideyoshi. They were not the end result 
of a device, unilaterally designed by Hideyoshi and systematically imposed 
throughout the land.76 The kokudaka system was a key point of articula­
tion between daimyo and their overlords, but it was a double-edged device, 
subject to manipulation by the daimyo as well as the hegemons. 
Hideyoshi's state, in sum, was not what it is held out to be. His public 
proclamations were grandiose and marked by bombastic rhetoric, but his 
capacity to compel change was restricted.77 Though the language of his 
orders was imperious, and their intent spelled out in detail, he could not 
overcome the contrary inclinations of many of his subordinate or allied 
daimyo. He managed to survey only a bare majority of Japan's traditional 
provinces, and even then, his principles were often thwarted. Old practices 
remained, new practices were manipulated, and though Hideyoshi clearly 
commanded more authority than his predecessors, that authority was not 
great enough to transform domain administration and local society. Kaga's 
deviation from standard practices was by no means unique. 
However much Hideyoshi may have wished to encourage the adoption 
of a specific method of computing domain value, accomplishing that was, 
as a practical matter, a secondary concern. As long as daimyo presented a 
generally acceptable figure, the potential cost of enforcing the ideal stan­
dards and actual measurements greatly outweighed the marginal benefits 
central authorities might have gained. The risks of provoking open daimyo 
opposition were much too great. These were not limited to outright rebel­
lion. The image of hegemonic authority was also endangered. To create a 
public issue over enforcement, even if ultimately successful, could seriously 
undermine the image of a hegemon's unchallenged authority, a tool useful 
in encouraging compliance even where his will could not be enforced in 
anyfinal, objective sense.78 The failure of Hideyoshi's Tokugawa successors 
to push ahead with the standardization of survey procedures and national 
surveys indicates that, like him, they were fully cognizant of the marginal 
gains to be made through such a mass effort. 
The imperfect implementation of surveys encourages a revaluation 
of the genesis of such great social transformations as the separating of 
warriors from commoners and the redefining of land tenure. If simple mea­
suring units could not be standardized, more difficult problems like these 
could not have been solved by central fiat. After all, they have resisted easy 
solution by modern governments with much stronger state apparatuses 
than Hideyoshi or the Bakufu commanded. Again, this does not mean that 
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central edicts were without influence, and in some instances Hideyoshi 
may have forced compliance. But on the whole, important policy decisions 
were made at the level of the domain and the village, not by the nascent 
state. The issue of agency is far more open, complex, and subject to subtle 
influences than we have held it to be. 
With this analysis as a backdrop, the following chapters explore the de­
velopment of the new social and political order in Kaga domain. Clearly its 
surveys were inadequate to the social tasks with which such investigations 
have commonly been identified. Yet in Kaga, too, classes were separated, 
land tenure issues were resolved, and retainers were removed from the land. 
Events there illustrate both the typical demands that confronted daimyo, 
samurai, and villager and the local forces that shaped the relationships 
between village and domain. 
Domain administrators faced four key issues: how to create stability 
within the domain; how to tie villages to domain administrative organs; 
how to keep samurai loyal and at the same time prevent them from abusing 
the commoners; and how to raise adequate funds to run the domain. Samu­
rai retainers were preoccupied above all with ensuring a stable and ade­
quate income. Villagers confronted the challenge of protecting themselves 
from the harsh exactions of the domain and its samurai and securing ade­
quate food, clothing, shelter, and perhaps even a measure of prosperity. 
Ultimately, daimyo, samurai, and villager each played a role in resolving 
these trilateral tensions and creating an environment in which all classes 
had a securer niche than they had had during the turbulent sixteenth cen­
tury. 
Chapter4

Land Tenure

Conventional historiography stresses the role of hegemonic policies, especially those of Hideyoshi, in transforming the land tenure sys­
tem and class relations of late-medieval-early-modern Japan. Through 
national policies Hideyoshi and the Tokugawa recast man-land relations 
on a national scale, granted villagers a new measure of tenurial security, 
whether described as "private" or "serf "-like, and freed them from samurai 
managerial oversight. 
In this chapter I explore how rights over land were distributed between 
members of the samurai and villager classes in Kaga domain and evalu­
ate how the late-sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-century transformation 
affected the distribution of these rights. In the process we will explore a 
form of samurai tenure that was dying out, the broad authority of a landed 
retainer over his property, as well as the more typically restricted rights of 
that class of samurai. We will also examine a form of tenure in rural com­
munities that provided one of the foundations of villages as administrative 
organizations. 
Of the whole range of issues—social, political, and economic—that are 
linked to land rights, I will focus primarily on the question of who deter­
mined them and the extent to which they were nationally uniform. I will 
not attempt to explore the development of class divisions within the village 
or relationships between landlords and tenants, two prominent themes in 
Japanese writings on land tenure. Those are large issues that deserve fuller 
treatment on some other occasion. 
Two concepts are central to an evaluation of land tenure. One is usu­
fruct. To what extent does someone with rights in land control the use to 
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which the land is put? Does he have to share the power to determine land-
use with others? The other is disposability. What restrictions are there on 
the ability of an owner to transfer his rights to another? Can he dispose of 
his land as he wants, or does he have to defer to the wishes of others? When 
we think of modern property rights, we think of owners having maximum 
freedom to determine both how the land will be used and how to transmit 
ownership to other parties. 
In terms of these two concepts, samurai tenurial arrangements shifted 
during the Sengoku-Kinsei transformation. In part this change resulted 
from a redefining of social classes. In general those who remained on the 
land lost any claim to samurai status. These families held maximum lati­
tude in their rights to use and dispose of their land as they saw fit. They 
assumed the rights and obligations of hyakusho, a term connoting full 
membership in the village community. Those who retained samurai status, 
however, even in domains like Satsuma, where rusticated samurai remained 
a prominent feature of local society, lost many of their property rights.* 
Samurai control over land generally was quite limited during the early 
modern era. Again, if we think of disposability and usufruct as the key 
elements of tenure, then samurai did not have tenure. As a rule landed re­
tainers, direct shogunal retainers (hatamoto), and daimyo, as well as the 
Shogun for most practical purposes, possessed rights to the income from 
land, but not the rights of transferability, disposability, or free use. 
The hegemon and later the Bakufu did retain a high degree of con­
trol over the disposition of both their own lands and those of the daimyo. 
They could and did transfer daimyo or hatamoto, and augment, reduce, or 
confiscate their domains. But even in transferring lands, the rights being 
transferred were limited and partook more of public, administrative rights 
and perquisites than private landownership rights. Though the Shogun, 
hatamoto, and daimyo could make law, administer justice, and levy taxes 
and the corvee on their holdings, and though landed retainers derived in­
come and sometimes corvee services from their fiefs, they generally could 
not actively manage the use of their lands. They could not decide on their 
own what crops to plant, when to plant them, or how to cultivate the 
land. Within the samurai class, access to the other samurai perquisites was 
carefully controlled by one's immediate superior, the hegemon, daimyo, 
or hatamoto. With the exception of shogunal control over Bakufu lands, 
samurai rights over land were not freely disposable. There was no mar­
'Satsuma samurai who served in the rural areas were systematically rotated from the 
countryside to the cities and back. They did not return to the same rural location. 
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ket for these rights in which they could be bought or sold; they could not 
be used as security on loans (although the tax revenues from them were); 
and they could not be subdivided at will, or, in principle, freely willed to 
successors. 
The removal of samurai from the land and the creation of these con­
ditions throughout Japan are inarguable. So, too, is the samurai's loss of 
a semblance of ownership rights over the land. To the extent that this ar­
rangement marked a new restriction of their rights over land, it might 
arguably be termed a "revolution" in land tenure. 
The same word, "revolution," has also been applied to the changing 
relationship of rural residents to their land. In this area I believe both the 
mechanism that guided the transformation and the result require reevalua­
tion. There are a number of problems with the common emphasis on the 
villagers' near-private landholding rights. 
Even if one assumes that Hideyoshi consciously pursued a policy of 
establishing autonomous nuclear agricultural households, significant ques­
tions arise about the policy's effectiveness. One concerns the import of 
listing a villager's name in land survey registers. This practice, more than 
any other, is held up as evidence that cultivators were confirmed in their 
right to farm specific pieces of land, and that the surveys thereby defined 
them as full-fledged members of the village. However, as the historian 
Hayami Akira has pointed out, contemporary records listing households 
for the purpose of establishing labor dues (buyaku) often name many fewer 
households than the survey registers. This suggests that the survey registers 
did not legally define autonomous households or clearly define a family's 
relationship to the land; what was a family unit for one purpose was not 
a family unit for another.1 The domain authorities did not use one type of 
record as a check on the other. In this area of administration consistency 
was not the hobgoblin of policy-makers. Even if the two kinds of records 
were a mirror image in some domains, that was not true throughout the 
land. The extent to which survey registers specified tenure rights needs to 
be determined domain by domain, and perhaps even by period. 
Another question arises when one looks at developments in the late 
nineteenth century. Assuming that private landownership was effectively 
established by the early seventeenth century, what need was there for the 
early Meiji tax reformers to stress resurveying to this end? Data from old 
records should have simply been transferable to certificates issued by the 
new government. In fact there was much confusion in many regions over 
who was to be listed as a property's owner. Regardless of Hideyoshi's 
intent, he clearly did not succeed in establishing a system of private land­
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ownership strong or durable enough to obviate the need for new legal 
principles of private property in the nineteenth century. 
Simply put, land-man relations in the villages were more complex than 
students of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries generally ac­
knowledge. They were too complex to have been the result of a centrally 
directed policy. Furthermore, the standard survey techniques that are seen 
as capable of defining individual landholding in villages were much too 
imperfect and incomplete for the task. Even the daimyo could not arbi­
trarily define the villagers' rights to land. In the final analysis, primary 
responsibility for defining land tenure lay at the village, not the domain or 
national level. 
Consequently, the claim for a revolution—a centrally directed, rapid 
shift—in village land tenure is very questionable. In Kaga domain, vil­
lage society showed significant elements of continuity in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. When rustic samurai remained in the villages, they 
did not generally lose their lands. They remained as large landholders and 
locally influential members of the community. 
As a preface to the discussion of developments in Kaga, let us look 
further at two general subjects—the inability of surveys to define indi­
vidual villagers' land rights and the corporate land tenure system com­
monly known as warichi, literally, "dividing the land." 
The Weaknesses of the Surveys as Tools 
for Determining Land Tenure 
Kaga's measuring techniques, however adequate for establishing a 
reasonable estimate of the amount of land to tax, were entirely inadequate 
for defining land tenure rights, since they made no pretense of measur­
ing individual fields. But the standard techniques were not much better. 
The measurements recorded in survey registers are marred by substantial 
inaccuracies that severely limit their ability to define the boundaries of a 
family's land rights. These inaccuracies are of three basic sorts. First, the 
data were not based on measurements between actual field boundaries; 
they were simple vertical and horizontal measurements that attempted to 
approximate a field's area (Fig. 3). Second, the figures in the registers are 
not the original calculations but adjusted data} Standard rounding prac­
tices of the day systematically intr6duced a downward bias to the final, 
recorded measurements; the size of demonstrably unproductive fields (be­
cause of poor soil, extensive shade, and other conditions) was reduced; and 
other adjustments were made based on the surveyors' perceptions of over­
strict measurements (up to 20 percent of the measured area). Since survey 
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Fig. 3. Crossed-rope survey measure­
ment. Top: An artist's record of the 
1840-42 survey of Mito. Note the use 
of poles to keep the measuring lines 
from sagging. Left: Rather than mea­
suring from actual boundaries, the 
crossed-rope technique measured rec­
tangles that approximated the size 
of irregularly shaped fields. Although 
taken from a late-eighteenth-century 
Kaga survey manual, "Kenchikata 
Hisho," illustrations like these can 
be found in survey manuals issued 
throughout the early modern era. 
registers do not record the details of such adjustments, it is impossible to 
manipulate the final data to arrive at even moderately accurate field dimen­
sions. Finally, technological factors introduced inaccuracies. Particularly 
problematical was the use of hemp ropes, which varied in length as they 
got wet or dried out.2 
In sum, none of the measurements were useful in determining bound­
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aries. At best the registers located fields within rather large sections (aza) 
of a village. Within each section there were numerous plots of land. 
No attempt was made to mark the boundaries of individual fields, 
either by erecting physical markers or noting latitude and longitude in sur­
vey registers.3 Neither the emerging central administration nor the domain 
authorities regularly kept plat maps showing each fiejd and to whom it 
belonged. Without these or similar devices, no outside authority could 
effectively guarantee rights to specific plots of land. Samurai officials were 
totally dependent on villagers for determining which piece of land belonged 
to whom/ 
These deficiencies raise significant questions about the intent of Toyo­
tomi Hideyoshi, the Tokugawa Shoguns, the daimyo, and the hatamoto. 
Could they have seriously expected to control landholding arrangements 
within villages using such primitive tools, especially in the absence of direct 
oversight by outside officials? I think not. 
Given the methodological limitations of the surveys, there could be no 
other locus for the effective authority over land tenure than the members of 
the community itself. They typically arbitrated landholding rights within 
their own borders/ By default, if not by design, villagers alone possessed 
the powers of oversight and sanction necessary to enforce a given system of 
land-man relationships. Domain lords might attempt to systematize local 
practice, and hegemons might issue proclamations, but neither could ride 
roughshod over village decisions. 
Warichi 
Nothing better illustrates the power of local communities over land 
rights than early modern land redistribution practices. Although different 
localities employed a variety of names for these practices, I subsume all 
under the term "warichi" in the discussion that follows. In villages that 
practiced redistribution, a villager's access to given pieces of land was 
controlled by all the villagers possessing superior rights to land acting as a 
corporate unit. (A caveat. By using the phrase "corporate unit" and similar 
terms below, I do not wish to imply that a "natural" harmony—or in James 
Scott's phrase, a "moral economy"—existed in these villages. First, one 
"This is one reason why villagers could £o readily circumvent widespread seventeenth-
century attempts to restrict the sale of land. 
t Satsuma may constitute an exception to this generalization. Domain ordinances allo­
cated access to land proportionally based on family composition (the kadowari or "gate-
dividing" system). Since Satsuma stationed samurai in a large number of rural castles, it had 
the necessary manpower to enforce this system of land allocation. 
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segment of the village population was excluded from participation—those 
people without land use rights. Furthermore, as some of the following ma­
terial on warichi in Kaga indicates, there were sometimes sharp divisions 
within a village over whether and how to conduct a redistribution. Docu­
ments compiled by villagers detailing the procedures they employed mask 
the tensions and disputes that had to be resolved throughout the process. 
The issues that warichi addressed needed to be dealt with in non-warichi 
villages, too, but their residents chose different approaches. Why these dif­
ferent choices were made and how internal disputes over procedures were 
resolved cannot be answered here. The descriptions that follow pertain to 
the outcomes and are not intended to imply harmonious village community 
bonds or interaction.) 
The warichi system was aimed at redistributing land use rights, not 
wealth. Each holder of land rights exploited the same proportion of a vil­
lage's arable land after a reallocation as before. The proportion of good, 
average, and poor quality land managed by each was also the same before 
and after. A holder was not forced to give up anything toward equalizing 
the distribution of wealth within the village. 
The basic function of Tokugawa redistribution practices has been ex­
plained largely in the context of the early modern land tax system. The 
development of the warichi system was in part a reaction to the interaction 
between the administrative demands of tax assessment and the destructive 
forces of nature.4 In contrast to modern systems of real estate taxation, 
domain governments (never the central authorities) collected land taxes 
from villages as corporate entities, not from individual villagers. The vil­
lage by itself determined how much each taxpaying member owed. If one 
of them could not pay his share, the others had to make up the shortfall. 
The taxpayers thus had a shared interest in seeing that each family shoul­
dered its responsibility. This interest was the source of much pressure on 
individual families from their relatives and neighbors. A family that was 
unable to pay its share of the land tax was encouraged to raise the money by 
mortgaging its property, selling its possessions or land, or selling its family 
labor (sometimes permanently). Such pressures could, in the extreme, force 
the sale of daughters into prostitution. 
Warichi was one common means of ensuring that each taxpayer paid 
what he ought to pay and no more. It provided a flexible way for the village 
to allocate taxpaying and related responsibilities without tying members 
to a specific plot of land. In most cases redistribution equalized the aver­
age quality of land held by each taxpaying family in order to ensure some 
fairness in the payment of land taxes. The tax-allocation process was sim­
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plified, too. If all taxpayers managed fields of the same average quality, 
the village could simply assess each in proportion to the amount of land 
he controlled. Since different villagers within the same community were 
often subject to different tax rates from different overlords (retainers and 
domain), the warichi system also provided a means of averaging the tax 
rate for the entire village. 
Land redistribution also spread the risks of a family's exposure to natu­
ral disasters. When land was lost from cultivation because of landslides 
or changes in riverbeds, for example, village lands were commonly reallo­
cated so that the loss was shared by all the taxpaying villagers. In this very 
limited sense, there was a redistribution of wealth. Each participant suf­
fered some loss, but no taxpayer was forced to leave agriculture as a result 
of the disaster alone. Unless very large portions of the village were lost, all 
taxpayers would have had land in other parts of the village that could still 
be harvested. All members continued to share the responsibility for paying 
land taxes and contributing labor to communal projects. 
Not only did this system maximize the potential for survival of each 
full-fledged village member, it also maximized the pool of families that had 
a vested interest in the upkeep of the irrigation and flood-control systems 
on which they all depended and in the maintenance of village commons. 
The preservation of a family's economic interest in these endeavors ensured 
its willingness to contribute labor to them. In the parts of Japan where 
water-control facilities were routinely damaged by heavy rains, snow and 
ice, or other climatic or geographic conditions, the demand for cooperative 
labor could be regular, time-consuming, and intensive. 
The warichi system represents a combination of the two other types of 
land use rights usually described by scholars of early modern Japan—those 
of common land (iriaichi) and near-private ownership. In the sense that 
the village taxpayers as a corporate unit determined who held rights to 
a specific plot and for how long, land subject to redistribution partakes 
of the character of common land. But warichi also embodied the kind of 
transferable rights associated with private ownership. Perhaps the closest 
modern analogue (imperfect as it is) is the joint stock company. Like the 
shares in a stock corporation, plots were treated as private property, with 
rights of disposability vested in the owner, but they did not represent the 
ownership of specific corporate assets. The participants in the warichi sys­
tem inherited, bought, sold, mortgaged, and subdivided their cultivation 
rights, whether surreptitiously or legally, just as villagers did in those parts 
of Japan that did not employ the system. In effect they were buying and sell­
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ing shares in a village-sponsored agricultural corporation or partnership, 
not titles to specific pieces of land. 
Land redistribution of one sort or another was a widespread phe­
nomenon. It was practiced in at least 23 of the 65 traditional provinces: 
Echigo, Echizen, Owari, Kaga, Noto, Etchu, Tosa, Ise, Tsushima, Hizen, 
Iyo, Iki, Iwaki, Hyuga, Satsuma, Mutsu, Hitachi, Tango, Yamato, Bungo, 
Chikuzen, Bizen, and Mino. (It was also practiced in Okinawa and the 
Ryukyu Islands.)5 A more telling measure of its national significance is 
the assessed value of the land involved. In several domains redistribution 
was mandated by official fiat, and these alone accounted for 23 percent 
of Japan's total assessed value of 24,554,000 koku of rice in 1645.6 Some 
of the largest domains fell in this group, notably Kaga (with branch fiefs, 
1,200,000 koku), Satsuma (770,000 koku), and Tosa (490,000 koku). On 
top of this, there were a number of regions where redistribution was a very 
common practice even though it was not mandatory. In 11 of Echigo's 12 
counties, the practice was close to universal. Adding in the bulk of Echigo's 
assessed value of approximately 1,143,000 koku brings the total propor­
tion of Japan's assessed value affected by redistribution up to almost 27 
percent, and even the addition of Echigo makes no pretext of comprehen­
siveness. 
The stimulus for this development came from different sources. As 
already noted, some domain administrations attempted to enforce periodic 
redistribution throughout their realms. In other cases the decision to resort 
to redistribution was made within the villages. That this was by no means a 
rare phenomenon is evident in the fact that land redistribution was the rule 
in Echigo province, even though it was not the official policy of domain or 
Bakufu administrators.7 Finally, redistribution might be employed in only 
a part of a village. In these instances the system commonly was a device for 
families involved in a cooperative reclamation project to allocate access to 
fields as they were opened, developed, and stabilized. 
Discussions of land tenure routinely ignore the implications of warichi. 
For example the fact that there was widespread deviation from standard 
conceptions of tenure arrangements even in regions where we find field-by­
field survey registers and despite proclamations by Hideyoshi suggests that 
land rights approximated private ownership. Such evidence further indi­
cates that neither Shogun nor daimyo freely dictated to villagers the nature 
of land rights (much less the distribution of landed wealth, as some would 
have it).8 In most instances, even in many of the domains that ultimately 
mandated redistribution, the impulse originated within local communities. 
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They, not the hegemons or daimyo, determined landholding policies. 
The practice of redistribution raises a variety of interesting questions 
with which we cannot deal here (e.g., questions of origin, variations in 
procedures, and the impact on incentives for cultivators to improve their 
output). An investigation of these questions and others must be postponed 
to another occasion/ My discussion here is limited largely to developments 
in Kaga domain. More specifically, I focus on the questions of who con­
trolled access to land use rights in the domain and how villagers, at least 
acting collectively, made contributions to the institutional foundations of 
domain administration. 
Samurai Land Tenure in Kaga 
From the outset the enfeoffed warriors who accompanied Toshiie and 
Toshinaga into Kaga, Noto, and Etchu were settled on the land in such a 
way as to deprive them of managerial control over the holdings from which 
they drew income. From this perspective the process of class separation 
was given significant impetus by the act of daimyo transfer itself. Toshiie 
settled immigrant retainers in a number of daimyo-controlled castles and 
not on theirfiefs. Their benefices were not tied to specific locations. Though 
given the right to assess annual land taxes and exact corvee from specific 
villages, they were never locally resident and did not manage the lands 
within their nominal jurisdiction. Through these measures the Maeda took 
complete charge of defining land rights for this set of samurai. 
The local samurai-gentry can be divided into two groups, those who 
had formed alliances with one or other of the Maeda's competitors, the 
Ikko sect, Sassa Narimasa, or Shibata Katsuie, and those who lined up 
with the newcomers. Most of the families in thefirst group that did not flee 
the Maeda forces remained on the land. Early land registers and the gene­
alogies of rural district administrators (called fuchibyakusho, and later, 
tomura) indicate that these families retained control over their lands and 
often earned special considerations from the Maeda. These samurai con­
tinued to oversee their lands as before, with full management and dispos­
ability rights. But opportunities for military service gradually declined, and 
*It is worth repeating that land redistribution practices varied from region to region 
throughout Japan. In a given village the practice might be applied only to seedbeds or to 
mountain fields, not to all of the arable land. Significant variations also existed in the period 
between rotations. In some instances a natural disaster would trigger a redistribution. In 
others land was regularly redistributed at intervals of from three to 20 years. I discuss the 
influence of warichi on Meiji to early Showa landholding rights and tenancy practices in 
Niigata prefecture in "Feudal Remnants and Tenant Power." 
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in the end they lost almost all of their samurai attributes. They became 
simply villagers. The tenures of these families were largely uninfluenced by 
the Maeda. 
As for the local warriors who went over to the Maeda they were ab­
sorbed into their new overlord's samurai band and generally enjoyed rights 
to assess corvee and land taxes on the same basis as the longstanding re­
tainers. These families had initially established their own tenures by dint 
of their military skill. Though they maintained some of their traditional 
rights during the early years of Maeda rule, the daimyo ultimately gained 
complete control over these matters. 
Within this second group of native samurai-gentry there was one ex­
ception, the Cho family. A brief examination of the position of the Cho 
and their landed retainers discloses the nature of medieval local overlord­
ship when it survived the birth of early modern Japan. It also reveals a 
bureaucratization and depersonalization of retainer fiefs that parallels the 
bureaucratization and depersonalization of the domain's administrative 
organization. 
Residents of the Noto Peninsula since the thirteenth century, the Cho 
had their ups and downs over the centuries. Their fortunes reached a nadir 
just before their alliance with Oda Nobunaga. Many of the Cho forces 
lost their lives when the family was expelled from its home base in the 
battle for Nanao castle. But when the Maeda occupied Noto as part of 
Nobunaga's victorious armies, Cho Tsuratatsu was ordered to serve the 
Maeda as yoriki^ and the ancestral lands were restored. In 1582 Maeda 
Toshiie added to the Cho's holdings, granting them some of the territory 
of the recently defeated Tempyoji partisans of the Ikko sect. This cemented 
a relationship between the two families that lasted long after Nobunaga's 
assassination. 
Toshiie's benefice was not predicated on a sacrifice of Cho autonomy. 
More than the other seven retainers who heldfiefs larger than 10,000 koku, 
the Cho maintained a surprising degree of administrative independence. 
Though this was by no means true private landownership (the Cho's mana­
gerial authority and rights of disposability were highly restricted), their 
rights of possession did allow them and their retainers to exercise enough 
control over the use of land and the resident population to preserve some 
of its elements.9 
The Cho established their own administrative organization, which 
paralleled that of Kaga domain. Like the Maeda administration, the Cho's 
took on a bureaucratized and public character more than a private one. 
At the top of the administrative pyramid the Cho Elders {karo) managed 
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administration and set policy. They supervised a treasurer (san'yo bugyo) 
to whom a county magistrate (kori bugyo) reported. The collection of land 
taxes on Cho land was supervised by officials called daikan, who were also 
subordinate to the treasurer. 
There was one daikan for each of three districts: the Eastern district, 
consisting of 17 villages; the Western district, consisting of 16 villages; and 
the Heartland (Oku) district, consisting of 2.2 villages. The daikan oversaw 
tax assessment, tax collection, the evaluation of wasteland, and related ac­
tivities on the lands belonging to the Cho themselves. They also performed 
these functions on some of the Cho retainers' lands, but this occurred only 
in an unusual instance or in villages in which the retainers had only a small 
amount of taxable land/ 
Commoner district chiefs (tomura) collected the household and horse 
tax [muneuma yakugin) and carried out other duties under the direction 
of the county magistrate. They also assisted the daikan in tax assessment 
and collection, organized corvee labor, kept track of reclamation projects, 
assessed all the major miscellaneous taxes and dues, and supervised the 
village headmen (mura kimoiri). 
The Cho retained the medieval "right of nonentry" (funyuken), mean­
ing that Maeda officials could not enter their lands.10 When the rest of the 
Maeda holdings were surveyed, even in the early to middle seventeenth 
century, the Cho holdings were exempt. Instead, the Cho conducted their 
own surveys on a different model, one that more closely approximated 
classic descriptions of the Taiko kenchi.* 
The Cho also used their own tax mechanisms. Retainer fiefs were 
valued by the taxes they purportedly yielded, rather than by their assessed 
value as in the other Maeda lands. Indeed, one of the purposes of the late-
sixteenth-century Cho surveys was to set a uniform tax of 60 percent of 
assessed value, a rate that would henceforth be used in assigning fiefs. That 
figure, which became the official standard for both directly controlled Cho 
lands (kurairichi) and retainer lands (chigyo) in the 162.0's, represented a 
kind of "fixed" assessment based on a flat village rate, rather than annual 
retainer or Cho assessments on parts of a village. Though retainers con­
* As in the Maeda case, a retainer could share villages with the domain or other retainers. 
Indeed, it was rare for a retainer to possess an entire village. Typically a large retainer's lands 
were scattered among two or three villages. A small retainer's lands might well be confined 
to a single village. (Kigoshi, "Kan'ei-ki Choke ryo Kashima hangun," pp. 31-32; ltd, "Kinsei 
shoki daimyo ryo," pp. 22-23,  2 7 - 2 8 ; KHNKy 1: 48.) The Cho and their chief retainers also 
possessed residences in Kanazawa. 
t Nonetheless, these surveys reflected the same political purposes as the Maeda's. For ex­
ample, the 1592 survey implemented an arbitrary 45% increase in assessed valuation (Kigoshi, 
"Kan'ei-ki Choke ryo Kashima hangun," p. 20). 
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tinued to set somewhat different rates from the "official" one, they do not 
appear to have varied a great deal from the 60 percent level.11 
In addition to the land tax, the Cho levied several lesser taxes on their 
subjects: the aforementioned household/horse tax, ordinary labor dues 
(hirabu), miscellaneous nonagricultural assessments (komononari), and 
miscellaneous local (county, district, and village) expenses (sho nyumai). 
Though the other subjects of Kaga domain paid these taxes, too, the dis­
tinctive feature in the Cho case was that these taxes were all administered 
by a retainer lineage, and not by the domain. Other retainers conscripted 
labor from villagers early in the Maeda occupation of Kaga, but they lost 
these rights by the very early seventeenth century. Only the Cho and their 
retainers continued to assess corvee and collect these taxes through mid-
century. 
The Cho retainers had a considerable degree of autonomy in their own 
right. For example, they could collect certain taxes from the villagers under 
their control that other villagers had to pay to the Cho, including their own 
version of the house and horse tax.12 And although these men could not buy 
and sell their lands, they exercised full managerial control over them. Their 
samurai servants (genin) lived in the villages, and some villagers were tied 
directly to individual retainers. As an immediate presence in the villages, 
the retainers were in a position to play an active role in the management of 
agriculture. New lands were opened, and old ones cultivated, under their 
direction. In these respects the Cho retainers exercised usufruct over their 
fiefs and maintained a degree of "ownership" rare among early modern 
enfeoffed samurai. 
Villager Land Tenure in Kaga 
Although corporate landholding under the warichi system was not offi­
cially mandated in the early years of Kaga domain, and was almost cer­
tainly not the only form of villager land tenure, it is the only form we can 
readily identify. Out of necessity, then, we will confine ourselves to the 
operation of that system. (Corporate landholding, let us note, meant vil­
lage control of access to individual plots; the village played no direct role 
in the management of cultivation. Each villager decided for himself which 
crops to plant, when to plant them, and all the other details of day-to-day 
management. He did of course have to defer to the collectivity in his ac­
cess to irrigation water and, in some cases, to the green manure and other 
products of the commons.) 
Redistributive practices in Kaga appear in domain records as early as 
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the beginning of the seventeenth century. But if formal documentation 
was part of the process at all, local officials did not preserve the earliest 
written records associated with warichi. They had little reason to do so. 
Decades after a redistribution, when precedents had been incorporated in 
more recent records or superseded by modifications, the question of who 
had managed what specific lands lost its relevance. Consequently, we only 
know of the origins and basic principles of redistribution through some­
what later evidence. Some questions, such as the length of the interval 
between ^allocations, can be judged only by looking at middle and late 
Tokugawa data. 
The warichi system of Kaga domain represents the furthest possible 
extension of corporate control over arable land. In principle all kinds of 
village land were subject to redistribution. Although mechanisms were de­
veloped that protected the residential land of villagers who possessed fully 
disposable cultivation rights (takamochi hyakusho), land redistribution 
might indeed mean that a tenant would be forced to change his residence.13 
This potential clearly indicates the full extent to which corporate control 
could be exercised over matters that scholars have generally treated as 
"private." 
During the period under study, warichi was almost exclusively a con­
cern of the takamochi hyakusho. These villagers originated the system and 
retained almost total control over it, though from 164Z down to the late 
Tokugawa, domain officials intermittently attempted to systematize some 
of the practices for the sake of uniformity and fairness. (Ultimately, in 
the nineteenth century, domain policy-makers did establish uniform maxi­
mum intervals between reallocations.) In this regard Kaga offers us an 
opportunity to examine the ways in which domain administrators built on 
a village-initiated practice in constructing their policies and institutions/ 
Since villagers themselves originated warichi, there was substantial 
variety in the specific procedures employed to reallocate land.1 There were 
differences not only between villages but also within a village over time. 
In some cases, ail the village's good, average, and poor land was propor­
tionately allocated to each shareholder. This format ultimately dominated 
warichi procedures during the mid-seventeenth century and after. In other 
cases, such as those from Noto's Nafune district, original fields (honden) 
were divided quite equally among villagers as well as proportionally by 
*In building on village redistribution practices, Kaga authorities were not at all unique. 
Several other domains took over village-based redistribution practices for their own ends. See 
Aono, Nihon kinsei warichisei shi, on this point. 
t There was not even afixed interval for reallocating land until the domain set a maximum 
of 20 years in 1838 (Oda Kichinojo, Kaga-han, p. 491). 
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land characteristics. These villagers held equal amounts of each category 
of land. 
Even when domain authorities first sought to employ the warichi sys­
tem for their own purposes, they refused to specify in any detail the pro­
cedures the villagers were to follow. The 1642 ordinance that first gave 
active encouragement to warichi and ordered it into domain-wide use did 
not specify what the standards of measurement were to be, which classes 
of villager were to be included, which lands were to be exempted, or any 
other procedural matters.14 These matters were left to the villagers to de­
cide for themselves, and the villagers would continue to be the arbiters of 
most warichi procedures throughout the early modern era. 
The first step villagers took after deciding to conduct a redistribution, 
then, was to meet and discuss the exact procedures to follow. Once they 
settled on these, the "rules" were spelled out in a formal document (a 
village sadamegaki), and all participants agreed to abide by the condi­
tions therein. This final formal agreement varied in length and detail, with 
greater detail becoming common later in the Tokugawa era. The following 
procedures were central to most redistributions in Kaga domain. 
Villagers first determined which lands were to be redistributed and 
which were not. Lands subject to reallocation were called lottery lands 
(kujichi); those exempted were called hikichi (withdrawn lands)/ In effect 
kujichi was a residual category that included all lands not specifically 
exempted from redistribution. Since exemptions were quite limited, the 
overwhelming majority of taxable land was subject to redistribution. 
The domain established a uniform general exemption for productive 
land in 1671, but this ordinance was probably built on earlier village prac­
tices. The domain simply standardized the exemption, setting a limit on 
the amount of land of whatever type that could be "withdrawn." Up to a 
total of six tan for each 100 koku of assessed village value could be ex­
cluded.15 Since 100 koku represented a minimum of 66 tan of land (about 22 
acres), only a small share of village land was protected from redistribution, 
at most 10 percent of a village's arable and residential land. Nonetheless, 
it was enough to encompass most residential compounds, seedbeds, and 
other lands that required very heavy investments of capital and labor.1 
*A third category had crept into use by the 19th century—sochiy especially "thin" paddy 
that was jointly owned by the village and whose income was dedicated to the village budget 
("Denchiwari," in Heki, [Kaitei zoho] Kano, p. 603). 
tlf someone had more residential land than his share of the legal exemption allowed, the 
surplus could be treated as constituting part of his share of arable land. In the case of the 
warichi conducted in Awabara village, Hakui county, in 1794, such lands would have been 
treated as coming from a shareholder's allotment of average paddy (Sadamegaki in Hakui shi 
shi,?.66$). 
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TABLE 4 
Hypothetical Allocation of Cultivation Rights to 22 Shareholding Families 
in 10 Kuji Groups Under the Warichi System 
Family Share Kuji group Family Share Kuji group 
1 1.25 A,B 12 .50 H 
2 1.00 C 13 .50 I 
3 .50 D 14 .25 I 
4 .50 D 15 .25 I 
5 .50 E 16 .25 J 
6 .50 E 17 .25 
7 .50 F 18 .25 J 
8 .50 F 19 .25 J 
9 .50 G 20 .25 B 
10 .50 G 21 .25 B 
11 .50 H 22 .25 B 
N O T E  : In this arrangement, all but Family z would participate in a second drawing for their part-
shares: Family i with Families 20—22. in kuji B; Family 3 with Family 4 in kuji D; etc. 
In addition to this small amount of residential and arable land, allow­
ance was made for unproductive lands. Roads, footpaths, and shrines, for 
example, were exempted. The small amount of land located in the perpetual 
shadow of houses, road trees, or other large objects was also exempted 
from redistribution because it was considered unproductive. 
Before the land was measured and evaluated, the village shareholders 
were divided into lottery groups called kuji. There were commonly 10 to 
12 kuji, each of which drew for one share of each category of land.16 Every 
participant belonged to at least one lottery group. If someone held rights 
to a sufficiently large amount of land, he might by himself constitute a kuji 
or participate in more than one. More often, several people formed a kuji. 
One of them, usually the largest holder, would serve as the group's official 
representative (kujioya) during the redistribution process. After the lottery 
established which kuji got which lands, a secondary lottery would be held 
among a kuji's several members to allocate the lands within the share. 
Table 4 shows one arrangement by which 22 shareholders might be de­
ployed to draw for their village's 10 shares of each category of land. In this 
arrangement Families 1 and 2, with a full share each, constitute their own 
kuji groups (A and C). Since Family 1 holds an additional quarter-share, 
it is also part of a second group (kuji B) and would draw a second time, 
along with Families 20-22, for a specific section of the land that group B 
drew in the initial lottery. Five groups would have been jointly managed 
by two families (D-H); one was shared by three families (I); and two were 
divided among four families (B, J). 
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Once the principles for defining the exemptions were settled and the 
kuji established, the village conducted its own land survey. The survey was 
more detailed than the domain's, making finer distinctions in quality in 
classifying the land. The purpose of the survey was twofold. Most obvi­
ously, it measured all redistributable land and assessed its fertility. But it 
also took topographic characteristics into consideration, in effect trying to 
assess a plot's vulnerability to natural disasters and fluctuations in climate. 
Surveying required a bare minimum of 15 to 20 people,* and the redistribu­
tion process as a whole involved a substantial cost to participants in terms 
of time, often four to six weeks. Any cash expenditures for the survey were 
borne solely by them. 
After the land was measured and its productivity evaluated, all redis­
tributable land was divided into sections (wari). Each wari contained land 
of comparable characteristics and quality. But the wari were not neces­
sarily of the same size; a wari for one class of land might be larger than the 
wari for another. Villagers could and often did change these wari with each 
redistribution.* The wari were then divided into equal sections, one for 
each kuji, and each section was assigned a number, which was inscribed 
on a lottery stick. The share representatives (kujioya) then drew sticks for 
each section of each wari until all were assigned to the various kuji. As 
noted, when a kuji consisted of two or more shareholders, they held a sec­
ond drawing to allocate the lands their representative had drawn among 
themselves.17 Consequently, each field group (wari) would be divided at 
least once and more commonly, twice. This whole process could entail 
redrawing individual field boundaries. 
The efficiency of the warichi system in protecting shareholders from 
a loss of land through natural disasters depended on what stimulated the 
redistribution. By and large, in the period with which we are concerned, 
the Kaga authorities did not encourage regular redistribution. Except for 
the mid-seventeenth century, the impetus generally came from the villagers 
themselves. But there were no clear stipulations on how often this was to 
be done. Warichi were implemented irregularly at the villages' discretion. 
*By the 19th century 15 different specialists were officially involved in making the actual 
survey. Two commoner survey specialists, the head surveyor {bunchinin) and the measurer 
(saotorinin), received a salary from the village. In addition to district and village officials, 
and in addition to the survey specialists, a substantial number of people drawn from the 
middle and lower ranks of the villagers stretched measuring lines and placed survey markers. 
(Tochinai, Kyu Kaga-han, pp. 117-20.) 
tThe wari that Shinbo village designed for the 1812 land redistribution ranged from 45 
bu to 540 bu in size. In two later redistributions the villagers restructured the wari in such a 
way as to limit these size differences. By 1867 only three were smaller than 270 bu, and only 
one was larger than 400 bu (Hakui shi shi, p. 675). 
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TABLE 5 
Intervals Between Land Redistributions for Eight Villages, 
Late Seventeenth Century to Late Nineteenth Century 
Village Time period 
Number ni 
redistributions Average 
Interval (years) 
Longest Shortest 
Kitajima 
Chokeiji 
Hongo 
Shinbo 
Tsubouchi 
Myoga 
Takasude 
Junen'aki 
1672-1865 
1785-1871 
1666-1857 
1722-1867 
1733-1857 
1729-1871 
1772-1853 
1734-1859 
9 
6 
10 
7 
7 
7 
7 
4 
24 
17 
21 
24 
21 
24 
14 
42 
43 
20 
37 
29 
23 
40 
19 
83 
12 
15 
11 
19 
20 
20 
8 
20 
S O U R C E S : Tochinai, Kyu Kaga-han, pp. 106-8; Hakui shi shi, Kinsei hen: 663; Tonami cho shi, 
p. 371. 
In general some form of natural disaster appears to have been the stimulus 
for building village consensus on the need to conduct a redistribution.18 A 
substantial loss of land was an indisputable event to be dealt with through 
redistribution, while more subtle shifts in the productivity of the land or 
small losses might be subject to some disputation.19 
Though in theory nothing prevented redistributions in consecutive 
years if the villagers who desired a change could obtain a consensus in favor 
of it, practical constraints (the cost in time and money) militated against 
frequent warichi. In any event the interval between redistributions varied 
substantially. As illustrated by the records from eight villages in different 
parts of the domain (Table 5), the range was from as little as eight years 
to as much as 83 years. The shortest average interval was one occurrence 
every 14 years, the longest one every 42. years. Most redistributions were 
conducted every 2.0 years or so.20 
Yet as the table shows, even within a village, the variation could be 
great. The residents of Junen'aki, for example, redistributed their land four 
times between 1734 and 1859, at intervals as short as 20 years and as long as 
83. In nearby Takasude village, with seven redistributions in the relatively 
short span of 81 years, the shortest interval was eight years, the longest 
19.21 The recurrent redistributions in Takasude were the result of frequent 
flooding.22 This wide variation in intervals reinforces the impression that 
warichi were triggered by an act of nature, and that in Kaga domain at 
least, the process functioned more as a device to spread the costs of natu­
ral disasters than as a way to ensure against tax inequities growing out of 
small changes in soil fertility. To the extent that the system was adapted 
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to local circumstances, it was a more cost-effective form of insurance for 
shareholders than regularly scheduled distributions. 
For many years the origin of warichi in Kaga domain was dated to 1642 
and attributed to the domain policy-makers who enacted a package of re­
forms at that time.23 This judgment was based on a mid-nineteenth-century 
document that described these reforms.24 But though contemporary docu­
ments verify the domain's active encouragement of redistribution at that 
time, this is an area in which we have concrete evidence of the positive 
contributions that villagers, acting cooperatively, made to domain admin­
istration. 
For one thing, we have evidence of the existence of redistributional 
practices as early as 1606. In the course of settling a village dispute in 1651, 
domain records specifically advised, "Regarding the repartition [goban 
wart] to be conducted this spring in Ota village in Tonami county, matters 
must now be settled quickly in accordance with the ordinance [sadame­
gaki] that resulted from disputes among peasants in 1606."M The reference 
to 1606 is early enough in itself to refute the old explanation of warichi's 
origin in Kaga. But if the principles recorded in this ordinance were suf­
ficiently sophisticated to provide a model for the resolution of a dispute 
45 years later, we can reasonably infer that they were the product of some 
years of local experience, and that repartition originated even earlier. 
Village shareholder and tax registers provide additional evidence that 
redistribution predated formal domain encouragement. Here the evidence 
is implicit but no less strong for all that. Only redistribution, surely, can 
account for the surprising equality of land use rights found in some early-
seventeenth-century shareholders' lists. Villages in the Nafune district of 
Noto province, for example, show a uniformity even to the thousandths of 
a koku in land value in 1635.26 Furthermore, in the vast majority of cases 
where there were inequalities, they can be identified as the result of very 
recent reclamations. Shareholder lists from Satomura in the same district 
indicate that this system of equal access to land was in operation in some 
places by 1617 at the latest.27 Similarly, we find the families of Fukamiya 
village, with only a very few exceptions, paying the exact same amount of 
land tax in 1640/ Such a high degree of uniformity within these communi­
ties suggests that they used a form of warichi to ensure equal access to all 
but recently opened land. 
There is other indirect evidence that does not deal specifically with re­
*WSS, 2: 117-18. Although as these examples indicate, the reallocation of wealth was 
sometimes an objective of redistribution, such instances were confined to the early 17th cen­
tury. This feature was not retained in later procedures for land repartition. 
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distributive practices but is consonant with them. Most significant are the 
land survey procedures that were employed almost from the time of the 
Maeda's entry. The approach to surveying was compatible with warichi. 
As we have seen, surveyors (if actual measures were made at all) did not 
measure or assess the quality of individual fields but only dealt with large 
sections of a village; and if any differentiation in the quality of land was 
made at all, it was based on various parts of the village's land, much in 
the way that villagers themselves might treat their holdings during the re­
distribution process. The domain's initial attempts to survey villages field 
by field made little intuitive sense if redistributions were already in use, a 
consideration potentially related to the rapid switch to less detailed inves­
tigations. 
Even if warichi was not already in use in 1581, the authorities' tendency 
to ignore most gradations in soil quality created incentives for taxpayers to 
employ a more detailed categorization of land as they developed a system 
of allocating the tax burden among themselves. The gradations employed 
in standard redistributions factored in the micro-climates within villages 
and allowed greater sensitivity to differences in soil fertility than domain 
procedures. 
All evidence suggests that before the mid-seventeenth century the de­
cision to repartition land rights lay entirely at the village level. Indeed, 
domain ordinances issued in 1631 specifically indicate that this was to be 
done only by the consensus of all villagers (mum chu).2S Although domain 
officials may have become involved in the process during a disruptive dis­
pute, there is no indication that they sought to make the practice part of 
domain policy at this time. 
Nothing in the warichi system as such prohibited an owner from selling 
or transferring his land use rights. And in fact rights were routinely trans­
ferred from one party to another through inheritance, sale, or foreclosure 
on mortgaged rights, much as stockholders today trade their shares on a 
stock exchange or pledge them as security on a loan.29 
The earliest domain surveys, those that list the names of individual 
villagers, demonstrate rural socioeconomic inequality and the continued 
strength of pre-Maeda elites, but they are ambiguous as evidence of land­
holding patterns or for documenting the use of redistribution. The Kaga­
han specialist Wakabayashi Kisaburo found not only a substantial variation 
in the amount of land held by the people listed in the registers, but also a 
very uneven distribution of different types of land among them.30 Table 6 
shows the distribution in the villages covered in the two earliest documents, 
Fukuno and Kumabuchi. 
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TABLE 6

Land Distribution in Fukuno and Kumabuchi Villages, 15 S2

Fukuno villagers Kumabuchi villagers 
Type of land (N = 33) (N = 25) 
All types 8 5 
Paddy and residential 3 2 
Paddy and dry fields 1 5 
Paddy only 10 1 
Dry fields only 0 2 
Dry fields and residential 0 3 
Residential only 11 7 
S O U R C E  : KHNK, 1:73, table7. 
Some residents possessed all categories of land, but in neither village 
did this class represent more than 25 percent of the people listed in the reg­
isters. Several of those with the greatest apparent access to land seemingly 
did not have residential compounds. This suggests that the uneven distri­
bution of different types of land did not necessarily correspond closely to 
differences in wealth within the village. 
The 1591 registers from Mizushiro village (Cho domain) likewise show 
extreme variation across families in both the size and the type of holding. 
For example, Negoya's paddy "holdings" of about 33 koku were divided 
into 19 different fields, whereas Heiemon's 50 koku of paddy were divided 
into only 13. Total paddy "holdings'* ranged from a low of just over one 
koku to a high of more than 50; totals for all a family's land ranged from 
a low of 0.075 koku to almost 52 koku.31 
If, as I indicated in the last chapter, this style of register did not presume 
an "ownership" relation between the registrants and the land, a number 
of registrants might not have held superior land rights but may simply 
have been household dependents of others who did hold such rights. Thus, 
though these documents suggest an inequality in land use rights, the dispro­
portionate access of households to different types of land may only reflect 
shareholders' parceling out different types of land to dependents and can­
not be taken as evidence that warichi did not operate at this time. That a 
number of those listed had no identifiable association with any residential 
land further suggests dependency. 
The fact of unequal access to land is significant in itself, but Hara Shogo 
has also correlated these registers with other documents to reveal what 
happened to local notables right after Toshiie's arrival. In several instances 
he was able to identify locally powerful figures, including Ikko sect leaders, 
who remained in the villages. All retained a prominent position in the vil­
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lage. Despite the Ikko sect's opposition to the Maeda at Sekidosan, even 
its adherents were listed as large landholders in these early registers. We 
find no evidence here that land investigations were used to redistribute the 
land rights of the pre-Maeda local gentry/ 
The old elites continued to command a disproportionate share of land 
and local influence in the era in which we know warichi operated. Later 
land registers and related documents compiled by village and district offi­
cials generally show widely diverse patterns of landholding. For example, 
in 1671 all but two of the 30 shareholders of Minamiyama village in Suzu 
county held rights to between six and nine koku each; the exceptions had 
rights to a bit more than five koku and to almost 18.32 More diversity ap­
pears in the register (same year) for Hiroguri village in the same county. 
Nine villagers held rights to from eight to 10 koku each, four to from 20 to 
29, five to from 11 to 19, and three to 30 or more; only one villager held less 
than eight koku, and he held about seven.33 In Etchu, Ota village showed 
an even wider range. In 1651 the smallest shareholder managed 35 koku, 
the largest 279; 64 percent of the villagers held rights to between 50 and 90 
koku. Within three years (1654), however (perhaps reflecting the impact of 
the domain's great mid-century reforms, the Kaisaku ho), a trend toward 
somewhat smaller holdings was evident: 67 percent now held between 20 
and 60 koku. The leveling trend continued over the next decade, and by 
1666, 76 percent held rights to between 10 and 40 koku.34 Yet even with 
this reduction in the size of the farm units, none of the villagers in these 
later registers came close to holding plots as small as the smallest in the 
1591 registers. The only exceptions, two tiny shareholders in Hiroguri vil­
lage, were outsiders who rented rights to a local holding. These rights were 
probably not their only access to land.35 
The ability to transfer land rights did not take place within a complete 
administrative vacuum, but the ineffectiveness of domain efforts further re­
flects the difficult time the ruling classes had regulating village land tenure. 
In late 1615 (28 years before the Bakufu took the same step), domain policy-
makers prohibited the sale of shares.36 But as in other parts of Japan, vil­
lagers found ways to circumvent this restriction; two common resorts were 
to adopt a son and to "loan out" the rights. Before the end of the century 
(1696), the policy proved such a failure that Kaga once again permitted the 
sale of land as long as all of a family's rights were not sold.+ (This helped 
to maintain a maximum supply of local labor to farm tax-producing land.) 
'Hara, Kaga-han, pp. 16-23. Hara argues that survey registers tied local samurai to land. 
However, as I show in the following chapter, the lines between these people, Maeda retainers, 
and commoners were still quite fluid. 
t This pattern held true in other parts of Japan: where not repealed outright, the restric­
tions on land sales were severely modified. 
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The prohibition on the sale of land use rights appears to have been 
directly related to changes in the procedures for assessing and collecting 
labor dues. Beginning in 1603, the domain moved to assess labor dues in 
cash instead of conscripting labor directly. The basis for assessing dues (the 
number of qualifying families in a village) did not change, but since the tax 
now had to be raised in the marketplace, this directive began to complicate 
life for taxpayers. The prohibition in land rights sales appears to have been 
preparatory to the switch two years later (1617) to pinning cash labor dues 
to holding size. Stopping land sales made the whole process of assessing 
labor dues on this basis much easier, but it also provided a strong incentive 
for large holders to reduce the publicly listed size of their holdings and to 
list dependent households separately. The social and economic dependence 
of those households (with their various ceremonial and labor obligations 
to the main family) were not lost, only the tax obligations. 
Even if shareholding did not represent private landownership, it was 
still the measure of a family's wealth and the basis of its land tax obli­
gations. In addition, of course, the size of a family's holdings was an im­
portant element in determining its social standing and political authority 
within a village and district. 
Conclusion 
The developments in Kaga domain illustrate well the limitations of both 
daimyo and hegemonic authority in the realm of land systems. Though the 
hegemons and Shogun influenced the relationship between daimyo or hata­
moto and the land, their ability to influence what went on in the villages was 
almost nil. Because their tools for influencing local practices (land surveys, 
in particular) lacked precision, uniformity, and adequate documentation, 
they were unsuited to the task of determining tenures or land use within the 
villages. With these poor tools, there could be no centrally directed domain 
or national revolution in commoner landholding patterns. 
Even daimyo exercised limited influence in late-sixteenth- and early-
seventeenth-century tenurial arrangements. They were best able to influ­
ence the relationship between landed retainers and the land. Landed re­
tainers, at least in the period examined here, were very poorly positioned 
to define their own rights to the land. The Maeda kept immigrant retainers 
outside the villages from the start. The Cho (and perhaps a few others) 
were the rare exception; and even then the relationship of landed retainer 
to fief developed along the same lines as in daimyo domains. Ties with vil­
lagers became increasingly distant, mediated by subordinates and limited 
by Cho directives as samurai concentrated in castle towns. 
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Daimyo were least effective in shaping commoner land tenure. They did 
have some influence, but as the policy of restricting land sales or the sale 
of use rights well illustrates, if the policy did not accord with the villagers' 
interests, they circumvented it, and ultimately it failed. 
Villagers were in the best position to define or modify land tenure. They 
alone possessed the capacity to implement a given system of man-land 
relationships. They alone had the day-to-day contact with the land that 
allowed them to detect illegal changes, enforce local custom, and adjust 
regulations as needed. Outsiders lacked an adequate documentary base to 
oversee these matters. 
Villagers did not merely react to domain initiatives affecting land 
tenure. The warichi system provides a concrete example of their institu­
tional creativity and ability to influence domain policies. Throughout the 
early seventeenth century, village shareholders maintained control over the 
specific procedures of land redistribution. The domain authorities adjudi­
cated disputes that villagers could not resolve themselves, and they stipu­
lated that villagers could redistribute land only when there was a consensus, 
but that was as far as their involvement went. To the extent that village-
domain interactions seen in warichi is suggestive, land tenure policies in 
other areas of Japan developed through a dialogue between village and 
'domain. 
An examination of the warichi system in Kaga not only clarifies the 
locus of decision-making on matters of land tenure policy; it also docu­
ments a substantial divergence from standard descriptions of the nature 
of village land tenure. Many areas in which warichi predominated do not 
conform to the standard model of nearly modern private landownership 
rights. The warichi system in Kaga domain dramatically illustrates how 
tenuous the tie between a villager and the land he farmed could be. Any 
given piece of arable land could be taken from him at almost any time 
and transferred to another villager based on the consensus of his fellow 
shareholders. 
Corporate control or "ownership" impinged on "private" landowner­
ship, and types of tenure varied from region to region. An exploration 
of the full implications of this variation must await additional research. 
Nonetheless, the material presented here suggests the need for caution in 
assessing the role of central and domain authority in manipulating tenure 
arrangements to effect specific social and economic changes within villages. 
PART TWO

Controlling People


Chapter 5

Putting Down Roots

The challenges the Maeda faced in occupying and extending their domain were typical of those faced by all "potted plant" daimyo 
ordered into new territories by Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi. 
Other daimyo may have been moved more often or suffered more com­
plete and sudden breaks with their traditionally held lands, but the basic 
problems posed by transfers were universal. Conscious decisions had to be 
made about which retainers to take to the new domain and how to allocate 
fiefs in the new territory. Transfer presented daimyo opportunities to re-
configure to their own advantage the rights granted to fiefholders. Daimyo 
had to develop some strategy for establishing initial contacts with their new 
subjects. One additional concern was to determine who among the local 
samurai and rural leaders should be incorporated into the new governing 
structure, and in what capacity. 
In each daimyo's resolution of these issues lie the origins of the varying 
degrees of class separation seen throughout Japan, the different pace and 
completeness of the urbanization of the samurai, and the diverse mecha­
nisms employed to bring the people under control. The very fact of this 
diversity indicates that daimyo selected from many possible solutions only 
those that best suited their particular situation. 
A brief discussion of several elements of rural administration illustrates 
the point. Standard interpretations, based largely on developments in the 
Kanto and the Kinai, describe a complete break between social classes 
and the ultimate evisceration of the retainers' administrative rights in their 
fiefs. Bizen province under the Ikeda seems typical of this pattern, as do 
many of the centrally located Bakufu domains. In contrast, Satsuma kept 
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samurai on the land, intimately involved in rural administration. Samurai 
rotated periodically between urban and rural locations. Other domains lie 
in between these extremes. Tosa, under the Yama'uchi, first pulled samurai 
off the land, and then, under the land reclamation policies of Nonaka 
Kenzan, encouraged samurai to return to rural life as agricultural entre­
preneurs. Retainers' rights in fiefs were never fully lost in Sendai.1 In Kaga, 
though samurai were pulled off the land entirely, the commoner officials 
who were central to rural administration, the district administrators, took 
on samurai-like attributes; and despite the accepted view of villages as 
the administrative foundation of domains, Kaga's district administrators 
certainly overshadowed village headmen in their importance—especially 
early in the era. 
The determination of administrative structures and the selection of 
local officials were made in a volatile context. A principal dilemma for 
"potted plant" daimyo was finding a way to control potentially rebellious 
subjects without alienating local talent essential for effective administra­
tion. The very real explosiveness of this situation is well illustrated by 
the Higo Rebellion (1588) and the outbreaks accompanying the subjuga­
tion of northern Japan (1590). In both instances newly enfeoffed daimyo 
tried to run roughshod over local warrior-gentry (kokujin). The result was 
widespread violence that threatened to disrupt Hideyoshi's dominance of 
all Japan. 
The Maeda shared these challenges with other daimyo. The fact that 
Kaga was dominated by the Ikko ikki for so long is commonly thought 
to mean that the Maeda faced an exceptional challenge in establishing a 
stable administration. The Ikko adherents bore the Oda forces particu­
lar enmity, labeling them "Enemies of the Law." It was a view that the 
transregional leaders of the sect clearly took seriously, as evidenced by 
various Ikko-instigated disturbances very early in the Maeda rule. But the 
absence of large-scale conflict even then suggests that local adherents were 
more concerned with protecting themselves from outside overlords than 
with ideology. Compared with the Higo and Tohoku situations, the Kaga 
Ikko ikki was unusual in its longevity, but not in the basic concept that it 
embodied.2 
Toshiie's initial solutions to the challenges of relocation focused on two 
goals: keeping the retainers he brought with him at some distance from the 
local population; and coopting local leaders in such a way as to fragment 
any ties between them and minimize the potential for resistance. The steps 
taken in pursuit of these goals set the domain on a path of reliance on 
district officials for local administration, a growing separation of warrior 
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and villager, and an increasing centralization of domain administration in 
daimyo hands. 
Landed Retainers, Old and New 
We begin with an examination of the treatment of the retainer band. 
For the purposes of examining the settling-in process, the retainer band 
can be divided into two segments. The first comprises those who came 
with Toshiie and Toshinaga from Echizen and Owari, the second the local 
population who participated in military activities. The second group can 
be further divided into the families that had connections with the Ikko ikki 
and those who, like the Cho, operated independently of it. In the latter 
instances Toshiie had to decide whether or not to incorporate any of these 
independent elements into his retainer band (kashindan), how to buy their 
cooperation if they were not made formal members of the domain's mili­
tary organization and how to deal with those who might resist. Regardless 
of origin, he had to determine how to reward retainers for their service. In 
most instances this meant deciding under what conditions to grant them 
fiefs and of what size. 
When Toshiie entered Noto, he was ordered to take along all of his re­
tainers and their families. By then, two groups of retainers had formed: the 
Arako group (Arako shu), composed of vassals and blood relatives who 
had allied with Toshiie before he received a fief in Echizen (23 men); and 
the Fuchu group (Fuchu shu; about 80 retainers), composed of men who 
had joined him when he took over his first Echizen fief. 
Toshiie quickly rewarded the most capable of these men as the new 
domain expanded. For example, Okajima Kazuyoshi, who held a 150-koku 
fief in Fuchu, received increases of some 5,800 koku in the first four years 
of the Maeda occupation alone. His fief totaled almost 12,000 koku by 
1600. With these increases in fief came major administrative and military 
appointments. By the turn of the century, Okajima had twice been ap­
pointed castellan at major local fortifications. In 1615 he was appointed 
castellan of Takaoka castle, site of Toshinaga's retirement.3 
Despite the order to take all his retainers with him within months of 
his transfer to Noto, Toshiie sent a few of his Echizen retainers off to serve 
Toshinaga in Fuchu. This had two distinct consequences. First, Toshinaga 
gained staff who were familiar with the area. The knowledge was useful 
both in administration and in defense of the new domain. Second, these 
retainers provided a link between Toshiie and Toshinaga that facilitated 
coordinated planning and, more important, ensured Toshiie's continued 
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influence in the Fuchu domain. These men may have served Toshinaga, 
but they never lost their honored position as Toshiie's retainers. Yamazaki 
Naganori, for example, soon returned toToshiie's service and by 1599 held 
a fief of some 15,000 koku.4 
Full study of what occurred in Fuchu after the Maeda left lies outside 
the scope of our study, but the fact that Toshiie was ordered to take all his 
military followers with him is highly significant: it represents one set of cir­
cumstances that contributed to the separation of warrior and villager. The 
cases of men like Yamazaki notwithstanding, transfer from Fuchu meant 
that Toshiie made a decision on who was a warrior, and hence a member 
of his retainer band, and who was not. Long before Hideyoshi's class-
separation and sword-collection edicts, the transfer of daimyo by itself 
forced a classification of subjects into those whose responsibilities were 
principally military and those whose responsibilities were principally non­
military. The lines between classes were not hard and fast. Local men who 
were primarily farmers might support armies or even take up arms if battles 
developed in their areas. Nonetheless, the process of marking a division 
between warrior and commoner had begun. 
Many of the middle- and lower-ranking retainers who were transferred 
to Noto and Kaga saw their families discontinued in the new domain. Even 
among the more powerful families there were casualties of shifting domain 
politics, and as we would expect during these turbulent times, battlefields 
also claimed a number of men before they had heirs prepared to take 
their places.5 Despite these losses, the retainers of the Arako and Fuchu 
shu provided the upper ranks of the new domain's military organization.6 
Their families retained their preeminence throughout the early seventeenth 
century.7 
Many locally powerful military figures survived the fighting prior to 
Toshiie's arrival. Those who chose to remain in the province had three 
basic options. They could passively submit to the new rulers and try to 
protect their fortunes by maintaining a low profile, concentrating on man­
aging their farms. Or they could seek a position within the new order, 
often as local administrators. In practice, choosing this course meant lead­
ing an essentially civilian life, although a man might be called to serve in 
combat against invaders or ordered to provide labor and supplies for such 
military purposes as castle-building. Finally, local warriors could join the 
Maeda retainer bands. In this instance they would function primarily, if 
not exclusively, as warriors and not as landlord-farm managers. 
Still, the last was not much of an option for most. The opportunities 
for local warriors to join the landed ranks of the Maeda retainer band were 
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limited, and this fact, too, had an important impact on the isolation of 
samurai and villager. Most landed retainers were men who came with the 
Maeda from outside the Kaga-Noto-Etchu region. Of 147 retainer houses 
active in the early seventeenth century, only eight were from Etchu, two 
from Kaga, and one from Noto, which is to say, better than 92 percent of 
the families were from outside the region.8 Indeed, a 1616 roster of the very 
prominent Honda family's retainers shows that only 7.3 percent of the 124 
mounted soldiers were from Kaga, Noto, and Etchu, suggesting that local 
men did not even fill the secondary ranks of Maeda vassals.9 
Over the long run, even those absorbed into the Maeda ranks fared very 
poorly. In general their power and income were reduced, not augmented 
by association with the new overlord.10 The story of the Kikuchi family is 
illustrative. A former vassal of Sassa Narimasa, Kikuchi Takekatsu, lord 
of Ao castle in Himi, surrendered to the Maeda once the battle for Etchu 
was lost. He was allowed to keep his domain of about 10,000 koku but 
retired in favor of his son Izu. When Izu died in 1596, the family's hold­
ings were reduced to 1,500 koku. The Toma family of Notojima fared even 
worse. They had held lands valued at more than 43 bales of rice under the 
Hatakeyama. At that time one of the Toma's responsibilities was to levy 
and collect the tax on oysters for their lord. Even though they continued to 
perform this duty forToshiie after his arrival, they lost their landholdings.11 
Others shared the Kikuchi and Toma fate, and still more local warriors 
simply became members of the new administration, without ties of fief to 
the land and passing from one administrative assignment to another.12 In 
sum, large fiefholders with pre-Maeda roots in Kaga, Noto, and Etchu, 
those with the best chance to create an autonomous local base of support, 
were weakened and restricted early on/ 
If pre-Maeda local samurai were absorbed into the Maeda ranks in any 
substantial number, it must have been at the very lowest levels of the re­
tainer band. Their fiefs would have been under 100 koku if, indeed, they 
had any fief at all. The Honda example suggests that though there may have 
been a slightly higher proportion of native sons among the subretainers, 
the percentage was still very low. Many of these low-level local samurai 
probably received a stipend rather than afief, and thus had no contact with 
the villagers at all unless they were appointed tax agents.13 
We have already encountered the only clear exception to this pattern. 
The Cho family occupied a special position in the retainer band. Though 
ordered to serve Toshiie when he took over in Noto, the Cho maintained 
*In the 20 years following the reduction of the Kikuchifief, several other important samu­
rai families saw their fiefs discontinued (Urata, "Shoki Maeda-ke kashindan," pp. 17-19). 
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their direct link to Oda Nobunaga. And when Oda died,Toshiie re-granted 
them the land they held, thereby cementing a mutually beneficial defensive 
tie during the uncertain period following Oda's death. Hideyoshi acknowl­
edged Toshiie's grant and treated the Cho as military dependents of the 
Maeda.14 Though the new grant placed the Cho in a subordinate relation­
ship toToshiie, as we have seen, the Cho retained an extraordinary degree 
of administrative autonomy (conducting their own land surveys, for ex­
ample), and a more traditional kind of rule prevailed in their fief than in 
other parts of Kaga domain, one in which a continued local presence kept 
them closely tied to the villagers.* 
The Fiefs 
The Maeda followed the prevalent custom of granting fiefs (kyiichi) 
only to their chief retainers. Though figures for the early period of domain 
development are not available, the proportion of the domain's land granted 
in fief was substantial, at least during the second decade of the seventeenth 
century. As the domain grew, the band of landed retainers expanded. In 
1612,590 landed retainers possessed about 235,000 koku of fief lands. Just 
after the Osaka campaigns, in 1616,995 retainers heldfiefs totaling 896,250 
koku. A decade later (1627) there were 1,333 retainers with lands valued 
at about 940,450 koku. This amounted to more than 70 percent of Kaga's 
total assessed value.15 
The sharp increase in the number of landed retainers and the proportion 
of lands held in fief cuts against the grain of the traditional view that more 
and more domain land came under direct daimyo control from the late 
Sengoku era to the late seventeenth century. The increase appears to have 
stemmed from the need to reward retainers for service in the two Osaka 
campaigns. However, there may have been an added consideration. If my 
calculation of land tax trends for the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries are correct, the daimyo's mechanism for land taxation began to 
fall apart. By shifting more of the responsibility for assessing and collecting 
taxes to retainers who benefited directly from the collections (as opposed 
to daikan, who were simply the daimyo's bureaucrats and lacked incentives 
to perform their duties efficiently), the Maeda may have hoped to improve 
the collection rate and rid themselves of some of the administrative respon­
sibility for tax assessment. (Whatever the motivation, the shift of authority 
*It was largely due to their close ties to the land that the Cho family and its retainers were 
able to resist the full centralization of domain authority in the mid-17th century. 
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was only temporary; by mid-century retainer fiefs were mere legal fictions 
and tightly controlled by the domain.) 
Scholars debate just how much autonomy landed retainers had in the 
domain's early years.16 Conclusions depend very much on what measure is 
employed. Perhaps the problem can be minimized if we consider the extent 
or limits of kyunin authority from two distinct perspectives. The scope of 
activities within which they could act represents one criterion. Were they 
able to exercise judicial rights? What village resources were open to them? 
Which taxes could they assess and collect? A second criterion concerns 
the latitude with which they could act within the permitted range of au­
thority. Within each category of action, how much decision-making power 
did they have? How much were they restrained by daimyo ordinances or 
custom? 
If one conceives of mid-sixteenth century retainers as having unlimited 
authority (much like a small daimyo), then the great majority of early 
Maeda retainers operated within a relatively restricted environment. The 
daimyo reserved for himself full control of all domain forest resources; the 
right to bamboo, river, and other miscellaneous taxes; and complete judi­
cial authority over commoners.17 At the same time, within the retainers' 
two areas of competence—assessing and collecting land taxes and con­
scripting rural labor—they had a high degree of autonomy, at least early in 
Maeda rule. Indeed, villager complaints about the retainers' capriciousness 
in assessing land taxes and conscripting labor formed the basis for conflict 
between kyunin and domain authorities over the next several decades. 
Even though the Maeda granted only limited rights to fiefs and took 
steps to constrain the powerful local military figures, Toshiie and his sons 
were not content to stop with these measures. From the inception of their 
rule the Maeda, alert to the possibility that landed retainers might build on 
ties to the local population to establish a threatening power base, relied on 
a variety of measures to discourage close relationships between the two: 
1. The initial grants of land to retainers were merely general statements 
of the grantholder's right to tax a specific amount of land within a large 
area, usually a district or county.18 Even though this grant was followed by a 
document allocating the fief among specific villages, these were not named 
in the primary grant, so that a retainer would have had difficulty press­
ing his claims over any particular village. This method of fief allocation 
reinforced the landed retainers' sense of dependence on the daimyo. 
2. The retainer's control was further weakened by the manner in which 
his lands were distributed. Generally a grant scattered his holdings among 
a number of different villages and often among different counties. Consider 
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Map 5. The Honda Family's Fiefs, 1614. Redrawn from Urata, "Shoki Maeda-ke," 
p. 20. 
the Honda family's domains in 1614, as shown in Map 5. Although most 
of the Honda's lands were concentrated in Ishikawa, Kahoku, and Hakui 
counties, some of the villages under their control lay in the farthest reaches 
of the domain, from Enuma county to Fugeshi county, and from Ishikawa 
county to Niikawa county. The villages close to Kanazawa may have been 
easy to reach for the purpose of inspecting crops regularly and setting tax 
rates, but several were not only far away from Kanazawa; they were far 
removed from other parts of the Honda domains. To tax these villages 
effectively required substantial efforts, and it would have been virtually 
impossible to maintain sufficient contact with them to form an indepen­
dent power base. Although this fief is a relatively late example, some of 
the first fief registers attest to the very early use of this means of daimyo 
control.19 
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As a general rule, largefiefholders were more likely to be granted rights 
over entire villages; medium- and smallholders were more likely to possess 
only parts of villages.20 Again, the Honda family holdings are typical. As 
Map 5 indicates, in only six cases did this powerful family share rights to 
villages with others. When villages were split this way, they were frequently 
partitioned among three or more retainers. Two villages in Ishikawa and 
Kahoku counties were split among seven retainers in 1599.21 Yanase village 
in Tonami county was held jointly by 13 retainers.22 In addition, many of 
these joint holders also shared their villages with the han.23 The adminis­
tration of fiefs, already encumbered by dispersal, was complicated where 
other shareholders set different tax rates in the same village. Argumenta­
tive residents used the lower rates of one retainer to bargain down another. 
Furthermore, other retainer tax agents could observe one's activities and 
this, too, discouraged close contacts. 
3. The frequent redistribution of fiefs further disrupted retainer-
villager relationships. Major redistributions took place in 1601 and 1627/ 
But even when there was no wholesale redistribution, fiefs were routinely 
shifted. In 1598, Fuwa Hikozo held five villages in Ishikawa county and 
three in Kahoku county. The following year he had six villages in Ishikawa 
and six in Kahoku—all different from the previous year.24 All or part of the 
fiefs of three retainers in Noto were confiscated in 1615.25 This same kind of 
redistribution or confiscation is evident on a larger scale in the 45 Tonami 
county villages under district chief Matauemon's jurisdiction in 1629-31. 
About half of them experienced some change in the kyunin who drew taxes 
from their land.26 Fief transfers of this sort reinforced the daimyo's control 
over the kyunin and weakened their relationship with the villages. Both 
effects minimized the possibility of retainers creating an autonomous base 
from which to oppose the daimyo. 
4. The concentrating of landed retainers in Kanazawa or local castle 
towns was another effective means of control. With rare exceptions retain­
ers did not live on rural estates, and by 1600 the estates of the surviving 
pre-Maeda retainers had all but disappeared. Kyunin whose fiefs were 
widely scattered through the domain could hardly live in or near all the vil­
lages they taxed even if they were posted to rural castles and fortifications. 
By one estimate, there were 54 rural fortifications during the early years 
of the domain.27 Since this figure includes not only the largest castles (at 
T w  o other major redistributions took place before the middle of the 17th century, in 
1639 and 1641 (Araya, "Kaga-han," p. 76; WSS, Tsushi hen, p. 201; IKS, 3:18). The fief ex­
changes of 1639 were tied to the creation of the branch han of Toyama and Daishdji; these 
were slightly adjusted in 1641. 
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Daishoji, Kanazawa, Komatsu, and Toyama), but also temporary fortifica­
tions constructed during the pacification of Etchu, it overstates the number 
of fortifications that housed landed retainers. Even so, the total is small 
enough to indicate that most landed retainers could not have lived suffi­
ciently close to their lands to be anything but absentee landlords. Over time, 
as fortifications were consolidated, even the limited proximity afforded by 
these facilities declined. 
In addition to these policies, many retainer families either died out 
because of military losses or were wiped out for political and economic rea­
sons. Though no data have been compiled on the cessation of family lines 
before 1596, over the next 20 years an average of one fiefholding family a 
year disappeared. These retainers possessed sizable fiefs, averaging 4,500 
koku each. Though the number of disappearances fluctuated from year to 
year over the next two decades, the size of the average fief lost fell to less 
than 1,000 koku. The families most affected, predictably, were those with 
large fiefs. Under Toshiie, 16 retainers had fiefs greater than 10,000 koku. 
By Toshitsune's reign the number had fallen to two. Over the same period 
those possessing fiefs between 4,000 and 9,999 koku fell from 24 to seven. 
In the five decades following 1596, the lands reallocated from discontinued 
families alone amounted to 123,000 koku.28 The actual impact of the dying 
out of families was greater than this figure indicates since, in a number 
of instances, documents simply note a family's demise without indicating 
the size of itsfief. The rapid increase in the number of fiefholders after the 
Maeda established themselves suggests that large fiefs were replaced by 
smaller ones in a conscious effort to prevent any individual retainer from 
amassing real power. 
In sum, over the whole period from the founding of the domain to the 
mid-seventeenth century, domain policies created barriers to close contact 
between the landed retainers and the general population. This substan­
tially restricted the retainers' effective administration of land taxation and 
corvee labor. Ultimately, it created frustration for all concerned. 
The Fuchibyakusho 
To this point we have discussed the fate of immigrant retainers and 
those local inhabitants who joined the Maeda ranks as enfeoffed retainers. 
We now turn to the families who stayed on the land, giving up the warrior 
component of their pre-Maeda life. These families constitute one of the 
most interesting classes of actors in the early annals of the domain, for in 
their collective biographies lies much of the story of class separation. The 
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group of men local historians call fuchibyakusho provide considerable in­
sight into this process. Neither clearly warrior nor clearly commoner, they 
became the pivotal link in local affairs, as district administrators. I leave 
a discussion of the fuchibyakusho's functions to Chapter 6; here I wish to 
examine their background and ambiguous social status, and the ways in 
which they made themselves useful to their new masters. 
The Japanese term fuchibyakusho (literally, "stipended peasants'*) 
refers to people who were paid by the domain for the services they ren­
dered. When applied to the very early years of the domain, the term is a 
misnomer, for these men were not peasants, at least not in the ordinary 
sense of the word. In important respects they resembled samurai more than 
peasants. Indeed, a number of them were associated with the armies of the 
Ikko sea and other pre-Maeda military bands. Though later classified as 
rural commoners, in this period they are better thought of as local warriors 
in transit to commoner status. 
Historians of Kaga domain tend also to limit the term to officials ap­
pointed in Noto. They do not acknowledge a similarity between local men 
who received a stipend and those who received some other form of com­
pensation from the domain. But I believe that the wide variation in stipend 
size (from a high of 140 bales of rice to a low of three) suggests some fuchi­
byakusho were closer to samurai masters than farmer subordinates and 
argues for a flexible definition of this category of administration. Further­
more, if such appointments were confined to Noto, we must explain why 
that was. Given the existence of local officials who seem very close to the 
fuchibyakusho in all respects except the formal granting of a rice stipend 
and the need for the domain administrators to establish some link to local 
inhabitants, it seems unreasonable to adhere to a narrow definition of these 
functionaries.29 
Fuchibyakusho came from the group of local farmer-warriors called 
kokujin, "provincial people." The services they performed for Toshiie ex­
tended into the military arena but were not limited to them. Their local ties 
to the land are evident from the fact that their stipends came from the tax 
proceeds of particular villages, typically from the one that served as their 
home base. 
Most were descended from prominent families who had resided in the 
area for some time. Often they claimed important warriors as ancestors. 
Though claims of centuries-old samurai origins are suspect, a number of the 
fuchibyakusho were certainly active as low-level samurai at the time of the 
Maeda occupation. The family of Tomosada of Jin'e village, for example, 
served local military leaders such as the Yusa and the Cho prior to the 
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Maeda arrival. In return Tomosada had received a partial tax exemption.30 
The family of Saneyori, Uwado village, came to the region from Echigo. 
During Sassa's invasion of Noto, Saneyori was involved in the defense of 
Nanao castle, along with the Hatakeyama, Cho, and Yusa.31 Though other 
fuchibyakusho—likeTaroemon (Nakagawa village), Shinbei (Tuschihashi 
village), and Yoichi (Nakashima village)—were apparently not fighting 
men before the Maeda arrival, they provided horses, supplies, and infor­
mation to the new daimyo's forces.32 
Toshiie's contacts with these families fit a broad pattern of overtures to 
locally influential people and institutions. This approach, evident from the 
earliest stages of his occupation of Noto, can be seen in the very large num­
ber of temples and shrines to which he made land grants.33 These grants 
were nominally for the maintenance of religious buildings and priests, but 
one aim was certainly to win over the Ikko sect adherents whom Oda 
Nobunaga had so recently defeated. The sect's strong military organization 
might have been broken, but its local leaders still had enough influence to 
persuade many followers to cooperate with their former enemies. 
Although influencing Ikko sect leaders may have loomed large in the 
policy-makers' minds, other prominent temples and shrines also received 
official support. Such actions helped to broaden the institutional base for 
Toshiie's fledgling rule and clearly were directed first at institutions that 
could exercise the most influence.34 These actions simultaneously paved the 
way for integrating those institutions into the domain's control structure. 
However necessary or helpful overtures to temples and shrines may 
have been, they were not adequate for the real goal: establishing func­
tional administrative links to the local population. For this purpose Toshiie 
sought to enlist the support of locally influential men. His grants gave sub­
stance to a broad promise he issued when he arrived. In a call for assistance 
to his fledgling administration, he pledged to reward service to the domain 
in the form of either rice from the current harvest (i.e., a remission of 
taxes or stipend) or a permanent fief (chigyo). This effort to reach out was 
closely associated with anti-Maeda disturbances at the Tempyo Shrine at 
Sekidosan in the summer of 1582. The first of these grants were issued only 
a month after that uprising was quelled, in reward for assistance in that 
endeavor.35 
Toshiie's call for assistance fit nicely with the desires of ambitious local 
gentry. The men who became fuchibyakusho were as eager to curry favor 
with their new lord as he was to have their cooperation. Through pro-
Maeda actions they hoped not only to earn the promised rewards but also 
to protect their existing perquisites. They were not disappointed. 
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Tabatabei of Sogo village provides the clearest example of a man who 
managed to preserve his privileges this way. After the Maeda occupation 
of Noto, Sassa Narimasa gathered his forces for an assault on the Maeda 
stronghold at Suenomori. Tabatabei, learning of the pending attack, noti­
fied the castellan at Suenomori and officials in Kanazawa. In reward for 
his timely military intelligence, Tabatabei was confirmed in his possession 
of the mountain lands in Noto that had originally been conferred on him 
by the Miyake, local military leaders in Noto.36 
Although most of the fuchibyakusho possessed a samurai pedigree of 
sorts, it was not their military contributions but their functions in local 
affairs that made them useful in the long run. Toshiie sent Hikosuke of 
Awagura village, for example, throughout Noto to assist in the setting and 
collection of taxes. In return Hikosuke got a stipend of 50 bales of rice 
annually.37 Not a few of the men had held formal positions in civil or reli­
gious administration before the Maeda occupation. Yukinaga, a kokujin 
and the head of the Kita Shrine at Sugawara, had collected taxes from 
surrounding villages for the support of the shrine. Toshiie allowed him to 
continue his duties and gave him a stipend rather than replacing him.38 
Gembei of Goshd village was closely affiliated with the Ikko sect. He con­
tinued to work for the new lords even without financial reward.39 Like 
Gembei, a large proportion of these men probably had some connection 
with the Ikko ikki, but extant genealogies rarely reveal the nature or degree 
of their involvement with the sect's formal organization.40 
'The specific contributions of each of the fuchibyakusho are not always 
recorded in the genealogies; but all of them actively assisted the newly ar­
rived daimyo in the occupation and defense of his domain. They provided 
information, acted as guides, and assisted in the investigation of taxable 
land. Although genealogies may exaggerate the role of certain individuals, 
there can be little doubt that in general the fuchibyakusho earned the trust 
of the Maeda by their actions and continued to earn their stipends as local 
administrators. They served as a crucial link between the new daimyo, his 
officials, and the local population. 
Though Toshiie's initial call for support made a distinction between 
two forms of reward, one paid like a salary from current domain revenues, 
the other granted as a fief, the ways in which those rewards were distrib­
uted suggests that no firm social or occupational distinction was intended 
initially. In practice the tax exemptions or stipends were as hereditary as 
the fiefs. Toshiie's purpose was to attract assistance from local gentry, not 
to create clear socioeconomic class distinctions. 
The experience of two families who ultimately settled into this class 
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of civilian rural administrators nicely illustrates the lack of a sharp dis­
tinction between the form of reward dispensed and the recipient's social 
status. When Kamijima Yagoro, an enfeoffed retainer of Toshiie's, died 
in 1583, Toshiie recognized his son Yaroku as his successor. But Yaroku 
declined to follow in his father's footsteps and chose to become a fuchi­
byakusho instead. Conversely, the son of the fuchibyakusho Hirosuke was 
later enfeoffed as a landed retainer.41 In both instances succeeding genera­
tions crossed what later became a line separating warrior from commoner. 
At this time the family of origin did not prevent the receipt of either type 
of reward. Nor did the receipt of one kind of award preclude the receipt of 
the other kind at a later date. 
In the first two decades of the Maeda occupation in short, the distinc­
tion between grant types was one in name only. The type of reward received 
did not yet mark a hard and fast separation of warrior from rural com­
moner.42 These locally influential people who linked the emergent domain 
administration and the rural population participated in both worlds. 
The fact that not all local leaders used by the Maeda received a fuchi 
further complicates any attempt to link type of reward to status. Jirobei 
(Kurami village) met Toshiie at Wajima and was appointed a tax collection 
agent. He was given a residential compound (yashiki) that may have been 
tax exempt, but not a stipend or a fief.43 Like Gembei of Gosho village, 
the ancestors of Shosuke (Imahama village) supposedly worked without 
stipend as kimoiri-gashira (chief headman) and kumigashira (head of a 
group of villages) in Imizu county during the late Tensho period (1581­
9Z).44 Though by the records these men did not receive a fief or stipend for 
their services, everyone who worked for the regime was probably compen­
sated somehow. That there is a measure of caprice in the reward structure 
reinforces the impression that compensation was unsystematized and did 
not yet reflect clear class-based distinctions. 
The men whom local historians specifically refer to as fuchibyakusho 
were concentrated in the Noto area, but there are examples of local notables 
in other areas who received grants from Toshiie in return for similar ser­
vices. Genjiro of Yoshino village (Ishikawa county) was originally asso­
ciated with the Ikko military organization. He came to Kaga from Echizen, 
where he had been a masterless samurai. Toshiie made use of him and gave 
him seven cho of land. His family remained on the land as commoners. 
Genjiro was not unique/ Since he and others like him fulfilled adminis­
*Tabatabei, mentioned previously, is another example; Jirozaemon and Rokurozaemon, 
discussed below, also fall into this category. See Tonami shi shiy p. 385; and JCHNK, 1: 525. 
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trative functions and were later considered to be full-fledged villagers, it 
seems appropriate to see them as the equivalent of fuchibyakusho.45 Thus, 
although in a narrow sense the fuchibyakusho system was confined to 
Noto, it represents the Maeda's overall approach to establishing a local 
administrative foundation. 
Toshiie continued to extend his local contacts for several years after 
his arrival, and Toshinaga followed a related strategy in his domains. He 
granted a stipend of ten bales of rice to Jirozaemon (Noga village) in 1594. 
The genealogy of Kambei's family (Fukutome village) indicates that their 
ancestor Rokurozaemon was appointed a district official in 1594. A similar 
claim is made in the Watanabe genealogy.46 
To this point, I have stressed the role of fuchibyakusho as a local link 
for the Maeda, but these appointments served another purpose. In Kaga 
the Ikko ikki and other local military bands bequeathed to the daimyo a 
number of leaders who were potential troublemakers. Accordingly, a key 
problem for the Maeda (and for all generals pacifying newly conquered 
lands) was finding a way to neutralize these potential opponents. In effect 
the strategy of granting stipends to fuchibyakusho did exactly this. It gave 
at least some of the earlier local leaders a stake in the new daimyo's suc­
cess. Their status was strengthened and protected by official recognition 
from the daimyo. They received economic benefits from the domain. There 
is little likelihood that the fuchibyakusho would have found opposition to 
the Maeda attractive under the circumstances. The beauty of the system 
was that it accomplished the regime's goals without threatening the local 
leaders who were not directly coopted. 
In addition, by appointing fuchibyakusho, the Maeda broke the previ­
ous equality that had existed among the village leaders under the ikki rule. 
Once some were given an interest in supporting the new rulers, the poten­
tial for unified local opposition and revolt was weakened. At the same time, 
the leaders who did not receive a stipend may well have been reluctant to 
revolt against their former comrades and place them in jeopardy by their 
actions. This was not simply a matter of fraternal feeling. The link to the 
daimyo could serve friends of the fuchibyakusho, too. 
Although the system disrupted the old social patterns, it allowed the 
daimyo to deal with his new subjects without having to establish sustained, 
direct contact with each village. This helped to isolate traditional Maeda re­
tainers from their new subjects. The Maeda's use of fuchibyakusho at once 
kept their retainers more dependent on them and minimized the poten­
tial for direct confrontations with villagers and their leaders. The domain 
administrators' relationship to villages was largely limited to the tax sys­
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tern, and they found an economical way to tap local administrative talent 
and knowledge for their own purposes. Fuchibyakusho could handle a 
variety of tasks without an extensive involvement of nonresident riiiddle­
and senior-level retainers. 
This system had advantages for local gentry, too. It left much of the 
detail of district and village administration to their discretion. To this ex­
tent the strategy appealed to the desire of local leaders to protect their own 
interests. There was no outside force hell-bent on redistributing land or 
tampering with the prerogatives they had built up over the years. 
The fuchibyakusho system may have been a sophisticated and useful 
way to put down roots in a new domain, but it leaves a puzzle for historians 
who want to identify the origins of class separation. The similarity between 
grants of land (kyiichi) and stipends, the obvious samurai background of 
most fuchibyakusho, the easy movement between that emerging status and 
the status of retainer, all suggest that there was no sharp division between 
commoner and warrior in the early decades of the domain. Though the 
samurai who came with the Maeda never settled on the land—in itself one 
point of departure on the road to separation—there is no clear break that 
tells us when fuchibyakusho lost their warrior roles and when it became 
impossible for retainers to return to the land. The form of Kaga land sur­
veys further complicates matters. Since the surveyors made no effort to 
list individuals' names in the registers, we have no clue, not even an am­
biguous one, to who was a villager in the eyes of the domain authorities. 
Nowhere is there a record of any specific order on the subject, nor did 
domain authorities act on the separation edicts issued by Hideyoshi.* 
But if we have no clear dates for the separation of classes, it is possible 
to point to developments critical to confirming the commoner status of 
fuchibyakusho and the urbanized warrior status of retainers. 
Most fuchibyakusho came from the local warrior class, men who fought 
largely to defend their home base, rather than to extend their territory. As 
long as there were battles nearby, they were useful to the daimyo either 
in their own right or as part of a local coalition. But they were never, as 
a group, well integrated into the daimyo's regular military organization. 
Consequently, they were not called on regularly to take up military duties 
outside their home province. 
As the battles of the late sixteenth century moved farther and farther 
* Sword hunt results were reported for one county in southern Kaga in 1588, but this ter­
ritory was not yet under Maeda control. Within the domain senior villagers (osabyakusho) 
were brought to Kanazawa to sign a pledge, but apparently no large-scale confiscations of 
weapons took place. See Hara, Kaga-han, p. 40; KHNK, 1: 41,98; and KHS, p. 376. 
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from the Hokuriku, fuchibyakusho lost their utility as soldiers and their 
opportunity to serve as such. The battle at Suenomori (1585) was the last 
campaign within the Maeda domains. None would again be fought nearby 
until the brief campaign in southern Kaga, preparatory to Sekigahara. 
Although the children of fuchibyakusho served in the households of re­
tainers, and a few had the opportunity for military service, they were an 
exception. In practice, if not in legal principle, the fuchibyakusho and their 
families had become commoners by the late 1580's.* 
On the other side of the coin, local peace gradually contributed to the 
consolidation of samurai in a few large fortifications. By 1599 major retain­
ers had been assigned residences in the castle at Kanazawa, and from that 
point on, their focus for their families' professional obligations became 
the castle town, not the rural fortifications to which the adult men were 
posted.47 
At the turn of the century, both trends had done much to reduce con­
tact between warrior and villager. To retainers, villagers were a source 
of revenue and labor. Except when fuchibyakusho children served in the 
households of landed retainers, there was no consistent contact between 
the two groups. Practically speaking, local and national peace meant that 
brave young commoners had no opportunity to come to the attention of 
battlefield generals and to join the ranks of enfeoffed retainers or their 
salaried counterparts. The line between warrior and commoner was being 
drawn in practice simply as a result of changes in the proximity of military 
conflict. Individuals still crossed the status lines or existed in the interstices 
between the two social groups, but this was increasingly less common. 
Conclusion 
In putting down roots in their new domain, the Maeda behaved pretty 
much as one would expect under the circumstances. They placed their trust 
first and foremost in the retainers who came with them to the new domains. 
These men were a known quantity. Toshiie had worked with them over the 
years and had a sense of who was capable and trustworthy. (In an age of 
treachery the latter was no mean consideration.) These men were granted 
fiefs and positions of greatest responsibility. 
Conversely, local samurai and gentry were granted limited opportu­
*Thc fuchibyakusho's role in local military conflicts remained in the minds of domain 
administrators; witness the order immediately before Sekigahara that they present themselves 
as hostages during the crisis, just as landed retainers had to provide hostages. (This was also 
an obligation of their successors, the tomura, during the Osaka campaigns.) 
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nities under their new lord. Certainly they were useful in promoting the 
defense of the domain and providing effective access to local resources, 
but they were not to be trusted with critical military responsibilities. Even 
those who were admitted to the ranks of the Maeda retainer band were 
phased out as it became practical to do so. 
Only in the realm of local liaison did the Maeda employ influential in­
digenous people on a long-term basis. Because of their standing, they could 
make significant contributions to the new administration. They knew local 
conditions better than the interlopers, they had performed similar duties 
before the arrival of the Maeda, and their assistance could be purchased 
cheaply. Gaining their cooperation helped to break up old gentry alliances 
as well. The rural elite who filled these positions were as eager to use the 
new daimyo to advance their own interests as he was to use them. This 
symbiotic relationship functioned well for both, and it, or something like 
it, was probably also characteristic of other parts of Japan.48 
The origins of class separation in Kaga lay in the early bifurcation of the 
local warrior-gentry's tasks, not in the orders of a central authority. To 
the extent that central authority played a role, it was indirect, an outcome 
of the decision to transfer Toshiie into Noto. As outsiders, already marked 
by their foreign origins, Maeda retainers were not allowed to create close 
ties to the villagers in their fiefs. Inhabitants who could have participated in 
local military campaigns early in the 1580's found their services irrelevant 
as the major campaigns in which the Maeda participated moved away from 
the domain. At the same time, the Maeda offered very limited opportunities 
for local samurai to join the ranks of their retainer band. 
How many other domains followed this path to a substantial and prac­
tical, if not legal, separation of classes is unclear. Certainly the ubiquitous 
transfer of daimyo during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries 
encouraged an increased distance between warrior and villagers through­
out Japan. But how far transfers carried the process must in part have 
been a function of time and the proximity of conflict. The earlier and the 
more frequent the transfers in a region, the greater the opportunity for the 
process to work its logic. The greater a region's freedom from major con­
flicts, the better the daimyo's opportunity to move toward consolidating 
his military forces in fewer and fewer fortifications. There was nothing de­
terministic about the impact of transfers on domains, and in some cases the 
role of central authority in class separation may have been more direct. All 
the same, a daimyo's need to put down roots in a new territory forced him 
to reconsider how much autonomy to give villages, landed retainers, and 
even domain officials. The challenge of a transfer provided a significant 
opportunity to reconstruct the relationships between warrior and villager. 
Chapter^ 
Early Rural Administration

At the same time that Toshiie and Toshinaga determined relationships i between their existing retainers and the kokujin of their new territo­
ries, they set about creating an administrative apparatus. As military rulers, 
they began gingerly, establishing only the most spartan of administrative 
structures. With the advent of peace, first within the domain and later at 
the national level, the Maeda, like other daimyo, focused more attention 
on resolving conflicts and inefficiencies in local administration. 
Early administrative contacts between the domain and villagers were 
mediated exclusively by tax agents of the daimyo (daikan), landed re­
tainers' agents (gedai), and nonsamurai district representatives/ Contrary 
to common descriptions of local administration in the early modern era, 
reorganizing village administration and maintaining close contact with 
village leaders were not significant concerns for the domain. 
Small Districts, the Foundation of Domain Administration 
Most historians tell the story of developing local institutions in Japan 
from the standpoint of the village. They stress how rural communities 
pressed for increased autonomy in the late middle ages through both peace­
*The term "daikan" was rather loosely used in practice. In Maeda domains it was occa­
sionally applied to the landed retainers' tax agents (see Oshimizu ebb shi, pp. 174—75) • It could 
also refer to officials who had county-wide functions {Shinto Niikawa gun shiko, 1: 737). In 
this chapter I follow the most common practice (see, among others, KHNK, 1:84), reserving 
it exclusively for those low-level agents of the daimyo who circulated throughout the domain 
in the performance of their duties. Some writers have preferred to call these officials uketori 
daikan or kumi daikan (see Kigoshi, "Maeda," p. 29; and Noto Wajima Kamikaji-ke monjo, 
pp. 86-87). 
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ful and violent means. The principal tools they used were the tax contract 
(hyakusho uke) with the overlord and the ikki, or local military league. 
Villages pledged to deliver an agreed-on amount of taxes but had the right 
to allocate them as they chose among their residents. This community au­
tonomy was jealously guarded by the ikki, which brought together kokujin 
and other influential families to prevent excessive taxation and other intru­
sions into local affairs by overlords. Most of these military groups endured 
only long enough to accomplish a specific task, but some, like the Buddhist 
Ikko ikki, lasted many decades. Early modern daimyo built on villagers' 
growing experience with self-government embodied in these trends. 
The widespread emphasis on village development derives from two 
sources. First, the weight scholars place on the structure of land surveys 
contributes to this interpretation. Villages were the basic units of surveys, 
and they were widely treated as the units of taxation. There are even those 
who argue that the creation of the village as an official administrative unit 
violated the "natural" village of the late medieval era. On this view, intra-
communal cooperation in "natural villages" flowed spontaneously from the 
community's day-to-day social and economic links. In contrast, coopera­
tion in the early modern village came from the demands of an overlord 
who treated the village largely as a legal individual for the purpose of tap­
ping domain labor, natural resources, and agriculture. Second, the village 
model is largely drawn from the Bakufu territories of central Japan, where 
villages were indeed the basic unit of commoner administration.1 
In fact, however, the principal locus of low-level administration varied 
from domain to domain and over time. In some cases the responsibility 
lay with low-level samurai officials, as in Satsuma, or was shared with rus­
ticated samurai (Tosa). In other cases commoner officials who presided 
over groups of villages held the pivotal position. Kaga domain fell into this 
category. 
From the earliest indications of local government in Kaga domain, the 
district, a group of villages, provided the critical link between rural sub­
jects, domain officials, and representatives of landed retainers. Except for 
tax documents and land surveys, individual villages do not figure promi­
nently in the early ordinances that affected rural residents. The structure 
of village officialdom was not specified by higher authorities, and it re­
mained unelaborated for decades. Villages, as nascent administrative units, 
had much autonomy. In this sense'village autonomy contributed signifi­
cantly to the separation of warrior and commoner. At the least, the lack of 
domain involvement in villages is a sign of how little time daimyo had for 
the minute regulation of rural community affairs of any sort. 
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Fuchibyakushd Administration 
As indicated previously, a principal issue for newly arrived "potted 
plant" daimyo was how to gain the support (or at least, the acquiescence) 
of local leaders whose talents and cooperation were essential to effective 
administration. To fail in this effort risked major local rebellions such as 
those in Higo and Tohoku. 
Ikko ikki remnants challenged the political and organizational skills of 
the Maeda, but all "potted plant" daimyo had to contend with the same 
sort of obstacle. Like other ikki in Japan, the Kaga Ikko ikki was oriented 
first and foremost to withstanding encroachments by outside overlords. 
An earlier view of the Ikko ikki treated it as broadly popular, democratic, 
and egalitarian. In this view, commoners cooperatively held the province 
(hyakusho no mochitaru kuni) and therefore were more likely to resist the 
imposing of a hierarchical warrior order. But recent scholarship empha­
sizes the similarities between locally active Ikko leaders and the kokujin 
of other parts of Japan. The Kaga ikki organizations even resisted the at­
tempts of the sect's headquarters, the Honganji in Kyoto and Osaka, to 
control it. Local adherents stressed their own political agenda and defied 
the Honganji's attempts to act like other sixteenth-century daimyo. As we 
saw in the investigation of the fuchibyakusho's origins, a gentry of kokujin­
like families controlled pre-Maeda Kaga. In this sense the task the Maeda 
faced was typical of late-sixteenth-century daimyo. All faced the problem 
of how to incorporate or subjugate the lower levels of the preceding rulers' 
military organization.2 
The Maeda solved the problem by co-opting the fuchibyakusho as 
district administrators. Their appointment marked the beginning of an 
organizational emphasis on district-level administration. District offices 
became the highest and most important level of rural administration held 
by commoners. 
The district emphasis in Kaga administration was not new to local in­
habitants. In the middle of the sixteenth century, official documents were 
commonly addressed only to the district, and not to an individual hamlet or 
village. Sometimes districts became so closely associated with each other 
that they were clumped under one name. This was the case with the three 
districts of the Oshimizu area near the modern-day city of Hakui, which 
became known as Oshimizu san ka (the three districts of Oshimizu). 
Small groupings of households, "villages" or "hamlets," gradually 
gained a small measure of the individuality that earlier had been sacri­
ficed to the district (go, sho, in, so, etc.). At least this was the case from 
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the perspective of higher administrators. If a village within a district was 
mentioned, the district name preceded the village or hamlet name. Menden 
village was not simply Menden, but Oshimizu Menden.3 Yet even in this 
context, the group or district was still dominant. 
Each group focused on a shared, practical concern—common access to 
water, mountains, grasslands, and other resources that were of vital eco­
nomic importance to each hamlet.4 The amalgamating of groups into larger 
ones (as in the Oshimizu area) suggests that the original groups expanded 
their need for cooperation to such an extent that some important decisions 
had to be made regularly on an intergroup basis. Consultations and per­
haps joint appeals to higher authorities became common enough for them 
to meld into a larger group. 
This process was not predestined or unidirectional. Examples of the 
opposite tendency also exist. Kami Machino so is a case in point. In the 
mid-sixteenth century, it was broken into two groups. This was probably 
due to changes in patterns of local cooperation and interests.5 
The undifferentiated and informal administrative structure of these 
district organizations reflected their flexible and practical nature. How 
much administrative power district groups had in the sixteenth century is 
debated. Some local historians believe they were self-governing.6 Others 
believe they had no administrative role.7 There are indications that dis­
trict groups served some limited official administrative function within 
the overall context of Ikko ikki provincial administration. In addition to 
the practice of addressing documents to groups of hamlets, the names of 
some districts reflect their role as low-level administrative or military units. 
Kanazu sho in Etchu was also called "go-ban-han" (fifth unit, half) and 
"go-ban ichi-gumi" (fifth unit, first group).8 The numbering of districts in 
this fashion suggests a formal role for district organization in the Ikko ikki 
chain of command. 
Whatever administrative functions the district organization had were 
insufficient to foster a formal administrative structure. We have no record 
of an appointed or elected official who headed each district. Administrative 
matters were handled by informal discussions among the hamlet leaders 
and influential residents (otonabyakusho). 
Under ikki rule, the largest formal administrative divisions were kumi, 
literally meaning "group." If the province of Kaga is typical, and it prob­
ably is, there were no more than a dozen kumi in each county. Since there 
were several hundred villages in a county, the average kumi would have em­
braced about two dozen villages.* By contrast, the Maeda's fuchibyakusho 
'Davis, "Kaga Ikko Ikki," p. 119, estimates that in 1531 there were nine or ten kumi in 
Ishikawa county, eight in Kahoku, and four in Nomi. Ishikawa ken Torigoe son ski, pp. 210­
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generally presided over only 10 or iz villages.* Commensurate with their 
smaller size, they could—and did—keep a closer eye on local conditions 
than supra-district officials under the Ikko structure. 
The fuchibyakusho in Noto and their counterparts elsewhere per­
formed a variety of services for the domain and the villagers. For the 
villagers, they were thefirst line of defense against the landed retainers' tax 
agents. If these lower samurai were arbitrary or unreasonable, the fuchi­
byakusho filed a complaint with senior officials. Fuchibyakusho were also 
expected to administer the natural resources of the mountain areas for the 
local residents and the daimyo.9 
For domain authorities, however, this side of administration was sec­
ondary. The most important duty of the fuchibyakusho was overseeing the 
collection of all local taxes. The principal tax was the annual land tax, 
which was usually collected in kind. The fuchibyakusho coordinated the 
actual collection and delivery of these goods. Their responsibility in this 
department extended to the management of the granaries where the tax 
rice was stored and to its transport to and from the granaries. 
Their other chief duty was to try to expand the land tax base. Fuchi­
byakusho identified usable but currently uncultivated land. They were ex­
pected to encourage reclamation. At this stage in the domain's develop­
ment, incentives to villagers who undertook the opening of new lands to 
cultivation or the conversion of dryfield to paddy were not well developed. 
The district chiefs had little with which to perform this part of their jobs 
except their own persuasive powers and personal leverage. 
In some cases fanners could not cultivate land after it was flooded or 
damaged by some other natural disaster. The fuchibyakusho assessed the 
unused land's potential for recultivation, and then took steps to ensure that 
it once again produced grain, and hence taxes, for the domain. To this end 
he might organize a village or district work force to clear the land of debris 
11, likewise indicates that there were four kumi in Nomi county in 1547. These kumi could be 
quite large. Yamanouchi-gumi encompassed about half the territory of Nomi county and was 
further semiofficially divided into three groups, one of which consisted of only 16 villages. 
Yamanouchi-gumi is dearly exceptional. It received orders directly from the Ikko sect head­
quarters, the Honganji. Orders were usually not addressed to individual kumi but rather to 
ail kumi in a county. In thcTensho era (1573-91) each of Hakui county's kumi contained 230 
villages (Kaneda, Minami Omi son shi, pp. 43—44). 
*See, for example, KHNK, 1: 87-94; Ishikawa ken.Shio cho shi, pp. 134—35; and 
Kawa, Hatta no rekishi, p. 53. The groups varied in size. KHNK presents one example of 
19 villages, but none approached the size of the Hakui county kumi during the Ikko ikki, and 
others may have been smaller than 19. Though die size and details of the administrative struc­
ture of these groups are often unclear, the Maeda unquestionably saw them as administrative 
divisions. Documents were frequently addressed to "the peasants [hyakusho] of X group." 
(See, for example, NSS, 1:50; and Araki Sumiko, "Kaga-han," pp. 493-9*0 
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and repair damaged irrigation facilities. Alternatively, he might only need 
to grant permission for a family to cultivate the land in place of a fellow 
villager who had given up on it. 
In other cases the land was not planted because its cultivator ran away 
from the village in protest or as the result of a dispute with other residents, 
so a logical corollary of the duty to preserve the land tax base was the 
obligation to prevent cultivators from leaving the village. Failing that, the 
fuchibyakusho was to locate the runaways and encourage them to return 
quickly before their fellow villagers were forced to assume their tax and 
corvee obligations. 
Rural migration concerned domain policy-makers from the start of 
Maeda rule. Migration occurred in response to two different stimuli: ad­
ministrative/political and economic. Early on, some villagers fled simply 
because they were unsure of what their new lords would do. In other in­
stances they migrated to escape what they perceived as unduly high taxes 
or harsh treatment by landed retainers and the daimyo's agents. The de­
sertion of individual families or even of whole villages was one form of 
opposition to samurai rulers.10 But villagers also migrated to take advan­
tage of economic opportunities elsewhere. Domain attempts to prevent 
them from going to Sado and other provinces to work gold mines reflect 
the lure of an early-seventeenth-century gold fever.11 The rapidly growing 
city of Kanazawa, the daimyo's administrative headquarters, also offered 
attractive opportunities for those trying to improve their lot.12 
The authorities worried that absconding and migration would lead to 
declining tax revenues. In 1591 they issued a pledge to the residents of 
Hongo, Urakami, Naiho, and Wada village groups that explicitly expressed 
this concern. In response to an apparently substantial problem, they prom­
ised not to collect back taxes, offered loan rice from the domain storehouse, 
and promised to deal with irregularities on the part of landed retainers and 
the daimyo's tax agents. Since they were making these pledges to meet the 
villagers' complaints, runaways should now "return to your villages and 
devote yourselves assiduously to the cultivation of your crops."13 
From the autumn of his Noto enfeoffment, Toshiie repeatedly ordered 
fuchibyakusho to call back absconding villagers. The first such order was 
directed to the residents of Toge area in the fall of 1581.14 Though han 
authorities occasionally made concessions, as in 1591, or rebuked abusive 
officials, their orders usually took the form of prohibitive legislation. In 
addition to bans on going to work in gold mines, domain authorities issued 
ordinances requiring the reporting of runaways, restricting the contracts 
of those hired as servants, and prohibiting the hiding of absconders.15 En­
forcing these ordinances was the responsibility of the district chiefs. 
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The fuchibyakusho were also responsible for the collection of miscella­
neous cash taxes on fishermen, charcoal kilns, and other small-scale busi­
nesses. Though significant, these taxes represented a relatively minor part 
of the villagers' tax burden.* Much more important, the fuchibyakusho 
organized work crews for the fulfillment of corvee obligations. Village 
labor was used not only to maintain roads and other public works, but also 
to construct and repair coastal defenses, castles, and other fortifications. 
Villagers transported military supplies throughout the domain, and they 
were even called on to work in support of military campaigns outside the 
domain.16 
The men who served as district administrators also probably acted as 
headmen for the villages in which they resided. This is suggested by a series 
of documents from the Ogino family collection in the vicinity of modern 
Himi City. Two sets of documents (1593 and 1595; 1596 and 1597) deal with 
both village and group matters. The Unami village headman and the Unami 
district official were one and the same: Sukeuemon.1 
Finally, the fuchibyakusho served in various miscellaneous capacities. 
In the military sphere they acted as a coastal guard, reported on potential 
invasions or disturbances, and occasionally acted as spies in other domains. 
They also supervised aspects of coastal shipping. At a more personal level, 
their children often worked in samurai households as servants.17 
Village Leadership 
Through the early seventeenth century, domain appointments in local 
government and ordinances were directed at districts. From the perspec­
tive of the domain, the village was an ill-defined administrative level. To be 
sure, it was a unit of taxation, and survey magistrates demarcated villages 
as such. They clarified those boundaries between villages that bore directly 
*The one possible exception is the tax on salt produced in the domain. The major salt-
producing regions were located in die coastal villages of Noto. Salt production accounted for 
a major part of the total income of several of these coastal villages. 
tThe first document, ordering the transport of charcoal from a village in Noto to Mori­
yama castle in Etchu in 1593, is addressed to "Unami mura kimoiri sho." This could mean 
either "office of the Unami village kimoiri" (village official) or, since this traffic involved a 
rather large volume and a long distance, more likely, "the Kimoiri's Office in Unami village" 
(district official). A second document, ordering the shipment of salted fish in 1595, is ad­
dressed to "Unami mura kimoiri hyakusho chu"—to "the kimoiri and peasants of Unami 
village"—and appears to concern only the residents of the village. The following year, 1596, 
another document encouraging full tax payment and dealing with other tax-related matters 
for Unami was addressed simply to "Unami village Sukeemon." Finally, a 1597 document 
was addressed to "Unami-gumi Sukeemon"—"Sukeemon of Unami district"—and two other 
district administrators. (Himi shi shi, pp. 1176-79.) 
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on taxation—all residents understood which unit was responsible for land 
tax payments on each plot of arable land. But beyond this, the domain 
authorities prescribed no offices or duties for village officials. 
Despite claims that the early modern daimyo froze villages into unnatu­
ral administrative divisions, there is little evidence that this was so in Kaga. 
The borders set by the land surveys were incomplete. Domain officials did 
not survey lands exempt from land taxes or uncultivated lands between 
villages that were not in dispute. The domain was simply not prepared to 
do this systematically. That level of intervention did not come until such 
time as it became the focus of an intervillage dispute, a common phenome­
non throughout Japan. The many intervillage disputes over lands that later 
came under the plow or became sources of green manure, kindling, and 
other resources attest to the lack of firm, clear borders in these previously 
little used sections between villages.* 
Cultivators were generally free to extend their activities into new lands, 
develop new irrigation and riparian works, and undertake any related en­
deavors until they came into conflict with a neighboring village's activities. 
As residents reclaimed land in more remote areas of a village, the domain 
often created a new village. The formal establishment of new villages (shin­
mura) permitted the authorities to recognize the distinctiveness of these 
newly cultivated areas—their lower land quality and their separate irriga­
tion systems—minimizing the strain on the cooperative relationships in 
the old, main village.1 
At the village level, the local gentry (kokujin) almost certainly con­
tinued to play the dominant role in local affairs. Though there is no clear 
documentation of this in the form of domain appointments, we have in­
direct evidence of their continued prominence as resident landholders. The 
handful of early 1580's records linking individual names to land show that 
With the passing of time and the growth of the rural population, competition between 
villages for access to these lands increased. It became particularly intense as villages expanded 
arable land into areas that had previously been unclaimed (formally) or utilized cooperatively. 
Richard Moore, Department of Anthropology, Ohio State University, has maps of a recla­
mation project cooperatively developed by Sakuraba, Ishin no Mori, Uwanuma, and Nagai 
villages in modern Miyagi prefecture. Though every map shows a complete division of the 
land, the boundaries shift substantially from year to year. Villagers did not see the boundaries 
as immutable. 
tThere are hundreds of cases of the spinning-off of villages. Instances appear in almost 
every local history, and documents prepared in the process of compiling the "Shoho yon nen 
gocho" reflect boundary changes in several hundred villages. Given the limitations outlined 
in Brown, "Mismeasure of Land," and the lack of any consistent use of maps in the late-16th­
and early-17th-century surveys throughout Japan, I believe that this same flexibility prevailed 
in other domains as well. (See, for example, Kikuchi, Shinden kaihatsu.) Furthermore, Hide­
yoshi's instructions on surveys did not effectively encourage more than the clear demarcation 
of boundaries between two villages1 arable lands. 
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a few people in each village were associated with large proportions of 
village land. The names of the largest can be linked to the Ikko military 
organization and the development of other large-scale economic projects 
in the years before the Maeda arrival. These past leadership experiences, 
in combination with continued large landholdings, placed the kokujin in a 
good position to influence village affairs.18 
Village headmen {mum kimoiri) may have played an important role in 
local life as well, but the han authorities did not define or officially recog­
nize that position until many years after the Maeda's entry into Noto. 
Domain ordinances do not explicitly mention the office of village headman 
until 1631.19 We know enough from other kinds of documents that villagers 
engaged in a variety of collaborative activities essential to their livelihood 
and village harmony. Allocating tax payments, conducting warichi, deter­
mining land tenure, and the like all required a degree of coordination that 
must have emerged from local ranks, but what is noteworthy is the lack of 
direct domain interest in regulating these activities. 
Villagers thus had considerable autonomy vis-a-vis the domain in the 
management of their internal affairs and the way they structured their own 
administrations. Only when intervillage disputes could not be resolved at 
the district level or involved taxation did the domain authorities intervene. 
Landed Retainers {Kyunin), the Daimyo's 
Intendants {Daikan), and the Villagers 
At the same time that the daimyo established new administrative struc­
tures at the local level, he appointed samurai intendants (daikan) to oversee 
the lands administered directly by the domain. Daikan were the daimyo's 
principal administrative agents in the field. Most came from low-ranking 
samurai families. They were sufficiently low-ranking to be familiar with 
agriculture and to return to farmer status in several instances (another 
reminder of the fluidity of class lines at this time). 
In addition, of course, Toshiie and his successors gave fiefs to their 
chief retainers. Through the mid-seventeenth century these landed retain­
ers (kyunin) held important private administrative responsibilities akin to 
those of daikan apart from their posts in the domain's military and bureau­
cratic structures. Their income came from taxes they assessed and collected 
from the villages in their fiefs. 
The daimyo's policy on the appointment and control of daikan re­
flected concerns similar to those he addressed in granting fiefs to retainers, 
and although both daikan and kyunin initially possessed considerable au­
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tonomy, conflicts between them and the villages induced the domain au­
thorities to restrict their activities. Eventually this pressure had important 
transforming effects, but at this stage in domain development, the daimyo 
simply sought to limit the potential for the official abuse of villagers. 
The daikan assessed and collected taxes. As with the fuchibyakusho, a 
closely related part of their primary charge was to encourage the expansion 
of the land tax base. In the very early stages of Maeda rule, the daikan also 
served as land surveyors.20 
The earliest daikan had a somewhat impermanent air about them. They 
did not have a standing local office and may have resided in major castles 
throughout the domain.21 All of the early daikan worked in somewhat un­
usual circumstances. Toshiie directly oversaw their work. Before 1589 his 
personal seal appeared on both the interim and the final tax receipts issued 
to the villagers. Tax receipts from 1589 on indicate a shift to permanent 
daikan offices and an official rural residence for at least some of the men. In 
that year Toshiie chose to withdraw from this activity and leave his agents 
in full charge of village tax matters.* How many daikan were active at any 
given time early in the domain's history is unknown. Shortly after the ini­
tial stages of a later district reform (ca. 1627), there was at least one per 
district.22 
But even with the establishment of permanent offices, there was little 
stability in the jurisdictions of daikan. In the period 1585—90, nine of the 
15 Noto villages for which we have tax data for more than one year experi­
enced at least one change in daikan. Three of those experienced at least 
three changes.23 (The situation did not improve with the passage of time. 
In Nafune-gumi, 16 of 37 daikan positions changed in the years 1631-34; 
four changed twice.24 These are very high rates of turnover for such a short 
interval.) 
Frequent transfers prevented daikan from establishing close ties with 
the local population. Such close relations could form a power base from 
which a daikan might oppose the daimyo or subvert his administrative 
goals. No document clearly establishes the daimyo's intent, but the tenor 
of the times certainly encouraged such thinking. In addition, frequent rota­
tion may have been designed to prevent villagers and district officials from 
gaining sufficient confidence to attempt to bribe the incumbent.* 
* Kigoshi, "Maeda," p. 31. The establishment of the office of daikan may have been ac­
companied by the establishment of a compound (yashiki) where the officeholder maintained 
a rural residence. Noto Wajima Kamikaji-ke monjo, p. 97, notes one case several decades 
after 1589. 
tBribery was a very real possibility. As we will see, this was the root of the Urano incident 
that brought Cho autonomy in Kaga to an end. 
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At first Toshiie gave both his lower officials and his landed retain­
ers substantial latitude in the exercise of their principal functions—the 
assessment and collection of taxes. Provided that the tax base was main­
tained and expanded and the tax system served the domain reasonably 
well, domain authorities had little interest in the affairs of either daikan or 
kyunin. Furthermore, in a period when the daimyo was heavily engaged 
in military activities in other parts of Japan, if was to his advantage to 
minimize the han's direct involvement. As long as monetary and military 
supplies were adequate and the lack of attention did not lead to serious 
disruptions of public order, attention to national activities took priority. 
But the need for institutional safeguards was soon impressed on han 
officials by village protests of daikan or kyunin abuse and the persistent 
absconding of peasants. In response, the Maeda imposed certain limited 
administrative restraints. (These developments were the first hints of a 
gradual shift toward greater central control at the expense of daikan and 
kyunin.) 
In fact, from the start Toshiie had foreseen the possibility of daikan 
and kyunin exceeding their authority. In connection with the first harvest 
after his entry into Noto, he proclaimed: "In addition to the annual tax 
rice from the assessed fields, the kyunin must not collect any other moun­
tain, river, boat, or ocean tax, etc. If there is anyone who attempts to order 
other taxes, notification [to the han lord] must be made."25 Again, in a 
1583 order, we find the charge: "There is not to be the smallest additional 
tax. Regardless of what the daikan or anyone else says, if there is no official 
seal to the document, it is not to be recognized."26 By these orders Toshiie 
showed that he was particularly concerned that the daikan and kyunin not 
take advantage of the confusion inherent in establishing the new Maeda 
rule. He was certainly well aware that mistreatment could lead to cultivator 
flight, with crops left unharvested and therefore uncollectable as taxes. 
Although there are only a few examples of official sanctions taken 
against those who violated these orders, they are sufficient to indicate that 
Toshiie's proclamations defining the duties of the daikan and kyunin could 
not be ignored with impunity. In the spring of 1587, he ordered that the 
dry fields he had granted to a kyunin be returned. Who the retainer was 
and what village or villages were involved are unclear, but the sequence 
of events leading to Toshiie's sanctions was recounted in the order itself. 
The land had been granted as part of a fief in 1586. The retainer promptly 
imposed excessive taxes, provoking the inhabitants to flee the village or to 
refuse to cultivate the land. The wheat crop, probably planted the previ­
ous fall, was completely abandoned. As a result of this mismanagement, 
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the land reverted to the daimyo, and new lands were to be granted to the 
retainer.* Similar actions must have also been taken against errant daikan. 
At the time of the Korean expeditions, daikan misconduct was an ex­
plicit matter of concern. Early in 1591 Maeda Yasukatsu, the castellan at 
Nanao and supervisor of Noto provincial administration, ordered villagers 
to report any misconduct on the part of their daikan. In addition, he in­
structed the daikan not to collect unpaid taxes.27 Though this order was 
clearly part of an attempt to dampen rural discontent and to coax villagers 
back to their agricultural labors, Toshiie's concern in the late summer of 
the following year (1592) focused specifically on preventing daikan abuses. 
His orders reflected the financial strains caused by recent military cam­
paigns and the Korean expeditions. Heavy manpower demands had forced 
him to send many samurai out of the domain who would normally have 
served as daikan. This left only a few to oversee tax collection. To ensure 
necessary military supplies and monies for his activities, Toshiie exhorted 
the remaining daikan: "Quickly complete the interim tax calculations and 
present them to Gorobei [Maeda Yasukatsu]. When I return to Kanazawa, 
there will be a general audit of taxes, and those daikan who caused villagers 
to fall into arrears in their payments . . . certainly will be punished."1 In 
addition to guarding against negligence in tax collection, Toshiie wanted to 
restrain unscrupulous daikan from capitalizing on the lack of supervision 
to extort money from the villagers and threaten the domain's interests. 
Toshiie followed through on his threat to punish daikan who violated 
his orders. When he returned from his activities in support of the Korean 
campaign in 1593, he conducted an investigation of the daikan's accounts 
as promised. The inquiry revealed that at least one, Hirose Sanai, had both 
embezzled funds and caused villagers great hardship. Sanai paid with his 
life for his abuse of power.28 
Although Yasukatsu's order to report daikan misconduct included an 
* TKSSf y.66. Toshiie clearly saw this transfer as an incentive for the villagers to return to 
cultivating the land. One of the final clauses states: "However, since this land is the daimyo's, 
it must quickly be recultivated." 
t JC1C, p. 857. The phrase "mishin o sase" is ambiguous and can be interpreted as either 
"permit die peasants to fall into arrears11 or "cause the peasants to fall into arrears.11 In light 
of the earlier warnings against the abuse of taxation powers, the notification that tax records 
would be checked on Toshiie's return, and the subsequent events noted below, I have inter­
preted the phrase as indicating causation rather than leniency or neglect of duty. The latter 
meaning, however, should not be excluded. Indeed, Toshiie could well have intended both 
meanings. Daikan could "cause" tax arrears in several ways: by making taxes so high that the 
villagers could not pay the full amount; by collecting personal loans and interest just before 
taxes were due; by pocketing tax monies before the villagers had paid all their taxes; and 
so forth. 
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injunction to report abuses by landed retainers as well, there is no evi­
dence of a kyunin being treated so harshly during the Korean campaign. 
Any punishment was most likely limited to a transfer or the reduction of 
a fief, or both. Since these men were so important to the smooth function­
ing of the domain's military machine, Toshiie may have been reluctant to 
take stronger measures against them. As noted previously, before 1600 the 
kyunin had wide-ranging authority in their own fiefs. They were gener­
ally free to manage their lands as they saw fit, provided that they did not 
provoke strong protest from the villagers. Within these broad limits, the 
daimyo could tolerate some abuse of individual cultivators, since it did not 
directly affect domain tax revenues, only the kyunin's/ 
Throughout this early period, there were very few officials who stood 
between the daikan or kyunin and the daimyo. When Toshiie was in the 
domain, complaints against daikan and kyunin were to be presented di­
rectly to him; when he was absent, complaints were to be reported to his 
assistant, Maeda Yasukatsu. 
Conclusion 
The transition to Maeda rule in Kaga did not bring radical transforma­
tions in village structures, and the shifts in domain administrative organs 
at somewhat higher levels were gradual, not wrenching. Rather than ap­
proaching the tasks of establishing a new domain administration with the 
uncompromising zeal of revolutionary ideologues, the Maeda displayed 
a pragmatic bent. They balanced the needs of the villagers against those 
of the domain and its landed retainers. In the course of maintaining this 
balance, they bore in mind their own need to rely on the retainers who 
supplied the domain with much of its military manpower. 
The changes were most marked in rural political structures; yet even 
here they were selective and gradual. The daimyo built on local resources, 
and in the process, created a district administrative unit under the fuchi­
byakusho without disturbing hamlet social and political structures. Village 
officers were not appointed by the daimyo or his subordinates. Nor were 
the hamlet leaders or the villages the object of detailed regulations from 
central administrative officials. Many functions typically thought to have 
'Kyunin as well as daikan had the power to approve of disapprove a villager's migration 
or adoption of a son or daughter (KHS> 1: 851). Most important, however, was the latitude 
kyunin had in collecting taxes, including the ability to press villagers into personal servitude 
and to use torture to force payment. On this point, see Iwai, "Shoki Kaga-han," pp. 41—42; 
Araya, aKaga-han,w pp. 69-75; and KHNK, 1: 52. 
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been the responsibility of villages (e.g., ensuring tax payments, allocating 
corvee labor duties) were assigned to district officials. 
Local talent was used at the district level as an intermediary in the 
domain's dealings with villages. Fuchibyakusho were an economical way 
to tap the talent of local men who knew the region well. Since they provided 
a regular channel for villager complaints, they were valuable in limiting the 
potential for local revolts against the new domain lords. 
Landed retainers and daikan initially were left largely to their own de­
vices in tax matters. The domain leaders were concerned that the villagers 
not be greatly abused, but in the case of kyunin especially, they were con­
tent to respond to complaints rather than to impose specific restrictions. 
That Toshiie did not impose universal restrictions on the kyunin in short 
order helps to explain why there was no broad opposition to his poli­
cies. The daimyo moved slowly, cognizant of the importance of the landed 
retainers to his military organization. Restrictions evolved over several de­
cades, and they did not mean a wholesale loss of retainer rights. They were 
designed to correct the abuses of individual retainers (and daikan) that 
caused cultivators to flee their lands. 
The specific steps the Maeda took in establishing their new adminis­
tration do not necessarily typify developments in other domains, but their 
experience does teach us something about the early process of domain for­
mation. Though the problems of setting up initial administrative structures 
were common to any new domain lord, the answers to those problems 
were not predetermined. Kaga's experience indicates that in some regions 
of Japan, domain lords were content to avoid the details of village gov­
ernment. Their key concerns were to maintain adequate revenues and a 
generally tranquil domestic order. As long as those criteria were met, the 
other demands on their time were too important to divert attention to 
the minutiae of village affairs. Only as the need to meet these criteria de­
manded or as domain administration stabilized and expanded beyond the 
early, spartan administrative staff would daimyo increase their efforts to 
regulate village affairs. 
Village actions had a significant influence on domain policy, at least 
in the Kaga case. As we have seen, the motor driving increased restric­
tions on daikan and kyunin—as least as far as we can tell from available 
documents—was absconding and village appeals. Ultimately, these pro­
tests from below did not simply result in a short-term gain, say, a one-
year reduction in land taxes, but produced structural changes in domain 
administration. 
Chapter"] 
Early Land Taxation

Was the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century a period of in­creased samurai control over the rural population, as is generally 
contended? In this chapter, though we will touch on the center's role in the 
matter of taxation, we will concentrate on the whole on what went on at the 
domain and village level. In this respect Kaga's land tax system is a signifi­
cant indicator of the relative balance of political capabilities at both levels, 
of how much the ruling classes could impose their will on commoners, and 
how much villagers in turn could influence domain policies. 
Land Taxation in Kaga: Some Preliminary Observations 
It is obvious from the preceding discussion of Kaga land surveys that 
we need to rethink the role of the domain in land taxation. But before 
turning to that issue, let us assess the land survey itself as an implement of 
land taxation. Although there were no actual measures, we can still make a 
qualitative assessment of what the "surveyors" were doing as they traveled 
through villages and how effectively they conducted their work. 
It is likely that surveyors first went to a central village, perhaps the 
one where the district chief resided, to review earlier assessment and tax 
records. At least after the initial investigations, any new data collected 
were compared against the figures in previous survey documents and other 
official records. These reviews were probably then supplemented by dis­
cussions with village headmen and others about irregularities, reports of 
unregistered fields, and boundary disputes. Representatives from neighbor­
ing villages were questioned to determine the tax responsibility for fields 
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athwart village borders.1 If the surveyors did any fieldwork, it consisted of 
little more than making a spot check of the villagers' reports, an inspection 
of a disputed border, or a sample cutting of rice (bugari) to reevaluate the 
tax rate. The resolution of such questions may have entailed some actual 
measurement by the kenchi bugyo, but this was an extraordinary rather 
than routine practice during the general surveys. 
One cannot, of course, make a certain judgment about the compre­
hensiveness of these investigations. But an examination of the documents 
available to surveyors and of the circumstances surrounding the investiga­
tions suggests that the cumulative result was a moderately comprehensive 
and accurate picture of the villages' taxable land.2 
Records became progressively more comprehensive, increasingly incor­
porating new kinds of land into the village land tax totals. Notably, the 
landed retainers lost the right to keep domain authorities out of their fief 
(funyuken). Furthermore, mountain dry fields (yamabatake or yama no 
hatake) previously taxed under a separate program, if at all, came to be 
counted in the land tax.3 Although the Genna survey instructions had not 
excluded mountain lands as such, these typically slash-and-burn fields con­
tinued to be tax exempt as late as 1616 in Yokoji village.4 The same was true 
in Etchu after the Keicho survey: the 1613 survey document for Hinata vil­
lage notes the exclusion of mountain dry fields from the assessed value.5 By 
mid-century these fields had come to be treated as part of the land subject 
to the annual land tax.6 
Villagers prepared their own documents identifying each family's lands 
for the purpose of dividing the taxes among themselves and for warichi 
reallocation, and these records were a logical source of additional informa­
tion for domain officials. Any substantial measurement of land was done 
by the villagers as they compiled these documents. Though not completely 
accurate, the records must have been reasonably close to the mark; any­
thing else would have brought stout protests, if not desertion, by villagers 
who came out on the short end. 
Thus, when surveyors investigated taxable land, they based their esti­
mates on a combination of past survey documents (those from regular 
investigations, wasteland surveys, and surveys to register hidden fields), 
the results of han determinations in boundary disputes, and the records 
that villagers kept for their own use. Some documents specifically indicate 
that records from a previous survey "were transcribed during the investiga­
tion—clear evidence that the review process was an important component 
of land investigations.7 Domain officials collected other village documents 
on these occasions (notably the original documents granting tax-exempt 
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stipends to fuchibyakusho), reinforcing the impression that the domain 
relied heavily on village-held documents.8 
The effects of repeated investigations were cumulative, and multiple 
efforts were essential to ensure the maximum registration of taxable land. 
By 1620 the degree of accuracy and comprehensiveness for most villages 
was reasonably high. Though some arable land certainly escaped the tax 
net, the time and expense involved in finding it would no doubt have out­
weighed any tax benefit. 
Other methods to encourage the full registration of arable land were 
available and widely employed. Most important, the domain enlisted the 
help of villagers. The domain's policy on unregistered fields (called onden 
or kakushida; onkai if it was secretly reclaimed land) played simulta­
neously on the villagers' sense of equity and their desire for personal gain. 
Authorities counted on villagers to report unregistered fields in their own 
self-interest: cheaters derived a tax benefit not shared by those whose fields 
were registered. Aware that villagers might keep some fields off the registers 
by mutual agreement, authorities offered substantial rewards for people 
who reported unregistered land. 
A clear policy to combat onden is discernible from the time the Maeda 
troops were no longer tied down in Korea or elsewhere, and the authorities 
could afford to invest more effort in discovering unregistered land. Once 
begun, that effort never stopped. By the turn of the seventeenth century, the 
domain had started encouraging commoners to report onden on the prom­
ise of a large reward. In 1600 one Kakugen, ancestor of one of the most 
prominent district chief families, the Kikuchi, reported onden in Take vil­
lage; in return Maeda Toshinaga gave him those fields to farm.9 Four years 
later, just at the beginning of the Keicho surveys, Toshinaga granted part 
of the taxes (an increase of one kan gold in the field tax, nozeni) recovered 
with the registering of onden to the villager who reported it.10 
When onden was reported, domain officials surveyed it (presumably a 
task small enough to permit actual measurements) to determine its size and 
the taxes payable on it. In 1604, for example, Toshinaga ordered Kamio 
Zusho and Obata Uemon to survey onden in Ota village, assess the amount 
of tax due, and formally assign added cultivation rights to two villagers, 
Soemon and Magoemon.11 
The domain's efforts in this realm sometimes resulted in a substantial 
increase in the amount of a village's officially registered land. In Tonami 
county onden was reported in nine villages in 1604. A huge amount of 
land was involved—1,900 bales, or about 950 koku, the equivalent of two 
medium-sized villages—so much in fact that a new village was created 
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from it. The villager-informant was generously rewarded with the tax it 
yielded for the year.12 Well-documented examples of this sort are not com­
mon before the major land investigations of Keicho-Genna, so it is difficult 
to determine how representative this case is, but the reward policy appears 
to have been successful, for it was continued with only minor elaborations 
thereafter. The 1616 survey regulations codified the measures for dealing 
with onden for thefirst time: "Peasants [hyakusho] who obscure or hide the 
boundaries of fields must be punished. If at this time there is onden, it must 
be revealed. As a reward, the land tax from the onden for one year will be 
bestowed upon the informant [soshonin]. In addition, the permanent allot­
ment of the residence and premises of the peasant who concealed his lands 
or obscured boundaries must be determined by the headman [kimoiri]"13 
Indeed the very success of the policy created a different problem, as 
a clause in a major ordinance almost 16 years later attests. It prohibited 
the reporting of onden in a village for five years after a claim had proved 
out.14 Apparently, once a valid claim of onden had been made, counter­
claims quickly followed in retribution. These had become such a bother 
that the domain instituted a cooling-off period during which no further 
actions could be filed. Another clause in the same document detailed the 
conditions under which there would be a resurvey to verify that there was, 
in fact, onden. Reports of onden had clearly become widespread enough to 
stir considerable dissension among the villagers, as well as between them 
and the domain authorities.15 
The authorities themselves could discover onden when they stepped in 
to resolve disputes between villages. At issue in such disputes were rights 
of access to irrigation water, firewood, natural fertilizers, and reclaimable 
land. They frequently involved the domain in the determination of village 
boundaries. Once in the villages for investigative purposes, domain offi­
cials could look at almost anything they chose; there were no limits to the 
kinds of shady or questionable practices they could look into. 
By the second decade of the seventeenth century at the latest, all but a 
small percentage of taxable land was on the domain's books. As new lands 
were secretly reclaimed, the accuracy of tax rolls was reduced, but these 
occurrences represented a small fraction of the total. After the Keicho-
Genna surveys, increases in the assessed value of villages generally came 
through the incorporation of legally reclaimed land into the village total, 
not through the reporting of unregistered land.16 
To be sure, the extent to which thefigures in tax registers conformed to 
domain principles of valuation is open to question. For example, village as­
sessments do not appear to have changed at all when standards of measure 
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changed, as from 360 bu per tan to 300 bu per tan in the Genna surveys 
of Kaga and Noto.17 The surveys alone determined the value of a village's 
lands. Even when actual measurements were made, the possibilities for a 
deliberate manipulation or inadvertent miscalculation were substantial. In 
compensating for special circumstances, such as heavily shaded fields, as 
well as for "excessively strict" measurement and different fertility levels 
(hatake ori in the case of Kaga), surveyors had an immense amount of 
discretion. There was no systematic attempt to place checks on their inter­
pretation of the survey rules and procedures.18 But for all this, there is suffi­
cient longitudinal consistency in the figures for each village to accept them 
as a standard against which to measure trends in land taxation. Inequities 
from village to village and the gain or loss to domain treasuries result­
ing from inappropriate measurements and valuations generally remained 
unchallenged and unchanged over the course of the Tokugawa era/ 
The Sixteenth-Century Maeda Tax Systems 
The daimyo who entered Kaga, Noto, and Etchu in the waning years of 
the Ikko ikki made no attempt to impose a new, uniform system of taxa­
* Although assessed valuations tended to be stable, there were temporary or one-of-a­
kind changes. But while it is easy to see why reductions were made for fields damaged by 
flooding, landslides, changes in the course of rivers, and the like, the motives for increases in 
assessed valuation are sometimes unclear. In one respect the general surveys of villages were 
less comprehensive than the late-16th-century investigations. Domain bureaucrats ultimately 
excluded wastelands {arachi)—arable land that had been taken out of production—from a 
village's assessed value. Special surveys measured these losses of arable land, and their authors 
usually listed only the amount of "waste" without citing the cause. Kigoshi, "Maeda," p. 36, 
sees the proportion of such land as an indicator of runaway peasants. But in fact when the 
late-16th- and 17th-century wasteland documents do mention causes at all, they mostly im­
pute the losses to natural calamities (see NSS, 3:186,306; Tonami shi shi, pp. 300-301; and 
Oku Noto Tokikuni-ke monjo, pp. 3—5). 
Tensho-era documents recorded wastelands under a special subheading, a reminder to 
villagers and officials alike that land was available for reclamation. As early as 1585 Toshiie 
sent orders to Sugawara, Nakagawa, Sugiya, Onomi, and Kumagi village, Fuchu-gumi, and 
the hyakusho of Fugeshi kori (all in Noto) to cultivate such lands wherever possible and in­
dicated that even if they were not cultivated, taxes would be assessed on them {KK, pp. 787, 
1143; KHS> 1' 303—5)- Such measures pressured villagers to find someone to work abandoned 
fields. 
The Keicho surveys made general a practice seen earlier in documents for Iisakano 
shin (1595, 1598) and Ishibarai villages (1598; Kamiichi cho shi> pp. 264-66), namely, ex­
cluding waste from the total assessed value without indicating the amount omitted. Many 
conclude with the statement, "The above lands are conveyed as stated with additional waste­
lands, streams, ditches, roads, and paddy ridges subtracted from the total" (Himi shi shi, pp. 
1181-82). Previously cultivated lands that were considered extremely difficult to restore were 
marked as permanent waste in Genna surveys of Kaga and Noto. By this time the domain 
had given up hope of recultivating many wastelands. 
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tion in their domains. Sassa Narimasa, for example, assessed taxes in both 
cash (in Noto in 1577) and rice (in Etchu in 1585 ).19 Even in the same village 
there was no consistency from year to year. Taxes for Yatabe village were 
expressed in both rice and cash in 1533, in cash only in 1550, and in rice 
in 1575.20 In neither case was the amount explicitly based on an estimate 
of the productive value of the village's land or on regular inspections of its 
crops. Nor did it matter, in the end, whether the tax was assessed in rice 
or cash. Payments could be made in either, or in silk, soybeans, or other 
products useful to the lord or marketable by him. 
The very first taxes collected by the Maeda were based on these old 
forms of taxation.* The 1583 receipts for Jisha village provide an illustra­
tion.21 The amount of tax due in 1582 was stated in cash. For the purposes 
of payment, however, this was converted to rice at the rate of about 3.33 
bales per kan. All of the payments made and the remainder owed were 
stated in rice.22 The tax due was not based on a land survey designed to 
assess the village's potential to pay taxes. The only survey was one narrowly 
restricted to investigating crop damage from an unspecified caused 
Though the Maeda did not immediately follow up with an annual in­
spection system, they did revise the existing method of assessment shortly 
after they entered Noto in 1851. Since the tax system they employed, called 
the sonmen (literally, "loss exemption") system, differed from most of the 
systems discussed in survey literature, we must look at it in some detail. 
The revision is reflected in two consecutive tax documents for the Nishi­
umi district.23 Taxes for the entire district in 1582 were 406 kan, 851 mon. 
As in the previous example, this was converted to rice at the rate of 3.33 
bales per kan. But by the next tax year the domain had estimated the area 
of arable and residential land subject to the land tax (99 cho, n  o bu), and 
it now used the villages' assessed value to calculate their tax obligation. 
The format in which taxes were stated presumed that all of the produce of 
the land was the lord's to do with as he pleased. 
In practice that obligation was much less than the assessed value. Allow­
ances were made for certain expenditures and compensations. The largest 
exemption, called the men (30 percent in this case), reduced the total tax 
by whatever amount the lord deigned to grant the villagers for their suste­
*Tagawa, "Kaga-han," p. 54; Kigoshi, "Maeda," p. 20. Since documents relating to 
kyunin taxation for this period are not available, this discussion is necessarily limited to the 
structure of taxation under the daimyo. 
tThe term "kenchi" was used in this document, but not as a designation for a full land 
survey of an actual measurement of arable land. One official was dispatched to estimate how 
much land was unharvested. This usage is another indication that the term did not carry any 
implications of a specific method. 
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nance.* Officials also subtracted enough to compensate the fuchibyakusho; 
the tax exemption represented their salary rather than a cash grant from 
the domain treasury. Also exempted were lands lost to cultivation from 
natural causes (wastelands). The remainder was the tax due. 
If the Nishiumi district is typical, the new tax system resulted in a sub­
stantial increase in taxes for the residents of the domain. The amount owed 
in 1583 was just over 1,619 bales of rice; this compares with roughly 1,272 
the year before, a jump of better than 28 percent. 
It is noteworthy that in these early years, tax payments were sometimes 
calculated for a district. For example, Toshiie's 1589 tax receipt for the Awa­
gura district does not identify individual villages but simply acknowledges 
that taxes for the group had been paid.24 Here we have another indication 
of the primacy of district administration over the village. The early land 
surveys did not uniformly transfer to the villages primary responsibility for 
tax payment. 
The district may even have been the basic unit of tax assessment, with 
the fuchibyakusho allocating the burden to be borne by each community. 
For example, when crops were extensively damaged in the Tata district in 
1583, Toshiie ordered a district-wide exemption (men) of 30 percent.25 A 
1587 tax bill for Kumagi district (so) simply declared that a total of 4,000 
bales of rice was owed.26 like the tax receipts cited above, these documents 
strongly suggest that it was the district, headed by a fuchibyakusho, that 
was primarily responsible for tax payments, not villages. 
As in the Nishiumi documents, authorities valued land at just over 
three bales of rice per tan (or at a rate of a little more than three to to the 
bale, about one koku per tan). This figure is uniform throughout almost 
all the Kaga documents. The Maeda did not follow the common practice 
of assigning different values to different grades of fields. In general tax 
valuations did not consider soil fertility. 
Domain ordinances do not explain the basis for determining either the 
regular or the extraordinary exemptions. Nominal tax rates appear high, 
perhaps even arbitrarily so, but they were also quite consistent from village 
to village. A 1585 summary of the exemptions for Noto Island (Table 7) 
suggests that regular exemptions were partly based on an estimate of each 
village's overall agricultural productivity relative to the others. The villages 
were ranked in three grades, superior, average, and inferior, each with a 
corresponding exemption (of 30 percent, 35 percent, and 40 percent, respec­
tively). Although variations within these categories were recognized (e.g., 
'Later in the Tokugawa era the word "men" referred to the official village tax rate, that 
is, die amount to be collected as taxes, and not, as here, to the amount the villages were 
permitted to retain. 
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TABLE 7 
Exemption Rates in Notojima Villages, is85 
Surveyor's Surveyor's 
categorization Rate categorization Rate 
Village of land (percent) Village of land (percent) 
Tori Tanoshiri Average 35% Hachiasaki Inferior 40% 
Bassho Average 35 Enome Average 35 
Musaki Average 35 Neya Average 35 
Kuki High ave. 35 Makari Superior 30 
Hon'noura Superior 30 Minami Superior 30 
Oura Superior 30 Koda Superior 30 
Ubakaura Average 35 
S O U R C E  : Tagawa, "Kaga-han," p. 55. 
"high average" for Kuki village), this apparently had no bearing on the ex­
emption rate. Instead of varying assessed values for many different grades 
of paddy and dry field, authorities set different exemption rates (men) for 
villages. But the range of variation was only 10 percentage points. 
As can be seen in Table 8, the assessed values also showed much sta­
bility under this system. In a sample of 17 Noto villages, seven seemingly 
experienced no changes at all in the years 1583-91, and nine had just one 
change. In only one village (Ozawa) did the value change more than once. 
Still, a village's total burden could fluctuate measurably from year to 
year. In the 1583-92 period changes in the amount of land temporarily lost 
from cultivation and then later recultivated (Table 9), coupled with an un­
usual increase in valuation in 1588 {shittai; uniformly 2.4 percent), caused 
swings of as much as a third in some villages' assessed value, changes that, 
in the final analysis, were reflected in taxes due.* The frequency of such ad­
justments in the Etchu and Noto villages sampled suggests that their land 
was often inspected by some means or another, but only for the purpose 
*The reasons for sudden jumps of this sort are not dear. They may have been due to land 
reclamations (Tagawa, "Kaga-han," pp. 58-60) or simply represent attempts by the domain 
to arbitrarily increase its revenues (Takazawa, "Tensho-ki nengu san'ydjo"). In all but one 
of the known cases, the tax hike (usually designated simply as shittai bun, "increase") oc­
curred in 1588. None was based on measurements by the daikan or other domain authorities; 
nominally, they arose in the villagers' own reports of increases in their holdings. A partially 
damaged ("onawauchi ni oyobazu [worm-eaten]") document describing the increase in tax­
able land for Tani and Korosa villages in 1588 clearly states that the villagers estimated the 
increase without a formal measurement (NSS, 3:185). There is evidence throughout the 16th­
century surveys and tax receipts that villagers occasionally did report increases in cultivated 
land to the authorities. For example, Ogishima* village reported that it had three more cho of 
land in 1589 than it had in 1586 {Ishikawa ken Shio cho shi, p. 158). Such disclosures were 
probably made under pressure from domain officials. The standards used to determine the 
increases are unclear. For a more detailed discussion, see Brown, "Domain Formation," pp. 
175-79­
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TABLE 8 
Changes in Exemption Rates for IJ Koto Villages, 1583-91 
Village 1583 1584 1585 1586 1587 1588 1589 1590 1591 
Nishiumi-Shimoura 100 117 117 117 117 
Enome 100 100 86 86 86 
Saihoji 100 100 100 
Yawata Shimo-mura 
Harada 100 83 
Awagura-suzuya 100 100 100 100 
Jikc 100 100 
Orido 100 100 88 88 
Ozawa 100 83 83 100 186 
Shibuta 100 100 
Kokuga 100 100 
Shitsura 100 120 
Takai 100 88 
Takojima 100 88 
Innai 100 100 86 
Morohashi 100 100 100 
Kizumi 100 100 100 88 
Yawata Shimo-mura 100 100 
S O U R C E S  : See Appendix A. 
N O T E  : Figures are index numbers, with the first year of data for each village taken as the base. 
TABLE 9 
Wasteland as a Percentage of Assessed Value 
in Noto and Etchu Villages, 1583-92 
Village sample 
TO/icrolinsI 
(Percent of Range Median 
Year Villages total value) (percent) (percent) 
1583 7 15.4% 0.4%-27.1% 14.7% 
1584 4 43.7 13.4-75.6 43.1 
1585 16 28.6 0.0-78.6 32.1 
1586 16 15.4 0.0-35.8 13.2 
1587 13 13.5 0.0-51.5 11.6 
1588 10 0.4 0.0-4.9 0.0 
1589 6 12.1 0.O-34.7 9.0 
1590-92 3 4.4 0.0-10.3 2.9 
SOURCES: See Appendix A. 
of detecting major changes in the amount of arable, not variations in crop 
yields. In effect the sonmen system assumed that villages produced stable 
yields.27 
Nevertheless, as Table 10 shows, even though temporary compensations 
for land lost from cultivation substantially lowered these villages' effective 
tax rates during the 1580's and early 1590's, as much as 50-60 percent 
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TABLE IO 
Land Taxes as a Percentage of Assessed Value 
in Noto and Etchu Villages, 1583-92 
Year Villages 
Collected taxes 
(percent of value) 
Change 
in percent 
(index) 
Village sample 
Range 
(percent) 
Median 
(percent) 
1583 
1584 
1585 
1586 
1587 
1588 
1589 
1590-92 
7 
4 
16 
16 
13 
10 
6 
3 
52.6 
36.8 
45.1 
55.1 
56.1 
60.2 
61.9 
60.4 
100 
70 
86 
105 
107 
114 
118 
115 
36.6-63.1 
14.6-56.3 
12.8-65.2 
37.8-75.3 
23.3-73.7 
44.2-77.3 
44.2-75.1 
44.2-69.0 
54.4 
38.1 
43.3 
54.3 
55.8 
66.0 
63.2 
67.9 
SOURCES: See Appendix A. 
of their assessed value was collected in taxes. In fact the proportion was 
even higher, for these data are computed from tax receipts that in many 
instances were written before the taxes were fully paid. (Cases in which 
the receipts either did not clearly distinguish the amount paid from the 
amount assessed or showed payment to only one of several overlords were 
not included in the calculations.) Other sources indicate that villages even­
tually paid much of the balance due.28 Consequently, the data in Table 10 
and below understate the effective tax rate. 
Across the whole period, an average of 45.95 percent of assessed value 
was collected as taxes from these villages. Significantly, the percentage 
increased over time, rising from the 2.0-30 percent range to the 50-60 per­
cent range, close to the two-thirds level suggested by Hideyoshi's "Osaka 
Wall Writings."* 
For tax purposes, reclaimed land (shinden) was treated separately from 
long-standing fields (honden) until such time as its productivity had stabi­
lized. Since newly opened lands required substantial investment, and their 
yields were below average for the first several years, the domain used the 
tool of tax incentives to encourage villagers to expand arable lands. Most 
new fields were taxed at reduced rates, and some were not taxed at all early 
in their development. Eventually, of course, these lands became "old fields" 
and were taxed at the standard village rate.29 
Despite annual fluctuations, the domain's tax revenues increased dur­
ing the first years of the Maeda takeover. The percentage of assessed value 
taken as taxes dipped briefly in 1584-85, but rose thereafter as the amount 
*Note, however, that these rates developed before Hideyoshi's orders were issued. The 
similarity may simply result from his adoption of an already widely accepted standard. 
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TABLE 11 
Changes in Effective Tax Rates for 17 Noto Villages, 1583-9* 
Village 1583 1584 1585 1586 1587 1588 1589 1590 1591 
Nishiumi-Shimoura 100 75 84 86 88 
Enome 100 61 100 107 107 129 
Saihoji 100 121 126 
Yawata Shimo-mura 
Harada 100 HI 
Awagura-suzuya 100 102 113 144 
Jike 100 102 
Orido 100 68 76 87 
Ozawa 100 54 68 77 104 
Shibuta 100 102 
Kokuga 100 103 
Shitsura 100 103 
Takai 100 113 
Takojima 100 120 
Innai 100 124 138 
Morohashi 100 102 125 
Kizumi 100 105 137 141 
Yawata Shimo-mura 100 132 
S O U R C E S  : See Appendix A. 
N O T E  : Figures are index numbers, with the first year for each village taken as the base. 
of wasteland decreased. Wasteland ratios increased the year after a domain-
mandated increase in the assessed values of some villages (1588), suggesting 
villager opposition to the increase, an inability to pay the increased taxes, 
or crop failure. But domain coffers still profited from the increment in as­
sessed value. Only two villages registered an absolute decline in land taxes 
over the time span for which there are data, Nishiumi-shimoura and Orido 
(see Table 11). This upward trend in effective (as opposed to assessed) tax 
rates attests to an increased effectiveness in the domain's land tax sys­
tem and political control. The rise in tax revenues may not have been all 
that dramatic, but the domain frequently managed to up its income by 10 
percent or more.* 
'See Brown, "Domain Formation," pp. 216—zo. The data discussed to this point may 
well not tell the entire story of trends in die effectiveness of the land tax system. The size of 
a bale of rice changed from three to five to with the tax receipts for 1588, but local scholars 
disagree on the impact of the change. Kigoshi Ryuzo argues that the measuring box (masu) 
remained constant, and the size of a bale rose 67%, subjecting villagers to a very large jump 
in land taxes ("Maeda," p. 25). Takazawa Yuichi feels that so large an increase is implausible, 
and sees the new size as simply a shift to a more common measuring unit ("Tensho-ki nengu 
san'yojo," p. 723). Given the relatively gradual changes in tax exemption rates, assessed value, 
and the like, I am inclined to accept Takazawa's explanation. All the same, the change from 
the three-to dobari masu bale (99.1874 cubic sun, about 119.02488 cubic inches) to the five-
to kikuchi masu bale (62.5 cubic sun, about 79.8 cubic inches) postulated by Takazawa still 
represented a tax increase of over 5%. This would mean that the Maeda land tax system was 
even more effective than the present analysis has shown. 
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Tax Billing 
There are very few extant tax bills with which to determine the timing 
and nature of the assessment process. But what we have in hand clearly 
does not support the argument for a very stringent, even confiscatory land 
tax system. In fact the available bills reveal a surprising degree of flexibility 
in tax collection, a system in which the domain was willing to make con­
siderable concessions to villages hard pressed to meet their tax obligation. 
Generally, tax bills were issued in either the summer or the fall of the 
tax year, before the harvest had begun or was completed.30 These first bills 
were merely preliminary, subject to adjustment for any crop damage before 
full payment was made in the late spring and summer of the following year. 
Once the tax bills were presented and the villagers had a chance to make 
the first payment, Toshiie himself issued a tax receipt. These receipts, as 
we have seen in earlier examples, detailed the taxes due, the exempt lands, 
the payments received to date, and the balance due. The receipt for 1583 
forTakai village is typical:31 
Tensho 11 Taxes 
Shoin District, Takai Village Computation 
Assessed value [taka]: 243 bales, 2 to, 2 go, 5 shaku 
Of this: 
15 bales Tone's stipend 
Of this: 1 bale, 2 to, 1 sho, 2 go, 5 shaku wastelands 
31 bales wastelands 
Remainder: 198 bales, 2 to, 1 sho, 2 go, 5 shaku 
Of this: 79 bales, 1 to, 4 sho, 4 go 40% exemption 
Tax due [jono]: 119 bales, 6 sho, 8 go, 5 shaku 
Of this: 
65 bales, 1 to, 5 sho, 1 go received 
25 bales in local warehouse 
15 bales received as 150 bales of salt 
Total: 105 bales, 1 to, 5 sho, 1 go 
Remainder: 13 bales, 2 to, 1 sho, 7 go, 5 shaku unpaid [mishin] 
Of this: 
5 bales payable as 2 momme, 9 bun gold, 
due in the 8th month 
5 bales payable as 2 momme, 9 bun gold, 
due by the 10th day of the 7th month 
3 bales, 2 to, 7 sho, 7 go, 5 shaku forgiven 
(Calculated) as above 
Tensho 12.6.15 
Seal [Maeda Toshiie] 
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Where, as here, a balance was owed, another receipt would be issued the 
following year and every year thereafter until the account was settled. The 
final receipt might be in the same form as the original or might be nothing 
more than a note appended to earlier receipts.32 
The period for revising the initial tax calculations extended into the 
spring of the next year. Five or six wasteland survey reports written before 
1594 clearly stated that the deduction for wasteland was to apply to the 
previous year's taxes.33 In only one instance did the report seem to apply 
to the tax year in which it was written. The results of these supplementary 
surveys were reflected in the receipts for tax payments issued thereafter. 
The timing of these investigations suggests that the fundamental pur­
pose was to gauge the extent of the damage to the land, not reduced yields.34 
In general wasteland surveys did not specifically define the cause of dam­
age; however, if officials were to inspect anything at that time of year, the 
damage would have had to be visible to them. This was most likely if the 
problem was wind-whipped or frost-damaged crops or the havoc wreaked 
by landslides or floods/ It is possible, however, that some wasteland inves­
tigations were directed at evaluating the quality of the harvest of winter 
crops such as wheat. In an order of escheat for certain kyunin lands in 
Etchu, issued in the spring of 1587, Toshiie expressed his concern that the 
willful acts of landed retainers had led cultivators to abandon that year's 
wheat crop.35 Such concern, as well as the timing of the wasteland sur­
veys, suggests that the condition of winter crops was considered in setting 
land taxes. 
The absconding of cultivators apparently did not directly result in 
wasteland. Though this was a major concern of domain authorities, only 
one tax receipt, for Ozawa village, in 1584, links the two. Even then, the 
uncultivated land imputed to absconding was listed separately rather than 
under the "wastelands'* heading in the tax receipt, suggesting that we can­
not simply read "desertion" wherever we find the heading "wasteland."36 
On the other hand, though the available documentation does not estab­
lish a clear relationship between absconding and wasteland, it was surely 
a contributing factor. Supposing that the runaway's fellow villagers did 
manage to bring in his crop, total output could well have been affected. 
The loss of labor of even a few men doubtless led to poorly weeded fields, 
put a strain on the maintenance of irrigation facilities, and prevented the 
'Crops ruined by high winds, heavy rains, cold snaps, and the like would probably have 
been left standing until lite inspection was over. Villagers would not have wanted to destroy 
evidence of the damage by plowing these fields under before officials could see the problem 
for themselves. 
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villagers from harvesting all their fields before the onset of bad weather. 
As in the case of wasteland surveys, authorities used general surveys to 
check the ability of villagers to pay the previous year's taxes. Most of the 
initial tax receipts for 1585,1587, and 1588 are dated after the major land 
surveys of 1586,1588, and 1589. They were issued by Toshiie himself and 
summarized payments made by the summer following the tax year.37 For 
example, Innai village was recorded as having 19 cho, 8 tan, 7 se, and 27.7 
bu of taxable land in 1589. Multiplying that total by the standard three 
bales per tan yields exactly the assessed valuation shown in the village's 
receipt for the previous year's (1588) taxes, just over 596 bales.38 This repre­
sents an increase of about 116 bales over the village's 1587 taxes.39 Clearly, 
the 1588 taxes were adjusted on the basis of the 1589 land survey. 
There are no similar sequences of documents with which to exam­
ine the correlation between areas reported in land surveys in 1587 and 
the previous year's assessed value. Nonetheless, the timing of tax receipts 
and land survey documents is consistent with the conclusion that the past 
year's taxes were uniformly checked against the survey results and adjusted 
appropriately. 
In sum, villages were often inspected twice (perhaps three times during 
years of major land surveys) for the purpose of assessing the land tax. The 
first inspection was to determine the initial assessment and occurred before 
the end of the harvest. A second inspection in the spring verified the extent 
of any damage to fields between the tax billing and the completion of the 
harvest. Whether such inspections were made routinely or only in response 
to villagers' demands is unclear. In any case, final bills were prepared and 
tax payments completed only after the period for making adjustments had 
elapsed. 
One striking illustration of the flexibility of the early Maeda system 
was the authorities' tolerance of tardy payments and even default. Not only 
do the first tax receipts of the year show a hefty balance due; even in the 
final accountings we find that a relatively high proportion of taxes were 
never paid. Table 12 presents data on the completion of tax payment for 
the years 1582-92. As can be seen, of the 73 instances for which there are 
at least interim receipts, only eight show no unpaid tax at all/ 
The average initial default of known cases was just under 20 percent, 
the median about 17.5 percent, the high 68 percent. If these data are di­
'In some of these cases the term "mishin," unpaid taxes, does not appear. However, 
statements that a gold payment was made at the time the receipt was prepared suggest that 
after the first tax collection but before Toshiie reviewed the payment, some of the tax was 
still to be paid. See, for example, the 1587 tax receipts for Enome village (Notojima no kinsei 
. 22) and Kawanishi village (WSS, 2: 284). 
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TABLE 12

Patterns of Forgiveness of Late and Unpaid Taxes, 1582—92 
Tax year and village/district 
1582

Nishiumi

Ozawa

Jisha

1583

Orido

Nishiumi Shimoura

Enome

Takai

Umawatari-Ushijima

Saihoji

1584

Ozawa

Shimoura

Iwasaka

Enome

1585

Enome

Morohashi

Konpoji

Ozawa

Nishiumi Shimoura

Saihoji

Yawata-Shimo

Awagura-Suzuya

Jike

Ushio

Shibuta

Orido

Takojima

Mon-Shirakawa

Ota

Kamishiro

1586 
Kizumi 
Sora 
Morohashi 
Saihoji 
Takai 
Orido 
Nakai 
Shitsura 
Nishiumi Shimoura 
Kokuga 
Awagura-Suzuya

Jike

Shibuta

Unpaid taxes 
Percent 
ultimately 
Initially forgiven 
37% 21%

20 34

36 p

30 22

52 19

51 19

10 23

66 18

62 14

25 0

38 50

68 p

10 63

0+ 100

39 0

6 100

22 45

46 19

63 12

13 6

26 9

20 11

7 34

18 7

19 0

18 0

0 0

23 0

1 0

5 100

0+ 100

29
 a 
35 21

13 0+

18 0

15 33

38

39 12

18 15

21 12

33 11

30 15

Date payment 
completed 
1583.7.30 
1583.7.21 
1583.7.7 
1584.6.15 
1584.6.15 
1584.6.11 
1584.6.15 
1584.6.15 
1584.6.15 
1585.7.27 
1585.11.16 
1585.11.26 
1585.11.26 
1586.6.22 
1586.7.5 
1586.7.8 
1586.7.11 
1586.7.11 
1587.5.30 
1587.6.2 
1587.6.2 
1587.6.2 
1587.6.2 
1587.6.2 
1587.6.2 
1587.6.2 
1587.16.? 
1588.9.14 
p 
1587.5.20 
1587.5.28 
1587.5.30 
1587.5.30 
1587.6.2 
1587.6.2 
1587.6.3 
1587.7.4 
1587.7.10 
1588.8.25 
1588.9.29 
1588.10.? 
1588.10.? 
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TABLE 12 
Continued 
Tax year and village/district 
1587 
Enome 
Takojima 
Kawanishi 
Kizumi 
Kokuga 
Nishiumi Shimoura 
Wakayama 
Orido 
Yawata-Shimo * 
Ozawa 
Shitsura 
Awagura-Suzuya 
1 588 
1JOO 
Hitani 
Nozaki-Oura 
Enome 
Morohashi 
Iwaya 
Ozawa 
Kizumi 
Innai 
Sano 
Awagura-Suzuya 
1589 
Kizumi 
Ozawa 
Morohashi 
Yawata-Shimo 
Ikawa 
Tane-Korosa 
1590, Innai 
1591, Yawata-Shimo 
1592, Ozawa 
S O U R C E S : See Appendix A. 
Unpaid taxes 
Percent 
ultimately Date payment 
Initially forgiven completed 
0 0 1588.8.27 
0 0 1588.9.7 
13 0 1588.9.8 
5 0 1588.9.19 
8 p 1588.9.20 
14 6 1588.9.26 9 0 1588.9.26 
20 0 1588.9.26 
1 100 1588.9.29 
28 36 1588.9.30 
36 0+ 1588.9.30 
2 100 1588.?.? 
8 p 1589.8.8 
8 38 1589.9.13 
3 100 1589.9.13 
20 15 1589.9.13 
3 100 1589.9.13 
45 0 1589.9.13 
18 19 1589.9.13 
16 20 1589.9.14 
18 17 1589.9.15 
17 14 1589.9.15 
0 0 1591.7.20 
0 0 1591.7.20 
8 0 1591.7.20 
7 0 1591.7.20 
0 0 p 
8 0 p 
0 0 1591.7.20 
p p 1594.1.28 
0 0 1593.12.27 
"Tax forgiven but to an unknown amount.

*Harada bun, part of a village only.

vided into five-percent ranges (1-5%, 6-10%, etc.), the modal range is 
16—20 percent. Though there were only eight instances of an arrears of 
more than 40 percent, between 6 percent and 40 percent of the land taxes 
were commonly unpaid when Toshiie first reviewed village tax payments. 
But as can be seen in Table 13, there was a steep decline in tax shortfalls 
over time. Through the 1584 tax year, the average amount of initially unpaid 
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TABLE 13 
Average Unpaid Taxes and Tax Forgiveness, 1582—92 
Unpaid tax Unpaid tax forgiven 
Year Percent Occurrences Percent Occurrences 
1582 31% 3 28% 2 
1583 45 6 19 6 
1584 35 4 38 3 
1585 20 16 21 16 
1586 23 13 27 12 
1587 11 12 22 11 
1588 16 10 35 9 
1589 4 6 0 6 
1590-92 0 3 0 3 
S O U R C E S : See Appendix A. 
tax was over 30 percent. The figure fell to about 21 percent in 1585-86 and 
declined further in 1587-88. From 1589, unpaid taxes became much less 
of a problem, reaching no higher than 4 percent of the taxes owed. Here 
again it is evident that the 24 percent increase (shittai) in assessed value the 
domain established by fiat in 1588 had no significant adverse effect on taxes 
paid. Tax arrears never returned to the high levels of the early Maeda years. 
Furthermore, substantial portions of the unpaid taxes were never paid. 
In only 24 of the cases for which we have detailed data did villages pay 
their taxes completely. Most of these were for 1587 and 1589-92. In 45 
other cases forgiveness (although not always the exact amount) can be 
documented, and these villages never paid the full tax due. In 27 of these, 
8 percent to 23 percent of the balance was forgiven; in eight instances the 
full amount was forgiven/ The median unpaid balance for the 67 cases on 
which we have complete data was about 11-12 percent. Expressed in five-
percent ranges (1-5%, 6-10%, etc.), the modal range of partial forgiveness 
was 11—15 percent. 
Based on this sample, the average rate of default in the early Maeda 
years was probably around 4—5 percent of all land tax owed. Before 1589 
there was no clear declining trend in the proportion of unpaid taxes or the 
rate of forgiveness. But in the subsequent years, land tax collection clearly 
became stricter. 
The tax payment schedule provides another sign of concession to vil-
Tables 12 and 13 perhaps exaggerate the effect of this forgiveness. In several instances 
the amount involved was small, though it constituted a sizable proportion of the arrears. In 
each case of total forgiveness the proportion of unpaid taxes was low, no higher than 6%, 
and we might suspect that forgiveness was a reward for the prompt payment of the bulk of 
the amount owed. But in other instances where the amount of unpaid tax was equally low 
there was no forgiveness at all, so this was clearly not, or at least not uniformly, the case. 
x
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lages: a relatively long period in which to complete their tax payments. 
Most completed receipts (Table 12) were dated in the summer or fall of 
the next tax year, many months and even as much as a year after the har­
vest. An additional year was allowed in 17 cases, and in two instances the 
village got three years. Across the group, final payment was deferred for 
more than a year in about a quarter of the cases. There is no indication 
that the domain penalized even the very late payers. Conceivably a penalty 
was built into the conversion rates when a village paid in cash, salt, or 
something other than rice, but there is no evidence to document this. 
In some instances extended payment and partial tax forgiveness were 
clearly linked. Many receipts included a heading designated "mitsu-wari," 
"yotsu-wari,"
 Or something similar. The heading "mitsu-wari" indicated 
that two-thirds of the amount listed there was to be paid later by the vil­
lagers, and the other third was to be forgiven completely.40 Multiple forms 
of tax forgiveness appear even in a single case, as in the receipt for Kokuga 
village's 1586 taxes, where eight bales, four sho was forgiven along with 13 
bales "mitsu-wari."41 Why a distinction was made is unclear. In any event, 
as Table 12 indicates, the practice of tax forgiveness stopped with the taxes 
assessed in 1589.42 
Several receipts document still another form of flexibility in the Maeda 
system by way of an entry marked "ukekoi."43 The amount shown there 
was considered paid, although it had not yet been received by the daikan 
or other domain official. Ukekoi, essentially a pledge by the villages to pay 
the amount due, represents another form of extended payment.44 That this 
pledge was considered adequate guarantee of payment is indicated by the 
inclusion of the phrase "payment completed as above" at the conclusion of 
most final tax receipts. It designates Toshiie's acknowledgment that all tax 
obligations had been fulfilled. The amounts of tax involved were sometimes 
quite large. The amount of ukekoi for Nishiumi-Shimoura's 1583 taxes was 
122 bales of rice.45 
Historians disagree on which individuals or corporate bodies acted 
as guarantors of the ukekoi debts. The fuchibyakusho, both as wealthy, 
locally prominent men and as leaders of multivillage groups, were ulti­
mately responsible. While a case can be made that individual communities 
were sometimes held responsible by domain authorities, the preponder­
ance of evidence indicates that this was rare. Even where the domain held 
a collection of villages responsible,* the dynamics of local administration 
would have first led to an effort by the fuchibyakusho to collect payment 
rather than direct domain contact with the village.46 
Despite a gradual tightening of han controls on unpaid taxes, the 
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Maeda's early land tax system can be characterized as flexible overall, and 
perhaps even as lenient. Although taxes from the second year of their ar­
rival may have been higher than before, the increases were at least partly 
ameliorated by the domain's apparent willingness to allow villagers to de­
fer their payments for an extended period without penalty. In many cases 
there was at least some forgiveness of the amount owed. 
Forms of Payment 
Though the form of tax assessments changed under the Maeda, in other 
respects the new system was not a radical departure from earlier times. 
In particular, as noted, the tendency to assess and accept taxes in rice was 
already well established in the region. The Maeda's use of these practices 
was no great innovation.47 What is more, given the widespread scholarly 
insistence that Hideyoshi converted the country's tax medium to rice, it is 
especially interesting to find the continued frequent use of gold and local 
products for tax payments in Kaga han throughout the late sixteenth cen­
tury. The switch to assessing taxes in rice did not mean an immediate shift 
to collecting them in rice. In 2.7 tax receipts partial payment was made 
in nine different items, most often salt, charcoal, or soybeans. In addition 
villagers paid partly in gold in the overwhelming majority of tax receipts.48 
Gold was the medium of choice especially for the final payments, but it 
was often used as part of the first installment as well.* 
As with tax forgiveness, the proportion of tax payments made in alter­
nate crops, handicraft products, and gold declined throughout the period.49 
But this general trend conceals sharp annual variations.50 In some villages 
the proportion of taxes paid in gold jumped by as much as 30—60 percent 
from one year to the next. Such sharp variations suggest a lack of system­
atic principles governing tax collection. Indeed, there are no extant ordi­
nances or administrative instructions limiting land tax payment entirely to 
rice or to a fixed ratio of rice to non-rice payments. During this period 
movement toward the increased use of rice apparently reflected social and 
economic considerations in the villages, not administrative initiative from 
the domain.51 Certainly, the principle of rice collection of taxes was not 
completely implemented by the early 1590's. 
Fluctuations in the value of rice relative to gold and other crops may 
have influenced the form of tax payment. When the harvests were good, 
taxes were somewhat more likely to be paid in rice.52 The exchange rates 
'Appendix A. Substantial nonrice payments were still widely accepted throughout Japan 
at this time. 
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for gold and rice showed marked variation from 1582 to 1592, with rice 
losing half its value relative to gold.53 To the extent that this change re­
flected market conditions, rice may have become the cheapest means of 
paying taxes. At other times villagers would have found it profitable to sell 
products that brought a higher price than rice and to pay their taxes in 
cash. Domain authorities may also have been swayed to accept alternative 
crops or special local products by shifting markets. 
Conclusion 
As in the case of surveys and the organization of local administra­
tion, the evolution of the domain's land tax system reflects an independent 
course of development. There is no evidence of any direct central influence 
or of changes in response to administrative orders from Oda Nobunaga 
or Toyotomi Hideyoshi. The early system employed in Kaga, the sonmen 
system, deviated significantly from the kokudaka system that Hideyoshi is 
said to have introduced nationwide. 
Though Kaga did not establish the land tax base through actual mea­
surements conducted under close domain supervision, the methods em­
ployed were reasonably effective. Repeated investigations succeeded in reg­
istering the vast majority of taxable land by the early seventeenth century. 
Whether the value of each village listed in the tax rosters was strictly calcu­
lated based on domain principles is open to question, but once established, 
assessed values remained constant.54 
The sonmen system built on pre-Maeda practices. The change from as­
sessing a flat amount of taxes, stated in either rice or cash, to pinning taxes 
to an assessed valuation of a village's agricultural potential, though note­
worthy, did not bring immediate major changes in the amount of tax owed 
or the means of payment. At most, one document hints, taxes may have 
increased some 28 percent. The sonmen system was more rigid in some 
ways than standard models suggest. It presumed a fixed tax obligation re­
gardless of the harvest, an amount that would be altered only when land 
was lost from cultivation or converted to arable. 
Yet in many ways the system was flexible, again, more so than standard 
models would have it, and hardly confiscatory. Tax increases were partially 
offset by the frequent use of significant tax forgiveness. Payments were 
not due until well after the harvest and might be deferred for a few years. 
Furthermore, taxes were reduced by allowances for wasteland. The form 
of payment, too, was flexible. In addition to rice and gold, the authorities 
accepted a wide variety of local products. 
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It is true that, like many other domains, Kaga assessed land taxes in 
rice. But the practice of accepting payment in rice was well established be­
fore the Maeda arrival and Hideyoshi*s rise to power. There was no rapid, 
dramatic shift from cash (kandaka) to rice (kokudaka). 
This flexibility represents domain concessions to villagers, and per­
haps directly to the threat of village opposition. Domain ordinances to 
fuchibyakusho and others clearly show the authorities' cognizance of this 
potential and desire to minimize disruptive outbreaks. They may have been 
successful in this effort, for there are relatively few documented instances 
of serious village protests in the late sixteenth century when effective land 
tax rates were at their highest. The threat of opposition combined with 
limited protest was a potent force against domain and retainer willfulness. 
Flexibility also allowed the domain to establish a new tax assessment 
mechanism and (ultimately) a higher effective tax burden. Over the years 
the authorities worked to bring the realities of tax collection into line with 
the amounts of tax they had established in principle. Although they were 
only partially successful, the tax system did yield increased revenues for 
the domain. All of this suggests a flexible yet firm political control of the 
countryside. 
That these practices were limited to the first years of their rule sug­
gests that the Maeda were especially concerned that high taxes and strict 
collection not precipitate widespread disturbances. Once they gained con­
fidence in their ability to control the local population, they did not hesitate 
to tighten the tax system. By 1595 taxes had been increased in all but three 
of the villages for which we have serial data. 
The added domain control over tax assessment and collection evident 
in 1589 was due to the establishment of the daikan as a permanent office 
that year.55 This change was probably associated with the erection of offi­
cial domain granaries.56 Positioning daikan in the districts for which they 
collected taxes provided a greater opportunity for them to become familiar 
with local conditions. More important, there was now a domain official in 
the field who could persistently encourage each district to pay its full share 
of taxes and press for the return of runaways. 
In sum, the Maeda and their retainers appear to have had reasonably 
effective control over their villages. The system was not without faults— 
there was desertion and appeals to the daimyo of mistreatment—but on the 
whole the tax system operated effectively for a ruling class still entwined 
in heavy military obligations to the hegemon. 

PART THREE

Tightening Control


Chapter Q

Villager-Samurai Tensions

With the advent of peace, first within the domain and then at the national level, the Maeda, like other daimyo, focused more atten­
tion on resolving conflicts and inefficiencies in local administration. Ieyasu 
became Shogun in 1603, a n ^ Tokugawa hegemony was secure for the im­
mediate future. Though the tensions between the Tokugawa and Toyo­
tomi families had not been resolved completely, they had reached a modus 
vivendi. Freed from imminent national conflict, the Maeda could tidy up 
domain administration. 
In any case, they needed to create administrative mechanisms to carry 
the family through a change in leadership. In 1605 Toshinaga retired in 
favor of Toshitsune. But Toshitsune, who was still quite young and needed 
to rely on Toshinaga for guidance, did not have the benefit of the retired 
daimyo's advice for long. Toshinaga died in 1614, and in his last years he 
was incapacitated by illness. 
At the top of domain administration, the most significant change 
was the emergence of senior councillors, toshiyori, as policy-makers. The 
daimyo no longer signed domain ordinances. Senior councillors jointly 
authored most domain ordinances (ofuregaki) issued from this time. 
As tensions arose between villages and agents of the domain and retain­
ers, the domain increasingly specified duties for district administration. In 
the process the ruchibyakusho were reorganized into a new class of district 
chiefs called tomura. In addition, the domain added new offices, staffed 
by samurai, who regulated tax agents and served as boards of appeal for 
villages. During this second period, details of village administration con­
tinued to be a secondary concern for the domain. 
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The Tomura System 
The concept underlying the fuchibyakusho system of local administra­
tion—using groups of villages as the principal point of contact between 
domain authorities and the villages—was elaborated and systematized 
early in the seventeenth century. Beginning in 1604, village groups through­
out the domain were reorganized into new districts known as tomura-gumi 
(literally, "ten-village-groups"), each comprising about a dozen villages.1 
This reform of district administration was part of widespread administra­
tive revisions that began that year and attempted to solidify the Maeda's 
control over their subjects. The senior councillors initiated and oversaw 
the reforms, and 'documents issued under their seals provide the first indi­
cations of a systematization or reorganization of the old districts. 
The first evidence we have of people being named to head the new 
village groups comes in a 1606 document sent to Jiroemon of Kurabone 
village, appointing him kimoiri and granting him tax-free status for his 
lands, valued at 93 bales of rice.2 Similarly, a later document (1608) granted 
Kahei of Tsuchiya village a stipend of five bales of rice as "kimoiri bun" 
(headman's portion).3 The use of the term "headman" (kimoiri) is not 
dear, and might mean that these men were village headmen. But in that 
case, we would not expect the letter of appointment to include compen­
sation (stipend or tax exemption) from the domain. There is no record of 
domain compensation for any village headman at this time, so it is prob­
able that Jiroemon and Kahei administered a group of villages.4 The fact 
that Jiroemon's descendants, at least, held the office of tomura supports 
this interpretation.5 
The absence of letters of appointment at the start of district reform 
(1604) indicates that the first stages were mild, largely involving a change 
in terminology, not a wholesale change in personnel, village groupings, 
and administrative functions. This suggestion is supported by other con­
siderations. Continuity in district heads was common. A large number of 
the new districts were headed by fuchibyakusho. Their survival under the 
new system implies that it was merely a mild reorganization of the old one. 
Moreover, the new headmen were drawn from the same strata of influen­
tial villagers and samurai-like families as the fuchibyakusho. The Kawai 
of Tonami county, referred to by the medieval-sounding title of jito-kata 
("honorable land steward"), appear to have been locally influential since 
some time in the middle ages.6 The Fujii of Arie village were Ikko sect 
priests.7 
In some instances appointment as a village group head resulted from 
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downward samurai mobility (again indicating fluid class boundaries). One 
genealogy relates the following story. Kameda Osumi was a division com­
mander for the Ikko forces. The Kameda forces later made peace with 
Shibata Katsuie, and one of them, Kameda Toshitsuna, eventually joined 
Maeda Toshitsune's retainer band. Though Toshitsuna died without heir, 
and his 2,000-koku fief was forfeited, his wife bore a son eight months 
after his death, and this son, Fujiro, was made a tomura headman.8 The 
Goto, too, were descended from a sixteenth-century warrior family that 
had reportedly held a fief of 300 koku not long before the Maeda's arrival.9 
In 1616 the domain, as part of its reorganization of local administration 
in Kaga province, introduced a systematic means of providing a salary for 
district headmen, allowing them to collect a "plow tax** (kuwayaku) of 
two sho of rice per plow (later per male aged fifteen to sixty) in the vil­
lages under their jurisdiction. This practice was extended throughout the 
domain a decade later. Apart from its significance for district administra­
tion, the creation of this salary system marks the first domain attempts to 
define legally the status of full village members (honbyakusho): villagers 
subject to the tax fell into that category; those not subject to it were treated 
as second-class residents of the village.10 Here, not in Hideyoshi's class 
separation edicts, we have the first efforts to create an identifiable, legally 
distinct rural class/ 
There was also considerable continuity of functions under the new sys­
tem. The 1606 document appointing Jiroemon kimoiri specifically states 
that he "must perform the duties he has performed heretofore."u Orders 
concerning local governance distributed throughout the domain in 1607 
placed responsibility for the investigation of boundary disputes, water dis­
putes, and similar matters in the hands of the tomura kimoiri. The tomura 
kimoiri were responsible for preventing villagers from abandoning their 
land and for pursuing those who did so.12 Other functions of the fuchi­
byakusho also continued under the tomura system.13 
Of all these functions, the one to which the domain gave greatest weight 
was the obligation to prevent villagers from deserting their land. That was 
the subject of the greatest number of ordinances directed to the tomura. 
To meet this problem the domain authorities had first relied chiefly on a 
policy of making a runaway's families and neighbors collectively respon­
sible for his action. In 1601 the domain carried this policy further, fining 
villages in which runaways were allowed to hide. In 1604, t n e v e a r of the 
'Dependent villagers did not pay this tax, though they were subject to corvee service. 
But their corvee obligations were always lower than those of full village members. 
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village group reorganization, that responsibility was extended to the guilty 
village's tomura group.14 
Later, in 1608, the domain authorities charged the tomura headman 
with responsibility for dealing with the runaway's possessions and land. 
This responsibility included the duty to see that the man's fields were prop­
erly cultivated and that his tax obligations were met.15 Though the head­
man may have turned first to the runaway's fellow villagers for labor, the 
domain clearly saw this as a shared responsibility of the entire district and 
expected the tomura to draw on cultivators throughout his jurisdiction to 
ensure that the land was farmed and land taxes paid. 
Like the fuchibyakusho, the early tomura headmen appear to have 
served simultaneously as the headmen of their home villages. That, at least, 
is the implication of the explanation of how the Kikuchi family came to 
be village headmen of Toide village in the mid-seventeenth century. The 
family's "Ancient Records" states, "The kimoiri of Toide village in pre­
vious years was [Kawai] Matauemon. Later, when Kawai was appointed 
to oversee other tomura (gofuchinin tomura), [Kikuchi] Jirozaemon was 
ordered to replace him as kimoiri"16 Since gofuchinin (receiving a stipend 
from the domain) tomura were appointed from within the ranks of the 
tomura, we may infer that before his promotion, Kawai was both the head 
of the local tomura group and the village headman.17 
Only in the matter of runaways did the domain show much concern for 
what went on in the villages. As under the old system, it was content to 
leave the details of village administration to the district and village leaders. 
The Restricting of Kyunin and Daikan Autonomy 
Coincident with district administrative reform, pressures built to re­
strict the activities of the daikan and kyunin. But the domain authorities 
were unwilling to take any drastic steps that might offend powerful retain­
ers. Under the new system, as under the old, samurai daikan continued to 
represent the daimyo, and landed retainers maintained their own indepen­
dent mechanisms for taxing land. 
But this apparent lack of change masked important new developments. 
The domain placed more responsibility in the hands of the tomura and mid-
level officials. The actions of the daikan and kyunin came under greater 
scrutiny, and the domain increasingly emphasized the role of the tomura 
where their duties overlapped those of the daikan (e.g., dealing with run­
aways and encouraging cultivation). 
The transformation began in 1601, when Toshinaga inserted the posi­
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Fig. 4. The structure of rural administration, 1581—1648. The relationship of the 
Inspectorate to other offices is unclear. 
tion of magistrate (bugyo) between himself and the daikan and kyunin, 
thereby extending his father's tendency to transfer more responsibility for 
local administration to intermediate officials. At the same time that power 
devolved from the daimyo down to the magistrates, powers were trans­
ferred upward to them from the kyunin and daikan. From the daimyo, the 
bugyo received authority to supervise both the daikan and kyunin more 
closely and to deal with any villager complaints against them. Simulta­
neously, the magistrates absorbed from the daikan and kyunin whatever 
judicial powers they had possessed (see Fig. 4). 
The 19-clause order in which Toshinaga created this new office dealt 
with a wide variety of issues.18 Most of the clauses covered things that were 
totally unrelated to taxation and rural administration: quarrels among 
samurai and various matters associated with their residence in towns, such 
as riots, gambling, and criminal activities. The breadth of responsibilities 
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encompassed in this 1601 order suggests that the position of magistrate was 
an outgrowth and expansion of the position of castellan at major towns 
like Nanao and Isurugi. He was not a rural administration specialist as his 
eventual successor the county magistrate (kori bugyo) would be.* 
Of the seven clauses that do have a bearing on rural administration, 
the most important restricted the authority of daikan and kyunin to prose­
cute runaways, impress villagers as servants, and settle on their own any 
disputes with the villagers under their jurisdiction. One specified that the 
magistrate was to make a determination concerning the justification for 
any villager complaints. The others set uniform penalties for hiding run­
aways and detailed the procedures for establishing legitimate, enforceable 
servant contracts. Toshinaga issued a supplement to these regulations early 
in 1602; additional regulations for the control of daikan and other domain 
tax officials followed at the end of the year.19 
As reflected in these documents, the villagers' complaints about daikan 
and kyunin were concentrated in two major problem areas: the extreme 
measures they used in the course of assessing and collecting taxes, and their 
arbitrary impressment of people into their personal service. In thefirst area 
of concern, both daikan and kyunin were prohibited from handing out pri­
vate decisions in disputes with villagers. Such disputes were to be reported 
to the magistrate for resolution. This was not simply a matter of ensur­
ing impartiality. Since officials sometimes resorted to torture and corporal 
forms of punishment, it was also designed to protect the physical safety of 
villagers. 
In response to the other problem, Toshinaga decreed that no villager 
could be contracted into the service of a retainer for more than one year 
and forbade daikan and storehouse managers (kura bugyo) from comman­
deering the labor of villagers or the use of their draft animals for their 
own personal use.+ The principal concern here was the direct link between 
these demands on villagers and their inability to meet their tax obligations. 
Impressment was apparently a common means by which the daikan and 
storehouse managers collected private loans from villagers. They insisted 
on being repaid before any taxes were paid, and if a man could not repay 
* As we have seen, Maeda Yasukatsu, the castellan of Nanao, supervised the daikan and 
kyunin, but whether or not he received an additional title (like "kori bugyo? a title then 
apparently borne by the Isurugi castellan) is unclear (see Himi shi shi, p. 742). The holding of 
several offices, both civil and military (or the combining of functions if not officially differenti­
ated), indicates the relatively undeveloped and transitional nature of han civil administration 
at this time. 
t KHS, 1: 851-52,869-70. The Bakufu's order prohibiting the sale of persons, the func­
tional equivalent of the servant contract order, was not issued until 1626. 
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in full, his children, his wife, or he himself was forced to work for the 
lender until the account was settled. In some cases the service was heredi­
tary. These practices threatened tax revenues by reducing the agricultural 
labor supply and siphoning off tax revenues before they could be collected. 
Toshinaga therefore sought to ensure that obligations to the domain took 
precedence over private interests.20 
The magistrate's authority over the daikan and kyunin was reinforced 
in 1607 and 1608.21 Both were now wholly prohibited from dealing with 
runaways on their own; other domain officials were given exclusive au­
thority in this matter. More important, these ordinances covered a quite 
different area of dispute between the daikan or kyunin and villagers, the 
levying of corvee labor, buyaku. To this point a prerogative of daikan and 
kyunin, the allocating of village labor was now placed in the hands of the 
magistrate. Daikan and kyunin were to present statements of their labor 
needs to him for final determination. This change was prompted not only 
by the misuse of village labor for private purposes, but also by the need 
to coordinate and balance the legitimate but potentially conflicting needs 
of the domain administration and the landed retainers. Hitherto, villagers 
could be subjected to corvee demands by both the han and the kyunin 
simultaneously; and even if the demands did not conflict, they often came 
at inopportune times and interrupted farming activities. Magistrates could 
now eliminate such scheduling conflicts/ 
In 1614-15, during the Osaka campaigns against Hideyoshi's heirs, 
domain officials issued regulations that summarized the duties of the bugyo 
in relationship to the daikan and landed retainers22—or more precisely, the 
hori bugyo (county magistrates), for by this time the office had evolved into 
one specializing in the administration of rural areas. The county magistrate 
was given the authority to investigate complaints against the daikan and 
kyunin, adjust excessive taxes, investigate the unequal taxation of villages, 
adjust the interest on daikan's private loans to villagers, oversee public 
(domain) loans, and deal with runaways. 
This new set of regulations did more than define the duties of the county 
magistrate. We may also view them as a summation of the prerogatives 
that the kyunin and daikan had lost. Most of their activities were now 
scrutinized by a higher office. There were restrictions on their latitude to 
set taxes. They could no longer deal freely with runaways. Once they lost 
the free use of conscript labor, their authority had been compromised in 
*Araya, "Kaga-han," pp. 83—84. In 1610 the han further attempted to resolve such prob­
lems by switching to a cash tax, bugin, to pay for hired labor instead of conscripting corvee. 
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each of its fundamental aspects, including the most central of them all— 
the assessing and collecting of taxes. Although a landed retainer's authority 
was somewhat less circumscribed by the new county magistrates than the 
daikan's, he was increasingly treated as a domain official and not as an 
autonomous fiefholder. All of these changes were introduced to counter 
abuses of the villagers, to keep them working their lands, and to eliminate 
conflicting demands on them. The changes were aimed at maintaining a 
stable, smoothly functioning domain administration, relatively free from 
open conflicts with its subjects. The ultimate objective was to keep labor 
on the land and productive, preserving and expanding the financial base of 
the domain and its retainers. 
Over the course of the next decade, the authorities mostly restated or 
elaborated earlier laws.23 A few additional, relatively minor restrictions 
were imposed, however. The kyunin's right to harvest the fields of ab­
sconded villagers was brought under the supervision of the county magis­
trate. Except in extraordinary circumstances, no kyunin or daikan could 
punish a villager without the magistrate's sanction. If a daikan or kyunin 
took independent action, he was to file a full report with the Inspectorate 
(meyasuba) for review. 
In 1624 the domain's policy-makers decreed that daikan and kyunin 
could use only measuring tools specifically approved by the han authori­
ties.24 This marked the first time that kyunin were subject to the same 
unequivocal standard in tax collection as daikan (years after Hideyoshi 
purportedly established a national standard). Up to now retainers had not 
only been using their own measures. Some had even used two sets: larger 
measures when they collected grain and smaller ones when they loaned or 
sold it to villagers. 
The same ordinance required that all kyunin file reports on the aver­
age rate of taxation in their domains with the county magistrate's office. 
The Inspectorate was to review these reports. For the very first time, the 
domain expressed an interest in the taxes assessed by landed retainers. 
Domain authorities had begun to question the kyunin's effectiveness, and 
that presaged more serious concerns soon to come. 
Early-Seventeenth-Century Tax Assessment 
Just as the years spanning the turn-of the century witnessed administra­
tive reforms, so they saw important changes in the domain's tax assessment 
practices and capabilities. The biggest change was to tie tax assessments 
to annual yield inspections. A change in the form of stating taxes came as 
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a corollary. In the context of samurai urbanization, the reliance on crop 
inspections, far from increasing the harshness of the land tax system, pre­
cipitated a decline in effective tax rates. The high rates of the early Maeda 
years were not maintained in the early seventeenth century. 
Along with these changes came a change of language. The term "men" 
used earlier to indicate the portion of assessed value exempt from taxa­
tion, came to signify the exact opposite. For a time, in fact, the term was 
dropped altogether; taxes due were stated simply as "X bales out of ioo" 
("hyaku hyo ni tsuki X hyd"). But once it was reinstated, the sense had 
entirely turned around: the phrase "men mitsu san bu," for example, meant 
"tax rate, 33 percent." This meaning persisted throughout the early mod­
25 ern era.
The first of the domain's annual inspections took place in 1595. At least 
one major landed retainer, Yokoyama Nagachika, adopted the inspection 
system about this time. Not long after, in 1598, Toshinaga spelled out for his 
daikan how the inspections were to be carried out.26 Other regulations, in 
1615, set out the terms for village appeals of inspection results.27 It appears, 
from documents on the 1595 Etchu survey, that the survey crews routinely 
set tax rates on the daimyo's holdings as they assessed the value of vil­
lages.28 Several reports list bothfigures.29 If that was the case, the surveyors 
would have been supplementing the daikan's tax assessment functions.* 
Changes in Land Tax Rates 
The new system did not function at all well. As Figure 5 indicates, soon 
after the system was inaugurated, tax rates fell 10-35 percentage points.1 
Assessed tax rates for 1595-1604 w e r  e generally about 50 percent or less 
of assessed value, substantially below the common assessed rates of 70 
"There is some evidence that surveyors similarly supplemented daikan at this time in 
Kaga and Noto. (See Hakui shi shi, p. 129; Oda Kichinojo, Ishikawa ken, pp. 355—56.) But 
since later documents from Kaga and Noto suggest that they only set rates in the villages or 
parts of villages directly administered by the daimyo, they would not have been involved in 
the case of retainers' agents. 
tThe 1593 data in the figure are from a roster transferring villages from Kaga domain 
to a Bakufu retainer, Hijikata Kawachi no kami, but the actual date of the data is uncertain. 
Though the document is dated 1605, a comparison with earlier records suggests that the fig­
ures are from about 1588 or somewhat later, and not from 1605. In 1604, for example, one of 
the villages, Tokikuni, had tax rates of 28% and 45%, as opposed to the 65% recorded in the 
transfer document, and another, Yawata-shimo, had a rate of 35%, as opposed to 70%. The 
data in the transfer document for Yawata-shimo comes much closer to its 1589 rate of 80%, 
and the reported rate for Innai of 60% is much closer to its rates of 65%, 62.1%, and 60% 
in 1587,1588, and 1590, respectively. The form for stating taxes assessed is also consonant 
with that of the sonmen, not kemi, assessments. Since there were no data actually ascribable 
to 1593,1 have used these "1605" figures for that year. 
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percent or more under the sonmen system. For several decades after the 
switch, tax rates commonly ranged between 10 percent and 40 percent. 
The three exceptions to this trend occurred in 1597, in closely proximate 
villages: Satoyama, with an assessed rate of 60 percent; Tochiage, with just 
over 70 percent; and Fujibashi, with almost 88 percent. They were extreme 
cases, even within their own district.30 As Figure 5 indicates, only three 
later tax rates fell in this range. Table 14 shows what happened in the eight 
villages where "pre" and "post" data permit a comparisoa (both sets of 
figures represent taxes assessed as a proportion of assessed value).31 These 
data also indicate a sharp decline in rates. Although the sample is small, 
statistical tests indicate that the trend it shows is probably representative.32 
The conclusion that tax rates fell after Toshinaga installed the inspec­
tion system is further borne out when we compare die mean assessed rates 
for the years 1582-94 and 1595-16x6 (Table 14). The mean rate for the pre-
inspection period was quite high, 64.7 percent, as against 36.7 percent in 
the first three decades of the inspections. Though one might wish for a 
larger sample than is currently available, there is very little chance that this 
decline is a sampling artifact.33 Furthermore, when changes in tax rates 
can be traced in individual villages, there is no indication that falling rates 
were offset by increases in assessed values. The declines were real. 
A similar trend emerges when we examine the percentage of assessed 
value actually collected as taxes. Though seventeenth-century tax bills do 
not provide information on tax collections, 1634 domain-wide and provin­
cial data can be compared with earlier rates. Both comparisons confirm a 
fall in taxes collected. 
TABLE 14 
Tax Rates for Eight Villages in the Pre-lnspection and Post-Inspection Eras 
Pre-inspection Post-inspection 
Rate Rate 
Village Year (percent) Year (percent) 
Konpoji 1588 70% 1620 45% 
Saihoji 1586 70 1620 33 
Shibuta 1586 60 1627 37" 
Noda 1586 60 1627 36 
Tokikuni 1586 75 1604 28 
Yawata-shimo 1587 80 1604 35 
Wakayamagumi 1587 65 1620 31 
Kawanishi 1587 70 1620* 30 
S O U R C E S : See Appendix A. 
a
 Rounded up from 36.8. 
^Daimyo's part only. 
J82. TIGHTENING CONTROL 
Looking first at Noto province, we find that the average rate fell by 
approximately one-third over the period 1583-1634. The average rate of 
collection in Noto villages in 1634 was fractionally more than 30 percent 
of assessed value, as compared with an average of 46 percent for the 73 tax 
receipts of 1583—92.34 
Since the pre-inspection data include some villages outside Noto, it is 
reasonable to compare them with the 1634 domain-wide collected tax rate. 
This comparison reveals a significant decline of just over 13 points. The 
mean collected rate fell from 46 percent to only some 33 percent of the 
domain's assessed value of 1,192,670 koku.35 
In sum, four different comparisons (of the assessed tax rates of the Noto 
villages for which there are data for both the late sixteenth and the early 
seventeenth century; of the average assessed tax rates before and after the 
inspections began; of the tax collection rates of the sonmen sample and the 
Noto data of 1634; and of the tax collection rates of the sonmen sample and 
the domain-wide data of 1634) all support the same conclusion: tax rates, 
both assessed and collected, declined substantially with the introduction 
of the inspection system. 
Three considerations increase confidence in the validity of this trend. 
First, although the sonmen-era Noto sample is not large, it is large enough 
to provide a reasonable basis for a statistical comparison with later data. 
Further, in reaching the above conclusions the standard applied in statis­
tical tests (the 1 percent level of confidence) is very rigorous. Second, the 
geographic distribution of the early data creates no apparent bias in the 
results. The average rates for Noto (30.4 percent) and the domain (32.5 
percent) in 1634 suggests that the Noto rates were consonant with the 
domain average. Noto's assessment and collection rates can be taken as 
representative of those of other parts of the domain. Finally, the estimated 
collection rates for the Noto sample are based on data that underreport the 
total amount of land tax ultimately paid, giving a slight downward bias to 
tax rates in the late-sixteenth-century sample. 
Not only did land tax rates decline; they also became less uniform under 
the annual inspection system. Comparing the standard deviation for the 
two periods (that is, measuring the extent to which cases deviate from the 
mean) shows far less deviation before 1595 than after. The pre-inspection 
figure of 7.8 is under half the figure for the period of annual inspections, 
16.2.36 
The greater deviation of later tax rates indicates a loss of control over 
tax resources. Daikan implemented tax assessment standards much less 
consistently under the inspection system than under the earlier sonmen 
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system. No explanation for this change is to be found in the principles of 
annual crop inspection. Officials computed the tax at a flat 40 percent of 
the sample yield and converted the result to a percentage of the village's as­
sessed value. Since the tax rate on the crop samples was constant, the only 
variable should have been the size of the yield. Under these circumstances, 
one would expect the variation in tax rates in each period to be fairly small. 
But it was in fact very large, too large to be the result of natural varia­
tion in crop yields. The discrepancy hints of difficulties in the inspection 
process itself. It suggests that tax rates bore a very imperfect relationship 
to yields, and that the theoretical advantages and rationality of annual in­
spections were outweighed by other factors. It underscores the impression 
that frequent inspections were associated with a loss of the rulers' (daimyo 
and landed retainers) grip on land tax resources, a loss of effective admin­
istrative control. From the standpoint of villagers, the new system of tax 
assessment must have appeared arbitrary and unfair. 
Practical Constraints on the Inspection System 
Clearly, Kaga's policy-makers did not anticipate this severe and perva­
sive decline in tax rates.37 The domain's financial burdens remained sub­
stantial throughout the period when the inspection system was used; a 
relaxation of demands on the treasury was unlikely. Though the Pax Toku­
gawa no doubt eased some of the financial pressure, the inspection system 
was implemented a half dozen years before the penultimate battle between 
theToyotomi and Tokugawa forces at Sekigahara. Furthermore, beginning 
in 1591, Hideyoshi required all daimyo to contribute toward two massive 
attempts to conquer Korea and China. This was on top of demands for 
contributions to various large-scale construction projects. 
Ieyasu continued these demands. Like Hideyoshi, he called on daimyo 
to contribute to major public works and castle-building projects. In addi­
tion, many daimyo felt obligated to prove their loyalty by spending much 
time in residence in Edo or keeping family members there (in high style) 
well before alternate attendance {sankin kotai) became the rule in 1635,38 
Like other daimyo, the Maeda labored under each of these substantial 
financial demands. Although the pacification of Japan meant that they no 
longer constantly defended their borders and did not have to replace de­
stroyed fortifications, their financial commitments to Hideyoshi and the 
Tokugawa took up much of the slack in the domain's military budget. 
The Maeda were the first to volunteer a hostage in 1599, when Toshi­
naga sent his mother to Edo as proof of his loyalty to the Tokugawa. 
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They also not only contributed to a variety of public works projects in 
conjunction with other daimyo, but funded some major projects on their 
own/ So though peace may have brought the daimyo and their retainers 
some relief, it is highly unlikely that the domain's expenditures shrank 
sufficiently to account for the nearly 45 percent reduction in assessed tax 
rates or the one-third decrease in collected taxes noted above. It is also 
worth reiterating that this downturn began before the commencement of 
the Tokugawa peace. 
Villagers occasionally rose in protest throughout the late sixteenth and 
early seventeenth centuries, but a fear of widespread eruptions does not 
appear to have been the cause of the decline in tax rates. Protests did have 
some impact. As we have already seen, entire villages sometimes deserted 
their fields in the first decade of Maeda rule, and domain officials offered a 
variety of inducements to entice them back to their villages. Nevertheless, 
the level of assessed and collected taxes in the first 15 years of Maeda rule 
was much higher than after the introduction of the inspection system. The 
limited documentation of early-seventeenth-century protests suggests that 
they were infrequent. 
Furthermore, though the goal was to adjust tax rates more sensitively 
to crop shortfalls and thereby relieve the extremes of village distress, there 
is no evidence that policy-makers intended to reduce tax rates in order 
to staunch a hemorrhage of protests. After the introduction of the annual 
inspection system, desertion appears to have been limited largely to indi­
viduals, not entire villages.39 This was no doubt due to lower land tax rates, 
but failing any other documentation, the change cannot be mustered as 
proof that increased protests forced lower tax rates from the domain. 
To what, then, are we to impute the decline? Since the design was to 
make taxation more sensitive to the impact of inclement weather and pesti­
lence, the authorities certainly anticipated some occasional, temporary falls 
in revenues. What they did not see was that the system was doomed by four 
structural constraints to result in a long-term decline in revenue-raising 
capabilities. 
First of all, effective inspections required knowledgeable inspectors. 
Perhaps the system would have worked under rusticated samurai, but by 
the dawn of the seventeenth century, most of Kaga's samurai made their 
main residence in the castle town of Kanazawa.40 Charged with carrying 
'When Toshitsune's daughter was married into the imperial household in mid-century, 
for example, the domain treasury financed the extension of the Katsura Imperial Villa. In 
addition,fires destroyed the domain castle and much of Kanazawa in the 1630's, resulting in 
extensive rebuilding expenses. 
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out the crop inspections but now bereft of any real knowledge of agricul­
tural processes and village conditions, these urbanized samurai were often 
unable even to identify appropriate fields for sample cuttings. And because 
of the policy of rotating both retainer and daikan jurisdictions, few were 
likely to gain any working knowledge of their assigned territories.41 
The deploying of inspectors to investigate low and widely varying tax 
rates reinforces the impression that assessors were often unable to do their 
job effectively. Indeed, inspectors were specifically encouraged to compare 
the fields of neighboring villages and evaluate general economic conditions 
in considering changes in taxes. These policies aimed to raise average tax 
rates and reveal the domain leaders' lack of confidence in the ability of 
tax officials to set uniformly appropriate rates. They felt that inspections 
were manipulated to deprive the domain and its retainers of the income a 
properly implemented system would have yielded. 
Second, effective inspections required adequate time for implementa­
tion. In Kaga domain the ordinary pressures of time were greatly increased 
by the dispersion of retainer fiefs, the domain's large size, and the urbani­
zation of the samurai. These pressures were exacerbated by the duplication 
of efforts required to tax villages under the jurisdiction of more than one 
overlord. 
Daimyo and retainer fiefs were scattered throughout the three prov­
inces, increasing the time and effort required to complete inspections. Even 
travel between villages in the same province could be difficult and time-
consuming, and it often took as long as a day or even two days when an 
official had to cross into another province. The task of crop inspection and 
sampling was arduous by itself. Selecting three or four fields of each grade 
of paddy to be sampled, measuring the areas to be cut, taking samples, and 
transporting them to a central location for threshing and measurement re­
quired at least half a day for each village.42 Extended travel time between 
sites forced inspectors to choose fields quickly so that they could rapidly 
move on to other villages in their jurisdiction. All assessments had to be 
finished before harvests were completed. Officials simply did not have ade­
quate time in which to work. They sampled yields more hurriedly than they 
would have had to do had they been assigned to contiguous villages. 
Traveling from the castle town, Kanazawa, to remote villages in Noto 
and Etchu provinces alone took as much as two days, further aggravating 
the problem of widely dispersed jurisdictions. Because of the additional 
time involved, less attention was given to outlying areas than to villages 
close to Kanazawa. The relatively greater demands made on villagers living 
close to Kanazawa is suggested by an ordinance issued in 1615. Domain 
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authorities, seeking to clamp down on official abuses, directed their orders 
solely to the retainers and daikan in Ishikawa and Kahoku counties, those 
closest to Kanazawa.* The villages in such areas were subjected to greater 
samurai oversight or interference than their more far removed counterparts. 
Distance reduced control. 
Third, when a village or district was divided among the tax agents of 
several overlords, there was substantial duplication of inspection efforts 
and waste of manpower. Each village appeal initiated still another inspec­
tion. It is understandable that in 1627 administrators tried to limit this 
duplication by ordering daikan to rely on rates already set by landed re­
tainers.43 
Finally, county magistrates and other supervisory officials had no way 
to check for inaccurate or falsified reports. There was no historical or com­
parative standard by which superiors could gauge the effectiveness or hon­
esty of individual assessors. Under a pure inspection system, each village, 
every year, was treated as unique. In general, claims of malfeasance had 
to come from villagers, and obviously they would report only instances in 
which they felt cheated, not those from which they benefited. Only when 
other officials took cuttings in the same village was there any opportunity 
to check for too-low assessments. 
To sum up, it was the shift to this flawed system that produced the 
declining tax rates. As constructed, the system contained no presumption 
of an appropriate year-to-year tax level. It forced officials to assess each 
year's taxes de novo, and they were often unable to justify high taxes. 
The early decline in assessed and collected tax rates was the result of in­
herent difficulties in carrying out inspections. Little or no knowledge of 
agriculture, time pressures aggravated by the need to traverse substantial 
distances, duplication of effort, and the inability of supervisory officials to 
identify inept or dishonest assessors all contributed to the poor revenue-
raising characteristics of the inspection system. As a result, the domain and 
landed retainers could not make the system function effectively, and they 
lost a measure of control over villagers. 
Curiously, considering how steep the fall in revenues was, the domain 
was very slow to respond. Some official patience with the new system was 
perhaps to be expected, and certainly the momentous national events at 
the turn of the century were an important distraction. But the granting of 
much more land to retainers (from 2^5,000 koku in 1612 to 900,000 koku 
*KHS, 1: 288-89. In addition to the misuse of villagers' labor, the abuses included 
charging excessive interest on loans and the maltreatment of runaways. 
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in 1616) and the increase in the number of fiefholders (from fewer than 600 
in 1612 to more than 1,300 by 16x7) may have obscured the dimensions 
of the problem as well. Much of the responsibility for taxation moved out 
of the hands of the daimyo and into those of inexperienced tax collectors 
who worked for retainers, not the domain administration. Toshitsune may 
even have hoped to improve land tax collections by enlarging the corps of 
enfeoffed retainers. By granting more land as fief, he not only would have 
rid the domain officials of some of the responsibility for tax assessment but 
would have transferred responsibility to people who had a greater personal 
interest in effective taxation than daikan. Whatever the expectations, in 
the long run this policy failed to improve the effectiveness of the land tax 
system. 
Early-Seventeenth-Century Land Tax Payment 
Since most of the tax-related documents for the early seventeenth cen­
tury record only tax rates or the amounts of tax rice due, analyzing the 
means of payment is difficult at best. Cash apparently continued to be a 
common form of payment. But other than rice, payment in kind was now 
confined to a few places like the very mountainous Gokayama region in 
Etchu where it was difficult to grow rice or to areas where special products 
were produced.44 
In 1616 domain authorities ordered villagers not to sell their rice be­
fore they paid their taxes 45 This order suggests that cash payments were 
sufficiently common to be considered problematic. Perhaps the authorities 
were cognizant of villagers taking advantage of the annual price cycle to 
sell at the market highs generally available in the spring and then pay their 
taxes late, in cash. The same document indicated that wood, soybeans, 
and other products would not be accepted for the late payment of taxes. 
Another order, issued later the same year, suggests that at least some vil­
lagers used poor quality rice to pay their land taxes (saving the best to 
market themselves); daikan were instructed not to accept inferior rice as 
payment.46 
These concerns were expressed just as the domain began to export 
large amounts of tax rice and were probably tied to efforts to maximize the 
profitability of that enterprise.47 From at least 1589, the domain had estab­
lished a relationship with the Takashimaya merchant house in Tsuruga. 
The following year, Toshiie sent military supplies and rice there. Takashi­
maya handled the sale of the rice the next year (1591), and also forwarded 
the material to the armies engaged in the Korean campaign. But as the 
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domain expanded its export activities, it sought additional outlets. In 1615 
it established a magistrate in Otsu to oversee the transport of tax rice. 
By 1616 the domain was selling two-thirds of its tax rice outside its 
borders. One-third was exported to Otsu, and one-third to Tsuruga.48 The 
opening of the new outlet at Otsu and the attendant increase in the ex­
port of tax rice coincided with orders restricting nonrice tax payment and 
encouraging the collection of high-quality rice. 
At some later point the domain established additional connections with 
trade centers at Wakasa and Obama.49 Throughout the Kan'ei and Shoho 
periods (1624—47), as the limitations of the local markets in Kaga, Noto, 
and Etchu became more evident to the domain's financial administrators, 
these two centers gained in importance. Later, the domain began sending 
rice boats to Osaka via the western coastal (Nishimawari) route.50 Reflect­
ing this increasingly outward orientation, the domain issued orders in 1631 
that rice must be used for all past-due land taxes.51 
This marked Kaga's first formal effort to establish rice as the sole 
medium for the payment of land taxes. It came with the domain's heavy 
involvement in the national economy. The new policy was associated with 
sustained, well-organized attempts to export tax rice, not as a response to 
central ordinances. 
The official period for the payment of taxes without penalty was also 
shortened. In 1603 Yasukawa village was warned that the tax "must be 
completely paid within the nth month" of that year.52 The 1610 tax records 
for six villages in Fugeshi county also indicate domain impatience at the 
taxes still owed from the previous fall. Villagers were ordered to provide 
servants to work as day laborers, to construct new salt farms, or to sell 
their daughters to make good the debt. Annual interest of 50 percent would 
be charged on unpaid taxes for which there was no official forgiveness or 
extension.53 
In 1628 the domain authorities set the interest on unpaid taxes at 20 
percent annually.54 Later, in 1631, they attempted to make interest charges 
applicable even in kyunin lands. Late payments could be made in silver, but 
the conversion rate from rice was to be based on the early-summer highs. 
On top of this, the delinquents had to pay 2.5 interest for each month's 
delay.55 The change to an official deadline reinforced the daikan's efforts 
to collect all taxes due promptly and fully. As villagers sought to com­
ply, and as the loopholes in the tax payment procedures were closed off to 
them, they increasingly resorted to borrowing, contract servant labor, and 
other devices to meet their obligations. The domain administrators issued 
instructions restricting the use of contract labor (1601) at about the same 
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time that official policy first emphasized the prompt payment of taxes. The 
domain's increasing concern with private loans, interest rates, and contract 
labor paralleled and reflected problems created by putting greater restric­
tions on tax payments. This policy evolved, along with the office of bugyo, 
from 1607 and 1608 on. 
Conclusion 
Maeda Toshinaga and Maeda Toshitsune continued to pursue a prag­
matic administrative policy after their father's death, attempting to balance 
the needs of the villagers against those of the domain and the landed retain­
ers. As it became evident that the Tokugawa order was relatively stable, 
and that with a decline in military demands they were now somewhat 
less dependent on the kyunin and daikan, they took steps to restrict the 
discretionary authority of these men. The domain supervised them more 
aggressively at the turn of the century. They were subject to the oversight 
of first a magistrate and later a county magistrate, by now an office special­
izing in rural administration. At the same time specific restrictions were 
placed on daikan and kyunin: their judicial rights were limited, their au­
thority to conscript labor was curtailed, and their decisions on taxation 
were routinely subject to higher review. 
All the same, the Maeda moved cautiously, cognizant of the impor­
tance of the landed retainers to their military organization. The restrictions 
were enacted over several decades, and in the end they did not result in 
a wholesale loss of the retainers' prerogatives, but simply provided for a 
supplemental review. They were designed only to correct the abuses of 
individual retainers and daikan that caused villagers to flee their lands. 
With the passage of time the domain systematized its fuchibyakusho 
intermediaries into a new office, the tomura. But many of the same families 
filled these new posts, and though their powers were strengthened in some 
respects (notably in dealing with runaways) the duties of the tomura built 
on those of the fuchibyakusho. 
Early-seventeenth-century reforms did not bring transformations in vil­
lage structures. However, the provision for the remuneration of tomura 
gave rise to the first legal definition of "villager." Kaga's experience sug­
gests that in some regions of Japan, domain lords continued to avoid heavy 
involvement with village government even in the seventeenth century. Like­
wise, Kaga's land tax system continued to reflect an independent but grad­
ual course of <lcvelopment. The role of the political center there, if present 
at all, was indirect. 
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Although the specific elements of the domain's land tax system were 
not necessarily typical, there is evidence that the generally experimental 
and gradual nature of change was typical of the process in other parts of 
Japan. Rather than stray too far afield, let me note just one example. In 
some areas of central Japan, the early tax system was soon confounded by 
changing yields per tan. This created a substantial gap between the official 
tax assessments and actual yields. Some revisions were needed if any equity 
in taxation was to be maintained. A new system of assessments, called 
domett, was introduced. In general this new system lasted only a few years 
before being supplanted by the fixed rate (jomeri) system.56 Here, too, we 
see a process of trial, error, and reform in operation. 
Like other domains, Kaga assessed land taxes in rice. However, the 
shift to rice was still incomplete as late as the first decades of the seven­
teenth century. Thereafter, the forms of payment were increasingly limited 
(rice and gold). The emphasis on rice payments and the shortening of pay­
ment schedules did not come until the domain became heavily involved in 
exporting its tax rice to central markets. 
With the switch to annual inspections, inefficiencies resulted in a sharp 
decrease in the effectiveness of land taxation. Tax rates, both assessed and 
collected, declined dramatically, and they remained low for decades. In­
deed, the decline in tax rates was sufficiently precipitous to be characterized 
as a crisis. In the absence of domain receipts and expenditures for these 
years, we cannot directly assess the impact on the domain's budget. It is 
certain, however, that domain leaders were aware of the problem, and they 
ultimately, if belatedly, attempted to remedy it. 
Why the authorities did not act earlier is not clear. They may have 
been slow to recognize the difficulties created by the interaction of their 
plans to supervise landed retainers and the demands of inspection-based 
land taxation. Possibly they saw the difficulties as temporary or, in light 
of a more stable domestic order, anticipated a peace dividend. They may 
even have attempted to avoid the problem by transferring more responsi­
bility for taxation to an enlarged corps of landed retainers. In any event 
they were ultimately forced to seek more drastic remedies as the expenses 
of maintaining Edo residences, sankin-kotai, and public works absorbed 
an increasing share of the domain's resources. A recognition of systemic 
weaknesses spurred the domain to alter the inspection process after 1627.57 
Throughout this era we see evidence that villagers had a significant 
influence on domain policy. They were the motor driving increased restric­
tions on daikan and kyunin through their absconding and appeals. Though 
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the fall in tax rates was not linked to an outbreak of widespread violent or 
disruptive protest, village appeals and the threat of opposition were potent 
forces in setting broad limits to domain and retainer willfulness. The result 
was not a mere short-term gain (e.g., a one-year reduction in land taxes) 
but structural changes in domain administration. 
Chapter*} 
Reform, Innovation, and 
Centralization 
Anew daimyo did not establish his authority over a domain merely L by imposing new men and a new superstructure over the existing 
local administration. Tensions and conflicts between villagers and their 
overlords were common. So, too, were frictions within retainer bands and 
between retainers and daimyo (ie sodo). Resolving these problems required 
that domains ultimately create administrative structures substantially dif­
ferent from those of the earliest years of domain formation. 
One principal difference between late-sixteenth- and late-seventeenth­
century domains was the strengthening of their central administrative au­
thority. The landed retainers' complete or partial loss of control over their 
fiefs provides the most striking evidence of increased domain authority. 
Greater daimyo control over the retainer band was already evident in the 
late sixteenth century, and the trend continued incrementally in the early 
seventeenth.1 
At first, as studies of domain formation in Tosa and Satsuma empha­
size, the daimyo sought to ensure their retainers' loyalty by indirect means, 
cementing family ties through intermarriage and adoption.2 But by the mid-
seventeenth century there had been a radical change in approach. Many 
daimyo stripped their retainers of their fiefs and put them on a stipend 
from the han granary. Most retainers in the other domains had lost not only 
their judicial rights but also the right to set tax rates within their lands. By 
the end of the century landed retainers in all but 17 percent of the domains 
had lost discretionary control over private fiefs.3 
 193 Reform, Innovation, and Centralization
There is evidence of greater centralized control even in the areas di­
rectly administered by the daimyo. Domains created new offices, and their 
instructions to county magistrates, intendants, and village officials became 
more detailed. New ordinances circumscribed the powers of local officials 
and subjected their administrative decisions to higher review/ 
Increased control, to whatever degree, would clearly have been impos­
sible without an effective, direct link between domain officials in the castle 
town and the villages. Someone had to replace rusticated samurai admin­
istrators and fiefholders. Though many scholars see the development of 
village autonomy as the foundation for pulling samurai out of the country­
side, village self-government, however essential to local administration, 
was not, in itself, a foundation for domain centralization. By the late six­
teenth century villages already exercised as much autonomy as they ever 
would, yet the fiefholding retainers and the daikan still frequently resided 
in the countryside. For a domain to pull them off the land entirely and to 
centralize control of the countryside, it had to create some conduit for ordi­
nances, some office responsible for carrying out domain policy. To do so 
most effectively, the people who occupied this position not only had to be 
honest and reliable, but also had to be familiar with agricultural processes 
and local conditions. 
In short, the critical development was the creation of a corps of disci­
plined, competent district administrators. These administrators were called 
by a variety of names and took on a variety of duties in different domains. 
Western readers are most familiar with the title djoya, but other titles were 
very common: warimoto, tomura kimoiri, okimoiri, sodai.4 Each domain 
determined the degree to which it vested powers in these commoner admin­
istrators. In rare instances, such as Satsuma, very low-level samurai were 
left resident on the land as a check on rural administration. In some areas 
nonsamurai district administrators were relatively weak, sharing respon­
*At the heart of standard explanations for this development are assumptions about the 
land tax burden on the village. Some argue that by confiscating fiefs and reducing the retain­
ers' stipends, daimyo were able to expand theirfinancial base at a time when the land tax rates 
were as high as possible. Increasing the rates was out of the question, so financially strapped 
daimyo were forced to cut their retainers' income. Others argue that the retainers' excessive 
taxation of villagers caused them to abscond, to the point that agriculture, the rulers' major 
tax base, was threatened. To protect the villages and stabilize their income, daimyo removed 
retainers and took over the direct administration of their lands. (These opinions are expressed 
in whole or in part in Hall, "flceda House," p. 85; Hall, Government and Power, pp. 405-6; 
Sansom, History, 1615-1868, p. 51; Kanai, Hansei, pp. 40-43; Kitajima, Nihonshi gaisetsu, 
pp. 114,117-18; Kitajima, Edo jidai, pp. 44-45; Sasaki, Daimyo, pp. 96-103,111-12,320; 
and Araki Moriaki, Bakuban, p. 77. For Kaga, see Araya, "Kaga-han," pp. 67-106.) Both 
interpretations imply that the villagers were so heavily taxed that their ability to continue 
farming was jeopardized. 
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sibility with village heads and samurai daikan. In others, such as Kaga, 
very strong district administration arose, staffed by villagers who wielded 
the powers of earlier samurai officials. There was nothing predetermined 
about the policy a given daimyo followed in laying the foundations for fully 
centralized administration. 
As we have seen, to centralize authority and stabilize domain adminis­
trations, daimyo commonly pursued a policy of further isolating samurai 
from villagers. The very fact that they did so indicates that the process 
of separation continued long after Hideyoshi's time. It was an extended 
procedure requiring at least a half-dozen decades. The long duration and 
the great variation in the tempo and degree of change accentuate the role 
of local conditions and choice on the process rather than the conscious 
implementation of centrally conceived initiatives by Hideyoshi and his suc­
cessors. 
Class separation in the Japanese case had two basic elements. The first 
was the isolation of samurai from the general population. The second was 
the active definition of other classes. In Kaga the first was well under way 
shortly after the initial Maeda occupation. The mid-seventeenth-century 
reforms, the Kaisaku ho, completed that process by effectively fictionaliz­
ing all fiefs and leaving only a small handful of samurai officials who had 
administrative contacts with villages. 
But this process defined only two classes at best, the samurai and the 
rest of the population. A distinguishing feature of early modern Japanese 
society was the clear identification, reflected in a body of laws, of seven dis­
tinct classes. The four major classes followed the Confucian social model: 
samurai, peasants (hyakusho), artisans, and merchants. To these we can 
add the small classes of imperial aristocrats, religious personnel, and out-
castes. Some of these laws attempted to give visible evidence of major class 
distinctions by governing clothing and housing materials, but the more 
fundamental and enduring ones ultimately gave each class a well-defined 
set of obligations and privileges.5 
Kaga domain's stability permits a long-range view of both the pro­
cess of centralization (with its implications for class separation) and the 
pressures that encouraged it. Developments there reveal that though Kaga 
was typical in the direction of its policies—centralization, class separa­
tion, strengthening land taxation—domain planners adopted some unique 
or pioneering solutions to their administrative problems. In some respects, 
such as the implementation of the jomen, or fixed tax rate system, Kaga's 
policies foretold developments in other regions of Japan. In others, such as 
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the degree to which samurai were shut out of rural administration, domain 
policies were undoubtedly less typical. 
The distinctive aspects of Kaga's institutional growth underscore the 
sense of experimentation and fluidity that characterized early-seventeenth­
century Japan. From Maeda Toshiie's entry into Noto, domain authorities 
pursued piecemeal reforms that slowly drew the domain into more details 
of local administration. This general process was evident throughout the 
country—in the Bakufu territories, as well as the domains.6 Only when 
these efforts failed to resolve important conflicts and problems did Maeda 
Toshitsune institute radical reforms/ The achievements of these reforms 
were long-lasting, and the administrative structure that grew out of them 
formed the basis for rural administration until the Meiji Restoration.7 
Daikan and Kyunin Effectiveness, 1627-1647 
I have noted that 1624 marked the beginning of a retreat from the prin­
ciples of annual inspections as a basis for tax assessment. The concern in 
these matters extended to the imposts of landed retainers as well as the 
daikan's. It was not a sudden new interest, to be sure; Toshinaga had first 
expressed concern with the kyunin's problems and excessive consumption 
25 years earlier. But the 1624 ordinances extended domain oversight into 
new spheres,8 venturing into the issue of how landed retainers assessed 
land taxes and ordering them to submit reports on their efforts. Yet active 
intervention and policy shifts were still three years off. 
In 1627 the domain retreated still further, requiring tax officials to com­
pare each village's tax rates with those of neighboring villages after they 
had completed their inspection. If the village's rates were lower than its 
neighbors' rates, the officials were to disregard the inspection results and 
raise taxes to the highest local level.9 
The "Fifty-eight Clause Ordinance" (1631) even more clearly expressed 
the domain's intention to raise low tax rates.10 Its provisions suggest that 
this was also the purpose of the kyunin tax rate reports ordered seven years 
earlier. Clause 16 states: "In villages where there are differences in kyunin 
tax rates, the higher rate is to be collected. The lower rates are to be inves­
tigated by the county magistrate's office, and if villagers' explanations for 
the lower rates are unfounded, the low rates should be raised in accordance 
*Toshitsune's son Micsutaka succeeded him but died suddenly in 1645, leaving the title 
of daimyo to his very young son Tsunanori. Until Toshitsune died, he served as Tsunanof i's 
guardian. 
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with the high rates." " The higher tax rate was also to be used as the stan­
dard for the tax rates on the daimyo's lands. Where there were no kyunin in 
a village, the county magistrate and the survey magistrate (kenchi bugyo) 
were to investigate and adjust the tax rates.12 
Significantly, though other clauses indicate the domain was also intent 
on standardizing tax rates within the villages and minimizing the differ­
ences between rates charged by the various fiefholders in a village, that 
uniformity was to be achieved only by increasing taxes. There is no indi­
cation that the authorities ever considered that some village rates might 
be excessively high. The ordinances provided only for increased tax levels 
to achieve parity between villages. Clearly, the administration felt many 
inspection-based tax rates were too low. 
Domain authorities, through the county magistrates, were now actively 
involved in setting the landed retainers' tax rates based on domain stan­
dards. They were no longer content with just what a kyunin could achieve 
for himself. Policy-makers had moved beyond simply responding to vil­
lage complaints of high tax rates; the magistrates undertook the task of 
identifying low rates and insistently sought to raise them. 
The 1631 regulations questioned not only the fairness of the daikan 
and kyunin, but their effectiveness as well. The unmistakable implication 
throughout the ordinance: the existing procedures were unable to pro­
vide the tax revenues authorities felt were appropriate. This impression is 
borne out by later complaints that kyunin were unable to maintain the tax 
increases that the domain awarded them after its investigations.13 
The county magistrates, previously empowered to intervene in cases of 
kyunin and daikan abuse, now took leadership in establishing tax rates. The 
kyunin's authority was substantially compromised. They were bounded 
by most of the same restrictions as the daikan and exhibited little of the 
autonomy they had possessed 50 years earlier. 
But even these programs proved inadequate, and in the mid-1630's 
the domain embarked on further reforms. A variety of new circumstances 
forced the senior councillors to take more interest in problems that they 
had been able to discount for several decades. Even if we impute the early-
seventeenth-century tolerance of low tax assessments and collections to a 
"peace dividend" that lowered expenditures for a time, there is good reason 
to believe that by the 1620's that dividend had begun to run out. 
By then, routine expenditures fof both the domain and its samurai had 
risen. The expenses demanded by the shogunate, the Maeda ties to the 
imperial household, and other obligations noted in the last chapter all con­
tinued. And in 1631 Kanazawa castle burned, forcing extensive repairs. The 
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losses extended beyond the domain itself to the many samurai and landed 
retainers now concentrated there, forcing broad concern to raise adequate 
funds to rebuild. 
Furthermore, samurai, now resident in the castle town, found their in­
comes inadequate to their increasingly luxurious life-style. Removed from 
the spartan existence of battle-ready soldiers, they aggressively indulged 
in all the entertainments and social competitions their new urban exis­
tence offered.14 But at the same time the buying power of their rice-based 
incomes plunged. Even ordinary samurai who might serve as daikan or 
the kyunin's tax agents had significant motivation to bolster their income 
through private initiatives. 
One favored recourse, for daikan, kyunin, and subordinates alike, was 
to engage in usurious lending. The resort to this practice suggests that usury 
was an easier way to increase income than raising land taxes, perhaps be­
cause pressure could be applied directly to an identifiable individual.15 For 
much of the early seventeenth century, this was an unregulated area of pri­
vate enterprise. The domain, however, had no such neat device to fall back 
on to raise its income. Indeed, to a large extent the authorities came to see 
these activities as interfering with the collection of land taxes. 
Usury and other signs of corruption did not appear on any notable scale 
until the 162.0's and later, two decades after the great decline in land tax 
rates. The first evidence of widespread problems appears almost four de­
cades after the change to assessments based on annual inspections, in 1625. 
In that year all the male members of the family of Oshio Denzaemon (an 
employee of the domain courts, kujiba yonin) and one of his confederates, 
Kobayashi Shohei, were executed for illicit loan activities that robbed the 
domain of its due.16 Another major case of corruption was uncovered in 
1636 and punished with equal severity.17 
Particularly noteworthy in the domain's efforts to resolve irregularities 
between villagers and tax collectors was just this: that the focus was on 
restricting private lending, not on complaints that villagers bribed officials 
to obtain lower tax assessments. Though domain ordinances first reveal 
concern with the issue in 1615, it was only in 1635 that authorities felt 
the problem common enough to insist that land taxes be fully paid before 
private debts were repaid. The implication of this order was that loans 
interfered with the payment of taxes due, not with setting tax rates/ 
*KHS92:767; Sasaki, Daimyo, pp. 271-72; Misc, "Inaba Sakon," pp. 39-40.The domain 
restricted the rates on the public storehouses1 loans to villagers in 1628, but the decrees did not 
apply to private loans (KHS, 2:565). Other than the standard prohibitions against requesting 
special favors from villagers under inspection, the 1627 and 1631 ordinances offer no hint of 
serious official corruption in the setting of tax rates. 
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In the fall of 1636 a substantial underpayment of land taxes in both re­
tainer and domain lands caught the full attention of officials throughout the 
domain. Toshitsune sent two officials, Okumura Inaba and TsudaKanbei, 
to investigate the daikan accounts.18 Based on the evidence uncovered, he 
authorized steps to relieve economic hardship in the villages and to tighten 
the local administrative structure. These efforts are known as the Kan'ei 
reforms, after the period in which they were enacted. 
To the first end, he ordered a partial forgiveness of loans. The degree of 
forgiveness was staggered, based on the age of the loans: those contracted 
before 1635 were completely forgiven, principal and interest; on those con­
tracted in 1635 and 1636, only the interest was forgiven. In addition, a lid 
of 20 percent annual interest was put on future loans/ At the same time 
the authorities reiterated their prohibition against any repayment of loans 
before land taxes were paid.19 (Lest readers assume that this measure repre­
sented an admission by the domain that its land tax rates were too high, 
note that a domain-wide 3 percent rate increase followed in 1637. What the 
fate of this effort was is unknown, but even if it was largely successful, the 
increase proved inadequate over the long run to meet domain goals.20) 
On the administrative front, Toshitsune made several changes. To mini­
mize contacts between officials and villagers that facilitated corruption and 
graft, the tenure of county magistrates was shortened to one year. To pro­
vide checks on the daikan's activities, the territories they managed were 
intermingled, and the size of each administrative unit was reduced.21 Rela­
tions between these officials and kyunin agents were restructured so that 
all came under the supervision of the san'yoba bugyo, the magistrate in 
charge of the Accounts Office and his subordinate officials, the county 
magistrates. Finally, the meyasuba (inspectorate), who had been given au­
thority to oversee some activities of daikan and kyunin in 1624, now took 
over die county magistrates' responsibility for hearing village complaints 
against tax assessors and collectors.22 
Experimentation 
Alongside these changes, senior domain officials now began experi­
menting with new arrangements for land taxation. There were three thrusts 
to these experiments: imposing uniform tax rates on villages (heikin 
men), setting fixed tax rates (jomen), and giving official encouragement 
"Because these measures resembled certain medieval laws {tokusei ret) restricting loans, 
historians refer to them as ban tokusei ret or "semi-virtuous government ordinances." 
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to warichi. Precedents also were set for domain assistance to distressed 
villagers and to tomura reorganization. 
These experiments help identify the source of the Kaisaku ho reforms. 
At about the time that the Kaisaku ho was enacted (intensively from 1651 
to 1656), several other domains, notably Owari, Kishu, and Hikone (1644­
47), Yonezawa (1652-57), Tsu (intensively, 1649-51), and Okayama and 
Choshu (1648—57), made major reforms. The chronological closeness of 
these efforts seems to argue that Kaga simply modeled its policies on the 
programs of other domains. But there is no direct evidence at all of imi­
tation, and the domain's dear experimentation with similar policies long 
before the Kaisaku ho suggests that the primary impulse for the reforms 
was internal, not external. The actions of the other domains may have 
affected the timing of Kaga's reforms, but their content came from the 
domain's own history. 
First attempts at uniform tax rates (heikin men) for kyunin may have 
begun as early as 1620.23 The phrase "heikin men" also appears in docu­
ments describing kyunin (but not domain) taxation in 1641, a year in which 
fixed tax rates were implemented in villages with averaged tax rates.* These 
changes were undertaken in connection with the instituting of branch 
domains in 1639. That reorganization worked many changes among the 
landed retainers. Those who went to the branch domains had to receive 
new grants within the boundaries of the new units. This created a degree 
of mobility that threatened unusual confusion in both the villages that the 
retainers took over and the old ones that they left. Averaging village tax 
rates and setting an explicit standard limited confusion and helped ensure 
that new tax burdens would not fall disproportionately on a fraction of a 
village's residents. Nevertheless, as Table 15 well illustrates, neither fixed 
nor averaged tax rates were effectively maintained on retainer lands. The 
range of variation in retainer assessments was wide within each year and 
also from year to year. 
Two things doomed this experiment in fixed uniform tax rates. First, 
these measures may have been intended only to ease the transition to branch 
domains and not as a permanent structural change. In any case, there is no 
evidence of aggressive follow-up efforts to maintain them. Second, even 
if these new approaches were intended as permanent, the effort was not 
*Sakai Seiichi, Kaga-han kaisakuho, pp. 184-88. Fixed rates were also imposed on the 
lands of religious institutions. The original purpose may have been different from the kyunin 
case: because the amounts of land involved were relatively small, fixed rates may have been 
easier to maintain. But this was probably later seen as a way to deal with the unpredictability 
of domain and retainer revenues. Since the domain granted lands to religious institutions to 
support their activities, the use of fixed rates ensured them a steady flow of income. 
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TABLE 15 
Range of Variation in Land Tax Rates in Kamiyasuhara Village, 1643-53 
Year Number of retainers Range (percent) 
1643 17 5.7-33.0 
1644 13 16.6-38.0 
1645 11 23.0-38.0 
1646 25 23.0-46.0 
1647 24 22.8-46.0 
1648 12 0.0-40.0 
1649 14 19.6-40.0 
1650 29 5.3-40.0 
1651 30 13.8-40.9 
1652 11 25.5-39.1 
1653 12 25.5-39.1 
SOURCE: KHNK, i: 190-91. 
accompanied by structural changes designed to ensure consistent imple­
mentation. Consequently, all of the same impediments to the effective use 
of annual inspections remained to confound the new system. 
Regardless of the reasons for the failure of these efforts, the domain was 
clearly experimenting in the same spirit that underlay its earlier efforts to 
increase tax revenues: to raise low rates to acceptable levels and achieve uni­
formity. In this sense the program was consistent with past policies. It was 
also consistent in principle with another experiment, spearheaded in Noto 
province by Inaba Sakon, a principal in the Accounts Office (San'yoba) 
and a county magistrate. 
In Noto all landed retainers in Suzu and Fugeshi counties had been 
removed and their properties put under the direct control of the daimyo's 
agents in 1627. From this time the land in each village was taxed at a single 
rate (heikin men). At the time tax receipts for the area had been anemic. A 
good collection of land tax receipts for the 15 villages from Nafune district 
reveals that 1626 taxes, the year before the removal of the landed retainers, 
averaged just over 38 percent and ranged from a high of 70 percent for Na­
fune village, a unique outlier, to a low of 17 percent (also unique). Through 
1634 tax rates remained constant at close to the same levels. From 1635, 
however, the average rates began to rise, just a percentage point for 1635 
to 1637, then up four points, to 43 percent, in 1638-39, and up again, to 
45 percent, in 1640, a rate that was maintained until 1656. Within each of 
these periods, annual fluctuations m collected taxes were generally within 
0.5 percent of assessments.24 In other words, the domain administrators 
who took over the area moved in several stages to reevaluate land tax 
rates, raising them to new highs; and once appropriate (from the domain 
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perspective) levels had been reached, they successfully kept them there. 
This success was made possible in part by a 1633 directive from Inaba 
that clearly identified tax responsibilities for reclaimed land as falling on 
the shoulders of three men who were specialists, not the daikan who super­
vised tax collections from village groups (kumi). These men appear to have 
staffed a new special accounting office called the Gosan'ydba. Although 
the name is similar to the domain office (the San'yoba), it did not carry the 
status of "magistrate" (bugyo). The three officials served under the county 
magistrate's jurisdiction (see Fig. 6), and later this responsibility was trans­
ferred to him. The same directive also clearly placed tomura completely 
under the supervision of the county magistrate and prevented daikan from 
intervening in affairs unrelated to taxation. This created greater special­
ization in their work, too. In these instances specialization appears to have 
brought rich rewards.25 
The Noto experiment provided a model for the domain-wide conver­
sion to a permanent system of fixed land tax assessments.26 It suggested that 
a properly ordered administrative apparatus under direct domain control 
could raise and maintain tax rates. It ultimately provided a context in which 
the domain could confidently promise its retainers a guaranteed income in 
return for the loss of their traditional rights in fief. The principles of the 
Kaisaku ho had begun to emerge through this experiment. 
Senior Councillors | 
iGosan'yoba | 
istrate 
(general affairs) 
Gosan'yoba Daikan 
(reclaimed land) (taxation) (village groups) 
I Tomura 
Villagers 
Fig. 6. The structure of rural administration in Noto, ca. 1633-51, 
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The Noto policies were not quickly exported to other parts of the 
domain. The new arrangements took several years to prove their efficacy, 
and during that time the domain was reluctant to reclaim more adminis­
trative responsibility for taxation from landed retainers. Earlier measures 
may have subjected their administration to oversight, but their basic tax 
perquisites remained intact. Removing them from one part of the domain 
to another was one thing; eliminating their traditional rights altogether 
was quite another. Questions remained, for example, about who would 
specialize in land tax administration, and until such time as they could 
be answered, the reforms could not be extended to Kaga and Etchu. That 
meant continued administrative instability and problems in tax assessment 
and collection outside Noto. 
The third thrust of the Kan'ei reforms, redistribution was viewed as a 
device for forcing a reassessment of the land tax base as well as equalizing 
the tax burden among shareholders and increasing the likelihood of full 
land tax payment. It, too, represented an experimental precursor of the 
Kaisaku ho reforms. But even more significant, it was the domain's first 
attempt to employ a village innovation to further its own policy objectives. 
The immediate stimulus to the adoption of this practice was the reallo­
cating of retainer lands with the creation of branch domains. Concerned to 
keep the disruption in both the new and the old locations to a minimum, 
domain authorities encouraged redistribution as a way to ensure that any 
resulting gain or loss to taxpaying villagers would be spread evenly rather 
than affecting just the land designated by the headman.27 
Administrators subsequently continued to encourage land redistribu­
tion for other reasons. Domain officials were acutely aware that many 
villagers were thrown into debt by their land tax burden.28 Warichi helped 
alleviate that broader problem. But redistribution also served the equally 
if not more important purpose of forcing a reevaluation of the land sub­
ject to taxation. The land surveys preceding a reallocation helped to reveal 
lands illegally kept off the tax registers and changes in the quality of fields. 
Though it might be possible to hide unregistered land from domain offi­
cials for a while, repartition generated pressures within the villages against 
those cultivating unregistered fields, for this was one time when all villagers 
were particularly conscious of tax inequities/ 
Even as the domain began to intrude into and to promote redistri­
butions, it simply built on village institutions. All operational decisions 
"This observation would carry less force (no force?) when one household was substan­
tially dependent on another. Then coercion could be applied to the dependent household. 
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remained in the hands of villagers.* Domain planners were clearly using 
warichi as they found it in the villages, but for their own purposes. 
Land Tax Rates 
To explore the impact of the domain's modified procedures, let us 
divide the 1600—1636 period into two subperiods, using 1627, the year the 
domain first required tax reports from all daikan and kyunin, as a bound­
ary. Though rates were not raised to sixteenth-century levels at any point 
across the period, there was a clear increase in mean tax assessment in 
1628—36. Assessed tax rates averaged 46.2 percent, against 36.7 for 1600­
1627 (see Fig. 5, p. 180).29 
Thanks at least in part to the officials' use of village-by-village compari­
sons, the rates continued to climb over the next decade. By 1646 assessed 
land taxes represented an average of 40 percent of an assessed valuation of 
1,340,000 koku, well over the 1634 domain average of 32.5 percent.1 But 
even after this rebound, the rates still fell far short of the 65 percent average 
in Noto for 1583-92. Moreover, among the villages in the sample, it was 
exceptional for the assessed rates to match those of the sonmen era. They 
were commonly well below 50 percent of assessed value. Consequently, the 
collected rates could not have matched the sixteenth-century level of 46 
percent, either. 
In addition, rates still varied widely (Fig. 5). There was less dispersion 
of tax rates in the second period, to be sure, suggesting that the domain 
had some success in its attempts to standardize land tax rates as well as 
raising them.30 But the difference is not statistically significant, and it is not 
possible to conclude that the reforms substantially improved the consis­
tency of assessments. Even under the modified inspection system, officials 
still struggled to impose uniform tax standards. 
'With the compilation of tax figures in the mid-1640's, the domain appears to have 
reconstructed several hundred villages for its own purposes and this, too, encouraged redis­
tribution. In most cases two or three villages were combined. In some cases villages were 
split. Superficially, this appears to be a violation of the village as a "natural" community. 
But in many instances the combining rejoined branch villages formed in connection with 
reclamation projects with their parent village. The reverse may be true in the case of splits. 
A reclamation project in some very remote area may have so isolated one part of a village 
that it deserved to stand alone because of separately managed irrigation systems and other 
resources. Either case encouraged a repartition ("Shdho san nen taka mononari cho genko," 
manuscript in the Ka-Etsu-No Bunko, Kanazawa City Library). For additional discussion, 
see Kigoshi, "Kaga-han gocho shindendaka." 
tKHS, 3: 208-13. This was despite the fact that the villagers of Kaga, Etchu, and Noto 
had suffered their worst crop shortfall to date in 1641-42. The shortfall had only a temporary 
impact. (Ishikawa ken saii shi, pp. 90-93.) 
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Table 15, presented earlier, well illustrates the disparity that could exist 
in a single village. Three points are noteworthy. First, there was substantial 
annual variation in rates assessed by individual retainers as well as between 
retainers. The period covered, 1643-53,w a s n o  t marked by major famines 
or natural disasters that might account for this phenomenon. The variations 
were the result of administrative decisions (misjudgments?), not the whims 
of nature.31 Second, the taxes were not specifically allocated by the domain 
to individual kyunin. Each retainer inspected the village and then set a rate 
for his portion of the village's total assessed value (kokudaka). Variation in 
rates does not say anything about the individual targets of taxation. Only 
if a village was not able to pay the full amount of tax due would a family in 
default be singled out (probably by villagers) for its failure to pay its share. 
Corporate tax liability isolated agents from assessments on sections of a 
village. Finally, some of the variation can be ascribed to the instability of the 
village's overlords. A different set of retainers taxed Kamiyasuhara village 
each and every year. Under such circumstances, their agents could hardly 
have become familiar enough with the village's agricultural conditions and 
crop yields to know what rate was realizable. 
Land Tax Reform and Centralization Under the Kaisaku Ho 
The authorities' doubts about the effectiveness of kyunin and daikan 
were not assuaged by the slow progress under the Kan'ei reforms. Ad­
ministrative experiments in Noto promised even greater tax revenues and 
more stable relations between the domain's officials and the villagers. Ulti­
mately, the policies developed there provided the foundation for Kaga's 
most famous reforms, the Kaisaku ho. 
The Kaisaku ho combined into a coherent program a variety of old 
domain policies and several significant new ones. Officials began by evalu­
ating earlier attempts to deal with a host of problems—demands on vil­
lagers' labor, the villagers' heavy reliance on high-interest loans, lazy cul­
tivators, ineffective land taxation, miscellaneous commercial taxation, the 
storage and marketing of tax rice, village-samurai tensions, and other re­
lated issues—and then selected the programs that promised to promote 
peace within the domain, adequate revenue flows for the treasury, and 
effective daimyo control over the landed retainers. Where old programs 
seemed unworkable, the policy-makers turned to new solutions. 
The discussion that follows does not attempt a comprehensive treat­
ment of the Kaisaku ho,32 but is confined to those elements that complete 
the processes at the center of earlier chapters: the evolution of land tax prac­
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tices; class separation; and village contributions to domain institutions. 
The centralization of domain authority and the fictionalization of fiefs were 
inextricably tied to these developments as both a tool of reform and an 
outcome of it. Increasing and stabilizing domain revenues was prerequisite 
to shifting the retainers away from the taxation of villages to a system of 
domain stipends. Conversely, removing samurai ignorant of agriculture led 
to more effective taxation and smoothed village-domain relations. These 
processes were extended beyond landed retainers. The new administrative 
and tax measures completely eliminated samurai daikan and replaced them 
with commoner officials drawn from the ranks of tomura. 
In 1648 policy-makers embarked on a systematic reevaluation of the 
land tax base, tax rates, and the administrative apparatus for assessing 
and collecting taxes. Unfortunately, hardly any survey registers survive for 
whole villages from these and succeeding efforts, commonly referred to 
as the "Keian surveys" (kenchi). We have some documents covering re­
claimed land, but that is all. Since this poor evidence for widespread actual 
measurements is an exception to an otherwise well-documented process, 
we should again interpret the meaning of the word "kenchi" very broadly 
as "investigations of the land," not as actual, detailed measurements. 
These investigations were simultaneously aimed at eliminating the 
villagers' chief dissatisfactions and the domain's revenue problems. The 
policy-makers' first solution was to increase the number of county magis­
trates.33 How far the domain intended to go with reforms at this time is 
uncertain, but during the process, it must have found substantial obstacles, 
for it soon embarked on an extraordinary administrative reorganization. 
To pave the way for that effort, investigators circulated among the vil­
lages to inspect fields, yields, and general economic conditions to get a 
better sense of the tax base and evaluate the appropriateness of current 
levels of taxation. Where necessary, they conducted full or partial surveys 
of villages. These efforts alone would have proved contentious, but another 
thrust x>f these investigations sometimes had momentous consequences for 
individual families and provoked several acts of violence. As the officials 
moved through each village, they identified and dispossessed "lazy" cul­
tivators, those who persistently failed to meet their tax obligations. This 
procedure was little more than an intensive application of existing ordi­
nances that had been enforced in varying degrees since 1616, when the 
"plow tax" (kuwayaku) system for raising tomura salaries began the pro­
cess of defining the adult males who cultivated lands as a legal class. (Recall 
that the mere ownership of land or shares was not a criterion; those who 
did not cultivate the land and certain other people were excluded from the 
2.O6 TIGHTENING CONTROL 
tax and full village membership.) It was these men who bore responsibility 
for the village's land taxes. If they failed to pay their share consistently, 
they could be removed from the land. 
Under the provisions of these ordinances, the defaulter was expelled 
from full membership in the community. This meant more than a superfi­
cial loss of status. His lands were turned over to a more capable person, and 
he was now forced to shift for himself; usually his wife and children were 
forced to work for the new cultivator. Not only was the man economically 
vulnerable; he had lost all the rights and the privileges of full member­
ship in the village community. During the Kaisaku ho, these regulations 
were diligently enforced. Moreover, these provisions were now commonly 
included in the instructions that were annually read to villagers.34 
The effort to replace those identified as lazy farmers sparked abscond­
ing, opposition to some domain actions, and various criminal acts, some of 
which we might now classify as terrorism. The entire process of identifying 
the men who habitually failed to pay their share of taxes not only created 
conflict but had the effect of directing much of the villagers' criticisms, 
frustrations, and anger at other villagers and commoner officials, not at 
the domain, its samurai officials, or specific policies. As a result, though 
there were a few instances of protest, usually carried on through normal 
channels of appeal, the domain's actions did not provoke a widespread or 
violent anti-domain protest movement in the countryside. That continued 
to be the case throughout the enactment of the reforms.35 
The actual implementation of the reform program is typically dated 
from 1651, with the first efforts in Ishikawa and Kahoku counties. But ex­
periments in fact began in 1648, with 14 Ishikawa villages as the test areas. 
Here the lack of actual surveys may have contributed to disputes between 
domain officials and villagers. The investigation led to a large increase in as­
sessed value and the villages' tax burden. In the subsequent tax year (1649), 
the villagers paid only half the amount owed. Domain officials entered 
the villages, completed the harvest under their own direction, and took 60 
percent as tax. The combination of tax underpayment and the villagers' 
complaints that excessive taxation was impoverishing them resulted in a 
new investigation in 1651 and a reduction in the villages' assessed value.* 
In the same year (1651) magistrates, accompanied by armed samurai, 
entered 31 villages in the Mount Haku region. There they implemented a 
combination of policies that typified the overall thrust of the reforms: to 
* KHNK, 1: 161. Similar accounts of concerted protest are rare. In 1656 and again in 
1658, Ota villagers opposed investigations, and eight families were expelled (Hara, Kaga-han, 
p. 140). 
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forgive uncollected taxes; to investigate loans, calling lenders to the castle in 
Kanazawa for interviews, and demanding careful documentation of legiti­
mate loans; to dispense assistance as needed, including for the maintenance 
of draft animals; to replace lazy cultivators; and to establish storehouses 
for grain to be lent in emergencies and under carefully controlled condi­
tions. The domain invested 90 gold kanme in this effort, but the investment 
quickly proved its worth: an arrangement that took care of villagers' needs 
for loans at reasonable rates and secured the regular payments of the land 
tax at levels acceptable to the domain. With the successful completion of 
this operation, authorities had a model that could be extended to the other 
parts of the domain.36 
Also in 1651, in the midst of the Keian reevaluations, MaedaToshitsune, 
guardian of the child-daimyoTsunanori, appointed Ito Naizen and Kikuchi 
Daigaku to a new office, that of reform magistrate (kaisaku bugyo). The 
office was created as a special, temporary post to oversee the adminis­
trative and tax reforms. Although only middle-rank samurai, both men 
had extensive experience in agricultural affairs, having worked as survey 
magistrates and in similar posts.37 Because of that experience, they proved 
to be especially valuable in effecting the Kaisaku ho. 
This turn to specialists, borrowed from the Noto experiment, had one 
distinct advantage: it took tax matters out of the hands of officials who 
were a fundamental part of the problems that created the need for reform. 
Toshitsune now assigned that responsibility to capable people with whom 
he had a long and trusting relationship. Their close association with the 
daimyo, the special nature of their appointments, and the specific focus 
of their task further isolated them from the pressures of fiefholders and 
daikan. Their independence enabled them to act resolutely. 
But the success of the Kaisaku ho did not, indeed could not, rest solely 
with a handful of samurai. With rare exceptions, even those most familiar 
with agriculture were too isolated in the castle town, too removed from 
the daily routines of agriculture, and too unfamiliar with local conditions 
throughout the domain to have a firm foundation for reassessing the land 
tax base or land tax rates in each village. Some direct link with each district 
(tomura-gumi) was essential. 
Central administrators found that link among the tomura. As promi­
nent landholders, these men were very knowledgeable about agriculture 
and village conditions in their districts. It was'only because the domain 
administrators succeeded in earning the cooperation of these villagers that 
they were able to replace the daikan and kyunin as the chief local tax 
agents. The tomura's assistance was critical to the success of rural reforms. 
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The tomura who assisted the reform magistrates were a newly restruc­
tured and highly motivated corps of men. A number of tomura, like daikan 
and kyunin, had been charged with usury, robbery, and other forms of 
misconduct, but by this time domain authorities had taken steps to elimi­
nate the men who were suspect and to ensure the full cooperation of the 
rest: in 1635 they had combined the original village groupings of a dozen 
or so villages into substantially larger administrative units—of up to 50 or 
more villages. By reducing the number of village groups, they at once got 
rid of the tomura who were ineffective or corrupt and enhanced the status 
and responsibilities of the rest. 
But the domain was still not ready to rely on the tomura until it purged 
their ranks again, in 1652. Only then was it satisfied that they would make 
an effective link between lord and village, capable of taking a major role 
in land tax and local administration. Most districts were now reorganized 
into units of 50 or more villages; several consisted of more than 100. In 
addition, tomura were transferred from one province to another with some 
frequency. This removed some of the opportunity for favoritism but still 
made use of administrators with a detailed knowledge of agriculture.38 
In a manner reminiscent of the initial appointment of the fuchibyaku­
sho, domain authorities also restructured the tomura system itself. In 1654 
the ablest men were elevated to the position of tomura gashira, or "head 
tomura," with authority to coordinate and supervise the activities of the 
several tomura under their jurisdiction. In return for their services, they 
received a stipend by specific domain appointment, the only commoner 
officials to do so since the fuchibyakusho. Eventually, they came to be 
known as gofuchinin tomura, or "stipended tomura." 
Through a number of devices domain authorities manipulated status 
symbols to encourage the full cooperation of the tomura. All of them 
were called to Komatsu, Toshitsune's residence, for intensive discussions 
with the reform magistrates.39 The magistrates quizzed them extensively 
on conditions in each of the villages under their control and aggressively 
probed their opinions on matters of domain policy. Through these meetings 
domain authorities carefully signaled to all that tomura were important 
officials whose knowledge was respected and valued. More concrete forms 
of flattery were used as well. Indeed, the tomura were treated almost as 
though they were samurai. In 1653 Toshitsune bestowed spears on 14 of 
them and gave horses to four others. Again, in 1654 and 1655, he presented 
the tomura with gifts—this time of rice and miscellaneous items. And in 
1656 all tomura were permitted to wear short swords, an honor usually 
reserved for samurai.40 These actions provided visible signs of the daimyo's 
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trust in his new administrators and clearly distinguished them from other 
commoner officials.* 
Such incentives were not confined to the tomura. Toshitsune increased 
the fiefs of many samurai with close involvement in the Kaisaku ho, espe­
cially the three reform magistrates. He also spent a good deal of time with 
both the reform magistrates and the tomura. Part of that time was spent in 
business consultations with them, but he also made a point of dining with 
them. Since senior councillors, men who were often involved in drafting 
the reform legislation and made many of the decisions on their own, were 
not, apparently, treated to such extraordinary consideration, these acts 
convey the impression that the daimyo deliberately employed his prestige 
to manipulate those most closely involved in the field.41 
In 1661 the tomura system was reorganized again. To this point the 
gofuchinin tomura had continued to administer the village groups they had 
headed before assuming their higher posts. Now the domain selected from 
among them one man from each county to serve solely in a supervisory ca­
pacity.42 These so-called "groupless" (mukumi) tomura no longer directly 
supervised a village. 
At about the same time the domain decided to make the office of reform 
magistrate a permanent part of the domain's administrative structure. The 
office had been abolished earlier, in 1656, when the work of implement­
ing the reform measures, reevaluating the land tax base, and raising taxes 
was largely completed. But events in succeeding years demonstrated a con­
tinuing need for a specialist in land tax administration. After Toshitsune's 
death in 1658, and after the disruptions caused by a serious crop failure in 
1660, the office was permanently reestablished.43 
Throughout these changes in administrative organization and policy, 
villages continued to play a very small role. Instructions to villages did be­
come more common in the 1630's, and in the course of implementing the 
Kaisaku ho, a number of detailed instructions were directed specifically at 
villagers. One typical set, issued in 1655, exhorted them to farm their land 
diligently, pay their taxes dutifully, and dress and behave in an appropriate 
way. But it did not place any added emphasis on village administration as 
an arm of domain government.44 
The one aspect of village self-rule in which the domain did take con­
siderable interest was warichi.45 The reform magistrates and tomura took 
every opportunity during their repeated consultations with village leaders 
'But dose as die tomura were to samurai in their trappings, they were still commoners. 
They and their families were not called on to serve in combat, were not banned from farming, 
and were not allowed to change their residence. 
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Fig. 7. The structure of rural administration, ca. 1670. 
and in the course of their land investigations to encourage repartition as 
a means of flushing out hidden fields and providing local records in sup­
port of their revised assessments. At the same time the domain refused 
to become enmeshed in regulating warichi. It only slightly modified its 
earlier restrictions. Now the process could not be initiated unless all of 
the shareholding villagers jointly requested permission from the district 
administrators (tomura) and the reform magistrates.46 So though the au­
thorities did specifically provide for the continuance of the system, and 
indeed promoted it, they were concerned to see that the system functioned 
in such a way as to maintain some measure of harmony within the villages. 
From the domain's perspective, encouraging warichi had one overriding 
function: to increase tax revenues. 
After the Kaisaku ho, domain administrators seldom devoted much 
attention to the matter. Once the reforms were fully in place, domain au­
thorities stopped insisting on regular repartitions for more than a century. 
The reason for this loss of interest is not hard to find. The intent all along 
had been to change the land tax system to a fixed rate system (jomen). 
When the authorities succeeded in determining the amount for each vil­
lage, the whole issue of spreading the tax burden across the community 
was greatly simplified. The only mafor challenge to the existing pattern of 
distribution would come from climatic changes and natural disasters that 
removed land from production. Convinced that all arable land was now 
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on the land tax registers, and that there was only a limited possibility of 
villagers secretly reclaiming new land, the authorities saw little need to en­
courage what for them had merely been a device for assuring the domain's 
tax revenues. In sum, the domain no longer had clear reason to press ahead 
with its involvement in redistribution. 
The shift to the fixed tax rate system brought with it an innovation in 
local administrative responsibilities and the full fictionalization of retainer 
fiefs. In 1653 the domain began to replace samurai daikan with tomura. 
Within five years the changeover was complete. By 1658 commoners served 
as the domain's tax agents everywhere.47 Their duties, however, were con­
siderably lighter than the daikan's, for the new tax system eliminated much 
of the routine work required under the old one. With a standard rate set 
for each village, there was no need to make annual inspections of crop 
yields in each and every village. If crops were particularly poor, a village 
could petition for a reduction in land taxes, but the general expectation was 
that villages would deal with ordinary declines on their own. Furthermore, 
in the event of above-average yields, villagers would keep the surpluses. 
Ideally, these would be stored against future shortfalls. In principle long-
term yield increases could result in increases in the fixed tax rate (as had 
happened in Noto), but in practice upward reevaluations seldom occurred. 
The elimination of annual inspections saved tax administrators a great 
deal of effort. There were approximately 3,500 villages in the domain. To 
inspect each one annually had required a formidable expenditure of energy. 
Furthermore, since some villages had been inspected by several kyunin and 
a daikan, a significantly greater amount of manpower had been required 
than the village total suggests. Under the jomen system, the domain could 
rely on far fewer agents, men who were more trustworthy and energetic 
than the samurai they replaced, and still accomplish more than under the 
annual inspection system (see below). 
The tax administration responsibilities that remained were still sub­
stantial. Tomura incorporated reclaimed land into the tax system. They 
also assessed taxes on reclamation projects still under development. If there 
was a flood or other damage to crop lands, they evaluated the seriousness 
and extent of the damage. On their recommendation a samurai-led survey 
team would be sent out to confirm their findings and remove land from the 
tax rolls. If there was a serious crop shortfall, they were the first officials 
to appraise yields and recommend lower tax rates. Under the new system 
the tomura's chief concern was maintaining the land tax base and col­
lecting taxes, not tax assessments. Though their work would be reviewed 
by higher-ups and sometimes even by the reform magistrates, front-line 
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responsibility for land taxation clearly lay with these commoner officials. 
When the reevaluations of the reform magistrates and tomura were 
finally completed in 1656, the domain distributed tax bills, called mura 
goin, to all villages except those in the Cho lands. These specified the vil­
lages' assessed value, their land tax rates, and their other miscellaneous 
taxes (komononari). Several years later, in 1670, officials reviewed these 
bills and issued new ones with only minor adjustments.48 The data in these 
bills formed the foundation for land taxation until the mid-nineteenth cen­
tury. Never again did domain officials repeat the exhaustive reevaluations 
of 1651-56 or base village tax assessments on regular inspections. All later 
adjustments in tax rates and assessed values were made on a case-by-case 
basis. Exceptionally dutiful reform magistrates or tomura occasionally in­
creased tax rates on established fields (honden). In response to village 
claims of hardship, tax officials would temporarily lower rates, too. With 
the exception of newly reclaimed lands, authorities calculated all later ad­
justments by adding to or subtracting from the assessed values and tax 
rates listed in the 1670 mura goin* 
Once again, and not surprisingly, when the domain shifted to the jomen 
system, it took great pains to set a high base tax rate. This served both 
domain and kyunin interests. It paid handsome dividends to the domain 
coffers. The rates now reached the levels collected in the late 1580's, before 
the adoption of the inspection system. By 1656 the domain was collecting 
taxes at about 48 percent of the total assessed value. This represented a 48 
percent increase over the rate in 1634, and a 20 percent increase over 1646. 
The jomen system capped the rising trends in assessed and collected tax 
rates that had begun in 1627. 
These rates were applied to the highest-ever assessed values (koku­
daka)—14 percent above the 1646 level for the domain as a whole, and 
9 percent, 13 percent, and 21 percent for Kaga, Noto, and Etchu, respec­
tively.49 Most of this jump in value came from the incorporating of land 
reclaimed over the past several decades into the total value of old fields 
(hondaka). This land had already been listed on the tax rosters, but it had 
generally been taxed at a reduced rate. The remainder of the increase was 
listed in the mura goin as teagedaka, or increases reported by the villagers 
to the domain.1 
'Shinden (reclaimed land) and honden were not handled in the same way. In theory re­
claimed land was inspected annually by a class of tomura with specific responsibility for that 
kind of land, the shinden saikyo. 
t Teagedaka were nominally gifts to the daimyo, offered in gratitude for his assistance to 
a village's impoverished members. 
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Available evidence indicates that these rates were collected with only 
modest adjustments in the years following the Kaisaku ho.50 The 1670 tax 
bills show few substantial changes from the ones issued 14 years before. 
Had most villages been unable to pay these rates, there would have been 
more and larger adjustments in both assessed values and rates in these docu­
ments.51 Moreover, widespread successful petitions for tax relief do not 
appear until the late seventeenth century, and there is no evidence of wide­
spread desertion, protest, or hardship to indicate that the villagers found 
the rates excessive.52 Consequently, it seems fair to assume that collected 
rates were roughly the same as the assessed rates. 
In any event it is clear that the jomen system corrected a serious long-
term lapse in the domain's revenue-raising capabilities.53 Fixed assessments 
halted the erosion of tax revenues that accompanied the introduction of 
the inspection system and brought rates back to a level domain officials 
considered acceptable. It also provided the foundation for the removal of 
almost all routine samurai contact with the domain's villages, permitting 
the full centralization of authority in the daimyo's hands. 
The domain's success in raising the land taxes suggests a need to re­
consider frequent claims that the villages suffered from excessive taxation 
at the hands of the retainers. In the matter of taxes, the Kaisaku ho was 
clearly a turn to stringency, not leniency. Landed retainers and daikan may 
have behaved in an extreme fashion toward villagers, but that behavior 
was not part and parcel of regular attempts to collect more than the vil­
lagers could pay. Considered in the light of the success of the Kaisaku ho 
tax increases, the maltreatment of villagers by retainers and daikan ap­
pears more as a sign of frustration over their own ineptitude than anything 
else. To the extent that increased domain authority was designed to protect 
the villagers, the goal was to insulate them from the willful use of force 
by landed retainers and daikan, not to reduce their tax burden. By cre­
ating greater consistency in tax rates, the reforms also reduced the grounds 
for villagers to perceive their community as having been singled out for 
unfairly high taxes. 
Side by side with these administrative and tax reforms, Toshitsune ter­
minated what independent control the retainers still had in their fiefs. One 
objective of this policy was to eliminate a threat to the peace of the domain. 
The tensions between villagers and kyunin, long the object of domain ordi­
nances and piecemeal reforms, ruptured into violence from time to time. 
Usually villagers (often officials) were on the receiving end, beset by frus­
trated representatives of the retainers. Riots had not broken out with any 
frequency, but the potential was there. The wide variation in retainer tax 
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rates also suggested to villagers that some retainers were treating them 
unfairly. 
The retainers were becoming restive, too. Despite their best efforts, 
many were unable to collect taxes on their own effectively. The variation 
in rates assessed by retainers within a given village was a painful reminder 
to some that they were not accomplishing what others had achieved and 
they might reasonably expect. Furthermore, their cost of living rose as their 
consumption patterns changed to more sophisticated and urbane tastes. 
Declining rice prices aggravated these problems.54 
Finally, although the strategy of rotating retainer fiefs and daikan juris­
dictions had succeeded in preventing kyunin from establishing a base of 
power independent of the daimyo, it had done so only at the high cost 
of administrative disruptions and ineffective taxation. Furthermore, the 
Cho remained an exception to the policy. By effectively eliminating all fiefs 
the domain could at once simplify administration and increase its internal 
security. 
Toshitsune came down on the kyunin in two quick strokes. In the sum­
mer of 1653 he forbade them to deal directly with the villages in their "fiefs." 
Then, in the following year, he prohibited them from sending their agents 
to the villages.55 Except for the Cho, all kyunin had now lost any pretense 
of control over their fiefs. 
Some kyunin opposed the effective abolition offiefs. The factional splits 
among retainers that had surfaced earlier in the debates over how to re­
spond to Bakufu threats had already exposed the potential for resistance 
by even semiautonomous retainers. In one instance a vocal critic was pun­
ished and had to return hisfief. Yet on the whole the transition to the new 
system proceeded quite smoothly.56 
Retainers tolerated these transformations for one simple reason: the 
domain's assurance that it would collect their full taxes for them. (Nomi­
nally, retainers continued to hold fiefs, and their income was still based 
on the villages' tax yields.) In 1654 the authorities guaranteed each landed 
retainer a certain fixed income. If tax collections fell below the officially 
promised level, the domain would make up the difference. Of course if 
collections went above that level, the domain got the surplus. 
Though the guaranteed tax rates did not match the new (1656 and 1670) 
domain average of 48 percent of assessed value, they represented substan­
tial improvements for many retainers. Initially, the guaranteed amounts 
were 33 percent for land in Kaga province, 36.5 percent for Etchu and Noto, 
and 35 percent for Nomi county. In 1656 the figures were revised upward, 
to 36 percent for Kaga and 41 percent for Etchu and Noto. These rates were 
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well above the domain average of 32.5 percent for 1634, and close to the 
40 percent of 1646. Compared with what had been collected from Kamiya­
suhara village in 1649-53, these retainers, at least, clearly profited from the 
new system. But even where individual kyunin had received more earlier, 
the difference was probably not sufficient to offset the two key advantages 
of the new system: a reasonable, guaranteed income and no expenditure of 
effort or money. These advantages made it easier for the kyunin to accept 
the loss of their fiefs and to swallow any injured pride. At the very least 
their discontent was not so great as to cause major disturbances. 
Through all this, though not explicitly exempted from the prohibitions 
applied to other retainers, the Cho continued to administer their lands. 
Despite the passage of decades since Nobunaga's investiture, the unique 
heritage of the Cho lands made it difficult to treat them the same way as 
other retainers. But ultimately they too were brought under domain con­
trol. That conversion was precipitated by an event known as the Urano 
incident.57 One Cho retainer, Urano Magoemon, accomplished what many 
domain lords feared: he successfully built a substantial local power base. 
He secretly used his position to reclaim a significant amount of land. When 
an anti-Urano faction planned a survey of all newly reclaimed land in 1665, 
he organized local tomura to oppose it. As the Cho forces showed them­
selves incapable of dealing with the situation, domain forces moved in. 
Urano was captured and forced to commit ritual suicide, and the tomura 
who cooperated with him were executed (some by crucifixion).58 
Though this incident did not immediately lead to the confiscation of 
the Cho lands, the domain did carry out the planned land survey under its 
own guidelines, and when the family head died in 1671, the Maeda used 
the issue of succession to force the Cho to administer their fief according 
to domain law. The process of instituting the Kaisaku ho began the fol­
lowing year. Final tax bills, equivalent to those issued at the conclusion of 
the Kaisaku ho in other parts of the domain, were finally compiled for the 
Cho lands in 1679. 
Conclusion 
The Kaisaku ho marked an irreversible extension of domain control. 
At the outset of Maeda rule, domain leaders had shown no great inter­
est in the villages other than to assess and collect taxes, fix labor dues, 
and obtain raw materials for military use. The domain's more active role 
in local affairs came only gradually, almost reluctantly, after a variety of 
piecemeal measures had failed to reduce tensions between samurai tax offi­
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cials and villagers and solve problems in land tax assessment. Even during 
these reforms, the domain never focused intensively on the village as a key 
administrative unit, only the district. 
In the third period of domain development, 1627-47, domain leaders 
reinforced the authority of the kyunin and daikan by putting the prestige 
of the domain behind their efforts at tax assessment and collection. With 
the demand for statements of the kyuninJs average taxes in 1624, domain 
leaders first indicated their doubts about their samurai's effectiveness as 
tax agents. Over the next two decades the difficulties in land taxation and 
the abuse of villagers remained intractable. Neither the Kan'ei reforms nor 
other experiments solved these problems. Nonetheless, these experiments 
revealed promising avenues of action, if only the problem of retainer fiefs 
could be worked out. By 1648 domain leaders were prepared to confront 
that final obstacle. 
The fourth period, 1648—72, encompassed the domain's greatest politi­
cal reform. The Kaisaku ho created specialists in tax administration, the 
kaisaku bugyo. Taxes were raised substantially. The samurai daikan and 
kyunin were removed from direct access to the villages. Many of their 
duties were eliminated under the system of fixed tax assessments; those that 
remained were transferred to commoners. All lands were brought under 
direct domain control. 
The domain's policies in the last two periods increasingly reflected an 
awareness that samurai who were no longer resident in the countryside 
could not, by themselves, adequately understand the productive capabili­
ties of the villages under their charge. Domain perceptions had finally 
caught up with the reality of the drastically reduced income of the past 
half-century. For the domain the principal challenge had rested in devel­
oping a cadre of officials who were knowledgeable about local conditions 
and agriculture and who would be faithful servants of the daimyo. 
To create such a cadre, Toshitsune resorted to the tactics that had 
worked so well when the domain was first organized. He promoted a 
small group of able commoner officials who had proved their willingness 
to serve the domain. He rewarded them with samurai-like privileges, and 
drew them into his confidence. He accorded the reform magistrates simi­
lar treatment. These efforts were well rewarded. The tomura and reform 
magistrates demonstrated that land tax rates and the tax base could be 
increased. Daimyo and landed retainer need not inevitably compete for 
limited financial resources. There were other options. 
One outcome of the reforms was the completion of the process of class 
separation. With a few, generally short-lived local exceptions, Maeda re­
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tainers had never been close to the land. Now landed retainers were re­
moved completely from any private administrative control over their fiefs. 
Even samurai daikan were abolished. 
Not only had warrior (hei) been removed from villagers (wo), the cul­
tivator class was given clear, positive definition. Regulations detailing vil­
lagers' obligations were widely circulated and routinely proclaimed in each 
community. By virtue of their opportunity to participate in agriculture, 
villagers were clearly distinct from other classes. If they failed to live up 
to their obligations, they lost the opportunity to continue as members in 
good standing of the village community. 
One element of the reform grew out of village institutions, notably, land 
redistribution. This was the first time since the domain prohibited the sale 
of shares that policy-makers addressed some aspect of land tenure. Domain 
authorities took the initiative only when there was a pressing need to step 
in—the need for greater land tax revenues. It also employed the minimum 
amount of intervention necessary to get accurate tax rolls and ensure an 
equitable distribution of land taxes so that capable cultivators would "not 
be forced off the land. In so doing, domain policy built on redistribution, 
a village institution, accepting it as it was rather than transforming or 
abolishing it. 
In some measure the reforms benefited all the major parties—the share-
holding villagers, the domain, and the retainers. True, small numbers of 
villagers were literally put out by the reforms, and some reacted violently. 
But tax protests were rare and generally restricted in scope or confined to 
proper channels. Where they did occur, they sometimes resulted in adjust­
ments of land tax levels. 
For the villagers, the allocation of the tax burden was more equitable, 
and relief, in the form of domain loans, was now available at interest rates 
that were much more reasonable than heretofore. Intense conflicts with 
samurai officials were virtually eliminated. The cause of many disputes, an­
nual assessments of tax levies, were eliminated, replaced by a predictable 
standard that could be, and frequently was, lowered when natural condi­
tions warranted. The new standard may have been high, but villagers could 
learn to live with it, confident that it would not arbitrarily be set higher as 
under the annual inspection system. 
Landed retainers, on their side, now had a guaranteed income that was 
probably in most cases greater than what they had garnered for themselves. 
They no longer had to conduct their own assessments and collect tax rice 
on their own. The domain administration took full responsibility for these 
duties. 
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The big winner, however, was the domain itself. Its tax revenues in­
creased; two threats to internal security had been removed—samurai­
village tensions and autonomous fiefholders. At the successful completion 
of the first tax collections in 1656, Toshitsune boasted to the Bakufu of 
his success, and Kaga had laid the foundation for its reputation as the 
best-administered domain in the land/ 
A primary motivation for centralization lay in ineffective taxation, 
rather than the alleviating of overtaxation. Evidence from Kaga contra­
dicts the assertion that daimyo sought to increase revenues primarily by 
reducing support for retainers through the confiscation of fiefs. Domain 
revenues probably did increase, but so did the retainers' income, and ap­
parently without any reduction in the number the domain supported. A 
more efficient land tax system was behind the domain's success, not the 
absorption of retainers* incomes. A second stimulus to reform was the need 
to curb the samurai's abuse of villagers and to reduce the chronic (although 
seldom spectacular) tensions between them. 
With the loss of Cho autonomy, Maeda Tsunanori had brought the 
entire domain under his direct administrative control.1 Kaga was now a 
unified small state, fully conscious of itself as a public authority (kogi) act­
ing largely on its own. To be sure, the domain was not in a position to deny, 
at least openly, the Bakufu's claims to act as a larger public authority. In­
deed, to do so would have risked the destruction of political relationships 
throughout Japan that protected the Maeda from attack by other daimyo. 
Like other domains, Kaga acknowledged the supremacy of the Bakufu in 
a combination of ritual and policy matters related to a limited national 
order (e.g., alternate attendance, gift exchanges and marriage, military ser­
vice). Nonetheless, its sense of autonomy in matters of local administration 
remained intact. Although it had arrived at social and political configura­
tions that had much in common with those of other domains, the orders 
of hegemons and shoguns had played no direct role. It had come to these 
results in its own way, at its own pace, and in response to its own needs. 
'Sasaki, Daimyo, pp. 269-70. Sasaki believes that, since this report was made, the 
domain's reforms must have had Bakufu permission. I am more inclined, in the absence of 
confirming evidence, to see in the report support for Gilbert Rozman's contention that Edo 
was a collection point for ideas from all over Japan, ideas that the shogun and daimyo alike 
then considered in light of their own needs (see Rozman, "Edo's Importance"). 
tl refer here to the main han. Its relationship with the branch domains of Toyama and 
Daishoji is a subjea for another investigation, But since they were treated as separate domains, 
they do not constitute an exception to this general observation. 
Chapter 1 Q

Conclusion

The Autonomous Domain 
With the extension of the Kaisaku ho reforms into Cho family lands in 1672, the Maeda completed the basic task of shaping a stable 
domain. Territorial boundaries were secure within an enduring national 
order: the Maeda were bound by multiple ties of marriage to the Bakufu, 
the imperial court, and other important daimyo; they dutifully participated 
in the Bakufu's military campaigns and contributed without opposition 
when extraordinary levies were assessed. The Maeda samurai were firmly 
under control, concentrated in the castle town andfinancially dependent on 
domain authorities. And the rural population had been brought in hand. 
The structure of rural administration and taxation would not materially 
change until the early nineteenth century, and even that was a short-lived 
deviation from the pattern established under the Kaisaku ho. Corporate 
village responsibility for tax assessments and payment was the rule. Lands 
were valued in rice (kokudaka), and land taxes were collected exclusively 
in rice, too. Social classes were now quite distinct. 
So simply stated, nothing suggests a departure from the standard de­
scriptions of this period of Japanese history. But this superficial view con­
ceals the historical energies that achieved many of these results. Some im­
portant developments in the domain's institutional and social history were 
the unplanned by-product of a confrontation between domain policies and 
the practical constraints of local circumstances, but for the most part they 
were shaped by a combination of external and internal political choices. 
In general external influences were strongest in the very first decades of 
the domain's formation and confined largely to matters affecting its exis­
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tence—transfers, war, and the threat of shogunal punishment. Internally, 
policies shared four interrelated characteristics: gradualism, experimenta­
tion, pragmatism, and local initiative. 
External Influences 
Despite the overbearing tone of central ordinances, the pomp with 
which Hideyoshi and the others surrounded themselves, and a semblance 
of effective administration, there was a great disparity between the early 
hegemons' nominal authority and their capacity to effect change in Kaga. 
The aura created by central ordinances was not matched by the reality of 
effective power.1 To be sure, the hegemons were able to make the Maeda 
bow to the many demands they made on the domain lords' person. Daimyo 
had to provide hostages; to live within the confines of the sections of the 
Laws of the Military Houses that regulated marriage, adoption, succession, 
collusion with other daimyo, and lese majeste; and to provide military ser­
vice on demand. There also were times when they had to submit to transfer 
at the behest of a liege lord. Toshiie and Toshinaga's entry into Kaga, Noto, 
and Etchu was a direct result of that process. But for all this, the role of ex­
ternal forces in shaping Kaga's institutions and policies was quite limited 
and never direct/ 
Indeed, on the one occasion when Tokugawa Ieyasu tried to move the 
Maeda from the region, his efforts ended in failure. The success that Toshi­
naga and later Toshitsune had in negotiating with the shogunate to avoid 
punitive expeditions and the loss of their domain suggests that the hege­
mons' authority to transfer daimyo or confiscate their lands was sometimes 
subject to successful opposition, at least in the case of a large domain. The 
Maeda accepted transfers only when the inducements were great. 
The Maeda's transfer into the region opened an important opportu­
nity to increase control over retainers and weaken their independent base 
'Although beyond the scope of this study, the fate in Kaga of two prominent Bakufu laws 
should at least be touched on, the "one castle per province" ordinance and the anti-Christian 
ordinances. The first does not appear to have had any impact. It is true that construction 
stopped on Takaoka castle soon after Toshinaga died, but this was a year before the "one 
castle" ordinance. It is also true that some of the castle's internal facilities were later destroyed. 
TKSS, pp. 805—6, ascribes that destruction to the law, but presents no documentary evidence 
to this effect in a volume that goes to great lengths to cite written support. In fact, even then 
Takaoka did not completely lose its military function. It is odd that the destruction of a castle 
planned to rival Kanazawa and so newly and.well begun has-left little documentary residue. 
According to one local history (Oyabe shi shi, 1: 258), Kaga domain maintained at least six 
castles through 1638. The Bakufu's anti-Christian ordinances, by contrast, do seem to have 
had some impact. But domain authorities clearly used them selectively for their own internal 
purposes, making members of the retainer band the principal targets. None of these men were 
permitted to recant (a standard practice), and all were condemned to death, suggesting an 
ulterior political motive (Hara, Kaga-han, pp. 109-14). 
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of support. It gave them a chance-to reduce the potential threat from 
autonomous landed retainers. After the transfer, Toshiie and Toshinaga 
never let their retainers settle on the land, greatly limiting their association 
with the villages in their fiefs. That outcome could not be claimed as Oda 
Nobunaga's primary intent in moving Toshiie and then Toshinaga into the 
Hokuriku, but it was a significant development that would not have been 
possible at this time without the transfer. 
Regional factors also affected the domain's development. The most 
obvious was the existence of hostile forces nearby. Dealing successfully 
with this threat (in league with the emergent hegemons) guaranteed the 
continuation of the domain. But the successful pacification of the Hoku­
riku, to which the Maeda contributed, had other significant consequences. 
It was a step on the way to clarifying the boundaries between samurai 
and commoner. Many of the members of the local warrior gentry who 
joined the Maeda retainers were killed in battle, and their family lines 
extinguished; the ties of their nonsamurai relatives to the world of the war­
rior were broken. Many of the others, who had confined their efforts to 
local self-defense, were, with pacification, no longer useful to the domain 
as warriors. They had lost their opportunity to demonstrate the skills and 
valor that might earn them a place in the retainer band. 
In Kaga the hegemons' influence in transforming local administration 
and society was generally indirect, not direct. When the shogunate set 
standard weights and measures for the central markets it controlled, the 
domain compradors adjusted to that system of measurements, an adjust­
ment they carried home. But Kaga leaders clearly did not respond to direct 
central initiatives and change its system of weights and measures until it 
suited their purposes to do so. Still, as these examples show, even though 
indirect, central authority's influence was sometimes consequential. 
Internal Dimensions 
Even as models, the institutional arrangements encouraged by central 
authorities were unused in Kaga's rural administration. Local problem-
solving was the driving force in domain policy. In approaching these 
challenges, Kaga took a gradual, tentative, pragmatic approach based on 
independent judgments by both domain and village authorities. These char­
acteristics shaped the growth of domain institutions and societal changes. 
Gradualism. Change, especially at the lowest levels of society, came 
gradually. The slow pace is implicit in the four stages through which I have 
analyzed the domain's early history. 
The first period, 1581-1600, represented an initial settling in. Admin­
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istrative arrangements, policies, and land investigations were down and 
dirty, and the Maeda made only minimal changes in local operations, 
those necessary to achieve stability and a reasonable income while they 
were heavily engaged in combat locally and elsewhere. These included the 
creation of district administration under the fuchibyakusho; preliminary 
assessments of the land tax base; and the flexible implementation of a 
modified land tax system. Daikan and kyunin possessed a high degree of 
autonomy within their responsibilities as tax assessors and collectors. The 
separation of warrior from villager was not forced: it grew out of fief grants 
that permitted little retainer involvement in village affairs and the decline 
of warfare in the region. Local talent was willingly employed by the Maeda, 
not removed to be replaced by outsiders. 
The following two decades, 1601-26, witnessed the Maeda's first at­
tempts to organize a more fully bureaucratic administration, one free of 
the first period's martial character. They placed tentative restraints on the 
daikan's and kyunin's activities in the villages but still accepted the need 
to rely on them and trusted in their basic competence as administrators. 
Toshinaga and Toshitsune replaced the existing system of land taxation 
with a more rational, less arbitrary (in principle) system based on annual 
inspections, made a start on the systematic evaluation of villages' taxpay­
ing potential, elaborated rural administrative structures, and provided for 
appeals from villagers in order to resolve tensions between samurai and 
commoners—over runaways, labor conscription, taxation, and physical 
abuse—problems that, untended, threatened substantial rural unrest. Class 
separation moved a notch forward as samurai were brought into the castle 
town, and the responsibilities of full-fledged villagers began to be defined 
in domain law with the imposing of the plow tax. 
Between 162.7 a n ^ l647> though Toshitsune simply tinkered with the 
existing system in some parts of the domain, intruding into the work of 
daikan and kyunin, implementing ordinances to protect villagers, and so 
forth, he experimented boldly with new, more radical approaches to taxa­
tion and administration in Noto. The domain reinforced the daikan and 
kyunin in their tax collection and assessment efforts, but in so doing took 
steps that expressed officialdoubt about their competence as land tax ad­
ministrators. 
Change in village administration came as gradually as social change. 
The domain relied on the district, not the village, as the basic unit of rural 
administration. It oversaw at least some aspects of the warichi system of 
land allocation, but not until the 1640's did administrators address them­
selves to legally defining some of the duties of village officials. In terms of 
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direct domain administration, they remained far less important than the 
district officials. Especially throughout the late sixteenth and early seven­
teenth centuries, village self-government was largely free of domain inter­
ference, continuing a late-medieval tradition of communal administration. 
Villages chose their own leaders and administrative structures during this 
time. Villages were not frozen as administrative units by kenchi; bound­
aries were routinely adjusted by splitting and joining villages. 
Only the last period in the domain's formation, 1648-72, saw intense, 
sometimes radical reforms. The most dramatic changes focused on efforts 
to remedy the problem of ineffective taxation and to centralize daimyo 
authority. Daikan and kyunin lost their administrative roles; land tax spe­
cialists, the kaisaku bugyo, were appointed within the intermediate ranks 
of domain administration; and commoner offices (the tomura) were elabo­
rated and strengthened. The system of fixed tax rates facilitated all of this by 
simplifying and raising assessments. The formal obligations of village tax­
payers were spelled out in some detail, and those obligations were actively 
enforced. 
The incremental nature of change was especially evident at lower levels 
of society. Rural society exhibited more elements of continuity with early-
sixteenth-century Kaga, Noto, and Etchu than sharp breaks. Local samurai 
who made their peace with the Maeda did quite well. Those who remained 
on the land had opportunities to benefit from the Maeda arrival. Their new 
status as fuchibyakusho, and later tomura, may have been an important 
change, but it was not a wrenching one. Most local samurai remained in 
villages as members of the rural elite, uninhibited by the daimyo's retainers. 
Except for a few short-lived examples of indigenous local warriors, most 
Maeda retainers never lived on private fiefs. Immigrant Maeda retainers 
did not settle in the villages, and likewise did not disturb the existing order. 
Consequently, in the typical village, the control of land and the social 
structure changed slowly. 
The divide between samurai and commoner also developed^gradually. 
Class separation was not an early Maeda preoccupation, nor, in the rural 
areas, did it take the form of an explicit policy orientation. Even such legal 
strictures as Hideyoshi's Sword Hunt and Class Separation edicts appear 
ancillary to the process of class separation, not central. Domain survey 
procedures were incapable of identifying villagers as a class distinct from 
samurai. Castles did not belong to landed retainers, but to the daimyo. 
Peace allowed the Maeda to vacate small, relatively vulnerable fortresses 
and gradually consolidate samurai in a few large ones. The kyunin's already 
limited administrative rights were further limited by their absentee status 
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and the frequent changes in and scattered locations of their jurisdictions. 
Their administrative rights did not involve tasks that threatened the posi­
tion of locally powerful and wealthy families/ 
In granting fiefs, the Maeda took care from the start to insulate im­
migrant retainers from the indigenous population, coopting prominent 
local residents to serve as intermediate conduits to the villages. These local 
farmer-warriors were not arbitrarily de-classed. Their military duties were 
eliminated gradually as battles moved away from the domain and their 
civilian administrative obligations took precedence. Although a sword 
hunt was carried out in southern Kaga in 1587,* there is no evidence of 
any effort to disarm commoners in the parts of Kaga province then under 
Maeda control. The continued semi-samurai status of the fuchibyakusho 
and tomura was also revealed by the domain's requirement immediately be­
fore Sekigahara that they present themselves as hostages during the crises, 
just as landed retainers had to provide hostages. 
The Maeda took more than three decades to evince any interest at all in 
the villagers' land use rights. The domain's simple survey procedures were 
useless as tools for defining tenure or redistributing local wealth. Villagers 
alone defined tenurial rights at this time. The domainfinally took one small 
step in this direction in 1615, when it prohibited the sale of land use rights. 
(The shift from assessing corvee to a cash labor tax based on land rights 
was likely the stimulus for this change.) But otherwise it left these issues 
entirely in the hands of villagers until the 1630's. Even when it did become 
involved, it did so only minimally, confining its influence to systematizing 
potentially disruptive aspects of warichi and encouraging its use. 
Experimentation. Throughout Kaga's first century the daimyo and his 
advisers tested diverse mechanisms for accomplishing typical daimyo goals 
—securing control of retainers, subjects, and the economic resources of 
the domain. Whether in local administration, land taxation, or retainer 
control, Maeda Toshitsune ultimately incorporated the most successful 
experiments in the Kaisaku ho reforms. 
Land investigations represent a case in point. Early Kaga documents 
reveal unsettled principles for valuing land. Variations in land registra­
tion were evident between Toshiie and Toshinaga, and even within each 
'Within the existing local order, however, as representatives of the villages and districts, 
the village elites might be the object of tax officials* wrath and physical abuse. 
tThe place where this sword hunt was said to have occurred, Enuma kori, was then 
under the control of Yamaguchi Munenaga and Niwa Nagashige. Furthermore, as often as 
this document (reproduced in Kodama et al., Shiryo ni yoru Nihon, pp. 38-39) is cited as 
evidence that the policy of disarming commoners succeeded, most references fail to mention 
that it concludes with a note that townsmen were still permitted to carry swords. 
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domain. Experimentation was evident until the Keicho-Genna surveys. 
The demands of defense and related pressures prompted a conservative 
use of land investigations, in which the Maeda accepted a less rigorous 
estimate of taxable land and patiently relied on other devices to provide a 
reasonably complete picture of the tax base: the encouragement of warichi, 
enticements to villagers to inform authorities of unregistered land, repeated 
reviews of documents, and interviews with village and district officials. 
In the 1630's Toshitsune tested the policy of encouraging the warichi 
system. In addition to revealing unregistered land, the aim was to provide 
some measure of fairness in the allocation of land taxes, and thereby maxi­
mize the chances for each shareholding family to avoid bankruptcy and to 
continue as active taxpayers. Based on the results, he relied much more 
heavily on that policy during the Kaisaku ho reforms. 
As land taxation passed through three distinct forms of assessment, son-
men, kemi, and jomen, the domain experienced widefluctuations in its tax 
revenues. Even within one system, there was experimentation. Throughout 
the first decades there was considerable experimentation andflexibility in 
the grace period allowed villagers in paying taxes, the forms of acceptable 
tax payment, and the practices of forgiveness. Not until national stability 
was within sight could the daimyo devote attention to more systematic 
efforts at standardization. 
Local administrative arrangements passed through several different 
configurations. While villages were allowed to go pretty much their own 
way, Toshinaga and Toshiie progressively enlarged, elaborated, and 
strengthened the authority of district administrators, first exploring their 
use as replacements for the landed retainers' and the daimyo's own samurai 
tax agents in Noto, and then extending the policy throughout the domain. 
At a somewhat higher level of administration, the domain's temporary ap­
pointment of a small, energetic coterie of samurai specialists (the kaisaku 
bugyo) in agricultural administration ultimately provided the foundation 
for a permanent transformation of rural administration. 
Pragmatism. In all these matters the Maeda struck a balance between 
the benefit and the costs of each action, be it further involvement in local 
affairs or potential conflict with the Shogun. This pragmatism showed 
in their decisions to negotiate and explain the domain's position when 
its loyalty was questioned and to cement their ties to the hegemons with 
marriages and hostages. While some retainers' arguments for directly chal­
lenging Bakufu authority to protect the daimyo's traditional prerogatives 
may have appealed to the Maeda's pride, they wisely resisted them. 
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Kaga's land investigations and land tax system are filled with pragmatic 
trade-offs. A certain laxness in the early surveys was the price the daimyo 
paid to maintain the cooperation of his new subjects while his samurai 
were still heavily engaged in military activities. Even during later actual 
measurements, procedures were kept as simple as possible, procedures in 
which the marginal increase in accuracy was considered insufficient to 
merit additional efforts at precision. 
Similarly, the early flexibility in the tax system was clearly an expedient. 
Although some tax revenues were lost, leeway in the timing and form of 
payment minimized the risk of seriously alienating taxpaying villagers. It 
may also have made it possible to manage tax assessments and collections 
with less manpower at a time when samurai were needed at the battlefront 
as much as or more than they were needed as administrators. 
Landed retainers also had to be tolerated until the daimyo's military de­
pendence on them lessened. Under these circumstances the domain pursued 
a policy of reviewing their activities in civil administration and providing 
for appeals and minimal restrictions on them. Only when peace made them 
less essential and when they could be provided with attractive alternatives 
to fiefholding did Toshitsune move to abolish their effective control of fiefs. 
Local Initiative. The importance of local initiative represents the final 
characteristic of Kaga's development. Local initiative has dual dimensions. 
First, of course, it involves the steps the domain administration introduced 
on its own. But local initiative was also manifested in the positive con­
tributions of important individual villagers and village taxpayers acting 
as corporate units. In addition, there were instances in which the simple 
overlapping of domain and village interests furthered a policy or set of 
policies. 
Even as late as the seventeenth century, the domain's concessions and 
skillful negotiating with the Bakufu did not quell the sense that the daimyo 
shared with the shogun a legitimate claim to represent public authority 
(kogi). Certainly many of the domain's policy initiatives were taken inde­
pendent of the Bakufu, and several, like the establishing of fixed land tax 
rates (jomeri), the restricting of the sale of land use rights, and the pro­
hibiting of the sale of people, predated similar Bakufu ordinances. Kaga's 
methods and use of land surveys were distinctive. Despite the imperious 
ring to Hideyoshi's land survey orders, they had no impact in the Maeda 
domains on the methods by which land value was calculated and expressed 
or on land tenure. The use of rice as the sole proper form of land tax 
payments was correlated with changes in the ways in which the domain 
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disposed of its tax goods: the increased reliance on national markets to get 
the best price for its rice. Likewise, the domain's willingness to rid its ad­
ministrative ranks of samurai daikan and transfer their responsibilities to 
commoner officials reflects an independent bent unencumbered by a strict 
sense of what work was proper only for samurai. The domain's emphasis 
on districts and its decision to place more and more responsibility in the 
hands of commoner leaders suggest an openness to creative approaches 
to administration. The tactics of change employed throughout the decades 
of domain formation reflect a general tendency to promote or strengthen 
the position of able men regardless of social origin, gradually reducing the 
number of rural administrative officials to achieve greater reliability and 
control. 
Villagers, at least collectively, initiated their own administrative poli­
cies, upon some of which the domain built. They did not just react in 
protest to domain initiatives. Village political structures and the methods of 
choosing officers were determined without reference to any explicit domain 
policy throughout the period we have analyzed. Land tenure was first and 
foremost a matter for villagers to determine, and the warichi system they 
developed became a significant element in domain policy. Commoner offi­
cials even took a leading role in shaping and carrying out the Kaisaku ho 
reforms. 
Interestingly, in those areas where historians do not insist on the effi­
cacy of hegemonic directives, there is a tendency to emphasize the ability 
of daimyo to impose their own agenda on commoners and retainers.2 It is a 
truism that law gains the greatest compliance when the population it affects 
subscribes to its content. In a world without mechanized transportation 
and mass communication, this is particularly so. In seventeenth-century 
Kaga, at least, successful policies affecting villagers were those that repre­
sented a confluence of domain, retainer, and village interests. From one 
perspective, land taxation is an excellent case in point. 
Since land measurements were inexact and crop sampling did not yield 
consistent results, villagers and retainers alike grew increasingly discon­
tented. In the villagers' case, the discontent expressed itself in desertion and 
complaints filed through the domain's administrative hierarchy. To many 
of them land tax assessments appeared arbitrary. Opposition (such as it 
was) to surveys and inspections in no small part came because the results 
were demonstrably unreliable, not because they were harsh in themselves. 
The fact that nearby villages of comparable agricultural yields were taxed 
at substantially lower rates or had lower assessed values gave rise to resent­
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ment. In this sense the capricious nature of land taxation at least as much 
as its absolute weight contributed to tensions within the domain. The lack 
of consistency and verifiability also increased the potential for extortion by 
survey officials. 
Many of these problems frustrated the tax agents and their superiors, 
too. Inconsistency in results suggested to them that they were being cheated 
of their rightful share of crops. As the expenses of urban living rose and 
income remained unpredictable, these anxieties grew. One result was the 
physical abuse of villagers. 
Despite the superficial rationality of annual inspections, they conflicted 
with the domain's policies for controlling its subordinate officials and 
landed retainers. The distance between the castle town and the villages to 
be taxed made inspections difficult, and the dispersal of fiefs and daikan 
jurisdictions and frequent changes of jurisdiction prevented tax assessors 
from learning the productive capabilities of the land in their charge. Samu­
rai urbanization compounded the problem by denying assessors any real 
understanding of agriculture. The system was a spectacular failure. 
If the failure had been less impressive, one wonders if the impetus to 
remove samurai from all contact with the land (as retainer or daikan) 
would have been as strong or resulted in as forceful a policy as the Kaisaku 
ho. All participants in the land tax system, administrators and subjects 
alike, desired improvements. The question was how to break the cycle of 
frustration. After much consideration, a new policy was developed that 
was successful precisely because it contained significant advantages for all 
major players. Taxpayers benefited from more predictable, more stable, 
and perhaps even more equitable taxes. They gained security from the 
domain program to provide regular relief in the event of significant crop 
shortfalls. The elimination of annual assessments and a sharp reduction 
in samurai-villager contacts cleared away major bones of contention be­
tween the two groups. Landed retainers got more stable income with less 
effort. The domain gained higher, more predictable revenues and greater 
internal security. Regardless of the "fairness" of taxes under the Kaisaku 
ho (as measured by any standard; there were always unhappy individuals), 
taxpaying villagers could learn to live with them—and live with them they 
did, for two centuries. 
Other successful policies for the rural sector also embodied the desire 
of villagers (or at least influential*villagers) to protect their own inter-' 
ests.3 Indeed, the stimulus for these policies came from the villagers them­
selves—through desertion or formal complaints about disruptions to their 
livelihood. Warichi is the most long-lasting example, but many villagers' 
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interests also overlapped with those of the domain, a fact that encour­
aged administrators to take steps to prevent tax assessors' abuses. Such an 
overlap in interests was not simply incidental or ancillary. Whether in the 
context of domain or national policies, it was an essential condition for the 
success of policies that would affect villagers' lives. 
As these examples all illustrate, the relationship between daimyo ad­
ministration and domain subjects was more important than that between 
daimyo^and hegemon in shaping the development of Kaga domain. Nor 
was the influence of local forces a matter of active protests, as descriptions 
of the anti-survey activities in Tohoku, Higo, Yamashiro, and Omi tend to 
portray the matter.4 In our review of developments in Kaga, violent oppo­
sition (and even nonviolent varieties such as absconding) appear to have 
been infrequent and were most notable during the Kaisaku ho reforms, not 
the early decades of the domain. The variant systems and distinctive pace 
of change in Kaga resulted from the fact that more subtle interactions of 
the domain, its retainers, and villages were the primary foci of policy. 
The Broader Context 
At the outset of this study, I noted a tendency to analyze state-society 
relations in an either-or framework: a given state is either strong or weak. 
But that dichotomy leads to some confusion. The problem created by the 
lack of a middle ground is nicely illustrated in Immanuel Wallerstein's de­
scription of sixteenth-century Europe. He sees the emergence of strong 
states then as "an essential component of the development of modern capi­
talism." To build their position, these states employed "bureaucratization, 
monopolization of force, creation of legitimacy, and homogenization of 
the subject population." They also employed "absolutism" as one device 
for reinforcing their authority. But Wallerstein goes on to assert that "the 
powers of the monarch were in fact quite limited, not only in theory but 
in reality. [Even] the strongest states in the sixteenth century were hard 
pressed to demonstrate clear predominance within their frontiers of the 
means of force, or command over the sources of wealth, not to speak of 
primacy of the loyalty of their subjects."5 These "absolutist" states were 
"strong" only relative to their predecessors. Even as Wallerstein makes the 
limitations of the state dear, he is still confined to describing it as "strong." 
Two specific examples bear out the vulnerability of this characteriza­
tion. 
Contemporaneous with the object of our study, the tsar of Russia man­
aged a military middle service class. This class was the creation of the tsars 
2 3° Conclusion 
and continued to perform regular military duties for them through the 
seventeenth century. They were routinely called to annual reviews, frontier 
patrol, and defensive siege service. They were remunerated with income 
from specifically designated service lands, but initially they did not directly 
manage those lands or collect the income from them. The service lands 
were small, supporting several dozen households at most, and widely scat­
tered. There were approximately Z5,ooo of these military servitors. They 
may not have been fully professional in the modern sense, but they were 
career and lifetime soldiers, dependent on the tsar. 
Over the years a combination of the crown's political and military needs 
and their own economic circumstances gave the members of this class lever­
age to turn the lands from which they gained income into personal estates, 
with the central government gradually (and at its own expense) increas­
ing the group's control over the local villagers to the point of ultimately 
tying them to the land as serfs. In effect the state .bargained for the con­
tinued support of the members of the middle service class by strengthening 
their economic and political position. The process took more than two cen­
turies, but in the end firm pressure from one segment of society allowed 
it to overcome its institutional limitations and decisively influence policy. 
In so doing, it not only furthered its own position within the state, but 
also altered the state's policy toward a very large proportion of its subjects. 
Furthermore (and in a direct parallel to Japan's early hegemons), it is note­
worthy that in the process of this change, a number of laws were issued 
that were never enforced/ 
John Rule describes a similar, if less grand, confounding of bureaucratic 
professionalism in France, one that had a more beneficial outcome to the 
state. The late-seventeenth-century secretary of state had two distinctively 
different duties. Under the authority of his own office, he issued written 
opinions. But in addition, he "modified, supplemented, tempered, and ex­
plained the will of the [sovereign]." Two sources of authority, one bureau­
cratic and the other based on personal ties to the king, were combined in 
the duties of a single office. One of the secretary's specific responsibilities 
was to rule on pleas associated with feudal privileges. Instead of using this 
power to investigate claims impartially, the incumbents employed it as a 
device to reward government functionaries (commis). Most of those whose 
privileges were denied were les grandes and ministers' families, which is to 
'There are several Russian parallels to the tactics employed by daimyo and hegemons 
to shore up the state's authority: dispersal of the lands from which the service classes de­
rived income, the use of land surveys, and the legal separation and identification of social 
classes, for example. More explicit and detailed comparisons would be interesting. See Hellie, 
Enserfment. 
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say, those who might challenge the king. Judicial authority in these matters 
was not independent of the king or objectively rendered. It was marshaled 
to strengthen the position of the people who assisted the king in the exer­
cise of his authority, and it was dependent on his personalistic feudal role 
as dominant seigneur.6 
These two examples are by no means unique. In many other instances a 
bureaucracy of sorts was in place, but had yet to becomefirst and foremost a 
loyal, effective servant of the emerging state. Venality of office, tax-farming, 
and other practices remind us that competent bureaucratic structures and 
instruments of control were in the process of development. To build their 
power, state leaders struck compromises with various elements of society, 
playing one against another, and often buying cooperation outright. Kings 
touted absolutism and argued that they should not be confined by law. 
They created as much of an atmosphere of supreme authority as they could, 
but as in Japan, the reality fell substantially short of the claim. 
Despite some important institutional differences, both Japan and the 
"absolutist" states of Europe were engaged in very similar processes— 
establishing domestic peace, increasing the viability of the emergent state, 
bolstering its effectiveness through the manipulation of other political 
actors, creating new institutional controls, and proclaiming ideologies of 
absolute authority. In both cases the state did not possess the powerjto 
back up its claim to absolute and undivided sovereignty. 
Absolutist states and Japan appear to share a configuration of nominal 
authority and capability that is intermediate between "strong" and "weak" 
states. Both were stronger than the political organizations that preceded 
them, but they still depended heavily on other political actors who were 
not formally part of the government. It is in just this kind of configuration 
that making a distinction between nominal authority and state capability is 
most useful. Arranging the potential interactions of these concepts in a grid 
defines four basic forms of state-society interaction (Fig. 8). This arrange­
ment incorporates the need for some assessment of the breadth of authority 
in both categories while focusing attention on the quality of state-society 
relations through the interaction of the two.* It is not bound by an a priori 
definition of certain structures, such as a bureaucracy or central taxation, 
as indicative of strength. 
'Some element of relativity is unavoidable in comparing states. Joel Migdal notes at the 
outset of his work Strong Societies and Weak States that political scientists have had difficulty 
creating a measure of state strength. Until such time (if ever) one is successfully developed, 
comparisons may have to be between well-defined areas of state activity (e.g., police and mili­
tary matters, land reform or tenure, education). A state may be strong in one area and weak 
in another. In each area, however, the standard of comparison must be clearly specified. 
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Fig. 8. Interaction of the nominal authority and capability of a state. 
The basic characteristics of "strong" and "weak" states were intro­
duced earlier and require no further discussion. Here I wish to concentrate 
on the two other configurations to suggest the potential range of intermedi­
ate options. 
One configuration, possessing a relatively narrow range of legitimate 
activities, may be able to carry out the state's objectives effectively within 
that scope. These 1 consider "minimalist" states. This description does 
not necessarily suggest a state in decline. The state may capitalize on its 
strengths to expand its generally accepted range of authority. For example, 
a state whose primary function is limited to defense might effectively pro­
tect itself from invaders, but it may also employ the pressure of defense 
needs to expand its legitimate scope of domestic activity. It demands con­
cessions from other political actors and greater control of economic and 
other resources on the pretext of protecting all. Minimalist configurations 
are an apt description of the successful late-fifteenth- and early-sixteenth­
century daimyo. Initially their authority was limited to the lands under 
their direct control except in the areas of defense and diversity disputes 
between different jurisdictions, retainers, villages, or towns. Many of the 
larger among them (like counterparts in Europe) employed pressures of de­
fense and the fruits of war to expand their control of their retainers.7 Where 
they did not reduce the proportion of domain land granted as fiefs, they 
dismantled traditional retainer autonomy (funyuken) and expanded their 
control of financial resources in retainer fiefs, enabling them to support 
larger, more dependable salaried armies. 
In the remaining configuration, the state has a relatively wide gener­
ally recognized, legitimate scope of action, but little capacity to impose its 
policies or to carry out the functions society nominally expects it to ful­
fill. It is this configuration that I believe best fits early modern Japan (and 
perhaps sixteenth-century European states as well).8 Since the state's reach 
exceeds its grasp in this configuration, I think of these as "flamboyant" 
states. Because the divergence between nominal authority and capability 
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is substantial, it is tempting to think of the flamboyant configuration as 
representing a weak, failed effort at state formation. The state is unable 
to fill some roles established for it. But this is not necessarily the only 
possibility. In building a configuration in which nominal authority is well 
developed before capabilities, state leaders potentially lay a foundation for 
the expansion of those capabilities or employ displays of the state's nominal 
authority to serve important symbolic functions—for example, reinforcing 
an image of common nationhood or destiny, a role cultivated by the Toku­
gawa shoguns and a traditional function of the emperor throughout much 
of Japanese history. 
Some may have reservations about the use of the term "flamboyant" 
as connoting a general lack of substance behind an ostentatious facade. I 
think the discussion so far makes it clear that I do not wish to suggest this. 
In addition, the term implies a showiness that may not always be present, 
but in the case of early modern Japan, all the pomp that the term implies 
was present—and fully marshaled on behalf of the hegemons in the politi­
cal use of Noh drama, monumental castle architecture, and tea ceremonies, 
among many examples.9 Furthermore, there is a highly bombastic tone to 
many ordinances. Hideyoshi, for example, threatened to pursue daimyo 
into their castles and kill them if they did not survey each field according 
to his wishes—a threat he never followed through on in even the most 
egregious cases.10 Many early modern European courts employed the same 
kind of ostentation to similar political effect. 
Japan 
With this tension between nominal authority and state capability in 
mind, the preceding chapters used Kaga domain's history to examine some 
of the common interpretations of the relationship between the villages, 
domains, and hegemons who created the early modern political order. As 
indicated along the way, Kaga was not an isolated example of the failure of 
central authorities to effect their will. Even where developments in Kaga 
seem unusual or unfamiliar, they have exact counterparts or analogues in 
other parts of Japan. 
Neither the case of Kaga nor these other examples, alone or together, 
can provide a definitive reinterpretation of the birth of early modern Japan. 
Broadly stated, our journey through Kaga domain's history raises questions 
about the effectiveness of central political authority as the self-conscious 
architect of the political, social, and economic transformations that marked 
the transition to early modern Japan. It suggests possible patterns that bear 
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further investigation. At the local level, the following propositions might 
be tested fruitfully: 
1. Political and social changes were gradual; domain authorities took 
an interest in village affairs only as expanding regional and national sta­
bility freed them from defense concerns and afforded them a secure place 
in the early modern order. 
2. Domain administrators experimented a great deal with local admin­
istrative institutions and policies, making their own choices about which 
problems to tackle first and how to resolve them. Through this process, 
the interaction between existing community powers and the domain led 
to different patterns of rural administration throughout Japan/ More than 
policies conceived by Hideyoshi and his successors, local factors and late-
medieval village institutions continued to shape domain and communal 
development well into the seventeenth century. In Kaga this meant build­
ing on the legacy of the Ikko ikki, but other parts of Japan gave rise to 
widespread analogues through which commoners contributed to the Toku­
gawa settlement.11 When a daimyo moved into a new territory, continuity 
in village elites was common, if not universal.12 
3. Through much of the early period, villages and commoners retained 
a substantial degree of local administrative autonomy and therefore had 
the opportunity to contribute to the institutional foundations and policies 
of domains. This was reflected especially in village administrative organi­
zation and the definition of land use rights. 
4. The administrative roles assigned to samurai, the final degree and 
form of domain centralization, and the balance among the mechanisms 
through which centralization was accomplished (e.g., samurai urbaniza­
tion, the confiscation of fiefs, increased domain oversight) depended on 
the specific pressures a daimyo faced in the sixteenth and seventeenth cen­
turies, most commonly, military incursions, inadequate revenues, discon­
tent among his subjects, or a fractious retainer band. These varied with 
time as well as region. Nationwide peace itself changed the dynamic be­
tween landed retainer and daimyo, lessening the retainers' opportunities to 
*As partial explanation for local institutional diversity throughout early modern Japan 
this study has examined the formal institutional contributions of pre-Maeda local organiza­
tions to die new order. Hitomi Tonomura, Community and Commerce, pp. 151—187, shows 
that it is also important to consider continuities in the informal inter-village relationships, 
even where transformation of the formal structures suggest such ties disappeared. Tonomura 
demonstrates the power of old inter-village shrine ties even in a region in which hegemonic 
edicts had more impact than they did in Kaga. 
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betray their overlord for personal gain and thereby decreasing his need for 
even tighter controls to maintain their loyalty. Even where the fictionaliza­
tion of fiefs was complete, the triumph of the daimyo's authority may have 
brought benefits to landed retainers, too/ Thefinal settlement often was the 
result of several decades of experimentation and adjustment in which the 
tensions in samurai-villager relations were reduced to some tolerable level. 
5. The legal establishment of a distinct village status system was a 
long-term process, one already under way before the 1580's in some re­
gions and one that continued long after Hideyoshi's death. Hardened class 
divisions resulted from the gradual intrusion of domain authority into the 
details of village life, as well as the establishment of peace within a region. 
In different parts of the country, the crystallizing of social divisions pro­
ceeded at very different paces and through a variety of mechanisms. Surveys 
(whether the daimyo's own or Hideyoshi's) and centrally proclaimed ordi­
nances on social classes could not effectively define members of a "peasant" 
(hyakusho) class at the time they were issued. Many rural warriors who 
aspired to samurai status lost that opportunity simply because battle sites 
moved away from their home territories. The removal of samurai to castle 
towns was one part of this process, but the elimination of many or all re­
tainer rights in land, as well as the clear legal definition of a cultivator class, 
took longer. 
6. Substantial practical constraints restricted the effectiveness of taxa­
tion, especially the widespread use of crop inspections. These constraints 
were the result of common strategies employed to control landed retainers, 
notably, dispersed fiefs and daikan jurisdictions, frequent rotation, and 
samurai urbanization, which between them made inspections impossibly 
time-consuming and robbed samurai of sufficient knowledge of agriculture 
to select fields appropriate for sampling. 
7. Heavy taxation was only one and perhaps not even the main source 
of villager discontent over surveys and assessments. For villagers, the arbi­
trariness of the system was at least as objectionable, if not more so. The 
lack of consistency and verifiability also invited official abuses. 
*Kaga and other domains where the samurai were completely removed from routine con­
tact with or presence in villages have been considered the norm, and those cases in which 
samurai remained on the land, notably Satsuma and Tosa, seen as exceptional. But as John 
Morris's work on Sendai shows, there were also cases in between (Morris, Kinsei Nihon 
chigyosei). Indeed, compared with Kaga, those regions in which samurai daikan continued 
to function seem to be part of a mid-range experience. As the case of Tosa nicely illustrates, 
domains did not create a permanent balance between samurai and village administrators at 
the start of the new administration. Samurai were first removed from the land and then, under 
the policies of Nonaka Kenzan, encouraged to return, retaining their formal military status. 
2.36 Conclusion 
At the risk of some repetition, the following correlates may apply at the 
national level: 
i . Late-sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-century social and political 
change was usually generated locally. In general the policies of emerging 
central political authorities only indirectly and sporadically influenced this 
process. Their greatest contribution was establishing a peaceful environ­
ment in which domain, district, and local leaders could work out stable 
administrative arrangements. Despite the emerging sense of kogi (public 
authority) at the national level, it was a perception that coexisted and still 
competed with the "small kogi" of the domains. Their own use of the term 
reflected a strong sense of autonomous identity (reflected in independent 
decisions) that did not quickly disappear. 
z. The contrast between pre- and post-Taiko kenchi society was less 
dramatic than is often portrayed. The processes of transformation did not 
complete their courses until the mid-seventeenth century or later. As a 
corollary of Hideyoshi's inability to establish nationally standardized sur­
veys, the kokudaka system cannot be treated as a nationally revolutionary 
innovation in land tenure, local taxation and administration, or social class 
relations.13 Surveys were technically incapable of defining field or village 
boundaries well enough to set land rights or restrict village growth. Though 
assessment procedures made the village the taxpaying unit, they did not 
freeze the physical and economic evolution of these communities. Villages 
continued to expand and control their resources, either alone or in col­
laboration (and often in contest) with neighboring communities.14 Villages 
were also the primary site for the defining of land tenure. 
3. The establishment of final assessed values for domains provided an 
explicit standard for valuing daimyo fiefs, but the figure was developed 
through a tacitly negotiated convention between daimyo and hegemon. 
This process left much room for daimyo to influence the size of the com­
mitment they wished to make to £ hegemon. In the context of the times, the 
creation of an explicit statement of domain value, acknowledged by both 
hegemon and daimyo, was a major innovation. Hideyoshi and his succes­
sors secured a fixed basis on which to assess extraordinary military levies. 
The lack of a rigid national standard facilitated the integration of hegemon 
and domain lord by providing a zone in which compromise was possible. In 
this sense the kokudaka system was, to use the historian Wakita Osamu's 
phrase, "a device for unification." Within the domains the establishment 
of explicit land values was frequently linked to the weakening of retainer 
autonomy (the decline of funyuken). 
Conclusion 237 
4. Despite each domain's distinctive path of development, daimyo 
pursued policies that moved Japan in a common direction. Trends like the 
separation of social classes, the turn to land surveys, and the rise of small-
scale family farming had their genesis in broad-based, common problems 
faced by all domains and their residents: the pressures of war, the adjust­
ment to peace, the growth of national markets, and so on. As the daimyo 
experimented with different means to cope with these problems, they de­
veloped policies from a limited range of potential solutions. Much of the 
social, political, and economic transformation of late-sixteenth- and early-
seventeenth-century Japan must be measured through the cumulative im­
pact of diverse local histories, and explained by reference to forces that 
transcended the reach of any one political actor or class of actors/ Hide­
yoshi's edicts nicely symbolize the trends of the time, but in many parts 
of Japan, these processes were well under way before his rise, and they 
continued without his direction or that of the Bakufu because they were 
stimulated and conditioned by local needs and circumstances. 
5. Policies directed at the personal behavior of daimyo could affect 
domain social structure and administration, although that was not the pri­
mary motive underlying the hegemon's orders. Most importantly,fief trans­
fers created opportunities for daimyo to reduce their retainers' involvement 
in the villages and to increase their dependence on their liege lord. 
6. Some daimyo used central ordinances to reinforce domain policies 
that were already moving in the same direction.15 Many also used central 
ordinances as models. Such influence was real, but it was subtle and in­
direct. Where central influence of any sort appears dear, the circumstances 
that permitted it to operate—a domain's recent defeat by hegemons, prox­
imity to agents of central power, or lack of resources (human and natural) 
and power; the strength of the central authority's motivation to act; and so 
forth—require careful delineation. This kind of analysis permits an assess­
ment of the degree of compliance with central orders. It also sheds light on 
the substantial institutional variation evident in early modern Japan, even 
in cases like Kaga, where there were no serious popular disturbances such 
as occurred in Higo and Tohoku. 
These hypotheses assume, of course, that the degree of central influ­
ence at local levels is problematic. The case for making this relationship the 
'Identical solutions, however, do not imply identical motivations. For example, in some 
instances the abolition of landed retainer status (or its fictionalization) was the direct result 
of a need to secure tighter control of landed retainers and in others, like Kaga and Bizen, was 
more immediately linked to difficulties landed retainers had in dealing with rural taxpayers. 
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object of explicit investigation does not rest alone on the evidence I have 
presented on the implementation of the Taiko kenchi. The time required 
for Kaga to standardize its own survey procedures within a small section 
of Japan and its inability (despite its reputation for very effective admin­
istration) to tax effectively early in the seventeenth century also stimulate 
this doubt. If domain authorities, possessing relatively greater knowledge 
of local conditions and easier access to villages, could not make these and 
other programs work, the central authorities certainly could not compel 
clear class separation, the redistribution of wealth, and a uniform system 
of land tenure by sending their own agents on a quick tour of a province. 
Some might argue that the daimyo were granted license to interpret 
central ordinances on their own, but this begs the central question of who 
had the ultimate capacity to set local policy on critical administrative and 
social issues like setting domain values, determining land tenure, and de­
fining class status. The case for discretionary latitude would be plausible if 
there was evidence of a dialogue between central and domain authorities 
over whether and how to implement laws that affected internal domain af­
fairs. Yet one searches in vain for some systematic, broad-based analogue 
to the sixteenth-century Spanish colonial administrators' practice of noti­
fying the crown, "I obey but do not comply," when centrally conceived 
policies struck them as inappropriate. 
We also might conclude that latitude was granted if deviations were 
only minor. Many, however, were major. Kaga was hardly the only or even 
the worst offender. Satsuma declined to make actual measurements despite 
Hideyoshi's direct, written orders, and even with one of his agents on site; 
that was clearly not just a matter of operating within a limited degree of 
latitude. The failure of some domains to employ kokudaka measures even 
at the nominal domain level is another example. 
Even if such breaks with policy could be documented as explicitly 
granted, the very ceding of so broad a latitude calls into question the re­
solve behind at least some central ordinances. The frequent, and sometimes 
gross, manipulation of the entire process of valuing land often went un­
chastised. These cases severely compromised any real effort to create a 
nationally uniform system of land values and registers. 
With so much latitude in practice, it is hard to agree that the daimyo 
were, in a meaningful administrative sense, "accountable to the overlord's 
laws, to the expectation of . .  . good administration."16 To argue that 
domain lords were held to some standard of good administration would 
require a redefinition of the key terms: "accountability" and "good ad­
ministration." At most they must be interpreted in the very broadest of 
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contexts—perhaps the daimyo's maintenance of public order within their 
domains and adherence to laws that governed their personal behavior 
and preserved a peaceful national order. (Fief transfers and attainders were 
useful in strengthening the central control of major markets, eliminating a 
threatening daimyo, and surrounding others with shogunal allies, but our 
exploration of the subject does not support the view that shoguns con­
sistently employed them to enforce administrative ordinances or a clearly 
defined standard of good administration.) Even in this light the local im­
pact of central directives remains problematic. In reshaping the standard 
of "good administration" in this fashion, we lose the expectation that cen­
tral directives on many administrative, economic, and social matters were 
executed or even that there was a conscious intent to implement them. 
Even if there were no constitutional limits on the hegemons, they faced 
very practical constraints. Unlike central authorities in Western Europe, 
they lacked an overriding incentive to enforce nationally uniform social 
policies, survey methods, tax systems, and standards even though, in prin­
ciple, they may have possessed the means. They had reason to encourage 
agricultural productivity, secure resources for defense, and so forth, but 
they had no compelling international or domestic crisis pushing them to 
risk inflaming the daimyo by meddling directly in domain administration. 
The marginal gains they might have achieved were not worth the heavy 
costs of enforcement. Perhaps Hideyoshi thought it well that his daimyo 
follow the procedures enunciated in the survey orders, class separation 
edicts, and related measures, but to get the job done, he in effect relied on 
what a later age would call jawboning. He and his successors were unwill­
ing to pursue a policy of systematic enforcement. To the extent that they 
sought change at the local level, they wanted to obtain it with minimal 
risks to their own position. 
In suggesting the need to take the efficacy of the state as problematic, I 
do not deny that there were new, significant, widely recognized, and legiti­
mate areas of central authority in Japan. Nor do I dispute the contention 
that the state's authority to act—its capability—grew during this era. A 
strong case has been made for both.17 The effective power of central au­
thorities was real within certain spheres: the ability to order most daimyo 
into new domains, the right to command them in battle and demand vari­
ous forms of military service from them, and the authority to manage key 
aspects of their personal lives, to name the most obvious. 
In fact, while central ordinances often fell short of effective state action, 
they contributed to the development of nominal authority. Daimyo did not 
explicitly challenge the central ordinances even when they failed to act on 
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them. They (and the new ideological constructs that undergirded the hege­
mon's actions) became an established part of seventeenth-century political 
discourse.18 By helping to build nominal authority, by reinvigorating the 
principle of a central political authority, the first hegemons laid a foun­
dation for the expansion of state capabilities. That potential was partly 
realized in realms beyond the personal or martial control of daimyo. The 
Bakufu effectively adjudicated diversity disputes and, over time, also ex­
panded its legitimate use of force to keep domestic peace. It conscripted 
daimyo resources for an increasing array of projects, including flood con­
trol in areas that did not affect its own lands. A consciousness of Japan 
as a single entity was strengthened and extended even among commoners. 
Regardless of the mixture of personalistic, bureaucratic, or simply Machia­
vellian measures, the new political order that Hideyoshi and the Tokugawa 
crafted was remarkably successful in that regard. The peaceful environ­
ment that resulted, with its social stability and economic growth, and the 
consequent national economic and cultural integration added substance to 
the image of one nation projected by the Great Heroes and their successors. 
Yet simply because their authority was real in some arenas of political 
activity does not mean that it was so in others. Nor does their effective au­
thority in one sphere (e.g., the ability to transfer daimyo) necessarily imply 
that such power was actively employed to extend their authority in another. 
Studies of the Taiko kenchi have provided the strongest, most commonly 
cited evidence of an effective central influence on internal domain policy, 
but the evidence from Kaga and a number of other domains, as well as data 
on the reasons for fief attainders, suggests that sanctions were not applied 
with a view to achieving consistent national implementation. 
The disjunction between image and reality encourages a characteriza­
tion of the early modern Japanese state asflamboyant. The central authority 
created by the Great Pacifiers and managed by their heirs may have been 
comparable to many of the absolutist states of Europe, but that still left 
the Meiji government with the daunting task of building a truly capable 
central administration. 
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Tonami shi shi, p. 301 
Tonami shi shi, p. 301 
Tonami shi shi, p. 301 
TKSS, 3: 394 
Kamiichi cho shi, pp. 266-67 
Himi shi shi, p. 1180 
Oku Noto Tokikuni ke monjo, 1: 9 
KHS, 1: 895 (combined with Nishi 
Hirokami) 
KHS, 1:895 
KHS,i: 895 (combined with Nishi 
Hirokami) 
KHS, 1:895 
NSS, 2:121 
Oku Noto Tokikuni ke monjo, 1:12 
NSS, 2: 441 
Hakui shi shi, Kinsei: 129 
Oku Noto Tokikuni ke monjo, 1:12 
Tonami shi shi, pp. 304-5 
Sakai Seiichi, "Kaga-han shoki," p. 20 
Fukumitsu cho shi, 1: 688 
Oku Noto Tokikuni ke monjo, 1:18 
Sakai Seiichi, "Kaga-han shoki," p. 21 
Sakai Seiichi, "Kaga-han shoki," p. 21 
Sakai Seiichi, "Kaga-han shoki," p. 21 
Sources of Village Tax Data, is 82-163 6

1611

Iori

Mawaki

[615 
Higashi Hongo
Himimachi 
Inamimachi 
Jin'e 
Minojima 
Nishi Inami 
1616—17 
Himimachi 
Jin'e 
Minojima 
Onaga 
Tokikuni 
1617, Yokota 
1618

Han'yano

Roshunji

Yokota

1619

Han'yano

Soyama

1620—26 
Fugeshimachi 
Hikari 
Ikari 
Jin'e 
Kawaimachi 
Kawanishi 
Konpoji 
Kotokuji 
Mochida 
Obako 
Saihoji 
Shinobu 
Tokikuni 
Wakayamagumi 
Yokota 
1626, Tokikuni 
Kashima gun shi, pp. 355-56

Oku Noto Tokikuni ke monjo, 1:14-15

Sakai Seiichi, "Kaga-han shotd," pp. 9-10

Himi shi shi, p. 1186

Inami cho shi, 2: 40 (two separately

recorded village segments combined into 
a single tax rate)

Suzu shi shi, 3: 631

Fukuoka cho shi, pp. 295,1209

Inami cho shi, 2: 40

Himi shi shi, p. 1186

Suzu shi shi, 3: 631

Fukuoka cho shi, pp. 1209-10

Hakui shi shi, Kinsei: 853

Oku Noto Tokikuni ke monjo, 1: 25

TKSS, 1:410

NSS,3:426

TKSS, 3: 410

TKSS, 3: 410

NSS,3:426 
TKSS, 3: 410—11 
WSS,4.i5

WSS, 2: 25

Yanagida son shi, p. 259

Suzu shi shi, 3: 632

Wajima cho shi, pp. 59—60

WSS, 2: 284

Ishikawa ken shi, 3: 784-85

WSS, 2: 515

Monzen cho shi, p. 73

Yanagida son shi, p. 1270

Suzu shi shi, y. \o6

WSS, 2: 462

Oku Noto Tokikuni ke monjo, 1: 30

Suzu shi shi, 3: 205-6

Sakai Seiichi, "Kaga han shoki," p. 22

Oku Noto Tokikuni ke monjo, 1: 42

1627 
Fukamidani 
Hakumai 
Higashi Innai 
Higashiyama 
Ikari 
Kanegura 
Nafune 
Nishi Innai 
Nishiyama 
Noda 
Obako 
Odaya 
Sato 
Shibuta 
Shinobu 
Soriji 
1628 
Tokikuni 
Wakayamagumi 
1629 
Sosogi 
Wakayama-Nobutake and 
Nakada 
1630 
Ebisaka 
Kosakai 
Soyama 
Tokikuni 
Unami 
1631 
Ebisaka 
Kosakai 
Tokikuni 
Unami 
1632 
Nishiyama 
Minamiyama 
Shirataki 
Tokikuni 
1633 
Shimoseki 
Tokikuni 
APPENDIX A 
WSS, 2: III-I2

WSS, 1:3

WSS, 1:5

WSS, 1:4-5

WSS, 1:7

WSS, 1:7-8

WSS, 1:3

WSS, i - 5

WSS, 1:7

WSS, 1:3-4

WSS, 1:7

WSS, 1:6

WSS, 1:6

WSS, 1:5-6

WSS, 1:4

WSS, 1:4

Oku Noto Tokikuni ke monjo, 1: 46

Suzu shi shi, 3: 207

Oku Noto Tokikuni ke monjo, 1: 50—51 
Suzu shi shi, 3: 389 (shinden excluded) 
Sakai Seiichi, "Kaga-han shoki," p. 23 
Sakai Seiichi, "Kaga-han shoki," p. 23 
TKSS, 3: 411 
Oku Noto Tokikuni ke monjo, 1: 56 
Sakai Seiichi, "Kaga-han shoki," p. 23 
Sakai Seiichi, "Kaga-han shoki," p. 23 
Sakai Seiichi, "Kaga-han shoki," p. 23 
Oku Noto Tokikuni ke monjo, 1: 59 
Sakai Seiichi, "Kaga-han shoki," p. 23 
WSS, 2: 469 
Suzu shi shi, 3: 334-36 
Suzu shi shi, 3: 391-92 
Oku Noto Tokikuni ke monjo, 1: 60—61 
Sakai Seiichi, "Kaga-han shoki," pp. 22-23 
Oku Noto Tokikuni ke monjo, 1: 64,69-70 
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1634

Kashima gun

Noto

Shimoseki

1635

Kawakubo

Kiriyama

Shimoseki

Yatsuo

1636

Nafune

Shirataki

Tokikuni

Yatsuomachi

Sources of Village Tax Data, 15 82-1636

Kashima gun shi, p. 357

Kashima gun shi, p. 357

Sakai Seiichi, "Kaga-han shoki," pp. 22-23

Yatsuo cho shi, 1: 316-17

Yatsuo cho shi, 1: 316-17

Sakai Seiichi, "Kaga-han shoki," pp. 22-23

Yatsuo cho shi, 1: 316-17

WSS, 2: 646

Suzu shi shi, 3: 392

WSS, 1:349

Yatsuo cho shi, 1: 316-17

Appendix B

Glossary

Bakufu. "Tent government," the Shogun's house administration 
bugari. "B«-cutting," harvest sampling for the purpose of determining land taxes 
bugyo. Magistrate 
buyaku. Corvee labor dues; often converted to cash payments in the seventeenth 
century 
chigyo. Early modern fief from which landed retainers derived tax income but over 
which they generally exercised little administrative or judicial power 
Cho family. Long-standing resident gentry of Noto who allied themselves with 
Oda Nobunaga and the Maeda in the early modern era 
Chosokabe family. Sengoku (q.v.) daimyo who ruled the part of Shikoku that 
became Tosa domain 
daikan. In Kaga domain, one of the daimyo's samurai tax agents 
daimyo. "Great Name," baronial lords of the early modern era 
fuchi. Stipend from the daimyo given to some rural administrators in Kaga domain 
fuchibyakusho. "Stipended peasants," local farmer-warrior gentry who received a 
stipend from the Maeda in return for their assistance during the early years of 
domain formation 
funyuken. "Principle of non-entry," a landed retainer's right to refuse his lord entry 
into his fief 
gedai. In Kaga, the subretainer in charge of assessing and collecting land taxes for 
his fief-holding lord 
genin. Servant 
go. District; an affiliated group of villages, smaller than a county [kori) 
gofuchinin tomura. "Stipended tomura," a tomura (q.v.) who supervised other 
tomura in a county and received a salary from the domain 
gosanke. The three branch families of the Tokugawa house who were to provide 
heirs if the direct shogunal line did not provide a suitable candidate for shogun 
gun'yaku. Formally, an extraordinary military levy; commonly employed in three 
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senses: (1) the obligation of a daimyo to provide men, money, and supplies 
for the military operations under the command of Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi, and the Tokugawa shoguns; (2) the similar obligation of landed re­
tainers to their daimyo; (3) a tax on villages to provide corvee and supplies for 
military operations. In practice, this category of extraordinary levies on daimyo 
extended to contributions to the imperial household and the maintenance of 
key public works 
ban. An early modern domain ruled by a daimyo 
hatake ori. "Dry field break,1* Kaga domain's unusual way of recognizing in land 
surveys the inferior fertility of dry fields by reducing the area measured before 
calculating the land's putative yield for tax purposes 
hatamoto. Direct retainers of the shogun; smaller than daimyo but ruled their 
own fiefs 
Wei-no bunri. "Warrior-peasant separation," the legal differentiation of samurai 
from commoners 
heikin men. In early-seventeenth-century Kaga, averaging the tax rates of all landed 
retainers and the daimyo into a single rate for a village 
hikichi. Land not included in a warichi (q.v.) redistribution in Kaga domain 
honbyakusho, see Takamochi hyakusho 
honden. "Basicfields," commonly used for fields long in production (paddy or dry) 
in contrast to reclaimed lands not yet fully incorporated into the tax registers 
hyakusho ikki. Often translated as peasant revolts, but the phrase carries a much 
broader range of meanings in the early modern era, encompassing peaceful as 
well as violent protests and demonstrations by commoners 
hyakusho uke. "Peasant contracts," for villages to pay a fixed tax to the propri­
etor in the medieval era; responsibility for allocating the obligations within the 
village and delivering the tax monies and goods lay with the villagers, not the 
proprietor's agents 
le sodo. "House disturbance," disruptive factional disputes within a domain's 
samurai ranks, often between the daimyo and his landed retainers 
Ikko ikki. A league of local forces in Kaga, organized around the Ikko Buddhist 
sect to oppose or limit the influence of outside lords 
jomen. "Fixed" tax rate; established for an entire village. In principle the rate was 
set for a number of years, but in practice it often became a permanent ceiling; 
taxes could be reduced in bad times, but not raised. 
kaisaku bugyo. Reform magistrate; initially a temporary position established to 
help carry out Kaga domain's major reform, the Kaisaku ho, and later made 
into a permanent office specializing in land tax assessment and collection 
Kaisaku ho. Kaga domain's mid-seventeenth-century reforms, which eliminated 
retainer fiefs, strengthened mechanisms for land taxation, and increased 
domain revenues from land taxes 
Kanazawa. The principal castle town of Kaga domain 
kandaka. Late medieval practice of assessing land value as a putative cash tax 
yield; measured in gold coins, kanme, kan, or kanmon. 
kemi. Crop inspections, usually based on bugari (q.v.) and conducted annually 
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kenchi. Investigations of the area and value of land; several methods were com­
monly employed, not all of which involved the actual measurement of area; 
usually translated as "land survey" 
kenchi bucho, see kenchicho 
kenchi bugyo. Land survey magistrate 
kenchicho. Land survey register. Often thought to detail field-by-field measure­
ments of paddy, dry fields, and residential land, along with indications of land 
quality, assessed value, and owner. In fact, a variety of names are used for land 
investigations, some of which bear a resemblance to this image, others of which 
simply summarize the data for either large parts of a village or for an entire 
village: kenchi bucho, mizucho, nawauchicho, and uchiwatashijo. 
kimoiri. Village headman 
Kinsei. Early modern era, ca. 1600-1868 
kogi. "Public authority"; daimyo and shogun used this concept to legitimate their 
rule by claiming to act for the public good, not for their private benefit 
kokudaka. The value of a village, domain, or fief expressed in the putative rice 
yield of its lands 
kokujin. Late medieval provincial warrior. 
kokumori. The assessed value of one tan of land, expressed in its putative rice yield 
kdri. A county 
Kori bugyo. County magistrate; before the Kaisaku ho (q.v.) in Kaga, in charge of 
all civil affairs; thereafter, his responsibilities no longer included land taxation 
kuji. A share to be redistributed under the warichi (q.v.) system of corporate 
village land tenure 
kujichi. Land subject to redistribution under warichi (q.v.) 
kuwayaku. Plow tax; assessed on certain categories of males aged 15 to 60 (Japa­
nese count); a major factor determining legal peasant status in Kaga domain 
kyunin. A landed retainer 
mawari kenchi. Circumferential survey; used to measure large sections or an entire 
village without measuring individual fields 
mizucho, see kenchicho 
murakiri. The process of clarifying boundaries between two villages 
nawauchicho, see kenchicho 
sankin-kotai. The system of alternate attendance in which the Tokugawa required 
daimyo to spend (usually) alternate years in Edo; when not there, important 
members of the daimyo's family were left behind as hostages 
sashidashi. Land investigations in which villagers or retainers made estimates of 
the area and value of their own lands and submitted them to daimyo 
Sengoku era. Ca. 1470-1575 
shinden. Reclaimed land 
sonmen. System of land tax assessments in which taxes based on fixed exemp­
tions for peasants were reduced by the amount of damaged land and officials' 
salaries; the Maeda employed this system only in the sixteenth century 
Taiko kenchi. Land investigations conducted under the auspices of Toyotomi Hide­
yoshi 
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taka. The assessed value of land and/or land use rights. 
takamochi hyakusho. A villager holding superior rights to cultivate land in a vil­
lage; such a villager usually participated in paying taxes (to the domain and 
village) and in managing the corporate village affairs. Village officers generally 
came from this class of villager. Also called honbyakusho. 
tomura. Head of a group of villages, initially about a dozen; successors to fuchi­
byakusho (q.v.) 
tozama. An "outer" or autonomous daimyo, one not closely allied to the Tokugawa 
family before the Battle of Sekigahara (1600) 
uchiwatashijo, see kenchicho 
warichi (also denchiwari; chiwari; etc.). System of corporate land tenure in which 
villagers periodically reallocated cultivation rights among themselves 

Notes

For complete authors' names, titles, and publication data on the works cited in short 
form in these Notes, see the Bibliography following. The following abbreviations 
are used in the citations: 
ES Etchu shiryo 
IKS Heki Ken, Ishtkawa ken shi 
KHNK Wakabayashi Kisaburo, Kaga-han nosei shi no kenkyu 
KHS Heki Ken, Kaga-han shiryo 
KK Heki Ken, Kano komonjo 
NSS Nanao shi shi (Shiryo hen unless otherwise noted)

TKSS Toyama ken shi (Shiryo hen unless otherwise noted)

WSS Wajhna shi shi (Shiryo hen unless otherwise noted)

BOOK EPIGRAPHS: Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, The Peasants of Languedoc, tr. 
John Day (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974), p. 4; Vivienne Shue, The 
Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic (Stanford Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 1988), p. 28. 
Chapter 1 
1. I refer here to the shugo. For brief but more detailed studies of the political 
organization of this era, see Varley, "Ashikaga Yoshimitsu"; the related articles in 
part 2 of the same volume by Cornelius J. Kiley, Nagahara Keiji, and John W. Hall; 
Harrington, "Regional Outposts"; and Arnesen, "Provincial Vassals." 
2. Some had a purely secular orientation, such as the do ikki, or "leagues of 
the land" of Omi and Yamashiro. Others were religiously based, such as the Ikko 
ikki, organized around the Buddhist Ikko sect. On the latter, see Davis, "Kaga 
Ikko Ikki." For a broader treatment of these activities, see Davis's "Ikki in Late 
Medieval Japan." 
*56 Notes to Pages 3-12 
3. Hall, "Foundations of the Modern Japanese Daimyo," provides a standard 
typology of daimyo development in the 15th, 16th, and 17th centuries. 
4. On this subject, see Katsumata (with Collcutt), "Development of Sengoku 
Law." 
5. On this point and others below, see Birt, "Samurai in Passage." 
6. On this and other political influences of 16th-century Buddhism, see McMul­
lin, Buddhism and State. 
7. For a full account of Hideyoshi's career, see Berry, Hideyoshi. 
8. For a recent biography of leyasu, see Totman, Tokugawa Ieyasu. 
9. See Fujiki (with Elison), "Political Posture"; Asao (with Jansen), "Shogun 
and Tenno"; Elison, "Cross and Sword"; and Elison, "Hideyoshi." 
10. For a complete translation of the 1615 version, see Tsunoda et al., Sources 
of Japanese Tradition, 1: 326-29. 
11. The sankin-kotai system is often called the "alternate attendance system." 
For an analysis of the significant long-term effects of this policy, see Tsukahira, 
Feudal Control. 
12. The principle of a two-tenths difference between land grades is referred to 
as ni to sagari. 
13. On Iate-i6th- and early-17th-century economic developments, see Yama­
mura, "Returns on Unification"; Yamamura, "Pre-Industrial Landholding Pat­
terns"; and Smith, Agrarian Origins. 
14. Araki Moriaki, "Taiko kenchi no rekishiteki zentei." 
15. Yamada Moritaro, Nihon shihonshugi bunseki. Suzuki Ryoichi has been 
considered a postwar proponent of this point of view (see his Oda Nobunaga). 
16. Fujita, Kinsei nosei, in his own, unique use of the terminology, refers to 
this as the establishment of "pure feudalism." 
17. Hayakawa, Nihon rekishi dokuhon; Nakamura Kichiji, Kinsei shoki; Kita­
jima, Nihon kinsei shi; Wakita, Oda Seiken; Wakita, Kinsei hokensei. 
18. Hall, "Japan's Sixteenth-Century Revolution"; Berry, Hideyoshi, especially 
chap. 6, "Federation and Its Motives," pp. 147-67. 
19. Ishii Ryosuke, History, especially pp. 59-79. 
20. Sansom, History, 1615—1867, p. 48. 
21. White, "State Growth." See also Fujiki, Toyotomi heiwarei, on the hege­
monic monopoly of force, the prohibition of private settlement of disputes, etc. 
22. Initially, comparison with Europe was one device that helped make Japa­
nese history comprehensible in the West. John Henry Wigmore, a legal historian, 
was clearly interested in comparative perspectives as he compiled his multivolume 
study on early modern Japanese law. Professor Kan'ichi Asakawa of Yale employed 
a comparative approach from the beginning of his academic career in the late 
19th century. Edwin Reischauer's essay in Rushton Coulbom's classic compara­
tive effort, Feudalism in History, built on Asakawa's rather positive evaluation of 
feudalism's contributions to modern Japan. Joseph Strayer's introductory essay to 
Studies in the Institutional History of Early Modern Japan continued this focus; 
and John Whitney Hall, in the following essay, attempted to bring some method­
ological rigor to the comparative analysis and questioned the applicability of the 
term "feudalism" to early modern Japan. In this essay and a review of Japanese 
 257 Notes to Pages 12-13
perspectives on the Tokugawa, Hall noted the gradual disappearance of feudal 
elements in the new state. See Wigmore, "Introduction,** in part 1 of Law and Jus­
tice, pp. xii-xiii; Coulborn, Feudalism in History, pp. 26-48; Strayer, "Tokugawa 
Period"; and Hall, "Feudalism in Japan." Hall's "The New Look of Tokugawa 
History** demonstrates some of the increasing sensitivity of Japanese scholars to 
the limitations of past applications of the concept of feudalism to their country. 
An influential stream in 20th-century Japanese historical writing also compared 
medieval and early modern Japanese institutions with those of Europe. Studies of 
landholding, manors, and other arrangements linked to feudalism often focused 
explicitly on such matters. See, for example, the opening sections of Fujita, Kinsei 
nosei. Ishii Shiro, Nihon kokusei, chap. 1, reviews common Japanese interpreta­
tions and discusses their European counterparts. Mid-20th-century Japanese schol­
ars emphasized the unique characteristics of Japan's early modern state in reaction 
to a perceived overreliance on the Western pattern of institutional development. 
They sought a more distinctly Asian or Japanese context. Nonetheless, they often 
remain implicitly bound by the more general predisposition established in European 
models of state development—the emergence of powerful central administrations. 
Several prominent examples are discussed below. See also Kobayashi, "Sengoku 
soran,*'p. 361. 
23. Berry, "Public Peace.'* 
24. White, "State Growth." White also evaluates others whose work does not 
explicitly employ the term "absolutism.** 
25. Sansom, History, 1615-1867, p. 48; White, "State Growth," p. 10. 
26. Ishii Ryosuke, History, pp. 61-65,74-75. 
27. Hall, "Hideyoshi's Domestic Policies," p. 206, relies heavily on the work 
of Ishii Ryosuke. Ishii has summarized his interpretation of Japanese history in an 
article translated into English as "Japanese Feudalism." See especially p. 26. 
28. Hall, "Hideyoshi's Domestic Policies,'* p. 206. Hall, in his most recent 
statement, argues: "In the final analysis it was the shogunate's capacity to govern 
the daimyo that gave stability to the bakuhan state. . .  . By keeping the relation­
ship between daimyo and shogun a precarious one and by making the daimyo 
accountable to bakufu regulations and codes of conduct [my emphasis], the sho­
gun was given numerous opportunities to transfer, reduce in size, or disinherit any 
daimyo. . . . Reductions and seizures were the result of disciplinary action by the 
shogun. Using the provisions of the Buke sho hatto [1615], the shogun could penal­
ize a daimyo for. . . many... seemingly minor acts that violated the code.'* In a later 
passage, he states: "The commonly given description of the power structure that 
supported the Edo bakufu inevitably leaves the impression that the Tokugawa sho­
gunate was all-powerful The truth is that many of the elements of power in the 
seventeenth century failed to retain their meaning in the nineteenth.** ("Bakuhan 
System," pp. 150,161.) Harold Bolitho argues: "The Buke sho hatto also seemed 
to foreshadow something new. Its thirteenth and final clause urged the daimyo to 
appoint none but capable men as ban administrators, thereby sounding a note to 
which the granting of formal certificates of enfeoffment two years later was to add 
resonance. The Tokugawa bakufu was claiming for itself ultimate responsibility in 
ban internal affairs.*' ("The Han,'* p. 194.) 
2 5 8 Notes to Pages 14-18 
29. Ishii Ryosuke, "Japanese Feudalism," pp. 19-20. 
30. Sansom, History, 1334-1615, pp. 316,318. 
31. Hall, Government and Local Power, p. 290. 
32. Kanai, Hansei, p. 21. 
33. See, for example, Hall's summary of Hideyoshi*s major policies in "Hide­
yoshi's Domestic Policies,'* p. 194. For a recent Japanese appraisal, see Mizubayashi, 
Hokensei, pp. 114,119-21. Hall states: "The land survey became the foundation 
on which rested both the mura and the legal structure by which the samurai class 
related to the peasantry and the peasantry related to the land" ("Introduction," 
p. 16, but see also pp. 7,11, 34). Asao, "Sixteenth-Century Unification," pp. 51^ 
53, and Susser, "Toyotomi Regime," pp. 139-40,150, both note some exceptions 
but still emphasize the effectiveness of Hideyoshi's efforts. See also Wakita, "Social 
and Economic Consequences of Unification," pp. 103,107-8,115; and Furushima, 
"Village and Agriculture," p. 480 and passim. 
34. For example, Hall, in the quote above, makes the argument that the basic 
units of measurement of area and volume were standardized. See also Kodama, 
Kinsei nomin seikatsu shi, pp. 16-17; Kanai, Hansei, p. 21; Sasaki, "Toitsu ken­
ryoku," pp. 58, 80; Oishi, "Kinsei," pp. 46-48; Mihashi, "Kinsei zenki," p. 18; 
Sansom, History, 1334-161$, p. 318; Ando Seiichi, Edojidai, p. 2; Wakita, "Koku­
daka System"; and Berry, Hideyoshi, pp. 117, 120. See also Susser, "Toyotomi 
Regime." Susser notes that "the cadastral survey was not uniformly carried out 
throughout the realm" (p. 139) but never clarifies the extent to which this was true. 
He then goes on to say that "Hideyoshi . . . tried to make his hold over his vas­
sals as secure as possible by basing grants on an actual cadastral survey" (p. 139), 
and that "in effect, the Taiko kenchi established nationwide the system of assess­
ing land value in terms of productivity" (p. 140). Readers are left with the distinct 
impression that variations were minor. Yamamura, "From Coins to Rice," p. 359, 
also stresses the minor nature of the variations. 
35. Sansom, History, 1334-1615, p. 318. 
36. Araki Moriaki, Bakuhan taisei shakai; Sasaki, Bakuhan kenryoku. 
37. Yamamura, "Returns on Unification," pp. 328, 339-49; Yamamura, "Pre-
Industrial Landholding Patterns," pp. 283, 285; Wakita, "Kokudaka System," 
p. 301. Yamamura sees the surveys as having some redistributive effects. 
38. Jansen, "Tosa in the Sixteenth Century," p. 96. Susser, "Toyotomi Regime," 
p. 148, represents a more common perspective. 
39. Nagahara (with Yamamura), "Sengoku Daimyo," p. 41, stresses that the 
kandaka system in the Gohojo lands included all arable land and not just paddy. 
Residential lands were included in calculating the yield based on the assumption 
that any land not used for housing would have been cultivated. 
40. Yamamura, "Returns on Unification," is the principal exception. 
41. Why a greater emphasis was placed on collecting taxes in rice is a subject of 
scholarly controversy. See Wakita, "Kokudaka System," pp. 312-13, for the major 
interpretations of the significance of the switch to payment in rice. For a more 
recent view, see Yamamura, "From Coins to Rice." Although this development is 
frequently stressed in studies of the late 16th century, we shall see (chapters 7 and 8) 
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that the increased emphasis on tax payment in rice was imposed gradually and not 
by any means completely. 
42. See, for example, Hall, "Hideyoshi's Domestic Policies," p. 220. Before the 
Taiko kenchi and the implementing of the kokudaka system, taxes could be re­
duced by fixed amounts for specific purposes, such as repairing shrines or irrigation 
systems, but the exemption did not fluctuate with actual crop yields. See Naga-
hara (with Yamamura), "Sengoku Daimyo," pp. 44-46; and Wakita, "Kokudaka 
System," pp. 313-14. 
43. Berry, Hideyoshi, p. 118. 
44. Both documents are translated in Tsunoda et al., 1: 321-22, 319-20, re­
spectively. 
45. Susser, "Toyotomi Regime," pp. 148-49, discusses two examples. See also 
Asao, "Sixteenth-century Unification," pp. 52-53; and Wakita, "Social and Eco­
nomic Consequences," pp. 107,115. 
46. On the link between survey registers and restrictions on the possession of 
swords, see Berry, Hideyoshi, pp. 119-20. The Sword Collection Edict (reprinted 
in ibid., pp. 102-3) does n o  t make survey registration as such a basis for prohi­
bition, simply using the vague, undefined category "farmers." Since the few lists 
of weapons collected do not mention from whom they were collected, drawing 
a direct connection between the two is unwarranted. On the use of survey regis­
ters to determine who could transfer to a new domain with a daimyo, see Susser, 
"Toyotomi Regime," p. 148; and Miyakawa, Taiko kenchi ron, 3: 396, doc. 138. 
In this and similar documents, Hideyoshi ordered the Mizoguchi and Uesugi fami­
lies to leave behind all peasants listed in the survey registers. Miyakawa (1: 357) 
refers to this "principle of domain transfer" as the "complete separation of warrior 
and peasant." Retainers were thereby "placed under the complete control of the 
daimyo." The earliest examples cited, however, come only from 1598, at the very 
end of Hideyoshi's life. It would be a mistake to take them as documenting similar 
uses for earlier survey registers. 
47. Elison, "Cross and Sword," p. 68. Elison also traces other policies gen­
erally associated with Hideyoshi back to Oda, namely, the destruction of rural 
fortifications, land surveys, and daimyo transfers. 
48. For one excellent study, see Birt, "Samurai in Passage." 
49. Hara, Kaga-han, pp. i-iii, 2-8. Berry, Hideyoshi, p. 108, notes that the pro­
cess of removing samurai from the land continued long after Hideyoshi's edicts and 
cites an example. She points out that the full implications of this policy were not 
drawn out until theTokugawa's order restricting daimyo to one castle per province. 
But like many others, she assumes rather than demonstrates a causal connection 
between Hideyoshi's orders and this social transformation. She does not discuss 
any case in which Hideyoshi's orders were the clear source of separation or pro­
vide evidence showing to what extent this transformation had already taken place. 
On p. 109, she speaks of incentives for daimyo to implement the policy on their 
own, but fails to discuss cases in which Hideyoshi's orders were demonstrably the 
inspiration of daimyo action rather than, e.g., daimyo self-interest. 
50. Berry, Hideyoshi, pp. 102-11; Susser, "Toyotomi Regime," pp. 140—45; 
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Hall, "Japan's Sixteenth-Century Revolution," pp. 19-20; Hall, "Hideyoshi's 
Domestic Policies," pp. 217-20; Mizubayashi, Hokensei, p. 124; Hall, "Introduc­
tion," p. 16. 
51. Takeyasu, Kinsei tochi seisaku, contends that from the very beginning of 
the Tokugawa era, deficiencies in the land survey process permitted peasants to 
accumulate a surplus. Hayami, "Nihon keizai shi," argues that Japan's economic 
and demographic growth in the 17th century would not have been possible if there 
had been a "complete confiscation" of the peasants' labor surplus. Of the members 
of the Quantitative Economic History Group, only Nishikawa Shunsaku's research 
bears directly on the impact of land taxation, and he focuses on a much later period 
("Seisan, shohi to shotoku katoku," in Shinbo et al., Suryo keizaishi nyumon, pp. 
151-54,165-66). Most of his colleagues ascribe 18th- and 19th-century economic 
transformations to other factors. See, for example, the essays in Nishikawa et al., 
Nihon keizai; Shinbo et al., Siiryd keizaishi nyiimon; and Shinbo and Yasuba, Kin­
dai ikdki. Nishikawa Shunsaku found that without the financial contribution of 
nonagricultural activities, Choshu villages would have been unable to pay the land 
tax. That conclusion and Thomas C. Smith's study of farm family by-employments 
indicate a need for caution in assessing the economic impact of land tax rates. These 
studies remind us that agriculture was not the sole source of income for Tokugawa 
villagers. 
52. Miyakawa, Taiko kenchi ron, 1: 370—71, suggests that this phenomenon 
raises the possibility of an early Kinsei peasant-based surplus in at least parts 
of Japan. 
53. Standard descriptions of this process for the Bakufu lands are found in 
Ando Hiroshi, Tokugawa, pp. 212-13; an<i Oishi Tsunetaka, Jikata hanrei roku, 
1: 143—66. On Kaga domain, see Oda Kichinojo, Kaga-han, pp. 358—66. Sasaki, 
Daimyo, p. 22, and Sasaki, Bakuhan kenryoku, pp. 101—10, present data from 
17th-century Kaga domain budgets. 
54. Though Western scholars generally accept this picture of the system's in­
creased revenue-raising capability, they do not necessarily see it as confiscatory. 
In addition to Berry, Hideyoshi, p. 121, see Hall, "Hideyoshi's Domestic Poli­
cies," p. 220. Yamamura, "Returns on Unification," pp. 354-55, is skeptical that 
tax reform at this time effectively increased land tax rates. Yamamura is fighting 
the general tendency to emphasize the weight of the late-16th-century tax burden. 
Berry and Hall are more representative. 
55. On Hideyoshi's two-thirds dictum, which is generally considered to mark 
the beginning of the kemi system, see Berry, Hideyoshi, p. 121. An English transla­
tion of this document appears in ibid., pp. 144-45 ;  s e  e especially item 3. It is unclear 
from Berry's account whether the daimyo were free to set their own tax policy 
(p. 116) and to take the standard expressed in this document as merely advisory 
(p. 150), or whether Hideyoshi in fact mandated equalized tax rates (p. 146). 
56. The phrase "near money" comes from Yamamura, "From Coins to Rice," 
p. 361. Yamamura sees Japan's early modern hegemons as deliberately promoting 
this use of rice as a way to promote trade and commerce. While this evaluation 
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of intent may be debatable, the effect—the widespread use of rice and rice-based 
notes as currency—is not. 
57. Jansen, "Tosa in the Seventeenth Century,'* pp. 115-2.9,131-39; Hall, Gov­
ernment and Local Power, chaps. 10—13; Hall, "Ikeda Mitsumasa." 
58. Hall, Government and Local Power, pp. 291, 318-23. See also Jansen, 
"Tosa in the Sixteenth Century," pp. 96-98; and R. Sakai, "Consolidation of 
Power," p. 136. 
59. Hara, Kaga-han, pp. i-iii, 2-8. 
60. Fujino, (Shmtei) Bakuban, apps. 1, 2. Much of the land gained by trans­
ferred daimyo appears to have come from discontinued fiefs, not from fiefs reduced 
as punishments. The majority of affected domains had less than 70,000 koku. 
61. Ibid., app. 1. Bolitho, "The Han," p. 196, stresses the insecurity of daimyo 
tenure—citing as evidence the 95 confiscations and 250 transfers that took place 
between 1615 and 1650—but then notes (p. 205) that "the death of Tokugawa 
Iemitsu . .  . in 1651 virtually marked the end of any consistent assault on ban pre­
rogatives and responsibilities. Thereafter, Tokugawa authority began to deteriorate 
and . . . never regained its original impetus." (Similarly, see Hall, "Bakuhan Sys­
tem," p. 150.) Bolitho, Treasures, pp. 7-10, also disagrees with the position I have 
outlined. For all the stress he lays on the effectiveness of Bakufu controls on domain 
administration (transfers, two different kinds of Bakufu inspectors, etc.), other 
than presenting anecdotal evidence, he does not analyze the extent to which these 
were effectively employed to enforce administrative ordinances. The purposes they 
served almost exclusively were to eliminate potential competitors and consolidate 
Bakufu control of strategic territories (commercial as well as military). Even James 
White's discussion of the Bakufu's increased exercise of force in "State Growth" 
focuses largely on what legal scholars call diversity cases, conflicts that transcend 
the boundaries of a single domain. The cases White examines are also relatively 
close to Edo and because of their size can r^ e seen as serious threats to the stability 
of the existing order; they were not cases involving only one domain. Still, many 
states like Tokugawa Japan have used the device of adjudicating diversity disputes 
to increase their power. 
62. On Hideyoshi and the relationship of transfers to the management of in­
ternal domain policies, see Berry, Hideyoshi, p. 129. On the lack of enforcement 
mechanisms, see ibid., p. 137; Bolitho, Treasures, pp. 9—10; and Bolitho, "The 
Han," p. 194. 
63. See, for example, the treatments of Befu, "Village Autonomy"; Vlastos, 
Peasant Protests; and Bix, Peasant Protest. 
64. White, "State Growth"; Migdal, Strong Societies. 
65. Hall, Government and Local Power, pp. 9-10, cites patrimonial bureau­
cracy as a common element in Japanese history and sees the early modern era as one 
that effectively relied on this means to rule. The increasingly bureaucratic nature 
of government shaped the attempts to legitimate shogunal rule (pp. 350-51). At a 
practical level the Laws of the Military Houses forced daimyo to accept shogunal 
meddling in the operations of domains (p. 368). In characterizing the early modern 
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state as I do, I agree with Berry who, in "Public Peace," moves away from conceiving 
of the early modern state as a Weberian "rationalized" order. See also White, "State 
Growth," p. 7. This may also be the kind of phenomenon Conrad Totman has in 
mind when he refers to the early modern order as an "integral bureaucracy" {Japan 
Before Perry; p. 137). 
66. Hall, Government and Local Power, p. 15. Both Jansen, "Tosa in the Six­
teenth Century," and R. Sakai, "Consolidation of Power," show a measure of sensi­
tivity to the problem of variation. However, the two domains are generally treated 
as exceptional in the extent to which they permitted the continuance of rusticated 
samurai. 
67. A widely known example is the way in which scholars deal with the prac­
tice of recording the names of two "owners" next to each measured plot of land 
(buntsuke) in a survey document. In Hideyoshi's view only one person had rights 
to a given field. 
68. This effort resulted in several essays on land-surveying practices and tenure 
systems. The findings of the most pertinent are noted in the following chapters. 
69. In approaching my subject in this fashion, I am following one of the uses 
the Annales historians have made of local historical materials. This is also part of 
the approach of others sympathetic to the use of social science concepts and meth­
odologies in historical studies. See, for example, Skocpol, "Emerging Agendas"; 
and Berkhofer, Behavioral Approach. 
70. Hara, Kaga-han; Matsushita, Bakuhansei shakai. 
71. Hanley and Yamamura, Economic and Demographic Change, pp. 53, 56, 
61; Smith, "Premodern Economic Growth," p. 132; McClain, Kanazawa, p. 2. 
From the early 18th century, the overall rate of population growth in Kaga domain 
was approximately the same as for the nation as a whole (1621-1872), 0.16% a 
year (Hanley and Yamamura, pp. 56,61). In the absence of any unique natural con­
ditions, disasters, or plagues, this suggests that growth patterns in the preceding 
century or so were also close to the national average. 
72. Calculated from area estimates in Nakamura Satoru, Meiji ishin, app. 
chart 2; and population estimates in Hanley and Yamamura, Economic and Demo­
graphic Change, p. 40. 
73. Shimode, Ishikawa ken, p. 134. 
74. Yamaguchi Keiji, "Han taisei," pp. 101-21, outlines the different ways of 
categorizing domains and discusses several daimyo whose rise predated that of 
Oda Nobunaga but who ultimately went through transfers, including Tokugawa 
Ieyasu. 
Chapter 2. 
1. Fujino, (Shintei) Bakuhan, apps. 1, 2. 
2. For a discussion of the significance of Nobunaga's struggle against this sect, 
see McMullin, Buddhism. The period of the Ikko sect's control in the Hokuriku is 
commonly referred to as the Ikko ikki. For a history of the movement, see Davis, 
"Kaga Ikko Ikki." 
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3. Shimode, Ishikawa ken, pp. 117-19; Wakabayashi, "Kaga-han," in Kodama, 
Mortogatari Hanshi, p. 108. For an extended treatment of Toshiie, see Iwasawa, 
Maeda Toshiie. Most of Iwasawa's work is devoted to Toshiie's life outside the 
domain. His youth and rise to prominence within Nobunaga's forces are treated in 
chaps. 2 and 3. 
4. Quoted in Elison, "Cross and Sword," p. 74. 
5. Shimode, Ishikawa ken, p. 113; Sakai Seiichi, Toyama-han, p. 32. 
6. Sakai Seiichi, Toyama-han, p. 33. 
7. Shimode, Ishikawa ken, p. 120. 
8. NSS, Tsushi-hen: 299. 
9. Iwasawa, Maeda Toshiie, pp. 86-87. 
10. NSS, Tsushi-hen: 300. For a more complete history, see McClain, Kana­
zawa. 
11. Sakai Seiichi, Toyama-han, pp. 36-37. 
12. Shimode, Ishikawa ken, p. 119; Davis, "Kaga Ikko Ikki," p. 129. 
13. Sakai Seiichi, Toyama-han, p. 37. 
14. Davis, "Kaga Ikko Ikki," p. 129; Iwasawa, Maeda Toshiie, pp. 110-15. 
15. Sakai Seiichi, Toyama-han, p. 38. 
16. Iwasawa, Maeda Toshiie, pp. 70-71. 
17. Quoted in Berry, Hideyoshi, p. 218. 
18. Elison, "Hideyoshi," pp. 236-37. 
19. Tanaka Yoshio, Jokamachi Kanazawa, p. 5. 
20. Ibid. 
21. Bolitho, Treasures, p. 4. 
22. Quoted in Totman, Tokugawa leyasu, p. 59. 
23. Hara, Kaga-han, pp. 52-57, describes these events. As a reward, Honda's 
fief was increased substantially. 
24. This pattern of marital interrelationships between the Maeda and the Toku­
gawa was a typical means through which major daimyo were tied to the shogunate. 
The shogun reinforced the pattern by arranging marriages between daimyo houses, 
too. For a full discussion of Maeda involvement in marital politics, see Taito, 
"Kaga-han." 
25. Tanaka Yoshio, Jokamachi Kanazawa, pp. 5-6; Shimode, Ishikawa ken, 
pp. 127—28; IKS, 2: 275-78. 
26. Hara, Kaga-han, pp. 51-63,79, explores the use of kogi at this time. On pp. 
74—78 he also explores daimyo-Bakufu relations, especially in the context of the 
employment and policies of Honda Masashige. Takazawa, "Maeda Toshinaga," 
and Kigoshi, "Keicho-ki Kaga-han," analyze retainer control and the development 
of factions threatening enough to prompt Toshinaga to have some retainers assas­
sinated. 
27. Sakai Seiichi, Toyama-han, p. 65. 
28. Wakabayashi, Maeda Tsunanori, pp. 6-7. 
29. Though there is no direct evidence on what motivated Toshitsune in this 
matter, local historians tend to emphasize to one degree or another his desire to 
protect Kaga domain from possible reduction or confiscation. For a discussion of 
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the most prominent explanations, see Brown, "Domain Formation," pp. 61-63. 
30. Fujino, (Shintei) Bakuhan, app. 1, parts 2 and 3. 
31. See, for example, Hall, Government and Local Power, p. 389; DiCenzo, 
"Daimyo," pp. 53-55; and F. Oda, "Saga Han," pp. 2i8ff. 
32. Oyabe shi shi, 1: 258. 
Chapter 3 
1. Sakai Seiichi, "Kaga-han shoto"; Kigoshi, "Kaga-han seiritsu ki." 
2. See, for example, Toide cho shi, pp. 243-44; Ishikawa ken shi shiryo, p. 159; 
and Nakamura Kichiji, "Shoki Kaga-han," p. 426. 
3. IKS, 3: 770, discusses several documents claiming that Oda sent officials to 
survey the provinces of Kaga, Noto, and Etchu. In the most intriguing of these, the 
Etsu-No-Ka san shu shi, we find the assertion that Sugaya Nagayori and Fukutomi 
Yukikiyo were sent out to conduct a survey in 1581. But though the two were in 
fact ordered into Noto with Toshiie, there is no evidence that they conducted any 
surveys. Authors of local histories in the Toyama prefecture area are perhaps more 
inclined to stress Oda's role to account for Etchu's having a tan of 360 bu, rather 
than 300 bu as in Kaga and Noto. As they would have it, Oda's death interrupted 
the survey process before it reached Etchu. See Toide cho shi, pp. 246-47. 
4. See, for example, Kosugi cho shi, p. 85; and Kurobe shi shi, 1: 90. Wajima, 
"Kinsei sonraku," p. 43, goes further and argues, in a similar vein to Araki Moriaki 
and Sasaki Junnosuke, that in this recording of field and holder, the kenchi was 
designed to develop small independent landholders. 
5. McClain, Kanazawa, p. 28. See also p. 21 for the national pattern of surveys 
in which McClain places Kaga developments. 
6.1 have found references to a total of 10 nawauchicho and mizucho that bear 
a resemblance to the land survey documents of Hideyoshi. For one of these, Sen­
koji village (Ishikawa county), a survey is reported for 1583, but no survey docu­
ment has been located, only a fief grant that includes this village. Oda Kichinojo, 
Kaga-han, pp. 221, 223, reports a survey for Okinami village (Fugeshi county) 
dated 1583.9.22. Although I have not seen the survey document myself, Kigoshi, 
"Maeda," p. 21, m. 1, verifies its existence. 
7. See, for example, Kigoshi, "Kan'ei-ki Choke ryo ni okeru kenchi." 
8. Oda Kichinojo, Kaga-han, pp. 219-21, presents an excerpt from this survey. 
See NSS, 3: 327-33, for a full copy. 
9. Miyakawa, Taiko kenchi ron, 3: 170-270, presents some typical survey 
documents that are thought to be actual measurements. 
10. KHNK, 1: 62. This same kind of contrast between vague and precise ex­
pressions of area size can be seen in early sashidashi Taiko kenchi documents and 
later, more standardized documents from actual measurements. See the mizucho 
for Kano village and the Amakawa village kenchicho in Miyakawa, Taiko kenchi 
ron, 3:156-69,170-218, respectively. 
11. KHNK9i: 62, and Kigoshi, "Maeda," p. 23, concur with this evaluation. 
12. KK, p. 1174. 
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13. Kigoshi, "Maeda," pp. 23,15. Evidence for these surveys is found not only 
in copies of survey documents but also in tax receipts. They were conducted after 
relations between the Uesugi and Toyotomi forces had stabilized in 1585, and the 
Maeda domains were less threatened by strong neighboring military forces. 
14. Ibid., p. 20. 
15. KK, p. 743. 
16. KHNK, 1: 64; Kigoshi, "Maeda," p. 26. See the discussion in Brown, 
"Domain Formation,'* pp. 141—42. 
17. Himi shi shi, pp. 1172-73,1232-33. 
18. Ibid., pp. 1172-73. 
19. Sakai Seiichi, "Kaga-han shoki," p. 19, considers all Tensho survey docu­
ments to be of the sashidashi type and therefore has no quarrel with Wakabayashi's 
and Kigoshi's evaluations of the earliest Kaga and Noto survey documents. 
20. Himi shi shi, p. 1174. 
21. Ibid., p. 1176. 
22. ES, 2: 50. 
23. See the survey documents for Akigashima, Kosuganuma, and Inamochi vil­
lages in TKSS, pp. 392-94; and the survey document for Iisakano shin village in 
Kamiichi cho shi, pp. 264-65. 
24. Kosugi cho shi, p. 86; Oda Kichinojo, Kaga-han, pp. 226-27; ES, 2:115. 
25. Tonami shi shi, pp. 306-7. 
26. Data from these documents are presented in Sakai Seiichi, "Kaga-han 
shoto," p. 8. Printed copies of a number of documents may be found in Himi shi 
shi, pp. 1179,1181-82; and Fukuoka cho shi, pp. 1050,1143,1231,1232. 
27. Tonami shi shi, pp. 301-2; Kamiichi cho shi, pp. 265-66. 
28. See Kamiichi cho shi, pp. 265-66, on Isakano shin and Ishibari villages; 
and Tonami shi shi, pp. 301—2, on Yasukawa village. 
29. Oda Kichinojo, Kaga-han, p. 92. 
30. This is a generous estimate of the growth in the number of villages. Given 
that villages were combined or disestablished as well as established during this 
period, the actual number of villages at the time of the surveys may have been even 
larger. If so, that would only reinforce my claim. 
31. IKS, 3: 782; Ishikawa ken Takamatsu cho shi, p. 201. 
32. IKS, 3: 782-83; KHS, 2: 376. 
33. See Hakui shi shi, p. 130, for one clear example of a village partly adminis­
tered by the daimyo. Without exception, the survey documents I examined for this 
period (15 from 1616,33 from 1620) do not give the tax rate for villages or parts of 
villages administered by landed retainers. 
34. Kashima cho shi, pp. 430,433; NSS, 3:96,113. 
35. NSS, 3: 53, 94-95, « i» "3,146,188, 334, 426; KHNK, 1: 129; Kashima 
cho shi, pp. 434,453. 
36. The manuscript is in the Toyama University Library, Toyama City. It is part 
of the Kawai Monjo Collection, section Ume no Yon. 
37. A more detailed outline of these procedures, as well as standard methods, 
appears in Brown, "Mismeasure of Land," pp. 115—55. 
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38. According to the area figures and kokudaka estimates in "Shdhd san nen 
taka mononari cho genko," a manuscript in the Ka-Etsu-No Bunko, Kanazawa 
City Library, the kokumori for Enuma and Nomi counties was 1.7 and 1*2 koku 
per tan for paddy and dry fields, respectively, until the mid-17th century, when they 
were given the same value—1.7 per tan. 
39. ES9 2: 419. 
40. See Brown, "Domain Formation," pp. 167-73, o  n t n  e origins of this prac­
tice. WSS, 2: 212, 276, presents the first documentation of its use. 
41. Iwasawa, Maeda Toshiie, p. 162. 
42. Berry, Hideyoshi, pp. 117,120. Similarly, see Susser, "Toyotomi Regime," 
PP- I39-4O­
43. Measuring rods of varying length were in use during the Taiko kenchi era 
in Awa, Settsu, Chikuzen, Satsuma, Osumi, Hyuga, Hizen, Hitachi, and Shin­
shu provinces; Sendai, Akita, Nanbu, and Shinjo domains. After 1600, variations 
were evident in Satsuma, Ise (in part), Matsushiro, Owari, Kaga, Iwashiro, Iwaki, 
Rikuzen, Akita, Nanbu, and Shijo. See Iinuma, Kokudakasei, pp. 128,160-62; and 
Oda Kichinojo, Kaga-han, pp. 2.17ft, for Kaga. Kanzaki, Kenchi, pp. 63, 68, dis­
cusses the Taiko kenchi and Tokugawa standards. On thefinal example of the short 
rod, see Iinuma, Kokudakasei, p. 180. This list is very conservative. More variant 
regions and domains could probably be discovered by culling the recent work of 
local historians. Although most examples of variant standards discussed here and 
below come from the late 16th and early 17th centuries, Iinuma's data indicate that 
variations persisted throughout the early modern era. 
44. Hegemons may have encouraged but did not force this transformation. For 
other viewpoints, see Nagahara (with Yamamura), "Sengoku Daimyo," pp. 28-30. 
Wakita, "Kokudaka System," p. 304, argues that the kandaka system was not typi­
cal. Yamamura extends the kandaka region into Shikoku, northern Kyushu, and the 
Chugoku. I believe that the differences between Wakita and Yamamura over which 
areas to count as kandaka reflect the difficulty of characterizing politically diverse 
regions. Yamamura poses a top-down paradigm for the transformation ("From 
Coins to Rice," pp. 353-54,364). My inclusion of part of Hokuriku in the category 
of rice-based assessments relies on my analysis of pre-Maeda land taxation below. 
45. See, for example, Wakita, "Kokudaka System," p. 310. 
46. Iinuma, Kokudakasei, p. 146; Takahashi, Miyagi ken, pp. 133-36. 
47. Iinuma, Kokudakasei, p. 150. 
48. Takayanagi and Takeuchi, Nihon shijiten, p. 1130. 
49. After the defeat of their allies the Takeda, the Sanada had joined Ieyasu and 
then Hideyoshi (Hirasawa, Kinsei sonraku e, pp. 231, 234, 260). 
50. Miyakawa, Taiko kenchi ron,y. 324-25, reproduces the instructions to the 
Aizu surveyors. See also Miyazaki, Aomori ken, pp. 127-28; and Handa Ichitaro, 
"Ushu Yuri kandaka ko," pp. 14-15. 
51. Oda Kichinojo, Kaga-han, p. 253 reproduces this report. The same source 
also gives the domain's assessed value for 1590 in koku, but the data are suspect. 
They exclude figures from Niikawa, which had been entrusted to the Maeda three 
years earlier. They also exclude Enuma, which was not yet part of Kaga han. But 
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neither was Nomi county, yet it was apparently included in the value of Kaga prov­
ince. These confusions suggest that later data were attributed to 1590 by an author 
unfamiliar with developments in Kaga han. Under the circumstances, it is difficult 
to be fully confident that Toshiie used koku in his reports to Hideyoshi. 
52.. Yasuzawa, Kittsei sonraku keisei, p. 72. 
53. Handa Ichitaro, "Ushu Yuri karidaka ko," pp. 14-15. 
54. Yamamura, "From Coins to Rice," p. 359. Berry, Hideyoshi, p. 112, argues, 
without substantiation, that "most remaining provinces, largely held by tozama, 
were examined by representatives of local daimyo who, in general, employed Hide­
yoshi's guidelines.** Later, on p. 118, she reiterates, again without documentation: 
"Active surveys were taking place in some of these [tozama] areas, and they tended 
to conform to Hideyoshi's own guidelines for inspection and measurement.'* 
55. Berry, Hideyoshi, pp. 113,114. 
56. Such reports may not have come from "proprietors,** but they still origi­
nated with people other than a daimyo agent, individuals who had a vested interest 
in distorting the results. For claims of tozama submission, see, for example, ibid., 
p. 117; and Araki Moriaki, Taiko kenchi to kokudaka sei, pp. 126-28, 132-44. 
See Iinuma, Kokudakasei, p. 150, on Matsumoto domain; Miyazaki, Aomori ken, 
p. 128, on Tohoku; and Iinuma, Kokudakasei, p. 146, on the Date, who continued 
to use their own kandaka system. Handa and Yokoyama, Yamagata ken, p. 108, 
discuss the lack of evidence confirming actual measurement. According to Matsu­
shita, Bakuhansei shakai, pp. 209-33, Satsuma did not make any surveys under 
Hideyoshi. See also his careful and critical studies of the mechanics and uses of 
surveys in other Kyushu domains in the same volume. Matsushita's subsequent 
article "Yanagawa-han shoki" reinforces the argument I make for the manipulative 
techniques and variant procedures used in land investigations. 
57. On the ikenchi, see Brown, "Mismeasure of Land,'* p. 138; and Oishi Tsune­
taka, Jikata hanrei roku, 1: 77,85. As we will see, the villagers who gathered data 
for the warichi surveyed large sections of the village at one time. 
58. Yamamura, "From Coins to Rice," p. 357, says: "These [the Unifiers'] sur­
veys measured the real yields of paddies far more accurately than had surveys by 
Sengoku daimyo.'* 
59. Oda Kichinojo, Ishikawa ken, p. 320. 
60. Yasuzawa, Kinsei sonraku keisei, pp. 26-33. 
61. Hansei seiritsu, p. 493. 
62. Kashiwakura, "Tokugawa," p. 1017. 
63. Ibid., pp. 1018—19. 
64. Iinuma, Kokudakasei, pp. 107-8, 151. Land was graded, however, and 
social distinctions among the listed landholders were indicated by writing the family 
names in different size characters and in different locations, along with a note on 
the person's status (Jansen, "Tosa in the Sixteenth Century," pp. 96—98). 
65. Yamamura, "From Coins to Rice," p. 359. 
66. In addition to the evidence on Shinano already presented, see Hirasawa, 
Kinsei sonraku e, pp. 263—64. On Satsuma, see Matsushita, Bakuhansei shakai, 
pp. 209-33. 
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67. Berry, Hideyoshi, p. 118. 
68. There were limits to how far hegemons and daimyo were willing to go for 
the sake of exactness. Although more precise techniques became known during 
the 17th century, they were never widely introduced. See Brown, "Mismeasure of 
Land"; and Brown, "Never the Twain Shall Meet." 
69. See, for example, the description of the Imagawa surveys cited in Nagahara 
(with Yamamura), "Sengoku Daimyo," pp. 39-40, especially table 1.1. Differen­
tiation under Oda's surveys is widely recognized. 
70. Berry, having noted that Hideyoshi's agents only surveyed 20 to 30 (of 
more than 70) provinces and having indicated numerous limitations (Hideyoshi, 
pp. 112-18), then asserts, with scant analysis of any data but Hideyoshi's edicts, 
"Hideyoshi improved upon the most advanced registration techniques of his age 
to achieve exceptional results. He oversaw the registration of much of the coun­
try's land; he demanded that Toyotomi deputies or daimyo officials . . . supervise 
that registration; he defined universal standards of measurement that were em­
ployed widely; he required the direct inspection of land." Substantial evidence of 
the effectiveness of Hideyoshi's orders and the conscious imitation of his efforts by 
independent daimyo is needed to validate such assertions. If, with his own agents 
present in Satsuma, Hideyoshi could not get a well-implemented survey based on 
actual measurements, it is impossible to assume compliance in areas where daimyo 
implemented their own. 
The synchronous or near-synchronous use of similar standards is not adequate 
to establish a causal relationship, since Hideyoshi's own standards of measure 
generally came from those already in use (the size of a tan is the exception). For ex­
ample, contrary to Berry, p. 263, n.35, which cites the use of Hideyoshi's standard 
measuring rod in Kaga as evidence of his impact on measures, this standard was 
in use before the Maeda's alliance with him in mid-1583; hence the source of the 
common standard lay outside their subordinate relationship to him, perhaps in the 
shared tutelage of Oda Nobunaga (on related concerns, see Iinuma, Kokudakasei, 
pp. 128-29). Furthermore, Berry's argument for Hideyoshi's influence in this in­
stance cannot explain why the Maeda failed to adopt Hideyoshi's other standards 
simultaneously (e.g., the 300-bu tan) or why diverse measuring standards persisted 
in other areas directly investigated by Hideyoshi's agents (e.g., Awa and Chikugo). 
To document a causal role of Hideyoshi's edicts calls for a long-term analysis of 
local data, compiled by administrative units or daimyo rather than provinces, as is 
common despite the fact that they were not administrative units. (Above, I have 
counted provinces as an expedient to place Kaga's experience in broader context 
and to show that even these limited data reveal a more complex process than is 
widely thought, raising questions about the reach of Hideyoshi's state.) Such local 
analysis will likely revise evaluations of additional cases like Satsuma and Kaga 
that are often seen to support claims of Hideyoshi's influence. 
71. Hall, Government and Local Power, p. 357. 
72. Kashiwakura, "Tokugawa," pp. 1026-30. 
73. Iinuma, Kokudakasei, pp. 178-81. 
74. Hall, "Japan's Sixteenth-Century Revolution," p. 18, indicates that the 
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Gamo were moved because they lied about their survey results. But he does not 
cite his source, and I have not found any evidence to that effect. The move came 
in 1598, three years after Gamo Ujisato's death. The survey was conducted during 
his tenure as daimyo. The land investigations, which were begun in 1591 and com­
pleted within the Bunroku era (1592-95), ran into stiff local opposition (Kobayashi 
and Yamada, Fukushhna Ken, pp. 96-102). But assuming Hall is correct, this lone 
example (at most) suggests that there were very broad limits to the process I have 
described. 
75. Matsushita, Bakuhansei shakai, pp. 220-28. The survey of the Date do­
mains may also have taken place under these considerations. See Iinuma, Koku­
dakasei, p. 146. 
76. Wakita, "Kokudaka System," argues that just the opposite was true: the 
system was devised for the specific purpose of fostering unification. 
77. Berry, Hideyoshi, p. 118, argues that survey deviations from Hideyoshi's 
principles were the result of the "imperfect judgment of his magistrates . .  . work­
ing . . . wi th . . . biased informants/1 She further argues that this imperfect judgment 
should not "conceal the extent of his reach." However, such variations as the use of 
kandaka instead of kokudaka, the use of a variety of survey methods (e.g., the con­
tinued reliance on sashidashi), some of which were imprecise even for the time, and 
the use of nonstandard measuring rods cannot be ascribed to imperfect judgment 
or biased informants. They help define the limits of Hideyoshi's reach. 
78. Elison, "Cross and Sword," Elison, "Hideyoshi," and Wheelwright, "A 
Visualization," all stress the importance of "image" in reinforcing the authority of 
Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi. 
Chapter 4 
1. See Hayami, "Rydshu"; Hayami, "Kinsei shoki"; and Hayami, "Kenchi 
torokunin." 
2. For a more complete discussion of these and other limitations of survey 
techniques, see Brown, "Mismeasure of Land." 
3. The latter was theoretically possible, for by the late 16th century the com­
pass and astrolabe had been introduced in Japan. For a full discussion of the more 
precise techniques that the Japanese rejected, see Brown, "Never the Twain Shall 
Meet." Some readers may feel that paddy ridges should have eliminated the need 
to mark field boundaries; however, villagers were known to shift ridges surrepti­
tiously so as to encroach on a neighboring field or extend their plots incrementally 
into uncultivated areas through a process called kirisoe. Paddy ridges made very 
unstable barriers. And of course dry fields would not have had ridges to define them. 
4. See Furushima, "Warichi seido"; and the introductory sections of Aono, 
Nihon kinsei warichisei shi. 
5. Furushima, "Warichi seido"; Aono, Nihon kinsei warichisei shi, pp. 201-3. 
Much of the early work on warichi focused on the question of how it arose, an 
issue I hope to deal with in future research. 
6. The list of domains is based on the two works cited in n. 5. The assessed 
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value for all Japan is from Hanley and Yamamura, Economic and Demographic 
Change, p. 71, and the data for domains come from individual domain entries 
in Takayanagi and Takeuchi, Nihon shi jiten. Data were not available for all the 
domains listed by Furushima and Aono. Furthermore, several classic studies treat 
entire provinces instead of domains; rather than risk duplication, I have therefore 
excluded the provincial data. As a result, a number of areas (e.g., most parts of 
Echigo) are omitted from these calculations. 
7. Inoue, Niigata ken, pp. 145-46. The warichi system was so widespread in 
Echigo that the area quickly became the focus of some of the earliest articles on the 
practice. The most important of these are cited in Furushima, "Warichi seido." See 
also the section on Echigo in Aono, Nihon kinsei warichisei shi. In addition, many 
local histories from the area devote at least some space to the subject. 
8. For example, see Araki Moriaki, Bakuhan taisei shakai, pp. 49-54,182-90. 
9. Hara, Kaga-han, pp. 32-33. 
10. Ito, "Kinsei shoki daimyo ryo,*' p. 29. 
11. Kigoshi, "Kan'ei-ki Choke ryo Kashima hangun," pp. 19-21, 23. 
12. The villagers* exemption from the Cho house and horse tax are recorded 
in official explanations of their failure to pay the tax (ibid., pp. 24-28). 
13. "Kawai roku," p. 913; Tochinai, Kyu Kaga-han, pp. 134-36. 
14. TKSS, p. 912. 
15. "Kawai roku," p. 913. 
16. The most commonly cited hypothetical case used to illustrate this process 
has a village of 100 koku divided into 10 shares valued at 10 koku each (ibid.) 
17. Tochinai, Kyu Kaga-han, pp. 136—42; "Kawai roku,*' p. 913; Hakui shi shi, 
p. 671. 
18. See, for example, the request submitted in 1679 by Omachi village in Hakui 
shi shi, p. 659. 
19. This assertion accords with Popkin's argument in The Rational Peasant, 
pp. 22—27,32~39> 46—58, that villagers will cooperate only in those activities least 
likely to provoke a dispute over the allocation of insurance benefits. 
20. The data for these villages suggest that in mandating a maximum of 20 
years between redistributions, the domain gave legal force to a customary interval. 
The impact of this 1838 regulation biases the intervals in the sample toward the 20­
year span, but apparently in only two or three cases. Even in these the impact is 
generally small. 
21. Tonami shi shi, p. 371. These two examples were selected because they 
illustrate the variation that could occur between villages in the same general area. 
Similar variations can be found in many of the local histories from the Toyama and 
Ishikawa prefectural areas. 
22. Ibid., table 5.3 note. 
23. See, for example, Oda Kichinojo, Kaga-han, p. 488; and Tochinai, Kyu 
Kaga-han, p. 82. 
24. The document, "Go Kaisaku shimatsu kikigaki," is transcribed in KHNK, 
1: 639—700. The passage on warichi is at p. 642. 
25. Quoted inTakazawa, "Warichi," p. 138. 
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26. WSS, i:55-S7. 
27. Noto Wafima Kamikaji-ke monjo mokuroku, pp. 100-101. 
28. KHS, 2: 634. 
29. Examples of sales and mortages of land rights in the 17th century are com­
mon in printed local histories. See, among others, WSS, 1: i n  , 117,134,136,364. 
30. The following discussion is based on KHNK, 1: 68-74. 
31. Ibid., p. 71, table 6. Transcriptions of these and similar documents can be 
found on pp. 387—467 of this volume. 
32. Suzu shi shi, pp. 359-60. 
33. Ibid., pp. 260-61. For other generally similar examples, see WSS, 2: 678­
86. 
34. These data are presented in a table in Tonami shi shi, p. 415; the original 
documents from which they were taken appear in Kaga-han shoki tomurayaku 
kaneko monjo, pp. 136-47,166-72. 
35. Suzu shi shi, p. 261. 
36. KHS, 2: 362—63. The prohibition was repeated in 1631 (ibid., p. 634). 
Chapter 5 
1. See Hall, Government and Local Power, chaps. 12.-13; R. Salcai, "Con­
solidation of Power**; and Jansen, "Tosa in the Seventeenth Century." On Sendai, 
see Morris, Kinsei Nihon chigyosei. The mechanisms through which officials and 
villagers interacted also varied from one domain to another. 
2. Davis, "Kaga Ikko Ikki." McMullin, Buddhism, presents the conflict be­
tween the Ikko believers and Oda in national historical context. 
3. Urata, "Shoki Maeda-ke kashindan," p. 3. 
4. Kigoshi, "Keicho-ki Kaga-han," pp. 338-39. Toshiie continued to place rank­
ing retainers in the kashindan of his sons. 
5. Urata, "Shoki Maeda-ke kashindan," p. 22, n. 10. 
6. Okumura, "Maeda Toshiie," pp. 33-34. 
7. KHNK, 1=44-45­
8. Ibid., pp. 45—46. 
9. Urata, "Shoki Maeda-ke kashindan," p. 8. 
10. Ibid., pp. 3,9; WSS, Tsushi hen: 193. 
11. Notojima no kinsei monjo, p. 16. 
12. Urata, "Shoki Maeda-ke kashindan," pp. 3,9; £5, 2: 51-52. 
13. This is not a particularly surprising conclusion given that the great majority 
of these men belonged to what is commonly called the kokujin class. 
14. Hara, Kaga-han, pp. 31—34. 
15. KHNK, 1: 45. Both McClain, Kanazawa, p. 27, and Tsuchiya, Hoken sha­
kai hokai katei, p. 60, present somewhat different estimates. Since Wakabayashi is 
the doyen of Kaga studies, I have accepted his estimates. 
16. For a discussion of some of the earliest means daimyo employed to restrain 
their retainers, see Hall, "Ikeda House," p. 80; and Hall, "Foundations," pp. 71-72. 
17. For relevant documents on the forests, see Okumura, "Maeda Toshiie," 
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p. 36. Some district officials {fuchibyakusho) did receive grants allowing them to 
collect duties on these resources. Such user fees were not uncommon (seeTotman, 
Origins, app. 2: "Han Forests and Fiscal Policy"). On the miscellaneous taxes, see 
Yanagida son shi, pp. 251-52; KK, pp. 739,899-900,1015-16; and IKS, 3:16-17. 
18. KHS, 1: 281-82, 359, 532-33, 565-66, presents some examples. At other 
times a smaller region, still larger than a village, was designated (ibid., pp. 260-61). 
19. For discussion and documents on several widely dispersed holdings, see 
KHNK, 1: 51-52; Urata, "Shoki Maeda-ke kashindan," p. 10; and Okumura, 
"Maeda Toshiie," pp. 35-36. 
20. See the fief distribution grants in KK, pp. 757-58,777-78,852,916,1015— 
16; WSS, 1: 265-66; IKS, 3: 161-67; Tonanti shi shi, pp. 305-6; and Oku Noto 
Tokikuni-ke monjo, p. 21; and the retainer holdings listed in "Kan'ei kyu nen hachi 
gatsu Tonami gun Toide mura Matauemon gumi furudaka shinkai sashiagedaka 
mononari oncho," in TKSS, 3, Furoku: 6-14. In all these sources, where a retainer's 
holdings were obviously large, there were fewer part-village holdings. 
21. KK, pp. 899-900. 
22. Tonami shi shi, pp. 305-6. 
23. Only seven of the 45 villages in district chief Matauemon's jurisdiction in 
1629-31 were under the control of just one master ("Kan'ei kyu nen . . . ,  " as cited 
in n. 20, above). 
24. KK, pp. 1015-16. 
25. Oku Noto Tokikuni-ke monjo, p. 21. 
26. "Kan'ei kyu nen . . ." (see n. 20, above). Twenty-one of 45 villages experi­
enced at least one change during the three years recorded in this document. 
27. Urata, "Shoki Maeda-ke kashindan," pp. 3,7. 
28. All data are from ibid., p. 18. 
29. Wajima, "Kaga-han," p. 82, imputes the appearance of "fuchibyakusho" 
only in Noto to the region's susceptibility to invasion from the sea (most of the 
known fuchibyakusho were from coastal villages). This does not seem to be an 
adequate explanation, for fuchibyakusho were appointed as late as 1588, well after 
any major threat of an invasion of the domain was over. Furthermore, both Kaga 
and Etchu provinces had extensive, vulnerable coastlines. 
30. Suzu shi shi, p. 667. 
31. Ibid., p. 711. 
32. KHNK, 1:534,536,538. 
33. Some number of these grants to temples and shrines are printed in KK and 
KHS, passim. Other, similar conveyances can be found in city, town, and village 
histories of Ishikawa and Toyama prefectures. 
34. For a discussion of a famous shrine that had declined during the 16th cen­
tury, with a resulting loss of local influence, and then made a comeback with Maeda 
support, see Kigoshi, "Keicho-ki Kaga-hari," especially pp. 332-37. 
35. Hara, Kaga-han, pp. 10-12; KK, p. 1708. 
36. KHNK, 1: 530; Fukuoka cho shi, p. 1205. 
37. KHNK, 1: 539. For other examples of local assistance to Toshiie, see ibid., 
pp. 530,536,546. See also Chap. 8, below. 
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38. Ishikawa ken Shio cho shi, p. 128. Yukinaga was one of the local men who 
helped Toshiie set up his first headquarters at the Kita Shrine. 
39. Ishikawa ken Unoke cho shi, p. 155. 
40. Evidence for Ikko links may be found also in the biographies of families that 
became tomura, the fuchibyakusho's successors. Their genealogies are reprinted or 
summarized in many of the village, town, and city histories of Ishikawa and Toyama 
prefectures. KHNK, 1: 524-93, gives two of the larger genealogical compilations. 
41. Hara, Kaga-han, pp. 12-13. 
42. Hara argues (ibid., pp. 9-15) that the distinction between these grants 
marks the beginning of the separation of warrior and peasant. For his discussion 
of distinctions between types of grant, see pp. 10-11. 
43. Ishikawa ken Unoke cho shi, pp. 170-71. 
44. Oshimizu cho shi, p. 195. 
45. See KHNK, 1: 524-93. Kano shiwa, p. 58, and Himi shi shi, pp. 738-39, 
discuss three examples of villagers in Etchu who might be ranked as fuchibyakusho. 
Genealogies for Kaga tomura include men who received land from Toshiie (see 
KHNK, 1: 525,530). Such cases, I believe, deserve to be considered on a par with 
fuchibyakusho. 
46. On Jirozaemon, see Tonami shi shi, p. 385. The authors claim that Jirozae­
mon was a village kimoiri, but there is no evidence that his function was so limited. 
Certainly this is not dear from the document that bestowed the fuchi. On Kambei, 
see KHNK, 1:525. The genealogy uses the term "tomura." That title did not appear 
until the mid-i7th century, though variants were used earlier in the century (e.g., 
tomura kimoiri). The use of the term for Rokurozaemon is clearly anachronistic, 
but the purport of the claim is clear. On the Watanabe, see Unoke cho shi, pp. 
172-73. 
47. McClain, Kanazawa, p. 35. 
48. See Owada, "Sengoku daimyo Gohojo-shi," on the Tokugawa's adoption 
of the Gohojo system of village administration. 
Chapter 6 
1. See, for example, Befu, "Village Autonomy." 
2. Davis, "Kaga Ikko Ikki." For the broader context, see Davis, "Ikki in Late 
Medieval Japan." 
3. This and the preceding example are from Oshimizu cho shi, p. 153. 
4. Ibid., pp. 154—55; Togi cho shi, Tsushi hen: 128. 
5. Yanagida son shi, p. 234. 
6. Togi cho shi, Tsushi hen: 129. 
7. Ishikawa ken Oshino son shi, p. 63; Kokufu son shi, p. 28. 
8. Ishikawa ken Unoke cho shi, p. 49. 
9. Wakabayashi, "Kaga-han no tomura," pp. 54-55; KHNK,i: 101-2. 
10. Kigoshi, "Maeda," pp. 36-37; KHS,i: 424. 
11. See, for example, the Keicho 4.2.14 document in KK, p. 898. 
12. McClain, "Castle Towns," especially pp. 282-83. 
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13. KK, p. 846. Han policies on the recultivation of wasteland also reflect this 
concern. 
14. KK, pp. 710—II . For another example, see KK, p. 735. * 
15. KK, pp. 819, 898 (documents dated Tensho 16.12.25 and Keichd 4.2.14); 
KHS, 1: 837-39,851-52,870-71,885-86 (documents dated Keicho 6.5.17,7.3.26, 
7.12.7, and 9.5.26). 
16. KHNK,i: 95-96,100-101. 
17. Ibid., pp. 96-98. 
18. Hara, Kaga-ban, pp. 18-23. 
19. KHS, 2: 638. Clause 2 of a 1607 ofuregaki mentions "mura mura kimoiri," 
but it is unclear whether this means the (tomura) kimoiri who presided over the 
several villages or the kimoiri of an individual village. Since the commoner offi­
cials referred to in the remainder of the document are tomura, it is likely that the 
reference is to them, not village officials. A document issued in 1611 by Yokoyama 
Yamashiro no kami to one of the villages in his fief mentions the "headman of the 
present village [to mura kimoiri]" (Sakai Seiichi, Kaga-han kaisakuho, pp. 2 0 0 ­
201). Though it is clear from examples of the latter sort that formal offices were 
recognized, the lack of documents specifying their duties suggests that they still 
played a very limited role in the thinking of domain officials and landed retainers. 
20. Kigoshi, "Maeda," p. 29. There is no evidence that daikan were used as 
land surveyors after the very early period of Maeda rule. 
21. Ibid. 
22. Noto Wajima Kamikaji-ke monjo, pp. 86—87. 
23. Kigoshi, "Maeda," pp. 30-31. 
24. Noto Wajima Kamikaji-ke monjo, p. 86. 
25./CIC,p.739. 
26. Suzu shi shi, pp. 13-14. 
27. KHS, 1: 424; KK, p. 846. After promising that loan rice would be pro­
vided and demands for unpaid taxes {mishin) would cease, Yasukatsu encouraged 
villagers to return and devote themselves wholeheartedly to farming. 
28. KHS, 1:476. 
Chapter 7 
1. The last is a clear corollary of the clarifying of village boundaries, a matter 
we will take up shortly. It is also in conformity with later kenchi regulations. 
2. In theory one might estimate accuracy by comparing late Edo survey and 
Meiji land tax reform data. For Kaga that would require detailed records of what 
the domain surveyors did in adjusting for dry fields or else the full unadjusted data 
on which they calculated a village's assessed value. I have not located the requisite 
documents for even one village. 
3. The same 1589 documents thatfirst mention hatake ori in Tokikuni and Ono 
villages indicate that the annual tax for mountain dry fields was calculated sepa­
rately and was not included in calculating the village's assessed value. A survey 
document for Yamada village includes the same notation. (See WSS, 2: 212, 276; 
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Hamade, Morohashi son shi, pp. 344-45.) A 1587 ordinance suggests that some 
mountain dry fields were reclaimed land and therefore subject to exemption from 
the main land tax: "Since here and there mountain dry fields have been newly re­
claimed and the previously taxed fields have gone to waste, the annual land tax is 
to be assessed on those mountain dry fields." To further encourage the retention 
of old fields, villagers were told, "If the previously taxed fields have not become 
wasteland, they are to be exempted." Though this was presumably a short-term 
measure, the clear implication is that up to this point no systematic effort had been 
made to tax reclaimed lands. {KHS, 1: 347; KK, p. 809.) 
4. These fields were called nagibatake. Eleven other Noto villages surveyed in 
1620 that cultivated mountain fields this way had a comparable exemption. Slash-
and-burn agriculture was typical in the mountain areas of Noto (WSS, 2:54). Where 
this technique was widely used, it must have been difficult to keep tax records, since 
fields would have been constantly going in and out of production. (See for example, 
the documents describing nagibatake in Monzen cho shi, p. 73; Ishikawa ken shi 
shiryo, pp. 157-59; IKS, 3: 484-85; WSS, 2: 284, 462, 515; Yanagida son shi, pp. 
259,1270; Suzu shi shi, pp. 106,632.) 
5. Himi shi shi, pp. 1184-85. 
6. It is clear from the way the tax on these fields was recorded and later assimi­
lated into the basic land tax that it was not one of the domain's miscellaneous taxes 
(komononari). 
7. For example, the copy of the 1586 survey of Tokikuni village was made on 
1620.11.3. That was precisely the time of the Genna 6 land survey. The copy was 
made by three officials, two of whom, Asano Shokan and Uemura Hachizaemon, 
were kenchi bugyo for the Genna investigation. (WSS, 2: 211.) 
8. See KHNK, 1: 542., for one example. If the officials took any documents, they 
left copies in the village officials' collections. 
9. Toide cho shi, pp. 1365-66. 
10. Shinminato shi shi, p. 630. 
11. Sakai Seiichi, Kaga-han kaisakuho, p. 140; Kaga-han shoki tomurayaku 
Kaneko monjo, p. 4. 
12. Toide cho shi, pp. 244-45. 
13. KHS, 2: 377. 
14. Ibid., p. 639; Oshimizu cho shi, p. 183. 
15. KHS, 2: 632. 
16. Kigoshi, "Kaga-han no muradaka"; Kigoshi, uKaga-han gocho shinden­
daka ni tsuite." 
17. Brown, "Domain Formation," pp. 163-64. 
18. See Brown, "Mismeasure of Land." 
19. Iinuma, Kokudakasei no kenkyii, pp. 44-45. 
20. Himi shi shi, pp. 782.-83. 
21. Suzu shi shi, p. 104; KK, p. 1177. 
22. Other receipts from the same district for 1582 taxes or earlier further sub­
stantiate the use of cash for the first two years of Maeda rule {Suzu shi shi, pp. 
11—12). Since cash and rice assessments in the pre-Maeda period appear to have 
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been interchangeable, it is possible that taxes for some villages were based on rice 
assessments as well. 
23. Both documents are from ibid., p. 626. See p. 158 for a typical tax bill/ 
receipt. 
24. WSS, 1:224. 
25. Suzu shi shi, p. 14. 
26. Nakajima cho shi, p. 413; KK, p. 815. 
27. For a more detailed comparison of the interrelationship between taxes 
collected, wasteland, reclamation, and shittai, see Brown, "Domain Formation," 
pp. 211-12. 
28. As we will see, typically only 5-10% of the assessed taxes went unpaid. 
29. Domain policies and incentives did not stabilize until the mid-17th century, 
but the special treatment accorded newly opened land required a separate set of 
books. By the 1616 regulations, reclaimed land had to be part of the village total 
in province-wide surveys. Even if it was not incorporated in this sweeping fashion, 
all reclaimed land was ultimately added to the existing registers and taxed at the 
standard village rate. 
30. For example, the 1582 tax bill for Nishiumi district was dated 7.20, that of 
1583,11.20 {Suzu shi shi, pp. 626-27). The 1583 tax bill for Ozawa village was 
dated in the nth month, that of 1587 for Kumagi 7.10 (Ozawa: Kigoshi, "Maeda," 
p. 22; Kumagi: Nakajima cho shi, p. 413). 
31. Suzu shi shi, pp. 735-36. 
32. Konpoji village's Tensho 13 tax receipt (ibid., pp. 739-40) is one example. 
Ushio village's interim receipt for its 1585 taxes was issued in 1586.7, and final pay­
ment was acknowledged by Toshiie's seal on the same document in 1587.6 (WSS, 
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after those surveys. 
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dential fief beyond the early decades of the 17th century. McClain, Kanazawa, pp. 
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41. The late-16th-century daikan rotation rate was discussed in Chap. 6. Of 
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{Noto Wajima Kamikaji-ke monjo mokuroku, p. 86). The rate of turnover clearly 
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43. KHS, 2:151. 
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KHS, 2: 304. 
45. KHS, 2: 380-81. 
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47. Sasaki, Daimyo, pp. 160-61, takes the position that these exports actu­
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48. KHS, 2: 387. 
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55. Ibid., p. 625. 
56. SeeTanaka Seiji, "Kinsei zenki"; and Nakaguchi, "Kinsei shoki soho." The 
assessment systems described in such manuals of local administration as Ando 
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14. McClain, Kanazawa, pp. 63—67. 
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17. Sasaki, Daimyo, pp. 271-72. 
18. Mise, "Inaba Sakon," p. 39; Yamada Shirozaemon, Mitsubo kikigaki, pp. 
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19. Mise, "Inaba Sakon," p. 40. 
20. TKSS, 3: 416-17. Follow-up orders in 1640 show that the authorities made 
at least one attempt to maintain this increase. Clearly some retainers were unwilling 
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21. For more on these changes in unit size, see Mise, "Inaba Sakon," pp. 42-47. 
22. Meyasuba were apparently not established in Etchu until 1637 (ibid., p. 47). 
23. Sakai Seiichi, Kaga-han kaisakuho, pp. 183-84. 
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to him, along with one or two other people who appear to be lesser village officers. 
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one retainer. (Kaga-han shoki tomurayaku Kaneko monjo, pp. 27-30, 54-59 pas­
sim.) In fact, since villages in Kaga domain periodically reallocated their land, and 
the size and arrangement of fields could change at the same time, retainers could 
hardly have been assigned the right to tax specific well-defined fields. 
28. KHNK, 1: 139-41, discusses some of the principal measures taken to 
counter mid-17th-century taxpayer indebtedness. 
29. F(i,92) = 7; the test statistic was 8.8. The difference is significant at the 1% 
level of confidence. Nonparametric tests yielded comparable results. 
30. The standard deviation shrank from 16.4 to 14.4. 
31. "Kan'ei kyu-nen hachigatsu Tonami gun Toide mura Matazaemon gumi 
furudaka, shinkai sashidashidaka mononari cho," in TKSS, 3: Furoku, shows simi­
lar if less dramatic tendencies. 
32. For a full treatment of the Kaisaku ho, consult Sakai Seiichi, Kaga-han 
kaisaku ho; Hara, Kaga-han; and KHNK, vol. 1. 
33. In the Oku Noto counties of Suzu and Fugeshi the number was increased 
from one to three (Hara, Kaga-han, p. 124). 
34. For an example of one early ordinance (1625), see ibid., pp. 94-95; and 
on this aspect of class separation more generally, pp. 93-105 • Village headmen 
and their children were exempted from the plow tax as compensation for the ad­
ministrative office. The instructions transcribed in ibid., pp. 94-95, also define the 
classes of rural residents who were exempted—generally, hereditary servants of 
both samurai and hyakusho; dependent households {genin) that did not cultivate 
land; and outcastes (hinin and eta). For a typical example of instructions to be read 
to villagers, from 1655, see ibid., pp. 132-34. 
35. Ibid., pp. 138—49; Sakai Seiichi, Kaga-han kaisakuhd, pp. 309—16. 
36. KHNK, 1: 161-62; Sakai Seiichi, Kaga-han kaisakuhd, pp. 233-34 (and 
pp. 350—51 on the return on the domain's investment). 
37. KHNK, 1:10, 238. 
38. Wakabayashi Kisaburo, "Kaga-han no tomura seido kakuritsu ni tsuite 
oboegaki," Nihon Rekishi, 236 (Jan. 1968): 95-96. For examples of regrouping, 
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39. KHNK, 1:163,645,648. 
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comes from the extensive document collections of their descendants. 
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Sakai Seiichi, Kaga-han kaisakuho, pp. 244-50. 
42. KHNK, 1:243. 
43. Ibid., pp. 163-64, 234-36. 
44. Hara, Kaga-han, pp. 132-34. 
45. Documents in Tonami shi shi, pp. 372-73, provide illustrations of warichi 
activity at this time. 
46. KHS, 2: 634. 
47. KHNK, 1:244-45. 
48. "Ka-No-Etsu san ka koku taka mononari chd," manuscript 7021, in Kana­
zawa Shiritsu Toshokan, Kanazawa, contains copies of all of the 1670 mura goin. 
Each of these documents notes all the changes made in the assessed values and 
taxes since the issuance of the 1656 goin. 
49. I am indebted to Kigoshi Ryuzo for allowing me to draw on his summary 
of the data in two manuscripts in the Early Modern Manuscript Collection of the 
Kanazawa Shiritsu Toshokan—"Shohd san nen taka mononari cho genko" and 
"San ka koku taka mononari cho." Kigoshi presents some of these data in his article 
"Kaga-han gocho shindendaka," p. 58, chart 9. The provincial figures presented 
here do not include Enuma and Neii counties, the two branch domains. 
50. This does not mean that there were no demands for tax reductions. They 
clearly occurred in 1660 and 1668, years of fairly severe crop shortfalls (see "Kawai 
roku," pp. 937, 939—40). In response to these pressures, there were investigations 
for the purpose of temporarily lowering the rates on paddy only, but few long-term 
reductions were incorporated in 1670 tax bills. 
51. This conclusion is based on my transcriptions of some 3,500 1670 mura 
goin. Many local histories reproduce these bills. 
52. Large-scale requests for rate reductions come much later. In 1737, 2,217 
villages requested a tax rate reduction, and 1,015 villages received one (KHS, 7: 
34). See also Tanaka Yoshio, "Kaga-han." 
53. The long-term impact of fixed tax rates is still to be investigated. The data 
in Thomas C. Smith, "The Land Tax in the Tokugawa Period," in Hall and Jansen, 
Studies in Institutional History, pp. 283-99, permit a preliminary estimate of later 
land tax trends in Kaga domain. Based on his 19th-century figures for Fugeshi, 
Kahoku, and Hakui counties in Noto (p. 287), the tax rate fell by 4% on average. If 
research should show that this was the extent of the fall, the jomen system, despite 
the sacrifice of the opportunity to keep up with increased yields, would have at 
least solved the immediate problem of how to restore and maintain revenues better 
than die kemi system had. 
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55. KHNK, 1:163. 
56. Hara, Kaga-han, p. 128. 
57. The incident is commonly treated as either an early form of village revolt or 
an ie sodo, a dispute among a daimyo's retainer band {KHNK, 1: 261; ltd, "Kinsei 
shoki daimyo ryo"). 
58. Fukaya et al., "Kanbun nana-nen Kaga-han kenchi," presents a more com­
prehensive treatment of this incident. For an older view, see Ito, "Kinsei shoki 
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Chapter 10 
1. The emphasis on the power of Hideyoshi and the early shogunate owes in 
good part to the abundance of early modern Japanese document collections. Their 
volume alone makes a balanced use of central and local data difficult and reinforces 
the tendency of historians to rely on central directives to develop their interpreta­
tions: local materials are read largely as verification of central ordinances. As much 
as historians know that the absence of evidence may have meaning, a "history with 
mirrors" may only be practical once the boundaries of known data become clear. 
(This characterization of the usefulness of lacunae in data is drawn from Jeffrey P. 
Mass, "Introduction" to Mass and Hauser, Bakufu in Japanese History\ p. 1.) In 
the 40 years since Araki Moriaki argued for the revolutionary impact of the Taiko 
kenchi, sufficient evidence has been unearthed and analyzed for historians to move 
beyond the perspective generated by examining centrally issued ordinances. We 
can now ask if documentary voids like the lack of standard survey registers in 
domains such as Kaga, Satsuma, and Bizen have something to tell us. (The absence 
of registers in Kaga and Satsuma has already been discussed. Even though Hall, 
Government and Local Power, pp. 3i8ff, indicates that very little is known about 
the Taiko kenchi in Bizen, and specifically notes, on p. 300, the lack of registers dur­
ing Hideyoshi's reign, his discussion of the Ikeda surveys on pp. 390-92 assumes 
that the earlier standard ones had taken place.) This question could be extended to 
matters like the sword hunt and class separation edicts and related ordinances. 
2. McClain built his analysis in Kanazawa as a counterargument to this kind 
of interpretation. 
3. Many scholars treat domain laws restricting the sale of land, the systemati­
zation and conversion of labor dues to cash or rice payments, and related policies as 
designed solely to serve the interests of the han treasury. Hara, Kaga-han, p. 92, for 
example, claims that 17th-century kenchi created a stable tax revenue {"anteiteki 
na nengu shuno o kakuho") and strengthened the domain's financial base. He also 
argues that the prohibiting of the sale of land, the demand for tax payments before 
rice sales, and the lightening of labor dues were all in aid of increasing the villagers' 
ability to pay land taxes. 
4. Wakita, "Social and Economic Consequences of Unification," p. 108, notes 
the impact of violent opposition more than most, but even he describes compro­
mises in survey practice only in terms of exempting some land from measurement 
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or the annual tax and making some exemptions from the corvee, not deviation 
from standard measures or procedures. 
5. Wallerstein, Modern World-System, 1:134,144-45. 
6. Rule, "Reading of the Rolle." 
7. Charles Tilly makes a similar argument for emerging states in early mod­
ern Europe. He stresses the interactions between the demands of defense and the 
expansion of a state's domestic authority. See "War Making and State Making as 
Organized Crime," in Evans et al., Bringing the State Back In, pp. 169-91. Par­
ticularly noteworthy in light of my discussion below are his comments regarding 
Richelieu's claims for a monopoly of the use of force—claims that came long before 
the state's effective accomplishment of a monopoly (p. 174). 
8. Kasaya, "Nihon Kinsei shakai," takes a similar position in arguing that some 
elements of daimyo autonomy could not be integrated into the Bakufu control 
system. 
9. See Wheelwright's analysis of Oda Nobunaga's use of monumental art in "A 
Vizualization"; and Elison's descriptions of Azuchi castle in "Cross and Sword," 
pp. 62-66, and Hideyoshi's political manipulation of tea, Noh drama, and poetry 
in "Hideyoshi," pp. 234-36, 239-44. On the use of ritual, era names, titles, and 
other devices in diplomacy, see Toby, State and Diplomacy, especially chaps. 3, 
5. The use of religious and philosophical traditions in late-16th- and early-17th­
century Japan to legitimate the emerging order is analyzed in Ooms, Tokugawa 
Ideology, chaps. 2-3. 
10. See Oishi Shinzaburo, "Kinsei," p. 52. 
11. See Birt, "Samurai in Passage." 
12. For evidence beyond Kaga, see Owada, "Sengoku daimyo Gohojo-shi," on 
the Tokugawa's adoption of the Gohojo system of village administration. 
13. The Bakufu's mid-17th-century orders of land surveys, taken by some as 
applying nationwide, were as ineffective in this regard as Hideyoshi's. See, for ex­
ample, Yamamura, "From Coins to Rice," p. 359, relying on Oishi Shinzaburo, 
"Kinsei," p. 52. See also Iinuma, Kokudakasei no kenkyu, on varying survey stan­
dards in the 17th century. Indeed, one might argue that in some instances the 
domain tail wagged the hegemon dog. In restricting the sale of land use rights 
and adopting the jomen system of tax assessment, the Maeda followed principles 
that the Bakufu would not put into practice until the early 18th century. Other 
domains also adopted the jomen system long before the Bakufu: Matsue, in 1687; 
Okayama, 1654; Matsuyama, permanently from 1679; and Todo, 1652 (Kodama, 
Kinsei nomin seikatsu shi, p. 40; Kanai, Hansei, pp. 58-59; Suga, "Matsuyama 
han," pp. 53,55-56; Sasaki, Daimyo, pp. 315,327-29). 
14. Often the expansion of arable land produced whole new villages, shinden 
mura. In fact, the names of many villages, wards, and hamlets throughout Japan 
today include the words shin (new), kaihatsu (development), or the like, clearly 
reflecting this heritage. 
15. Harafuji, "Han Laws." 
16. Hall, "Hideyoshi's Domestic Policies," p. 206. Berry, Hideyoshi, notes that 
there is no evidence under Hideyoshi of a "scheme to enforce compliance" (p. 137), 
2.86 Notes to Pages 239—40 
but in earlier references to his surveys, she speaks of his "demanding," "establish­
ing,'* etc. (pp. 114,118). 
17. See, for example, White, "State Growth," Totman, "Preindustrial River 
Conservancy." 
18. See Ooms, Tokugawa Ideology, on the political discourse through which 
a rationale for the new order was developed. While Ooms examines ideology, 
Thomas Keirstead {The Geography of Power) analyzes institutional transforma­
tions of the shoen in terms of "discourse" in order to avoid a sense of unidirec­
tional, linear history and to open a sense of possibility as opposed to an image 
of determinism (Chapters 2 and 3, which deal respectively with conceptions of 
hyakusho and land records, will be of particular interest to readers). Although my 
approach differs from Keirstead's deconstructionist analysis, my effort has roots 
in similar objections to writings in Japanese history that impose uniformity on 
complex developments and which reduce the resulting variety of outcomes to a 
single form. These concerns are part of diverse scholarly efforts to deal with the 
limitations of linear analytic models. Although Ooms, Keirstead, Harry D. Haroo­
tunian {Things Seen and Unseen), and others derive their inspiration from theories 
of literary criticism and linguistics, other scholars develop alternative approaches 
from the models provided by non-linear science (of which "chaos" theory is most 
widely discussed). On the latter see Alan Beyerchen, "Non-linear Science," and 
"Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War"; and Randolph Roth, 
"Is History a Process?" 
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Fukutomi Yukikiyo, 43 f, 46, 264n3 
Funyuken (right of nonentry), 3,17-18, 
100,148, 250 
Furushima Toshio, 27on6 
Gedai (subretainer), 250 
Genin (servant), 250 
Gofuchinin tomura (stipended tomura), 
174, 2o8f, 250 
Gohojo family, 5, 40,83,86, 258^9 
"Good administration," standard for, 
238-39 
Gosanke (Tokugawa branch houses), 55, 
150 
Gosan'yoba (special accounting office), 201 
Gradualism: in Kaga domain history, 190, 
221-24, 234; change in local adminis­
tration and, 222-23;  c l a s s separation 
and, 223-24, 235 
Gun'yaku (military levy), 6,10, 250 
Hall, John Whitney, 11,13,15, 23, 28, 
25^22, 257n28, 261n65, 268n74, 2.84m 
Han (domain), 251. See also Domain 
administration; Kaga domain; Daimyo 
Hanley, Susan, 27on6 
Hara Shogo, 20, 23, 30,109-10, 
Hatake ori procedure, 74, 2ji 
Hatakeyama family, 119,126 
Hatamoto (shogunal retainers), 90, 251 
Hayakawa Jiro, 10 
Hayami Akira, 21,91, 26on5i 
Hegemons: control over daimyo and, 6—7, 
13-14, 23-24, 41, 238-39, 257n28; 
alternate attendance system and, 8, 
23, 252, 256ml; influence on domain 
administration, 13-14, 24,34-35, 220  ­
21, 261 n6i; foreign policy and, 1411; 
local administration and, 22-24,111, 
221; Maeda relations with, 40-44, 4 8  ­
49, 51,166,183-84, 225-26; daimyo 
obligations to, 85-86,183-184,196, 
279n38; image and, 87, 232-35,16^78; 
land disposition and, 90-91. See also 
Gun!yakw, Oda Nobunaga; Tokugawa 
Ieyasu; Toyotomi Hideyoshi 
Heikin men (tax rate averaging/uniform tax 
rates), 198,199-200, 203, 251 
Hei-nobunri. See Class separation 
Heki Ken, 53n, ij6n 
Hellie, Richard, 23011 
Hidden fields (onden), 17,149-50 
Hideyoshi, see Toyotomi Hideyoshi 
Hikichi (land not in warichi redistribution), 
103,251 
Hioki Ken, see Heki Ken 
Historiographic research: central authority 
as issue in, 10—14; u s  e °f local histories 
in, 28-30, 284m; linear analytic models 
in, 286ni8 
Honbyakusho (villager status), see 
Hyakusho 
Honda family, 119, i22f 
Honda Masashige, 52n, 53, 263 n26 
Honden (long-standing fields), 102—3, 251 
Hostage-holding, 8, 23, 47, 51, 52n, 183-84, 
220, 224 
Hyakusho (villager status), 15,16—17,90, 
173,189,235,251 
Hyakusho ikki (rural protests), 251 
Hyakusho uke (tax contract), 4, 20,134, 251 
Ie sodo (house disturbance), 251 
Ieyasu, see Tokugawa Ieyasu 
Iinuma Jiro, 2661143, *67n64 
Ikenchi measurement method, 80 
Ikki, 3, 20,134, 255n2. See also Ikko ikki; 
Rural protests 
Ikko ikki, 251, 255112; Maeda and, 42ff, 
47, 98-99,109-10, u6f, i26f, 234; 
fuchibyakusho and, 135; tomura and, 
2-73n 4 ° 
Immigrant retainers, 98, i n  , H7f, 
Impressment, 176-77 
Inaba Sakon, 2oof 
Inoue Toshio, 27on7 
Inspectorate (meyasuba), 178,198 
Investiture, see Transfer of daimyo 
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Ishida Mitsunari, $i 
Ishii Ryosuke, 12,257027 
Ishii Shiro, i8n, 257022

ltd Tasaburd, 4611

Iwasawa Yoshihiko, 470, 26303

Jansen, Marius, 17

Jomen (fixed tax rate) system, 190, 251,

283053; crop sampling and, 2in; experi­

mentation with, 198—201; Kaisaku ho

reforms aod, 210—11,2i2f, 223; domain

initiative and, 225, 226, 285013

Juji nawa (crossed ropes) measurement

method, 73,93

Kaga domain: characteristics of, 30—34;

external influences on, 34-35, 220—21;

internal influences io development of,

35-36, 221-29, 234; local initiative and,

35-36,226—27; development of, 40—56,

233—40; early land surveys in, 59—68;

warichi system in, 97,101-11; samu­

rai land tenure in, 98—101; early land

taxation in, 147-67; land tax system in,

151—67; sonmen assessment system and,

152—57,181; villager-samurai tensions

and, 171—91; change to kemi system in,

178—83; pragmatism in administration

of, 189, 225—26; gradualism in his­

tory of, 190, 221-24, *34; "Fifty-eight

Clause Ordioaoce," 195-96; patterns

io development of, 233-40; population

growth in, 262071

Kaga land surveys: io late sixteenth cen­

tury, 59-68,147-48; procedures in,

60,62,66-75,147~5I; evideoce for

central initiative io, 60-61,68,75-76;

format of survey documents, 61—72

passim; measurement units io, 62,66—

67; in early seventeenth century, 68—75,

148-51; policy regulations aod, 71-72;

variations from standard survey model,

75-76

Kaga province: early land surveys of, 60— 
65; Geooa surveys of, 7i~75> 79

Kaisaku bugyo, see Reform magistrate

Kaisaku ho reforms, 251; Cho family and,

46n, 219; class separation aod, 194,

216—17; implementation of, 206—9; 
land tax reform and, 213—15, 217-18;

retainer autooomy aod, 213—15; Kaga

domaio administration aod, 216, 219,

223; role of villagers io, 217, 227; ex­

perimentation and, 224f; failure of

annual inspection system and, 228f

Kaoai Madoka, 15, 281032

Kaoazawa (castle towo), 47,53, 251;

samurai io, 184—87

Kandaka (cash assessmeot) system, 78-79,

251, 266044, 275022

Kan'ei reforms, 198—204

Kasaya Kazuhiko, 140

Katanagari (sword hunts), 13,19, 223,

259046

"Keian surveys,*' 205

Keicho survey, 68-71,151 o

Keirstead, Thomas, 286018

Kemi system. See Annual inspections

Kenchi (land surveys), as term, 59n, 80,

15m. See also Land surveys

Kenchi bucho, see Land survey register

Kenchi bugyo, see Land survey magistrate

Kenchichdy see Land survey register

"Kenchikata Hisho" (manual), 73-75

Kigos^i Ryuzo, i42n, 15m, 157^ 277^5,

283n49

Kimoiri, see Village headman

Kinsei era, n n  , 21 n, 252

Kitajima Masamoto, 10

Kodama Kota, 16

Kogi (public authority), 8,11,54, 226, 236,

131

Kokubu village survey, 61—62 
Kokudaka (rice-based assessment) system,

10,14, 252; role of land surveys in

change to, 15; comprehensiveness of,

17-18, 236; tantori method and, i8n;

effectiveness of, 18-19; compliance

with, 78-79,165,190, 238; negotiation

of domaio value and, 84—87; tax col­

lection and, 165-66; domain initiative

and, 226-27; switch to, and central

authority, 258^1,2601156, 277^1

Kokujin (provincial warriors), 116,134,140, 
252. Set also Local gentry, pre-Maeda; 
Tomura 
Kokumori	 (official yield estimate), 69,

80-82, iji
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Kori (county), 4, 252 
Kori bugyoy see County magistrate 
Kuji (warichi lottery groups), 104, 252 
Kujichi (land subject to warichi redistribu­
tion), 103, 252 
Kumabuchi village, 6zf, io8f 
Kurosawa Akira, 2 
Kuwayaku (plow tax), 173, 205-6, 222, 
252, 2821134 
Kyunin (landed retainers), 252; land rights 
and, 99; administrative rights of, 121, 
141,146, 223-24; concentration in 
castle towns, 123-24; cessation of 
family lines and, 124; autonomy of, 178, 
28in3; tax collection standard and, 178, 
195—96; Kaisaku ho and, 214-15, 217. 
See also Cho family; Retainer fiefs; Tax 
officials 
Labor dues {buyaku),<)\, i n  , 139,177, 250. 
See also Contract labor 
Land desertion, see Runaways 
Land quality, 9; early Kaga surveys and, 
61-62,151,153; Keicho survey and, 69; 
Genna surveys and, 73-74; hatake ori 
procedure, 74; procedural variation and, 
80—81,151; daintyo initiatives and, 84; 
warichi system and, 102-3,108 
Land redistribution system, see Warichi 
system 
Land survey magistrate {kenchi bugyo), 79, 
196, 2j2, 275n7; Kaga surveys and, 62, 
7on, 148 
Land survey register (kenchicho), zjz-y class 
separation and, 15,16—17, 259n46; de­
termination of use rights and, 16-17,76, 
91-92; listing of villager names in, 91, 
108—9; adjustments to data in, 92-93; 
absence of evidence and, 284m 
Land surveys {kenchi), 252; in Sengoku 
age, 3; standard procedures for, 9; class 
separation and, 15,16-17, 20, 223, 
2671164; determination of land tenure 
and, 16-17,76,91,91-94; impact of, 59, 
226, 285ni3; kenchi as term and, 59n, 
80, i52n; use of actual measurements 
in, 67f, 70-71,75f, 82; time required to 
complete, 70; functions of, 75; daintyo 
initiatives and, 83-84; Cho family and, 
100-101; conducted by villages, 105; 
survey process and, 147-48; previous 
year's tax billing and, 160; tax as­
sessment and, 179; "Keian surveys, 
205-6; experimentation and, 224— 
25; pragmatism and, 226; anti-survey 
protests, 227-28, 229, 235, 268n74, 
28404; circumferential survey (mawari 
kenchi) and, 252. See also Kaga land 
surveys; Sashidashi land survey system; 
Taiko kenchi 
Land tax system: conversion to kemi sys­
tem, 9; role of central authority in, 20— 
22,76-88; Kaga survey formats and, 
61—70 passim; unpaid taxes (mishin) 
and, 144,160—63,188; early survey pro­
cess and, 147-51; in sixteenth-century 
Kaga domain, 151-67; measuring box 
(masu) in, i57n; tax billing and, 158­
65, 212; flexibility of Maeda system and, 
160-65,166-67; pledges (ukekoi) and, 
164; forms of payment and, 165-66; 
pragmatism and, 189, 226; experimen­
tation and, 190,198-203, 225, 28on56; 
mura goin and, 212; factors in com­
pliance with, 227—29. See also Annual 
inspections; Taiko kenchi 
Land tenure rights: legal status as villager 
and, 16—17; surveys in determination of, 
16—17,76,91,92—94; usufruct and, 8 9  ­
90; disposability and, 90-91; samurai 
and, 90—91,98f, i n  ; "revolution" in, 
91-92; villager landholding and, 91-92; 
warichi system and, 94—98,101—11; of 
pre-Maeda samurai allied with Maeda 
competitors, 98-99; corporate land 
tenure and, 101—11,112; sale of, under 
warichi system, 108,110-11; inequality 
within villages, 109-11; prohibition 
of sale of land, n o  , 224, 226, 2.84113, 
285n 13; village authority over, 112, 224, 
227, 236; involvement of Maeda in, 
224; double ownership (buntsuke) and, 
262n67. See also Retainer fiefs; Sale of 
land, prohibition of; Warichi system 
Land valuation {taka), 69-70, 253; varia­
tions across regions and, 84-88; changes 
in, 154—55,3Li2r-13; wasteland as per­
centage of assessed value, 155,156—57; 
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taxes as percentage of assessed value, 
155—56. See oho Kandaka system; 
Kokudaka system; Land tax system 
Landed retainers. See Kyunin 
Laws of the Military Houses (Buke sho 
hatto), 8, iz, 14, 24,55, 220, 257nx8, 
2.611165 
Loans to villagers, 176-77, i97f 
Local administration: role of central au­
thority in, 22-24, Z Z I i village leader­
ship and, 139—41; structure of, 175, 
201; involvement of daimyo in, 193, 
265n33; gradual change in, 222-23; 
experimentation and, 225, 234; manuals 
of, 2801156. See also Fuchibyakusho; 
Retainer-villager relationships; Tomura; 
Village headman; Villages 
Local gentry, pre-Maeda: fate of, 90-91, 
118—20; land tenure rights and, 98  ­
99,109—11. See also Fuchibyakusho; 
Kyunin; Tomura 
McClain, James, 30,32,59 
Maeda family: development of Kaga 
domain, 34,39-57; retainer fiefs and, 
40—44, 52,120-24; relations with 
hegemons, 40-51 passim, 166,183-84, 
225-26; Ikko ikki and, 42ft, 47, 98  ­
99,109—10, n6f, i26f, 234; battle of 
Sekigahara and, 51—52; branch fiefs 
and, 55—56; samurai land tenure and, 
98—101; domain administration and, 
116-17,171; early rural administration 
and, 133-46; land tax system of, 151-67; 
administrative initiatives and, 226-27, 
Maeda Mitsutaka, 54^ 195 n 
Maeda Nagatane, 52,53 n 
Maeda Toshiie: development of Kaga 
domain, 40—44; Ikko ikki and, 42ff; 
territorial expansion and, 44—50; land 
surveys and, 65,75,225; reporting of 
domain valuation and, 79, 266n5i; Cho 
family and, 99,119—20; land tenure 
and, 109—10; retainers and, 117-20,141; 
fuchibyakusho and, 126—31; daikan 
and, 142-45; local administration and, 
142—45,225; land tax system and, 15m, 
153,158-64 passim, 187; reforms and, 
195 
Maeda Toshimasa, 51 f 
Maeda Toshinaga: territorial expansion 
and, 48-50; Kaga domain and, 50  ­
52,53; relations with Tokugawa, 51, 
183-84; Etchu land surveys and, 60, 
66; retainers and, 117-18,195, z6^nz6; 
land tax system and, 149, 222; local ad­
ministration and, 171,174-77,189,195, 
" 5 
Maeda Toshitsune: Kaga domain and, 5of, 
52-56; retirement of, 54-56; relations 
with Tokugawa, i84n; administra­
tive policy and, 189; reforms and, 195, 
198, 207, 208-9, "4» « 6  , 218; policy 
experimentation and, 222 
Maeda Tsunanori, 195 n, 207, 218 
Maeda Yasukatsu, 144-45, *7*>n, 274n27 
Magistrate [bugyo), 174-78,198, 250. See 
also County magistrate; Land survey 
magistrate; Reform magistrate 
Malfeasance of office: Bakufu administra­
tive enforcement and, 24; tax officials 
and, 144,197 
Markets, national: rice as medium for tax 
payment and, 187-88,190, 226-27; 
price variations and, 280047 
Marriage alliances, 3,7, 23; Maeda and, 
48-54 passim, 219, 263n24 
Marxist historians, 21 
Mass, Jeffrey P., 284m 
Matsumoto domain, 78,80 
Matsushita Shiro, 30, 267n56 
Mawari kenchi (circumferential survey), 
z$i 
Measurement procedures: use of actual 
measurements, 67f, 70—71, 75f, 82; 
crossed ropes (juji nawa) method, 
73,93; "Kenchikata Hisho" methods, 
73—75; variations in, 79—84; ikenchi 
method, 80; determination of land 
tenure rights and, 92—94; measuring box 
(masu) in, 15711. See also Sashidashi land 
survey system; Standardization 
Measurement units: relationships among, 
xv—xvi'y standardization and, 16,77— 
78,85', 178, 258n34, 266n43, 268n7O; 
Kaga surveys and, 62,66—67,68. See 
also Standardization 
Men: meaning of term, 29,15311 
3o8 Index 
Meyasuba (Inspectorate), 178,198 
Migdal, Joel, 2311,23m 
Migration, rural, 138,145^ See also Run­
aways 
Military activity: territorial acquisition and, 
40—44; village administration and, 65, 
144 
"Minimalist" states, 232 
Mishin (unpaid taxes), 144,160-63, X88 
Miyakawa Mitsuru, 21,159x146 
Mizubayashi Takashi, 14 
Mizucho, see Land survey register 
Moore, Richard, 14011 
Morris, John, 235n, 2811132 
Mountain dry fields, see Dry fields 
Murakiri (boundary clarification), i$z 
Nakamura Kichiji, 10 
Natural disasters, 105-7, *37» 15m 
Nawauchtcho, see Land survey register 
Negotiation: Maeda-Tokugawa relation­
ship and, 50—57, 220; of domain value, 
84-87, 236 
Niikawa county, 69f 
Nishikawa Shunsaku, 2.601151 
Nobunaga, see Oda Nobunaga 
Nominal authority vs. state capability: 
state-society relations and, 25-27, 231­
33, 239-40; Hideyoshi's land surveys 
and, 77—84. See also Central authority 
Nonentry, right of (funyuken)y 3,17-18, 
100,148, 250 
Noto Peninsula: early land surveys of, 42, 
60—65,15Ii Maeda expansion and, 42, 
44-47; Genna surveys of, 71-75, 79; 
fuchibyakusho in, 125,128—29, 272n29; 
land taxation in, 154-57,182, 200-201; 
structure of rural administration in, 201. 
See also Cho family 
Oda Kichinojo, 17911,164116, 2.661151 
Oda Nobunaga: career of, 4—5,6; assassi­
nation of, 5,49; class separation and, 
i9f; Maeda domain and, 40-44, 48—49, 
166; strategy of transfer, 42, 49; early 
Kaga land surveys and, 59,84, 264113; . 
Cho family and, 99,119-20; Ikko ikki 
and, 116,126 
Official yield estimate (kokumari), 69, 
80-82, 252 
Otshi Shinzaburo, 21 n 
Okajima Kazuyoshi (Maeda retainer), 117 
Okinami survey, 61 
Onden (hidden fields), 17,149-50 
Ooms, Herman, 286ni8 
Osaka campaigns, 6, 40,53 
Oshimizu, districts of, 135-36 
Paddy, 9,74, 26903. See also Fields; Land 
quality 
Personalistic ties, 23 n, 46f, 230—31 
Plow tax (kuwayaku), 222, 252, 2821134; 
status as village member and, 173, 205-6 
Policy implementation, time required for, 
185, 238 
Politics: and variations in land valuation, 
84-87 
Popkin, Samuel L., 2701119 
"Potted plant daimyo>n 6, 40, 42,115,116 
Pragmatism: in domain administration, 189, 
225—26 
Provincial warriors {kokujin), 116,134,140, 
252. See also Local gentry, pre-Maeda; 
Tomura 
Public authority {kogi), 8, 252; concept of, 
11,54,226,236 
Reclaimed lands (shinden), 137,150,156, 
252, 275n3, 276n29, 277^4 
Reform magistrate (kaisaku bugyo), 207­
10,216, 223, 225, 251,281 n7 
Reforms, see Kaisaku ho reforms; Kan'ei 
reforms 
Reischauer, Edwin, 256022 
Retainer bands, 20,46,53,118—20,192, 220 
Retainer fiefs {chigyo), 250; right of non-
entry (furiyuken) and, 3,17—18,100, 
148, 250; domain centralization and, 
120—21; retainer-villager relationships 
and, 120—24, Z37; redistribution of fiefs 
and, 123f, i93n, 202,237; distinguished 
from grants to fuchibyakusho^ 126,127— 
28; land tax system and, 186—87, 211; 
Kaisaku ho reforms and, 211,213 f 
Retainer-villager relationships: retainer 
fief grants and, 120-24; tensions and, 
121,176,192, 213-14, 222, 234-35; 
fuchibyakusho and, 129-32 passim; 
magistrates and, 176-77,178 
Retainers: early attempts to control, 3, 
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1711116; right of non-entry (funyuken) 
and, 3,17-18,100,148, 236, 250% 
Maeda family and, 117-20,141,195, 
2.631126; collection of taxes by, 120— 
21, 2821127; Maeda control of, 120-24, 
220-21, 263026; assessed land value 
and, 281113. See also Immigrant retain­
ers; Kyunin; Retainer band; Retainer 
fiefs; Samurai 
Rice-based assessment system, see Koku­
daka system 
Rozman, Gilbert, 2i8n 
Rule, John, 230—31 
Runaways: district administration and, 
137-38,173-74* 176; wasteland vs. 
abandoned land and, 15m, 2761136; 
wasteland surveys and, 159-60; village 
responsibility for, 173, 2781114; "lazy 
farmers" and, 205—6; regulations on, 
2801139. See also Migration, rural 
Rural protests (hyakusbo ikki), 116,190­
91,206, 251; resistance to tax demands, 
167,184,190—91, 2801139; anti-survey 
protests, 227-28, 229, 235, 268n74, 
28404. See also Ikki 
Russian military service class, 229-30 
Sakai (city), 3 
Sakai Seiichi, i99n, 2651119 
Sale of land, prohibition of, n o  , 224, 226, 
28403,285 n 13 
Sale of people, 95, 226. See also Contract 
labor 
Samurai, 2, 8,88; land rights and, 90— 
91,98 f, i n  ; gradual changes in status 
of, 172-73, 222ff. See also Daikan; 
Fuchibyakusho; Immigrant retainers; 
Kyunin; Local gentry, pre-Maeda; 
Reform magistrate; Retainer-villager 
relationships; Retainers; Tomura 
Samurai urbanization, 4,8,2801140; daitnyo 
initiatives and, 20; failure of annual 
inspection system and, 184-85, 228; 
samurai income and, 197; class separa­
tion and, 222, 2591149; gradualism and, 
222 
Sankin-kotai (alternate attendance) system, 
8,23,252,256ml 
Sansom, George, i2f, 15 f 
Sasaki Junnosuke, 16-17, *o, 2i8n, 264114, 
2801147 
Sashidashi land survey system, 15,80,252, 
264mo, 265 n 19 
Sassa Narimasa, 43-44,152; Maeda family 
and, 47-48,49,127 
Satsuma domain, 23,79,86,94,115-16, 
235^ 238 
Scott, James, 94 
Sekigahara, battle of, 5, 40,51-52 
Sendai domain, 115-16 
Sengoku era, 1-4,9,19, 252. See also 
Kandaka system 
Senior councillors (toshiyori), 171,196 
Shinden (reclaimed land), 137,150,156, 252, 
±7Snh 276n29, 277^4 
Shogun, office of, 7. See also Hegemons 
Shoken Hyozaemon, 85 
Slash-and-burn agriculture, 27504 
Smith, Thomas C  , 32, 26on5i, 283n53 
56, see Villages 
Sonmen assessment system, 152—57,166, 
225, 252 
Standardization: Hideyoshi survey proce­
dures and, 15-16,82-84, 236» 268070, 
285 n 13; early Kaga survey procedures 
and, 60,62,66—68; domain compliance 
with, 76-84, 221, 268n74; Tokugawa 
survey procedures and, 87; land taxa­
tion experimentation and, 225; prior to 
Hideyoshi, 268n7o. See also Measure­
ment units 
State: defined, n n 
State-building, n -14  , 23—24. See also 
Central authority 
State-society relations: and nominal au­
thority vs. state capability, 25-27, 
*3i-33> 2.39-4O 
Stipend (fuchi), 46,125,128,148-49, 2.50 
Stipended peasants, see Fuchibyakusho 
Strayer, Joseph, 256022 
Strong state-weak state dichotomy, 25—27 
Survey procedures: standardization of, 
under Hideyoshi, 15-16,82—84, Z3^> 
268070, 269077, 285n 13; in early 
Kaga. surveys, 60—70 passim, 147-51; 
standardization of, and Tokugawa, 87 
Susser, Bernard, i3n, 258034 
Sword hunts (katanagari), 13,19, 223, 
259^6 
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Tagawa Shoichi, i5xn, 154 
Taiko kenchi (Hideyoshi land surveys), 
252; central authority and, 13,14­
19,58, 2.36; basic consequences of, 
15; precision as characteristic of, 15­
16,6511,76, Z641110; standardization 
of survey procedures and, 15-16,82­
84,86, 236, 268n7o, 269n77, 285ni3; 
determination of land rights and, 16­
17; principle of non-entry and, 17-18; 
local administration and, 22-23; format 
of Kaga survey documents and, 6 1  ­
65; compliance with, 76-84; factors in 
variation and, 84-88; time required for 
implementation of, 238 
Taka, see Land valuation 
Takamochi hyakusho (class of villager), 
102, is3 
Takashimaya (merchant), i87f 
Takayanagi Mitsutoshi, 27on6 
Takazawa Yuichi, i54n, i57n, 277^2, 
Takeda Shingen, 2 
Takeuchi Rizo, 27on6 
Takeyasu Shigeji, 21, 2.601151 
Tantori method, i8n 
Tax assessment procedures, see Domen 
system; Jomen system; Kandaka system; 
Kokudaka system; Sonmen assessment 
system 
Tax collection: early procedures for, 4; 
fuchibyakusho and, 137; forms of pay­
ment and, 165-66; annual inspection 
system and, 181-82 
Tax contract {hyakusho uke), 4, 20,134, 
Tax forgiveness, 161—64 
Tax officials: abuse of office and, 143-44, 
178,189,197, 216; restraints on, 174­
78,189,195, 216, 222f. See also Daikan; 
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